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Phenomenal content and the richness and determinacy of colour experience
Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (9-10):112-131 (2007)
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Citations of this work
Phenomenal Concepts.Katalin Balog - 2009 - In Ansgar Beckermann, Brian P. McLaughlin & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 292--312.
Why illusionism about consciousness is unbelievable.Christopher Devlin Brown - 2021 - Ratio 35 (1):16-24.
On The Infinitely Hard Problem Of Consciousness.Bernard Molyneux - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (2):211 - 228.
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