Zusammenfassung In Deutschland verlangt das Transplantationsgesetz die Zuteilung von postmortal gespendeten Organen nach den Kriterien der Dringlichkeit und der Erfolgsaussicht. Der herrschenden Auffassung zufolge darf die Erfolgsaussicht hierbei jedoch lediglich den Charakter einer Minimalnutzenschwelle annehmen. Eine darüber hinausgehende Gewichtung von Erfolgsaussichten soll zudem nicht mit der Lebenswertindifferenzkonzeption des Bundesverfassungsgerichts zu vereinbaren sein, die aus dem Gleichheitsgrundsatz sowie aus der Menschenwürde abgeleitet wird. Gerhard Dannecker argumentiert, diese im juristischen Schrifttum überwiegend vertretene Auffassung sei weniger zwingend, als es auf den (...) ersten Blick scheinen mag. Seiner Auffassung zufolge lässt sich aus der Lebensschutzgarantie in Artikel 2 der Verfassung eine Pflicht ableiten, die vorhandenen Ressourcen möglichst effektiv einzusetzen. Zwar dürfe Effizienz hier tatsächlich nicht bedeuten, dass die Funktionsdauer der vorhandenen Organe über das Gesamtkollektiv aller Patienten hinweg utilitaristisch zu maximieren sei - eine Pflicht zur Rettung einer möglichst großen Anzahl an Menschen lässt sich ihres Erachtens jedoch durchaus rechtfertigen. (shrink)

This paper supplements an earlier one (Wassermann 1978b). Its views aim to reinforce those of Lewontin and other prominent evolutionists, but differ significantly from the opinions of some philosophers of science, notably Popper (1957) and Olding (1978). A basic distinction is made between 'laws' and 'theories of mechanisms'. The 'Theory of Evolution' is not characterized by laws, but is viewed here as a hypertheory which explains classifiable evolutionary phenomena in terms of subordinate classifiable theories of 'evolution-specific mechanisms' (ESMs), each of (...) which could apply to a host of species. Adaptations could result from ESMs that are rooted in molecular complementarities. The status of optimization theories that aim to predict best adapted states of organisms or populations is also discussed. (shrink)

Nonmonotonic reasoning in its broadest sense is reasoning to conclusions on the basis of incomplete information. Given more information, previously drawn inferences may be retracted. Commonsense reasoning has a nonmonotonic component; it has been argued that almost all commonsense inferences are of this sort. From the end of the 1980s to the present there has been an explosion in research in nonmonotonic reasoning. It is now possible to understand more clearly the properties of the major formalisms from a metatheoretical point (...) of view, the relationships among the formalisms and their connection to independently developed proof methods. The goal of this monograph is to make this understanding more accessible. (shrink)

Les divers points de vue relatifs au concept mathématique de l’infini sont ordonnés en série croissante d’après le degré où l’on reconnaît ce concept en ses diverses complications. Cette série est divisée en trois groupes : la mathématique du fini, la « conception constructive », et la « conception en soi » de l’infini. D’après cette série, l’on explique le programme d"Hilbert, qui est de prouver que la mathématique est libre de contradiction, et l’on rapporte brièvement les méthodes qui sont (...) en question pour administrer cette preuve. (shrink)

Ob “nicht etwa eine vernünftigere Anordnung von Kreisen zu finden sei, von welchen alle erscheinende Ungleichmäßigkeit abhinge”, ist die Frage, die Copernicus umtreibt. Eine einheitliche, eine systematische Berechnung aller Planetenbewegungen – auch der der sogenannten irrenden Sterne – sucht Copernicus durch die Einführung einer Hypothese, die über eine bloß mathematische Annahme hinausgeht, zu begründen. Die Erkenntnis der einheitlichen Weltgestalt und des festen Ebenmaßes ihrer Teile hat die Annahme eines die systematische Einheit konstituierenden Prinzips zur Voraussetzung. Als dieses Prinzip versteht Copernicus (...) die Erdbewegung. So schließt Copernicus, daß entweder die Erde nicht ruhe oder eine vernünftige Ordnung der Planeten nicht zu begründen sei. Für Bruno und Schelling ist das Prinzip zur Ordnung des Universums keine mathematische Hypothese, sondern ein naturphilosophisches Prinzip. Schelling schließt sich Bruno in der Behauptung an, daß eine Ordnung nur unter der Voraussetzung möglich sei, daß das Subjekt wie das Objekt der Ordnung sich auf ein Prinzip zurückführen ließen. Damit droht die Kopernikanische Wende auf den Kopf gestellt zu werden. (shrink)

This paper contributes to the clarification of the concept of “typicality” discussed in contemporary philosophy of physics by conceiving the nomological status of a typical behaviour such as that expressed in the Second Law of Thermodynamics as a “minutis rectis law”. A brief sketch of the discovery of “typicality” shows that there were ideas of typical behaviour not only in physics but also in sociology. On this basis and in analogy to the Second Law of Thermodynamics, it is shown that (...) the nomological status of sociological laws such as Gresham’s Law can also be conceived as “minutis rectis laws”. (shrink)

The main thesis of the article is that one’s responsibility to render assistance is not affected by having contributed to the situation by causing harm. I examine ways in which contribution to need is morally significant. Although contribution is relevant with regard to certain features, such as questions of blame, compensation, and fair distribution of the cost of assistance, I argue that contribution should carry no weight when assessing our duty to assist people in severe need if we can do (...) so at little cost. If this is true we have reason to suspect that it is redundant to know whether or not we have in fact contributed to the need of the global poor when assessing our duty to address global poverty. (shrink)

Wer hat sich nicht schon gefragt, was es mit unseren moralischen Überzeugungen auf sich hat: Spiegeln diese die Wahrheit in Sachen Moral wieder? Gibt es eine solche Wahrheit überhaupt? Oder sind moralische Überzeugungen eher das Produkt unserer Interessen und Neigungen, Ausdruck unserer Wünsche oder Mittel der Machtausübung, das bloße Ergebnis unserer Erziehung, unseres sozialen Umfelds oder gar eine List der Evolution? Ist es eine Illusion, wenn man glaubt, echte moralische Erkenntnisse gewinnen zu können? Kurzum: Kann die Moral Objektivität beanspruchen? Die (...) vorliegende Arbeit versucht, eine Antwort auf diese zentrale Frage der Metaethik zu geben. Dazu wird zunächst gezeigt, dass uns der Status der Moral ein Rätsel ist, weil wir dazu neigen, drei Thesen für wahr zu halten, die nicht zugleich wahr sein können. Die drei prinzipiell möglichen Strategien zur Auflösung dieses Trilemmas geraten jedoch in Schwierigkeiten, weil es bisher nicht gelungen ist, ein passendes Vergleichsobjekt für die Moral zu finden. In dieser Arbeit wird dafür argumentiert, dass die Moral in genau der gleichen Weise wie die Wissenschaft Objektivität beanspruchen kann. (shrink)

English summary: Johann Gottfried Herder played a central role in the emergence of aesthetics and art history in the eighteenth century. His was not only an avid reader and critic of important contemporaries, but also made essential contributions to the possibilities of art and art theory. This volume is illuminated by contemporary art discussion and the many facets of debate around Herder and the emergence of aesthetics and art history, from his early writings in the 1760s and 70s, to this (...) later works. French description: Johann Gottfried Herder spielt eine zentrale Rolle fur die Entstehung der Asthetik und der Kunstgeschichte, die beide zu den grundlegenden geistesgeschichtlichen Neuerungen des 18. Jahrhunderts gehoren. Er war nicht nur ein aufmerksamer Leser und Kritiker der wichtigsten Autoren, die sich mit dieser Materie befassten, wie etwa Winckelmann, Lessing oder Baumgarten, sondern hat selbst grundlegende und umfassende Beitrage geschrieben, die immer wieder aufs Neue die Moglichkeiten und Grenzen der Kunst, der Kunstwahrnehmung und der Kunsttheorie ausloten. Der hier vorgelegte Band leuchtet vor dem Hintergrund der zeitgenossischen Kunstdiskussionen die vielen Facetten der Auseinandersetzung Herders mit der entstehenden Asthetik und Kunstgeschichte aus, beginnend mit seinen Schriften, Kritische Walder' und, Plastik' aus den 1760er und 1770er Jahren bis hin zu seinen spateren Werken. (shrink)

Gerhard Richter's groundbreaking study argues that the concept of "afterness" is a key figure in the thought and aesthetics of modernity. It pursues questions such as: What does it mean for something to "follow" something else? Does that which follows mark a clear break with what came before it, or does it in fact tacitly perpetuate its predecessor as a consequence of its inevitable indebtedness to the terms and conditions of that from which it claims to have departed? Indeed, (...) is not the very act of breaking with, and then following upon, a way of retroactively constructing and fortifying that from which the break that set the movement of following into motion had occurred? The book explores the concept and movement of afterness as a privileged yet uncanny category through close readings of writers such as Kant, Kafka, Heidegger, Bloch, Benjamin, Brecht, Adorno, Arendt, Lyotard, and Derrida. It shows how the vexed concepts of afterness, following, and coming after shed new light on a constellation of modern preoccupations, including personal and cultural memory, translation, photography, hope, and the historical and conceptual specificity of what has been termed "after Auschwitz." The study's various analyses—across a heterogeneous collection of modern writers and thinkers, diverse historical moments of articulation, and a range of media—conspire to illuminate Lyotard's apodictic statement that "after philosophy comes philosophy. But it has been altered by the 'after.'" As Richter's intricate study demonstrates, much hinges on our interpretation of the "after." After all, our most fundamental assumptions concerning modern aesthetic representation, conceptual discourse, community, subjectivity, and politics are at stake. (shrink)

Scientific knowledge should not only be true, it should be as objective as possible. It should refer to a reality independent of any subject. What can we use as a criterion of objectivity? Intersubjectivity (i.e., intersubjective understandability and intersubjective testability) is necessary, but not sufficient. Other criteria are: independence of reference system, independence of method, non-conventionality. Is there some common trait? Yes, there is: invariance under some specified transformations. Thus, we say: A proposition is objective only if its truth is (...) invariant against a change in the conditions under which it was formulated. We give illustrations from geometry, perception, neurobiology, relativity theory, and quantum theory. Such an objectivist position has many advantages. (shrink)

By advocating an enlightened method of theorizing committed to thinking in terms of a system of differences, Luhmann has contributed to the development of sociology in a manner that cannot be praised enough. Nonetheless, he does not succeed in giving an account of his own position that satisfies the very logical preconditions that he himself has formulated for it. Instead, his systems theory paradigm of sociology is based on metaphysical premises characteristic of the identity-logical thought of "Old Europe." In fact, (...) the only way to make Luh mann's approach truly comprehensible is to reconstruct it as a new version of Hegel's dialectic. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Religion a Threat to Morality: An Attempt to Throw Some New Light on Hume's Philosophy of Religion* Gerhard Streminger At the beginning ofhis Natural History ofReligion Hume writes that two questions in particular... challenge our attention, to wit, that concerning its foundation in reason, and that concerning its origin in human nature. The first challenge is taken up by Hume in the Dialogues ConcerningNatural Religion, and the second (...) in hisNatural History ofReligion. In this paper I will try to show that there is a third fundamental problem discussed by Hume with regard to religion, namely its relationship to and influence on morality. Although he never wrote on this topic in as systematic a way as on the above-mentioned two questions inparticular, I am convinced that his thoughts about it were not just casual. The passages in Hume relevant to this third central question about religion are to be found in "Of Superstition and Enthusiasm," in Essays Moral, Political, and Literary; in section 11 ofAn Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding; in Appendix 4 and "A Dialogue," in An Enquiry Concerning the Principles ofMorals; in the History ofEngland; in Part XII of the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion ; and, in particular, in the Natural History ofReligion. Why Hume never wrote about the relationship between religion and morality in a more systematic way is not entirely clear. He may have decided not to provoke the orthodox any further than he already had. That Hume changed the title ofsection 11 ofhis first Enquiry from the original "Of the Practical Consequences of Natural Religion" to the rather non-committal "Of a Particular Providence and of a Future State" may support this conjecture. Before going into more detail as to Hume's view on the relationship between religion and morality, I want to make a few remarks about Hume's opinion of religion in general. Hume made a distinction between one 'true' and two forms of 'false' religion. His most explicit description of true religion is to be found in a preface to the second volume of his History ofEngland: Volume XV Number 2 277 GERHARD STREMINGER Theproper Office ofReligion, Hume wrote in terms which have a Quakerish flavour, is to reform Men's Lives, to purify their Hearts, to inforce all moralDuties, & to secure Obedience to the Laws & civil Magistrate. While it pursues these useful Purposes, its Operations, tho' infinitely valuable, are secret & silent; andseldom come under the Cognizance ofHistory... The Idea ofan Infinite Mind, the Author ofthe Universe seems... to require a Worship absolutely pure, simple, unadorned; without Rites, Institutions, Ceremonies; even without Temples, Priests, or verbal Prayer & Supplication. This preface, however, was not printed in the words quoted above. Instead it was reduced by Hume to a footnote at the end of the second volume of his History of England in a shortened and toned-down version. Even this footnote was removed in later editions ofthe History ofEngland. But in the Dialogues Hume repeated his idea of the effect of true religion on morality almost verbatim: The proper office of religion is to regulate the heart of men, humanize their conduct, infuse the spirit oftemperance, order, and obedience; and as its operation is silent, and only enforces the motives of mortality and justice, it is in danger of being overlooked, and confounded with these other motives. This form ofreligion, however, although without anypernicious consequences with regard to society (D 223), is extremely rare. Religion, as it has commonly been found in the world (D 223), is a threat to morality. The corruptions of true religion, namely superstition and enthusiasm, are the popular forms of religious worship. Whenever Hume talks about religion without qualifications, he has this false religion in mind. Coming back to my original thesis, Hume, I think, sees three main negative influences of false religion: (1) The clergy has an interest in setting bounds to human knowledge; (2) The God offalse religion is no moral authority; (3) False religion corrupts the natural moral sentiments and promotes an 'artificial, affected' life. I. False Religion and Human Knowledge To see the force of Hume's argument concerning the threat of false religion to morality, one has to take into account some general assumptions of Hume... (shrink)

Ecological objectives in environmental reports usually promise a high degree of environmental responsibilities in a company’s activities. Several studies have already highlighted that most companies do not keep their promises since stakeholders’ expectations and a company’s capabilities for internal adjustments do not always match. Thus, a company might use strategic reporting in order not to endanger its legitimacy. However, no study so far has demonstrated how companies use different legitimacy strategies in reporting their environmental objectives over time. To achieve this (...) in our study, we focus primarily on findings from legitimacy theory in combination with the legitimacy strategies suggested by Lindblom Social and environmental accounting: developing the field, Sage, Los Angeles, pp 51–63, 2010). To test our theoretical framework empirically, we analyze 260 corporate environmental reports of German DAX companies between the years 2000–2014 by coding all disclosed objectives within these reports. Based on this longitudinal approach, we are able to identify reporting patterns of the different companies that provide insights into those companies’ environmental reporting legitimacy strategies. Overall, this study contributes to research on voluntary disclosure by showing that a comprehensive analysis of the reporting pattern of disclosed objectives allows the identification of certain legitimacy strategies. (shrink)

The 14th Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science will be held on July 19-26, 2011, in Nancy, France . In order to provide some historical background about DLMPS Congresses, we are honoured to have the opportunity to reissue a chapter of Anita Burdman Feferman and Solomon Feferman's Alfred Tarski : Life and Logic, dedicated to the early history of the DLMPS and the organization of the first Congress held in 1960 in Stanford. We are very grateful to the (...) authors and the Cambridge University Press for their kind authorization to reissue this text. (shrink)

Im Zentrum der Hauptform des metaethischen Relativismus steht eine kontextualistische Analyse der Bedeutung moralischer Aussagen. Gegen diese Analyse lassen sich jedoch bestimmte sprachliche Beobachtungen anführen, die der Relativist erklären muss, wenn er an seiner Theorie festhalten möchte. In diesem Aufsatz argumentiere ich für die These, dass keiner dieser Erklärungsversuche gelingt. Wir betrachten, wie sich zeigt, moralische Aussagen als weder in offensichtlicher noch in versteckter Weise kontextsensitiv. Damit gerät aber der Relativismus als metaethische Position überhaupt in ernsthafte Bedrängnis.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:A Reply to Ellin Gerhard Streminger Professor Ellin's very interesting and stimulating comments may be summarized in the following four points: 1. Hume's opposition to religion is even more far-reaching than I had acknowledged, since there is "no evidence" that any form of 'true religion' is to be found in Hume. According to Ellin, the discussion on 'religion and morality' in the second halfofPart XII ofthe Dialogues is (...) "not about true religion at all," since by using the term 'true religion' Philo means nothing but philosophy ("being whatever reason can tell us about the question ofthe originofthe universe") and morality("being the set ofprinciples ultimately founded on inclination and the natural motives of justice and benevolence"). Therefore, "there are not four things: philosophy, morality, true religion, and false religion; but only three," and my remarks on 'true religion' are "a distortion of Hume's views, based on a misreading of Hume's text." I will try to show that there are slightly more things in Hume than 'empirical philosophy, morality and false religion' by collecting some relevant passages in Part XII ofthe Dialogues.1 Philo: But in proportion to my veneration for true religion, is my abhorrence ofvulgar superstitions. (D 219) Cleanthes: Theproper office ofreligion is to regulate the heart ofmen, humanize theirconduct, infuse the spiritoftemperance, order, and obedience; and as its operation is silent, and only enforces the motives ofmortality andjustice, it is in danger of being overlooked, and confounded with these other motives. When it distinguishes itself, and acts as a separate principle over men, it has departed from its proper sphere, and has become only a cover to faction and ambition. (D 220) Philo: And so will all religion... except the philosophical and rational kind. (D 220) Philo: the vulgar... are utterly incapable ofso pure a religion as represents the Deity to be pleased with nothing but virtue in human behaviour. The recommendations to the Divinity are generally supposed to be either frivohus observances, or rapturous ecstasies, or a bigoted credulity... Amongst ourselves, Volume XV Number 2 301 GERHARD STREMINGER some have beenguilty ofthat atrociousness... ofdeclaiming, in express terms, against morality, and representing it as a sure forfeiture ofthe divine favour. (D 221-2) Philo: True religion, Iallow, has no suchpernicious consequences : But we must treat ofreligion, as it has commonly [Editor: commonly for always] been found in the world. (D 223) Cleanthes: Take care, PHILO... take care: Push not matters too far:Allow not your zeal against false religion to undermine your veneration for the true... The most agreeable reflection, which it is possible for human imagination to suggest, is that ofgenuine theism, which represents us as the workmanship of a Being perfectlygood, wise, andpowerful. (D 224) Philo: These appearances... are most engaging and alluring; and with regard to the true philosopher, they are more than appearances. (D 224) Philo: These fine models of religion are the mere product of philosophy. (D 225) Philo: It is an absurdity to believe that the Deity has human passions, and one ofthe lowest of human passions, a restless appetite for applause. It is an inconsistency to believe, that, since theDeity has this humanpassion, he has not others also; and, in particular, a disregard to the opinions ofcreatures so much inferior. (D 226) Philo: To know God, says Seneca, is to worship him. All other worship is indeed absurd, superstitious, and even impious... Yet is this impiety the smallest ofwhich superstition is guilty. Commonly, it depresses the Deityfar below the condition ofmankind; and represents him as a capricious Daemon, who exercises hispower without reason and without humanity! [But] philosophical theists... entertain, or rather indeed endeavour to entertain, suitable notions ofhis divine perfections. (D 226-7) I believe that these passages reveal a semi-serious discussion between Philo and Cleanthes on 'true religion' (after Demea, the orthodox, is gone), and if one adds to this collection other passages in Hume's work, it seems to be probable that there is a form of religion Hume considered to be worthy of being called 'true' (although he did 302Hume Studies A REPLY TO ELLIN not adhere to it). With some reservations, 'true religion' may be characterized in the following way... (shrink)

I explain the asymmetry between innocent aggressors and their victims, and attempt to separate justified and unjustified defensive force when both parties are innocent. I propose the principle of initiating behaviour, which states that: ‘In order for one person to be justified in using defensive force the other party must initiate the apparently threatening behaviour, but the defendant’s interpretation of that behaviour, as being threatening, would have to be reasonable.’ We can thereby maintain the view that there is a significant (...) relation between an act being justified and which party ought eventually to be given priority in a conflict situation. If we know that an act is justified, we know that we have to give preference to its agent when there is a choice between imposing equal harm on him or her and his or her victim. (shrink)

It is shown that the evolution of physics canin several regards be described by elements of``regression'', i.e., that within a certaintradition of ideas one begins with theconstruction of most ``plausible'' statements(axioms) at hand, and then ``works onselfbackwards'' with respect to developmental terms.As a consequence of this strategy, the furtherwork proceeds along such a ``regressive'' path,the more one arrives at concepts andrelationships which are unexpected or evencounter-intuitive in terms of our everydayexperiences. However, a comparable phenomenology is wellknown from studies on states (...) of consciousness.In particular, the evolutionary logic of theconstructions of major ``cognitive invariances''in physics, which is in part due to everincreasing rates of data processing, ismirrored in a logic of states of consciousnesswhich deviate from a ``normal'' state of dailyroutine along increasing levels of centralnervous arousal. Examples are given from the evolution ofphysics, and future perspectives are brieflyoutlined on the basis thereof. (shrink)

As an introduction to the plenary session “Metaphysics and Aesthetics” in my article I try to describe the state of philosophy of art today and give an outlook to its future development. In the last century analytical philosophy of art has been occupied with the following four questions: What is the essence of art? What is the ontological status of works of art? What are aesthetic qualities and how do we come to know them? Have aesthetic value judgments objective validity? (...) In the first step I explain why analytical philosophy of art failed to answer these questions and what this failure has to do with the end of art. In the second step I attempt to give a definition of art myself which allows to show that this failure and the end of art were inevitable. Finally I try—as a consequence—to define the general features of the art of the future. (shrink)

A philosophical position may be characterized in different ways. Here we try to say how the naturalist answers certain . The questions come from very different areas; the spectrum of subjects is therefore quite mixed. There are, however, aspects of order: We start with (questions about) abstract subjects like logic, mathematics, metaphysics, then turn to problems of realism. And since in general naturalists are realists, the following questions on truth, laws of nature, origin of the universe, cosmology, evolution, body-mind-problem, freedom (...) of the will, religion, moral, and pseudoscience, are answered against a realistic background. German Eine philosophische Haltung kann man auf verschiedene Weisen charakterisieren. Hier versuchen wir zu sagen, wie der Naturalist auf bestimmte Kernfragen antwortet. Die Fragen stammen aus sehr verschiedenen Gebieten; das Themenspektrum ist deshalb recht bunt. Es gibt aber durchaus Ordnungsgesichtspunkte: Wir beginnen mit (Fragen zu) eher abstrakten Gegenständen wie Logik, Mathematik, Metaphysik, kommen dann zu Problemen des Realismus. Und da Naturalisten im Allgemeinen Realisten sind, werden die anschließenden Fragen über Wahrheit, Naturgesetze, Weltentstehung, Kosmologie, Evolution, Leib-Seele-Problem, Willensfreiheit, Religion, Moral und Pseudowissenschaften vor einem realistischen Hintergrund beantwortet. (shrink)

Eine "rein" philosophische - Ethik lässt zu viele Probleme ungelöst. Oie wenigen formalnen Bedingungen, die sich transzendentalphilosophisch, transzendéntalpragmatisch oder konstruktivistisch gewinnen lassen, reichen bei weitem nicht aus, um uns zu praktischen Handlungsanweisungen zu verhelfen. In die ser Situationistes wohl einen Versucht wert, sich auf die anthropologischen und damit letztlich biologischen Grundlagen der Ethik zu besinnen, lässtsich der "Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie" eine "Evolutionäre Ethik” an die Seitestellen? Oder ist ein solches Unternehmen von vornherein zum Scheitern verurteilt? In diesem Beitrag werden Absichtund Besonderheit (...) des evolutionären Ansatzes charakterisiert, wird der mögliche Beitrag der Soziöbiologie zur Ethik skizziert und werden die Einwände geprüft, die gegen eine solche Evolutionäre Ethik vorgerbracht werden (obwohl sie noch gar nicht existiert). (shrink)

The internet has been discussed as a major agent of change for political communication and participation. One important dimension of possible effects is the influence of online communication on the participation habits of citizens. In this article, panel survey data from Germany that cover almost the first decade of this century are used in order to test causal hypotheses about this transformation process. The results highlight that new forms of political communication are mainly a complement to existing forms with few (...) substitution effects. Additionally, the data demonstrate the strong role habitualization plays, particularly in the field of political information seeking and traditional forms of political discussion and participation, while online communication is still evolving with yet less fixed patterns of action. (shrink)