Background Over the last decades, the neurosciences, behavioral sciences, and the social sciences have all seen a rapid development of innovative research methods. The field of bioethics, however, has trailed behind in methodological innovation. Despite the so-called “empirical turn” in bioethics, research methodology for project development, data collection and analysis, and dissemination has remained largely restricted to surveys, interviews, and research papers. We have previously argued for a “Design Bioethics” approach to empirical bioethics methodology, which develops purpose-built methods for investigation (...) of bioethical concerns. In this paper we compare a research tool created using a design bioethics approach to a “methods-as-usual” approach in empirical bioethics. Methods Our study compared dimensions of engagement with a digital game we created, called “Tracing Tomorrow,” to a standard vignette survey. The two tools investigated the same subject matter, digital phenotyping for mental health, in a sample of 301 UK adolescents. Results Participants who played the game reported a greater sense of presence, emotional engagement, cognitive absorption, and mental health ethics insight, compared to participants who completed the vignette survey. Perceived authenticity and curiosity/motivation to learn more was equivalent for both methods. Conclusion The results of this study highlights the importance of purpose-built methodology for empirical bioethics research. (shrink)

Why has gender equality progressed so much more slowly in philosophy than in other academic disciplines? Here, I address both factual and theoretical matters relating to the causes, effects, and potential redress of the lack of women in philosophy. First, I debunk extant claims that women are more likely than men to disagree with their philosophy professors and male peers; that women are more sensitive to disagreements in the philosophy classroom than men are; and that the gender imbalance in philosophy (...) is no worse than in many cognate disciplines. Second, I discuss ways in which the nature of philosophical inquiry and debate may provide uniquely strong opportunities for person-perception to hinder progress toward egalitarian treatment of interlocutors. And third, I argue that a diversity of perspectives in philosophy is essential not only for reasons of social justice, but also for philosophical progress. Efforts to improve philosophy should therefore countenance the role of person-perception in the practice of philosophical debate. For philosophy to become more diverse, the steps the profession takes to achieve that goal will have to go beyond—and not merely match—the steps taken to increase the numbers of women and otherwise underrepresented individuals in other fields. (shrink)

This article takes issue with procedural reductionism, which is the inclination to reduce all matters of judgement and responsibility to the following of some procedure or rule. Two scenarios provide content for a discussion of professional discretion in the context of accountability. The author shows that in professional life there will always be situations that stand beyond the rules of procedures and require the unique judgement of the professional at the time. While this judgement may be determined by the facts (...) available in a situation of uncertainty, it cannot be reduced to the facts (including facts about rules and procedures). The moral judgement will still have an essential indeterminancy about it. (shrink)

Philosophical discussion of forgiveness has mainly focused on cases in which victims and offenders are known to each other. But it commonly happens that a victim brings an offender under a definite description but does not know to which individual this applies. I explore some of the conceptual and moral issues raised by the phenomenon of forgiveness in circumstances in which identification is incomplete, tentative or even mistaken. Among the conclusions reached are that correct and precise identification of the offending (...) individual is not essential for forgiveness to take place; that an offender can, under certain strict conditions, be said to be forgiven by proxy where the victim has misidentified the offender and ‘forgiven’ the wrong person; and that proxy forgiveness of this sort is not subject to the objections commonly levelled against ‘proxy’ or ‘third-party forgiveness.’. (shrink)

With developments in the 19th and early 20th centuries, structuralist ideas concerning the subject matter of mathematics have become commonplace. Yet fundamental questions concerning structures and relations themselves as well as the scope of structuralist analyses remain to be answered. The distinction between axioms as defining conditions and axioms as assertions is highlighted as is the problem of the indefinite extendability of any putatively all-embracing realm of structures. This chapter systematically compares four main versions: set-theoretic structuralism, a version taking structures (...) as sui generis universals, structuralism based on category theory, and a quasi-nominalist modal-structuralism. While none of the approaches is problem-free, it appears that some synthesis of the category-theoretic approach with modal-structuralism can meet the challenges set out, given the notion of “logical possibility.”. (shrink)

Starting from a behavioural-economics critique of standard rational choice theory Sugden seeks to restate the case for classical liberalism. That case has three strands: a refutation of libertarian...

This volume offers a theoretical and practical overview of the ethics of pediatric medicine. It serves as a fundamental handbook and resource for pediatricians, nurses, residents in training, graduate students, and practitioners of ethics and healthcare policy. Written by a team of leading experts, Pediatric Bioethics addresses those difficult ethical questions concerning the clinical and academic practice of pediatrics, including an approach to recognizing boundaries when confronted with issues such as end of life care, life-sustaining treatment, extreme prematurity, pharmacotherapy, and (...) research. Thorny topics such as what constitutes best interests, personhood, or distributive justice and public health concerns such as immunization and newborn genetic screening are also addressed. (shrink)

A volume of essays by leading photography writers and critics, published to benefit Amnesty International, cites such examples as the work of Susan Sontag to question whether photography of disturbing images stirs empathy or voyeurism in its viewers, outlining how to look at photographs to become contextually informed. Original.

This chapter examines the nature and normative significance of taxation. In particular, it identifies and explores two central normative questions: (1) What tax arrangements should a state or society put into place? (2) How should a citizen or taxpayer relate to an existing system? In thinking through these and relate questions, the discussion also critically engages with the broadly Rawlsian view of taxation defended by Murphy and Nagel in The Myth of Ownership.

Augustine’s interpretation of the parable of the rich man and Lazarus from Lk 16 shows how much the parables of Jesus are open to a variety of interpretations and applications depending upon which part of the parable is emphasised. In Augustine’s writings the second part of the parable only is commented upon (the exception being ep. 157) to illustrate points about the afterlife and the fate of the soul. However, in his homilies we find him engaging with both sections of (...) the parable (this life and the afterlife). We can note the dexterity with which Augustine handled diverse themes in the parable by selectively emphasising either the fate of the rich man in this life or the next or the fate of Lazarus in this life or the next. From these different perspectives Augustine could deal with questions of wealth and poverty either materially or spiritually. This research supports the notion that whatever Augustine had to say about almsgiving is to be understood within a soteriological context to urge his congregation to be rich in humility and poor in pride. (shrink)

Along with Frege, Russell maintained an absolutist stance regarding the subject matter of mathematics, revealed rather than imposed, or proposed, by logical analysis. The Fregean definition of cardinal number, for example, is viewed as (essentially) correct, not merely adequate for mathematics. And Dedekind’s “structuralist” views come in for criticism in the Principles. But, on reflection, Russell also flirted with views very close to a (different) version of structuralism. Main varieties of modern structuralism and their challenges are reviewed, taking account of (...) Russell’s insights. Problems of absolutism plague some versions, and, interestingly, Russell’s critique of Dedekind can be extended to one of them, ante rem structuralism. This leaves modal-structuralism and a category theoretic approach as remaining non-absolutist options. It is suggested that these should be combined. (shrink)

Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, in Dialectic of Enlightenment [Dialektik der Aufklärung, first published in 1944], argue that Donatien-Alphonse-François, the Marquis de Sade (1740–1814), and Friedrich Nietzsche have brought the Enlightenment project of grounding morality in reason to an end. For Adorno and Horkheimer, Sade has revealed philosophy’s moral impotency, in particular “the impossibility of deriving from reason any fundamental argument against murder [...].”1 Marcel Hénaff, Susan Neiman, and Annie Le Brun have similarly suggested that Sade has demonstrated that morality (...) is no more philosophically justified than immorality.2 There is no doubt that there is much discussion of moral philosophy in Sade’s surviving works. But are these extraordinary claims of Sade’s sceptical powers justified? To answer this question, this paper sets out to identify the moral and meta- ethical claims made in Sade’s works, and to assess his arguments for those claims. (shrink)

G. E. R. Lloyd considers how we can resolve the tension that exists between an appreciation of the cognitive capacities that all humans share, and a recognition of the great variety in their manifestations in different individuals and groups--while avoiding the imposition of prior Western assumptions and concepts.

The paper explains and differentiates the concept of ‘fact’ in the legal setting. Fact and evidence, fact/falsity distinguished; fact and law considered -- a real difference or a pragmatic device? Questions of fact and degree considered, in themselves and in the context of jury trial and of appeals. Primary fact, factual inferences from primary fact, questions of classification of fact are considered. Whether inference is supported by evidence, and whether classification is correct may be questions of law. Issues of fact (...) and opinion, fact and comment, relative to freedom of speech, defamation etc: no clear distinction available. Legal problems concerning absence of workable distinctions. (shrink)

After some introductory remarks on "experimental metaphysics", a brief survey of the current situation concerning the major types of hidden-variable theories and the inexistence proofs is presented. The category of stochastic, contextual, local theories remains open. Then the main features of a logical analysis of "locality" are sketched. In the deterministic case, a natural "light-cone determination" condition helps bridge the gap that has existed between the physical requirements of the special theory of relativity and formal conditions used in proving the (...) Bell -Wigner theorem. Natural generalization to the stochastic type, taking account of the distinction between epistemic and physical probabilities, leads to a series of independence claims constituting some significant limitations on generalized Bell theorems. In particular, the conditional stochastic independence requirement is seen both to go beyond the demand of compliance with the STR and to be a genuine necessity in deriving any Bell theorem for the stochastic case. The conclusion is also supported that, if determinism is given up, the Bell theorems and experiments do not pose an additional obstacle to unifying relativity theory and quantum mechanics beyond what is already posed by the "instantaneous" collapse of the wave function. (shrink)

This extraordinary book offers a clear and compelling biography of Jacques Derrida along with one of Derrida's strangest and most unexpected texts. Geoffrey Bennington's account of Derrida leads the reader through the philosopher's familiar yet widely misunderstood work on language and writing to the less familiar themes of signature, sexual difference, law, and affirmation. In an unusual and unprecedented "dialogue," Derrida responds to Bennington's text by interweaving Bennington's text with surprising and disruptive "periphrases." Truly original, this dual and dueling (...) text opens new dimensions in Derrida's thought and work. "Bennington is a shrewd and well-informed commentator whose book should do something to convince the skeptics... that Jacques Derrida's work merits serious attention."—Christopher Norris, _New Statesman & Society_ "Geoffrey Bennington and Jacques Derrida have presented a fascinating example of what might be called post-structuralist autobiography."—Laurie Volpe, _French Review_ "Bennington's account of what Derrida is up to is better in almost all respects—more intelligent, more plausible, more readable, and less pretentious—than any other I have read."—Richard Rorty, _Contemporary Literature_. (shrink)

Possibilities haunt history. The force of our explanations of events turns on the alternative possibilities these explanations suggest. It is these possible worlds which give us our understanding; and in human affairs we decide them by practical rather than theoretical judgement. In his widely acclaimed account of the role of counterfactuals in explanation, Geoffrey Hawthorn deploys extended examples from history and modern times to defend his argument. His conclusions cast doubt on existing assumptions about the nature and place of (...) theory, and indeed of the possibility of knowledge itself, in the human sciences. (shrink)