As the work of thinkers such as Michel Foucault, François Jacob, Louis Althusser, and Pierre Bourdieu demonstrates, Georges Canguilhem has exerted tremendous influence on the philosophy of science and French philosophy more generally. In Knowledge of Life, a book that spans twenty years of his essays and lectures, Canguilhem offers a series of epistemological histories that seek to establish and clarify the stakes, ambiguities, and emergence of philosophical and biological concepts that defined the rise of modern biology. How do (...) transformations in biology and modern medicine shape conceptions of life? How do philosophical concepts feed into biological ideas and experimental practices, and how are they themselves transformed? How does knowledge "undo the experience of life so as to help man remake what life has made without him, in him or outside of him?" Knowledge of Life is Canguilhem's effort to explain how the movements of knowledge and life come to rest upon each other. Published at the dawn of the genetic revolution and still pertinent today, the book tackles the history of cell theory, the conceptual moves toward and away from mechanical understandings of the organism, the persistence of vitalism, and the nature of normality in science and its objects. (shrink)

Georges Rey presents a much-needed philosophical defense of Noam Chomsky's famous view of human language, as an internal, innate computational system. But he also offers a critical examination of problematic developments of this view, to do with innateness, ontology, intentionality, and other issues of interdisciplinary interest.

This paper examines the work of Nāgārjuna as interpreted by later Madhyamaka tradition, including the Tibetan Buddhist Tsongkhapa (1357–1419). It situates Madhyamaka skepticism in the context of Buddhist philosophy, Indian philosophy more generally, and Western equivalents. Find it broadly akin to Pyrrhonism, it argues that Madhyamaka skepticism still differs from its Greek equivalents in fundamental methodologies. Focusing on key hermeneutical principles like the two truths and those motivating the Svātantrika/Prāsaṅgika schism (i.e., whether followers of Nāgārjuna should offer positive arguments or (...) should proceed on a purely “negative” basis), it argues that the Svātantrika commitment to mere conventional practice is robust and allows for a skepticism consistent with the scientific practices we must take seriously in the modern world. These findings are put forth as an illustration of what the Western tradition might gain by better understanding of non-Western philosophy. (shrink)

“Intentional content,” as I understand it, is whatever serves as the object of “propositional” attitude verbs, such as “think,” “judge,” “represent,” “prefer” (whether or not these objects are “propositions”). These verbs are standardly used to pick out the intentional states invoked to explain the states and behavior of people and many animals. I shall take the “normativity of the intentional,” or “Normativism,” to be the claim that any adequate theory of intentional states involves considerations of value not essentially involved in (...) the natural sciences. Thus, according to Normativism, whether or not someone thinks that fish sleep, or even can represent fish at all, depends upon making a judgment about the person’s goodness or rationality, of a sort that would not be involved in merely determining whether or not fish in fact sleep. (shrink)

Avant-propos.--Saint Thomas d'Aquin, sa mission intellectuelle.--Saint Augustin, éducateur idéal.--La physionomie de Saint Français d'Assise.--Un grand coeur, Saint Albert le Grand.--Les thomistes et saint Augustin.

According to the “Folieism” I have been recently defending, communication is a kind of folie à deux in which speakers and hearers enjoy a stable and innocuous illusion of producing and hearing standard linguistic entities (“SLE”s) that are seldom if ever actually produced. In the present paper, after summarizing the main points of the view, I defend it against efforts of Barber, Devitt and Miščević to rescue SLEs in terms of social, response-dependent proposals. I argue that their underlying error is (...) a failure to appreciate the important shift of the explanatory locus in modern linguistics, from external objects to internal conceptions. I go on to show how (i) pace Devitt, this shift is entirely compatible with there being conventional aspects to language, and also serves to distinguish the ease of natural language from the waggle dance of the bees; and (ii) pace Barber and Smith, it is compatible with an appearance / reality distinction, and with reliance on testimony in epistemology. I conclude with further arguments about why, pace Collins and Matthews, intentionality is a crucial feature of linguistic explanation, even if it is ultimately spelt out largely in terms of computational role. (shrink)

Kant's masterpiece, Critique of Pure Reason, is universally recognized to be among the most difficult of all philosophical writing, and yet it is required reading in almost every course that covers modern philosophy. Most students find Critique of Pure Reason impenetrable without the help of secondary sources. While there are numerous advanced scholarly works on the topic, Dicker's is the first treatment explicitly designed for undergraduates to read alongside the primary text, rendering Kant's views accessible without oversimplifying them. His book (...) will be useful to both undergraduate and graduate students tackling this notoriously difficult yet highly influential thinker in courses in modern philosophy, epistemology, and Kant. (shrink)

The author of this major study compares the significantly different approaches to business ethics on both sides of the Atlantic and considers what they have to learn from each other. He has considerable experience of business ethics in both Europe and North America, having taught and researched the subject at the University of St Gallen in his native Switzerland before his appointment as Professor of International Business Ethics in the College of Business Administration, University of Notre Dame, Indiana 46556, USA. (...) Professor Enderle was also the founding Honorary Treasurer of the European Business Ethics Network and is an Associate Editor of this Review. (shrink)

A searing personal record of spiritual and communal crisis, wherein the death of god announces the beginning of friendship.

I. L’unité fonctionnelle se définit par une synergie s’étendant à des corrélations de plus en plus complexes : elle dépend soit des mécanismes du système nerveux, soit des sécrétions internes, soit de la corrélation des organes.II. L’unité mentale est la systématisation consciente et réfléchie des représentations ; ‘dans bien des cas, elle dépend de processus sensori-moteurs ; dans le cas des idées, elle en est indépendante, et elle se manifeste par le langage conceptuel.III. Les structures sensori-motrices et mnémiques opèrent le (...) lien entre unité fonctionnelle et unité mentale. (shrink)

L'itinéraire de pensée d'Emmanuel Levinas, qui s'est étendu sur plus de soixante ans, est traversé et animé de part en part par une évidence : celle du caractère exceptionnel, transcendant, du phénomène humain rompant avec la brutalité et l'anonymat de l'être. Mais où donc se situe le noeud de "l'humanité de l'homme"?1'clle est la question à laquelle il a cherché inlassablement à répondre, avant même que sa philosophie ait pris la forme à laquelle elle a abouti, celle d'une philosophie éthique, (...) de l'altérité et de la responsabilité pour autrui, d'une pensée pour laquelle l'éthique est la "philosophie première". D'autre part, si Levinas ne s'engage guère dans les débats qui constituent la substance de l'actualité immédiate, si même ses recherches explorent des régions dont la description exige le recours à l'abstraction la plus pure, sa pensée reste constamment attentive aux mouvements de fond qui traversent l'histoire et les drames de son époque qui y ont laissé leur trace. C'est ainsi que Levinas rencontre la région du politique, composante de base de l'architecture de l'humain. (shrink)

Georges Rey; XV*—Semantic Externalism and Conceptual Competence, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 92, Issue 1, 1 June 1992, Pages 315–334, https.

Nous, êtres humains, sommes issus d'une longue évolution, minérale et cosmique d'abord, biologique et terrestre ensuite. Pour certains, nous aurions définitivement rompu avec un héritage ancestral qui faisait de nous des bêtes. Nous seuls serions capables du sens du bien et du sens du beau. Nous seuls serions doués de morale. Il existerait ainsi un fossé infranchissable entre le grand philosophe Emmanuel Kant et nos cousins les chimpanzés! Ou bien, au contraire, faut-il considérer que la morale et l'esthétique chez l'homme (...) plongent leurs racines dans le terreau de la «nature»? Les animaux ne sont-ils pas eux aussi capables de dévouement pour leurs proches? Nos cousins les primates ne peuvent-ils pas éprouver eux aussi des sentiments en face d'une belle chimpanzé? Bref, la découverte des «cultures animales» n'amène-t-elle pas à concevoir davantage de continuité entre l'homme et l'animal? (shrink)

Ce dictionnaire offre un répertoire des concepts les plus usités du marxisme.