Philosophy of epidemiology has recently emerged as a distinct branch of philosophy. The field will surely benefit from pluralism, reflected in the broad range of topics and perspectives in this special issue. Here, I argue that a healthy pluralistic field of philosophy of epidemiology has social responsibilities that require the field as a whole to engage actively with research on social determinants of health and health disparities. Practicing epidemiologists and the broader community of public health scientists have gradually acknowledged that (...) much of their attention ought to be paid to these, i.e. inequitable between-population health variations that largely reflect the world’s inequitable distribution of resources and social conditions. The paper illustrates how and why health disparities and social determinants of health, through no ill will, become de facto secondary concerns in Alex Broadbent’s field-defining Philosophy of Epidemiology, showing the ease with which these topics can be incidentally sidelined. As means for philosophy of epidemiology to meet its social responsibility obligations, I suggest philosophy of epidemiology expand its attention to two particular lines research. First, the paper discusses Geoffrey Rose’s concept of “causes of incidence”—causes of disparities between populations—and argues for the importance of engaging with these causes. Second, the paper argues for the value of engaging with Bruce Link and Jo Phelan’s “fundamental causes” model of how flexible social resources serve as buffers from harms, generating a plethora of shifting and locally-contingent health effects. (shrink)

Norms are a pervasive yet mysterious feature of social life. In Explaining Norms, four philosophers and social scientists team up to grapple with some of the many mysteries, offering a comprehensive account of norms: what they are; how and why they emerge, persist and change; and how they work.

In this paper several problems are raised concerning Ian Barbour's four ways of interrelating science and religion—Conflict, Independence, Dialogue, and Integration—as put forward in such publications as his highly influential Religion in an Age of Science (1990) and widely adopted by other writers in this field. The authors argue that this taxonomy is not very useful or analytically helpful, especially to historians seeking to understand past engagements between science and religion.

Philosophy, Music and Emotion explores two contentious issues in contemporary philosophy: the nature of music´s power to express emotion, and the nature of emotion itself. It shows how closely the two are related and provides a radically new account of what it means to say that music "expresses emotion." Geoffrey Madell maintains that most current accounts of musical expressiveness are fundamentally misguided. He attributes this fact to the influence of a famous argument of the nineteenth-century critic Hanslick, and also (...) to the dominant "cognitivist" approach to the nature of emotion, which sees the essence of emotion to be the entertaining of evaluative judgments and beliefs. This book argues that the cognitivist account of the nature of emotion is false and should be replaced with a conception of emotions as states of feeling. Central to this bold analysis is a new account of two closely connected mental states, desire and pleasure, and their role in human motivation. (shrink)

Darwin himself suggested the idea of generalizing the core Darwinian principles to cover the evolution of social entities. Also in the nineteenth century, influential social scientists proposed their extension to political society and economic institutions. Nevertheless, misunderstanding and misrepresentation have hindered the realization of the powerful potential in this longstanding idea. Some critics confuse generalization with analogy. Others mistakenly presume that generalizing Darwinism necessarily involves biological reductionism. This essay outlines the types of phenomena to which a generalized Darwinism applies, and (...) upholds that there is no reason to exclude social or economic entities. (shrink)

Moral knowledge, to the extent anyone has it, is as much a matter of knowing how -- how to act, react, feel and reflect appropriately -- as it is a matter of knowing that -- that injustice is wrong, courage is valuable, and care is due. Such knowledge is embodied in a range of capacities, abilities, and skills that are not acquired simply by learning that certain things are morally required or forbidden or that certain abilities and skills are important.1 (...) To lose sight of this fact, to focus exclusively on questions concerning what is commonly called propositional knowledge, is to lose one's grip on (at least one crucial aspect of) the intimate connection between morality and action. At the same time, insofar as it suggests that moral capacities can be exhaustively accounted for by appeal to peoples' cognitive states, to focus on propositional knowledge is to invite an overintellectualized picture of those capacities. No account of moral knowledge will be adequate unless it does justice to the ways in which knowing right from wrong, and good from bad, is not simply a matter of forming the correct beliefs but is a matter of acquiring certain abilities to act, react, feel, and reflect appropriately in the situations in which one finds oneself. And this means a satisfying treatment of moral epistemology must give due attention to what's involved in knowing how to be moral. (shrink)

L'immense aventure du savoir grec est encore aujourd'hui la source essentielle à laquelle puise et revient sans cesse notre civilisation. L'ambition de ce livre, élaboré par les plus éminents spécialistes de l'Antiquité et traduit en plusieurs langues depuis sa parution initiale, est de mesurer ce que les Grecs savaient, ce qu'ils croyaient savoir, ce qu'ils ont inventé ; d'analyser le regard qu'ils ont porté sur leur civilisation et sur leurs propres entreprises intellectuelles. Il y est ainsi moins question de leur (...) histoire que de leurs historiens, de leur poésie que de leur poétique, de leur musique que de leur harmonique, car l'originalité des Grecs n'est pas tant d'avoir su beaucoup de choses que d'avoir exigé d'eux-mêmes de savoir ce qu'ils savaient, ce qu'ils disaient, ce qu'ils faisaient, ce qu'ils voulaient... (shrink)

At Cratylus 385b–c, Plato appears to argue that names have truth-value. Critics have almost universally condemned the argument as fallacious. Their case has proven so compelling that it has driven editors to recommend moving or removing the argument from its received position in the manuscripts. I argue that a close reading of the argument reveals it commits no fallacy, and its purpose in the dialogue justifies its original position. I wish to vindicate the manuscript tradition, showing that the argument establishes (...) that there is subject matter for investigation, and there is a correctness of names. (shrink)

The paper explains and differentiates the concept of ‘fact’ in the legal setting. Fact and evidence, fact/falsity distinguished; fact and law considered -- a real difference or a pragmatic device? Questions of fact and degree considered, in themselves and in the context of jury trial and of appeals. Primary fact, factual inferences from primary fact, questions of classification of fact are considered. Whether inference is supported by evidence, and whether classification is correct may be questions of law. Issues of fact (...) and opinion, fact and comment, relative to freedom of speech, defamation etc: no clear distinction available. Legal problems concerning absence of workable distinctions. (shrink)

In Morality, Bernard Gert argues that the fundamental demands of morality are well articulated by ten distinct, and relatively simple, rules. These rules, he holds, are such that any person, no matter what her circumstances or interests, would be rational in accepting, and guiding her choices by, them. The rules themselves are comfortably familiar (e.g. “Do not kill,” “Do not deceive,” “Keep your promises”) and sit well as intuitively plausible. Yet the rules are not, Gert argues, to be accepted merely (...) because they are intuitively attractive, nor because they are already widely recognized, but because they stand as the only set of rules that can qualify as appropriately acceptable to all rational beings. (shrink)

In responding to an essay by Marianne Hirsch and Leo Spitzer about photographs taken in the streets of Chernivitsi in the 1940s, and thus in the midst of the Holocaust, this paper seeks to link their concerns to a broader consideration of photography as a modern phenomenon. In the process, the paper provides a brief history of street photography, a genre virtually ignored in standard histories of the photographic medium. The author suggests that Hirsch and Spitzer’s paper bravely reminds us (...) that our fascination with photographs is based not on truth, but on a combination of desire and faith . Their account of street photography in Czernowitz thereby amounts to an interpretation of photographs as dynamic modes of apprehension rather than as static objects from the past that veridically represent it. It is precisely this aspect of photographs that makes them such unusually complicated, ambiguous, and incongruous historical objects. (shrink)

Keynes always intended to write 'footnotes' to his masterwork _The General Theory_, which would take account of the criticisms made of it and allow him to develop and refine his ideas further. However, a number of factors combined to prevent him from doing so before his death in 1946. A wide range of Keynes scholars - including James Tobin, Paul Davidson and Lord Skidelsky - have written here the 'footnotes' that Keynes never did.

“It is the creation of the paternalistic but secretive company which produces moral indifference towards its employees”. This Turner & Newall case‐study highlights the significance of how a corporate morality or a thought world can affect the ethical conduct of the individuals in the organization. Geoffrey Tweedale is Senior Research Fellow in the Centre for Business History, and Richard C. Warren is Principal Lecturer in the Department of Business Studies, at The Manchester Metropolitan University, Aytoun Building, Aytoun Street, Manchester. (...) M1 3GH. Acknowledgments. This study draws partly on a study funded by the Wellcome Trust. Also to be thanked are David Jeremy and Andrew Lock. Michael O’Connor of Chase Manhattan Bank kindly provided court transcripts and other records from the Bank’s collection of non‐confidential T&N materials. (shrink)

This volume presents the most recent research on Title I federal compensatory education programs. Over the past three decades, Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act has served as the cornerstone of the federal commitment to equality of opportunity. It is the federal government's single largest investment in America's schools. As Title I begins a new century, this book documents the program's history and points to the potential for its future, building on 35 years of research, development, and (...) practical experience. The research and analysis it provides fills a void for systematic information that can help inform Title I education policies and practices. _Title I: Compensatory Education at the Crossroads_ is essential reading for educational researchers and students working in the areas of social stratification and equity-minded policies, programs, and practices. It will serve well as a text for graduate courses on these topics in education, as well as in public policy, sociology, and psychology. Educational policymakers and administrators at the federal, state, and local levels who are concerned with Title I and programs for students placed at risk will find it an important resource in crafting policies and programs for this population of students. (shrink)

Academies were introduced by Labour in 2000 and first opened their doors in 2002, but during Labour’s time in power the nature of the Academies changed. At first they were designed to replace existing failing schools but, by 2004, the expectation had widened to provide for entirely new schools where there was a demand for new places. From 2010, under the coalition government, two new types of Academy were introduced. While the original Academies were based on the idea of closing (...) poor schools and replacing them by dramatically redesigned and restructured ones, the _2010 Academies Act _allowed existing highly successful state-maintained schools to apply to become Academies as well. Further, while Labour had restricted Academy status to secondary schools, the Coalition extended it to primary and special schools. The result is that there has been a dramatic increase in the number and diversity of Academies. In addition to this, the 2010 Act introduced Free Schools, wherein groups of parents, teachers, or other sponsors can apply to start their own state-maintained, but officially ‘independent’, schools. These schools can either be completely new or the result of existing private schools applying to become state-maintained. The results of these changes remain under-researched. This book puts forward new research that examines the history and nature of Academies and Free Schools, the processes by which they have come into existence, and their effects in terms of social justice. The contributors do not all speak with one voice, but rather present a diversity of views on these important topics. Included in the collection are the results of research on pupil outcomes and socio-economic segregation; issues of identity and ethos in church academies; the problems of establishing free schools; the history of policy on Academies; and a comparison between Swedish independent schools and Academies and Free Schools. This book was originally published as a special issue of _Research Papers in Education. _. (shrink)

The argument I defend in this paper takes for granted that the proceduralist indictment against judicial review is at least partly justifiable, and that a complete theory of democratic legitimacy will therefore attempt to address it to the greatest possible degree. I examine how the indictment can be addressed via the practice of nonparty participation, whereby members of the general public may seek participatory involvement in a court proceeding despite not being directly implicated by the dispute at issue. Through this (...) practice, courts acquire a means to expose themselves to a cross-section of societal influences, which in turn can be said to improve the legitimacy of the decisions they render from a procedural perspective. Importantly, however, such legitimacy will not be transmitted spontaneously, as if the mere fact that courts allow nonparties to participate is all that is needed to address the proceduralist's concern. The crux of my argument is that only when the practice is conceived in a particular way, and is subjected to the appropriate conditions, does it have a genuine chance of realizing its legitimating promise. (shrink)

Drawing on Peter Harrison's argument that individuals should be attributed a central role in analyses of the relationship between science and religion, this article proposes that an understanding of personality can help us better appreciate a person's attitudes to both science and religion. Rather than seeing an individual's attitudes to these two topics as separate, if sometimes overlapping, parts of their lives, it is suggested that both may result from psychological drives and sometimes from the same psychological drive. Two contrasting (...) case studies are employed to illustrate this proposal. First, Paul Dirac who, it is argued, was on the autistic spectrum, a personality profile that is often linked to both mathematical physics and atheism. By contrast, Michael Faraday's scientific practice and his commitment to a specific form of Christianity were underpinned by his need for security, as assured by the God‐given laws that operated in both the physical and moral domains. (shrink)

RABBI SIMḤAH ZISSEL ZIV OF KELME, LITHUANIA, WAS ONE OF THE EARLY leaders of the Musar movement, a pietistic religious movement in nineteenth century Europe that attempted to place concerns with moral character at the center of Jewish life. This essay introduces Simḥah Zissel's virtue-centered approach to the Torah's central commandment that one "love one's fellow as one-self." For Simḥah Zissel, love is a disposition of the soul, with emotional and intellectual aspects culminating in action. Love demands a sense of (...) partnership with others and a sense of care that should extend to all of God's creatures; love requires that we not privilege ourselves over other people; and the highest level of love is "sharing the burden of one's fellow," compassionate love characterized by empathy and responsiveness, which can only be cultivated through great effort. (shrink)