This paper presents a comprehensive account of Peirce's post-1900 theory of abduction. The account aims at bringing together various strands of discussion in Peirce's work, showing how their interaction creates a more coherent picture of his thoughts on abductive reasoning as manifest after the turn of the century. The discussion is of a historical nature, rather than a critical assessment.

We argue that pain behaviour cannot be wholly accounted for within the operant model of Fordyce (1976). Many pain behaviours, including facial expression, are not socially reinforced but are evolutionarily predetermined. We urge researchers to take into consideration other learning accounts. Building on the idea that pain sufferers learn to suppress the expression of pain, we begin the development of a framework for a relational understanding of pain complaint.

Historians are showing increasing interest in scientific internationalism, the notion that science transcends national differences and hence advances peace and cooperation. This notion became particularly popular in the decades around 1900, the heyday of the universal expositions and the so-called first era of globalization. In this article I argue that in order to properly historicize scientific internationalism, it is imperative to understand how actors imagined science to have pacifist effects, and to relate their technoscientific to their geopolitical imaginaries. To illustrate (...) this, I analyze the 1911 novel Der Menschheit Hochgedanken (translated as When Thoughts Will Soar) by the famous Austrian pacifist Baroness Bertha von Suttner. It tells the story of a scientific conference whose participants, by the sheer brilliance of their thought, ward off war and preserve world peace. Relating the novel to von Suttner’s own life experiences, I situate her internationalism in the social texture and international relations of the late Habsburg Empire. It appears that Von Suttner mobilized notions of the pacific effects of science with an eye to preserving both the European system of states and the position of the aristocracy. (shrink)

Departing from the (post-)Anthropocenic crisis state of today’s world, fuelled by the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, various post-truth populist follies, and an apocalyptic WW3-scenario that has been hanging in the air since the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, this article argues for the possibility – and necessity – of an affirmative posthumanist-materialist mapping of hope. Embedded in the Deleuzoguattarian-Braidottian (see Deleuze and Guattari 2005 [1980]; Braidotti 2011 [1994]) methodology of critical cartography, and infused with critical posthumanist, new materialist, and queer theoretical perspectives, (...) this cartography of hope is sketched out against two permacrisis-infused positionalities: nostalgic humanism and tragic (post-)humanism. Forced to navigate between these two extremes, the critical cartography of hope presented here explores hope in numerous historico-philosophical (re-)configurations: from the premodern ‘hope-as-all-too-human’, to a more politicised early modern ‘hope-as-(politically-)human’ – representing hope’s first paradigm shift (politicisation), and from a four decades-long neoliberal redrawing of hope as ‘no-more-hope’ – hope’s second shift (depoliticisation) – to a critical (new) materialist plea to de-anthropocentrise and re-politicise hope – hope’s third and final post-Anthropocenic shift (re-politicisation). By mapping these (re-)configurations of hope, a philosophical plea is made for hope as a material(ist) praxis that can help us better understand – and counter – these extractive late capitalist, neoliberal more-than-human crisis times. (shrink)

Clahsen's claim that output forms of productive processes are never listed in the lexicon is a consequence of the rule/list fallacy, empirically incorrect, and not necessary for the hypothesis that the human language faculty has a dual structure, that is, a lexicon and a set of rules.

In the first two books ofDe finibus(=Fin.), Cicero deals with the Epicurean view of the final goal of life. This philosophical discussion, which is preceded by a rhetorical proem that stands on itself, is framed as a dialogue between Torquatus, who defends the Epicurean position, Cicero, who attacks it, and Triarius, who confines himself to a few critical interventions. If philosophy starts in wonder, according to the celebrated passage from Plato'sTheaetetus(155d), the company meets this criterion admirably well, for the actual (...) discussion starts with Torquatus’ surprise about Cicero's aversion to the Epicurean view (Fin.1.13). He even suggests that this aversion has nothing to do with a fundamental disapproval of Epicurus’ doctrines but that it should rather be sought in stylistic concerns. (shrink)

The maintenance of genetic integrity is of vital importance to all living organisms. However, DNA – the carrier of genetic information – is continuously subject to damage induced by numerous agents from the environment and endogenous cellular metabolites. To prevent the deleterious consequences of DNA injury, an intricate network of repair systems has evolved. The biological impact of these repair mechanisms is illustrated by a number of genetic diseases that are characterized by a defect in one of the repair machineries (...) and in general predispose individuals to cancer. This article intends to review our current understanding of the complex nucleotide excision repair pathway, a universal repair system with a broad lesion specificity. Emphasis will be on the recent advances in the genetic analysis of this process in mammalian cells. (shrink)

In this paper, I will argue that it is a moral obligation for companies, firstly, to accept their moral responsibility with respect to non-discrimination, and secondly, to address the issue with a full-fledged programme, including but not limited to the countering of microsocial discrimination processes through specific policies. On the basis of a broad sketch of how some discrimination mechanisms are actually influencing decisions, that is, causing intended as well as unintended bias in Human Resources Management (HRM), I will argue (...) that the well known tools of legislation and ethical codes are necessary although insufficient to cope with the problem. However, based on empirical evidence, we know which set of measures is likely to diminish discrimination. Taking non-discrimination seriously implies complex and longitudinal policies which include assigning responsibility for a non-discrimination policy within the firm, making managers conscious of implicit stereotypes and helping them to cope with prejudices that no one can totally overcome. Insofar as corporate responsibility with respect to non-discrimination is accepted and strategies that are not prohibitively expensive are known, companies are bound to implement them. Not implementing the best set of measures may be considered at least as a moral shortcoming or, depending on the size of the company, mere lip service to the non-discrimination principle. Although the paper refers to empirical material of diverse backgrounds, its intent is clearly normative. It wishes to spell out what companies ought to do if they are committed to responsible behaviour. The discussion of effective remedies against discrimination is based on a case study of a French company. The retailer Auchan was recently surprised to learn that it was discriminating against ethnic minorities despite strong ethical standards, an ethics committee and ethical leadership. The company dropped its naïve beliefs and set up an ambitious policy cope with the issue. The case illustrates what recent empirical research has revealed about the effectiveness of diversity policies: establishing responsibility for diversity results, firm ethical commitment and support from top management make diversity programs effective. (shrink)

One of the most interesting features of the computer is its ability to create virtual environments. These environments allow us to interact with objects that are simulated by the computer and are not real. They thus allow us to realize actions that have no repercussions whatsoever on the non-virtual world. This seems to qualify virtual environments as an ideal playground to do all kinds of things that would be labelled ethically wrong if realized in the real world. Nevertheless, we have (...) the feeling that certain types of virtual actions – raping computer simulated girls for example – are not right at all, in spite of the fact that we know that no actual person is harmed by this. In the light of phenomena like virtual rape and violence, philosophical reflection on the ethical status of actions realized in virtual worlds has become inevitable. This paper will provide the groundwork for such a reflection, by answering the following questions: Can we apply the predicates of ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ to actions realized in virtual worlds? And if this turns out to be problematic, how can we explain our feeling of discomfort with certain types of virtual behaviour, i.e. our feeling that there is something ‘not at all right’ about, for example, virtual rape? These questions will be answered in the three sections of this paper.The first section deals with the necessary condition for the application of the predicates of ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ to virtual actions: freedom in the virtual environment.In the second section, we will endeavour to demonstrate that the fulfilment of this necessary condition is not sufficient when it comes to the application of these predicates to virtual actions.The last section explains how we can still be uncomfortable with certain virtual actions, even though the said actions escape ethical judgment. (shrink)

New-born screening programs for congenital disorders and chronic disease are expanding worldwide and children “at risk” are identified by nationwide tracking systems at the earliest possible stage. These practices are never neutral and raise important social and ethical questions. An emergent concern is that a reflexive professionalism should interrogate the ever earlier interference in children’s lives. The Flemish community of Belgium was among the first to generalize the screening for hearing loss in young children and is an interesting case to (...) study the public justification of early interventions for families with deaf children. This article uses a critical lens to study the archive of the government child healthcare organization in Flanders in order to uncover underlying constructions of childhood, deafness, and preventive health. We focus on two interrelated themes. The first is the notion of exclusion of the human factor through the mediation of technology. The second is the idea of deafness as endangering a healthy development, an impairment that can nevertheless be treated if detected early enough. It is argued that, since deafness cannot be viewed as a life-threatening condition, the public interest which is implicitly defended is not the rescue of deaf children rather the exclusion of otherness. (shrink)

This chapter first considers the most important of Kelsen's own express statements of a connection between his legal theory and the philosophy of Cohen. It then argues that Cohen's interpretations of Kant as well as his own ‘System of Philosophy’ actually differ profoundly from the historical Kant, thus showing the key theorem of Cohen's system to be not Kantian in origin but Platonic. Finally, the chapter considers the centrepiece of Kelsen's theory, the doctrine of the basic norm. It shows that (...) Kelsen's solution to the problem of establishing legal validity by appeal to the basic norm represents a direct application of the key theorem of Cohen's system, and that this theorem offers one plausible possibility — albeit not the only one — for the problem of validity on the basis of a concept of law that refers neither to natural law nor to any metajuridical source. (shrink)

This intra-view explores a number of productive junctions between contemporary Deleuzoguattarian and new materialist praxes via a series of questions and provocations. Productive tensions are explored via questions of epistemological, ontological, ethical, and political intra-sections as well as notions of difference, transversal contamination, ecosophical practices, diffraction, and, lastly, schizoanalysis. Various irruptions around biophilosophy, transduction, becomology, cartography, power relations, hyperobjects as events, individuation, as well as dyschronia and disorientation, take the discussion further into the wild pedagogical spaces that both praxes have (...) in common. -/- . (shrink)

The emergence of conferences in the late nineteenth century significantly changed the ways in which the international scientific community functioned and experienced itself. In the early modern Republic of Letters, savants mainly related through print and correspondence, and apart from at local and later national levels, scholars rarely met. International conferences, by contrast, brought scientists together regularly, in the flesh and in great numbers. Their previously imagined community now became tangible. This paper examines how conferencing reshaped the collective of international (...) scientists by zooming in on the massive meetings of the International Congress of Applied Chemistry, 1893–1914. Drawing on Emile Durkheim's studies of religious gatherings it analyses the ritualization of routine conference practices, such as plenary ceremonies, toasts, ladies’ programmes and committee meetings. It looks at how roles were distributed as participants performed as hosts and guests, and in masculine and feminine and national and international identities. Importantly, it shows both how the sacralization of chemistry as a higher aim served to instil senses of dedication in order to organize labour and mitigate conflict, and how the self-perception of the international chemical community was based on contemporary understandings of parliament, democracy and representation. (shrink)

This article proposes a way to zoom in on the concept of the social license to operate from the broader normative perspective of contractarianism. An SLO can be defined as a contractarian basis for the legitimacy of a company’s specific activity or project. “SLO”, as a fashionable expression, has its origins in business practice. From a normative viewpoint, the concept is closely related to social contract theory, and, as such, it has a political dimension. After outlining the contractarian normative background (...) to the SLO, we will show how academic concepts such as legitimacy and stakeholder management have a tendency to provide the intellectual underpinning for the business case for securing an SLO. While business case perspectives on the SLO may well be in line with the use of the term in business practice, we will highlight certain difficulties and ambiguities related to the instrumental use of the expression. In the final section, we briefly introduce the articles of this Special Issue to the reader and explain how they relate to the topic. (shrink)

Die verästelte Diskussion über den Naturalismus in der Gegenwartsphilosophie lässt sich grob in einen theoretischen und einen praktischen Zweig gliedern: ›Naturalismus‹ heißt in der theoretischen Philosophie etwas anderes als in der Ethik. Die theoretische Philosophie grenze ich dabei durch das Kriterium ab, dass in ihr die Frage, was wir tun sollen, keine Rolle spielt. Die erste Hälfte des Beitrags ist der Unterscheidung dreier Spielarten des Naturalismus in der theoretischen Philosophie gewidmet, die man ›metaphysischen Naturalismus‹, ›Scientia mensura-Naturalismus‹ und ›analytischen Naturalismus‹ nennen (...) kann. Im dritten und vierten Abschnitt gehe ich auf erklärtermaßen naturalistische Positionen ein, die sich auf die Natur des Menschen berufen. In diesen Positionen kommt der Naturbegriff auf andere Weise ins Spiel als in den drei genannten Varianten des Naturalismus. Wo von der menschlichen Natur die Rede ist, wird ›Natur‹ nicht als Bereichsbezeichnung verstanden, sondern im Sinne von ›Wesen‹ oder ›eigentliche Beschaffenheit‹. Der Schlussteil des Beitrags handelt vom neoaristotelischen oder kurz aristotelischen Naturalismus, der mit einem normativ gehaltvollen Begriff der menschlichen Natur operiert, was auch immer das heißen mag. Der aristotelische Naturalismus wird gewöhnlich als eine Form des ethischen Naturalismus aufgefasst. Auf den zweiten Blick ist die Zuordnung nicht so klar, weil der aristotelische Naturalismus Elemente enthält, die zur Unterscheidung zwischen deskriptiv-anthropologischen und normativen Aussagen quer liegen. Hauptziel des Beitrags ist es, die Naturalismen der menschlichen Natur, den aristotelischen eingeschlossen, im Kreis der anderen Naturalismen zu verorten und insbesondere zu klären, mit welcher Rechtfertigung sie ›naturalistisch‹ genannt werden. (shrink)

Der Naturalismus in der theoretischen Philosophie tritt in drei Varianten auf. Der metaphysische Naturalismus behauptet, dass nur Natürliches existiert. Der Scientia mensura-Naturalismus behauptet, dass die Methoden der Naturwissenschaft der einzige Weg zur Wahrheit sind. Der analytische Naturalismus versucht, in nichtintentionalen Begriffen formulierte hinreichende Bedingungen für das Vorliegen eines intentionalen Phänomens anzugeben. Im Beitrag wird gezeigt, dass diese drei Varianten des Naturalismus nicht miteinander konkurrieren, sondern Ausarbeitungsstufen eines und desselben Grundgedankens sind. Der Naturalismus in der Ethik, wie er aus den Debatten (...) um den »naturalistischen Fehlschluss« bekannt ist, wird nicht behandelt. Wenn hingegen von der Natur des Menschen die Rede ist, kommt der Naturbegriff auf andere Weise ins Spiel als in den genannten Varianten des Naturalismus. Natur wird hier im Sinne von »Wesen« verstanden. In jüngerer Zeit sind verschiedene, oft aristotelisch inspirierte Naturalismen der menschlichen Natur vertreten worden (zum Beispiel von Strawson, Hornsby, Nussbaum, Foot und McDowell). Im Beitrag wird dafür argumentiert, dass die Berufung auf die menschliche Natur wenig mit Naturalismus zu tun hat. Die Rede von »Natur« im Sinne von »Wesen« ist legitim, aber es ist unzweckmäßig, in diesem Zusammenhang von Naturalismus zu sprechen, mit welchem Epitheton auch immer. Anderenfalls wäre jeder Essentialismus ein Naturalismus. Tatsächlich können Berufungen auf die Natur des Menschen einen dezidiert antinaturalistischen Charakter annehmen, wiewohl sie das Wort »Natur« im Munde führen. (shrink)

Den Spuren des amerikanischen Philosophen Willard Van Orman Quine (1908-2000) begegnet man in der theoretischen Philosophie der Gegenwart auf Schritt und Tritt. Dies zeigt schon die lange Liste der Thesen und Stichworte, die mit seinem Namen verbunden sind: Kritik der Analytisch-synthetisch-Unterscheidung, Duhem-Quine-These des wissenschaftstheoretischen Holismus, die Dogmen des Empirismus, radikale Übersetzung, Unbestimmtheit der Übersetzung, ontologische Relativität, Flucht vor den Intensionen, Naturalisierung der Erkenntnistheorie. -/- Quine verstand die Philosophie als ein wissenschaftliches oder wissenschaftsbegleitendes Unternehmen. Sein Werk lässt sich den Disziplinen Erkenntnistheorie, (...) Sprachphilosophie, Wissenschaftstheorie, Ontologie und Logik zuordnen. Die Einführung nimmt eine Frage zum Leitfaden, die Quine zeitlebens beschäftigt hat: Wie gelangen wir von den Reizungen unserer Sinnesorgane zum imposanten Apparat unserer wissenschaftlichen Theorien über die Welt? -/- . (shrink)

The essay looks into the world of the Internet after the dotcom crash. It investigates the ways in which libertarian gurus and leading business journals responded to the April 2000 downfall of the NASDAQ. Also it reviews the latest work of Manuel Castells, The Internet Galaxy, and looks into the ambivalent position of Castells towards « real » Sillicon Valley and the « bubble » dotcoms.

This dissertation, located at the crossroads of Continental political philosophy, feminist theory, critical theory, intellectual history, and cultural studies, provides a critical cartography of contemporary new materialist thought in its various constellations and assemblages, while using diffractive theorizing to examine two Continental terror(ist) events. It is argued that such a critical cartography is not only a novel but also much needed undertaking, as we, more than almost two decades after the Habermas-Derrida dialogues on terror(ism), are in need of a Zeitgeist-adjusted (...) conceptual framework, and, thus, a revitalization of philosophizing as such, that could lead to an analysis of the complex ontological, epistemological, and eco-ethico-political entangled aspects of global crises, and, specifically, terrorist events, the actual terror they produce, and the bio-/necropolitical repercussions they often engender. -/- Using the new materialist methodologies of critical cartography and diffraction, this project’s first part explores what it means to “theorize from the ground up” in a feminist manner, while furthermore offering a situated critical cartography of new materialist thought. Within the contours of this Deleuzoguattarian mapping exercise, new materialist thought is shown to be grounded in foregoing materialist philosophies, transversal and trans(/)disciplinary, and, moreover, a revitalizing ever-evolving philosophical strand of thought with crisscrossing, transcontinental roots and a strong foundation in (post-)Foucauldian poststructuralist thought. Particular attention is paid to what in this project are called “critical” new materialisms, or those new materialist philosophies that take the necessity of critical power analyses seriously, and could be said to be “eco-ethico-political” in nature. This cartography is furthermore accompanied by a digital critical cartography that can be utilized for pedagogical means. -/- The second and final part of this dissertation, preceded by an excursus that accentuates the importance of Harawayan ecophilosophical thought for critical new materialist philosophies, consists of one chapter that puts the idea of diffractive theorizing into practice; subsequently exploring theorizing on terror(ism), the Habermas-Derrida dialogues with regard to 9/11, and the Paris 2015 and Brussels 2016 attacks as affect-inducing events of “feeling-thinking-through.” This chapter ends with a diffractive rereading of Habermas, Derrida, Benjamin, and also partially Levinas, on the subject of the contemporary democratic state, terrorism, and the legitimacy of lockdowns and emergency state declarations. By doing so, this final chapter anticipates on this dissertation’s epilogue, in which the need for an up-to-date critical new materialist eco-ethico-political model of justice and responsiveness-as-response-ability, is highlighted. (shrink)

Despite the fact that business people and business students often cast doubt on the relevance of universal moral principles in business, the rejection of relativism is a precondition for business ethics to get off the ground. This paper proposes an educational strategy to overcome the philosophical confusions about relativism in which business people and students are often trapped. First, the paper provides some conceptual distinctions and clarifications related to moral relativism, particularism, and virtue ethics. More particularly, it revisits arguments demonstrating (...) that virtues in business are not in contradiction with the relevance of universal principles, despite the fact that virtue ethics is often identified with particular relationships and contexts. It goes on to show how students and managers, but also researchers, often mix up radically different conceptions of moral relativism. It is also argued that this confusion is in part created by the cross-cultural management literature in which the methodological stance of the value-freedom of the social sciences is, in a perplexingly mistaken way, transformed into a rejection of all normative discussion and a plea for relativism. The remainder of the paper presents some tools that may be helpful in steering people toward less simplistic views about moral relativism and virtue ethics. It further argues that it is equally important to spell out that moral universalism can be understood in a humble way, without implying either arrogant ethnocentrism or omniscience, as part of an ongoing debate that progresses gradually. (shrink)

This article discusses the conditions under which the use of expert knowledge may provide an adequate response to public concerns about high-tech, late modern risks. Scientific risk estimation has more than once led to expert controversies. When these controversies occur, the public at large – as a media audience – faces a paradoxical situation: on the one hand it must rely on the expertise of scientists as represented in the mass media, but on the other it is confused by competing (...) expert claims in the absence of any clear-cut standard to judge these claims. The question then arises, what expertise can the public trust? I argue that expert controversies cannot be settled by appealing to neutral, impartial expertise, because each use of expert knowledge in applied contexts is inextricably bound up with normative and evaluative assumptions. This value-laden nature of expert contributions, however, does not necessarily force us to adopt a relativist conception of expert knowledge. Nor does it imply active involvement of ordinary citizens in scientific risk estimation – as some authors seem to suggest. The value-laden, or partisan, nature of expert statements rather requires an unbiased process of expert dispute in which experts and counter-experts can participate. Moreover, instead of being a reason for discrediting expert contributions, experts'' commitment may enhance public trustworthiness because it enlarges the scope of perspectives taken into account, to include public concerns. Experts who share the same worries as (some of) the public could be expected to voice these worries at the level of expert dispute. Thus, a broadly shaped expert dispute, that is accessible to both proponents and opponents, is a prerequisite for public trust. (shrink)

This book provides an overview of the recent free will debate and considers the consequences of neuroscientific research for the problem of freedom. In the process of surveying the field, the author develops an original position. He takes issue with the broad philosophical consensus that at least one kind of freedom is incompatible with the scientific worldview -- namely, the ability to make decisions one way or another exactly the same circumstances. The book argues that, on closer examination, this so-called (...) libertarian view of freedom (which we accept in our everyday lives) does not contradict any facts but only philosophical doctrines. Although we're unable to alter physical laws, nor are we 'first movers,' this isn't required for us to have acted otherwise under the same circumstances. (shrink)

In psychiatry there is no sharp boundary between the normal and the pathological. Although clear cases abound, it is often indeterminate whether a particular condition does or does not qualify as a mental disorder. For example, definitions of ‘subthreshold disorders’ and of the ‘prodromal stages’ of diseases are notoriously contentious. -/- Philosophers and linguists call concepts that lack sharp boundaries, and thus admit of borderline cases, ‘vague’. Although blurred boundaries between the normal and the pathological are a recurrent theme in (...) many publications concerned with the classification of mental disorders, systematic approaches that take into account philosophical reflections on vagueness are rare. This book provides interdisciplinary discussions about vagueness in psychiatry by bringing together scholars from psychiatry, psychology, philosophy, history, and law. It draws together various lines of inquiry into the nature of gradations between mental health and disease and discusses the individual and societal consequences of dealing with blurred boundaries in medical practice, forensic psychiatry, and beyond. -/- Part I starts with an overview chapter that helps readers to navigate through the philosophy of vagueness and through the various debates surrounding demarcation problems in the classification and diagnosis of mental illness. Part II encompasses historical and recent philosophical positions on gradualist approaches to health and disease. Part III approaches the vagueness of present psychiatric classification systems, and the debates concerning their revisions by scrutinizing controversial categories, such as posttraumatic stress disorder, and the difficulties of day-to-day diagnostic and therapeutic practice. Part IV finally focuses on social, moral, and legal implications that arise when being mentally ill is a matter of degree. (shrink)

Inleiding tot het gedachtegoed van de Deense filosoof en theoloog (1813-1855).

Das Buch verschafft einen Überblick über die neuere Willensfreiheitsdebatte, wobei es auch die Konsequenzen der Hirnforschung für das Freiheitsproblem erörtert. Ferner entwickelt der Autor eine eigene Position, die er 'fähigkeitsbasierten Libertarismus' nennt. Er widerspricht dem breiten philosophischen Konsens, dass jedenfalls eine Art von Freiheit mit einem naturwissenschaftlichen Weltbild unverträglich sei, nämlich die Fähigkeit, sich unter gegebenen Bedingungen so oder anders zu entscheiden. Im Buch wird argumentiert, dass der libertarischen Freiheitsauffassung, die wir im Alltag alle teilen, bei näherer Betrachtung keine Tatschen (...) entgegenstehen, sondern nur philosophische Doktrinen. Zwar können wir durch unser Handeln keine Naturgesetze abändern und sind auch keine ersten Beweger, aber für ein So-oder-Anderskönnen bedarf es dessen nicht. (shrink)

In this article, we explore the implicit conceptions of business ethics and social responsibility of owners−managers of small and medium enterprises (SME) in Cameroon. While using a hermeneutical approach, our main objective is to clarify how Sub-Saharan African business people themselves understand and define corporate responsibility in their particular economic and political environment. Our aim is not to deliver an empirical study of business practices and management behavior in SMEs. We wish to discuss which responsibilities they themselves judge to be (...) relevant and which can legitimately be attributed to them by third parties. Secondly, we relate our findings to other empirical work on SMEs, in Africa and elsewhere. It is shown that there are similarities with the way in which SMEs in Europe interpret their responsibility, but also striking differences. Further, we relate our findings to some theoretical controversies around corporate social responsibility (CSR) in SMEs, to questions about evaluation tools for CSR in the SME context, and to the role of CSR with respect to poverty alleviation in developing countries. (shrink)

Wenn wir handeln, greifen wir in den Lauf der Welt ein und führen Veränderungen herbei, von denen wir zu Recht denken, daß sie nicht eingetreten wären, hätten wir nicht eingegriffen. Durch menschliche Eingriffe herbeigeführte Veränderungen machen aber nur einen kleinen Teil dessen aus, was in der Welt geschieht. Der größere Teil geschieht ohne unser Zutun. Beide Arten von Geschehnissen werden sowohl alltagssprachlich wie philosophisch in kausalem Vokabular beschrieben. Handelnde werden als kausale Urheber eines Geschehens verstanden; zugleich sind die mit Handlungen (...) einhergehenden Körperbewegungen kausal in natürliche Verläufe eingebettet: sie haben Ursachen und Wirkungen. -/- Die Studie versteht sich als Beitrag zu einer deskriptiven Metaphysik des Kausal- und des Handlungsbegriffes anhand einer Gegenüberstellung von kausaler Handlungstheorie und Handlungstheorie der Kausalität. Der Neuansatz besteht darin, das Verhältnis von Kausalitäts- und Handlungsbegriff konsequent als eine Gleichung mit zwei Unbekannten zu behandeln. -/- Die Untersuchung besteht aus drei Teilen. Der erste Teil dient einer Darstellung und Kritik der kausalen Handlungstheorie, welche den Kausalbegriff zur Analyse des Handlungsbegriffs verwendet. Ihr zufolge sind Handlungen Körperbewegungen, die sich durch eine besondere kausale Genese auszeichnen. Es zeigt sich, daß eine sachgerechte Lösung der internen Probleme dieser Theorie schlecht mit dem weithin akzeptierten Prinzip vom nomologischen Charakter der Kausalität vereinbar ist. Die Auseinandersetzung mit diesem Prinzip steht im Zentrum des zweiten, kausalitätstheoretischen Teils des Buches. Nancy Cartwright vertritt die These, daß es die strikten empirischen Sukzessionsgesetze, die die nomologische Kausalitätsauffassung erfordert, nicht gibt. Diese These wird ausführlich gegen Einwände aus der Wissenschaftstheorie verteidigt. Es entsteht ein kausalitätstheoretisches Vakuum, dessen Auffüllung der dritte Teil dient. Hier wird der kausalen Handlungstheorie eine Theorie der Kausalität gegenübergestellt, die das Explikationsverhältnis von „handeln“ und „verursachen“ umkehrt: die interventionistische Theorie der Kausalität, derzufolge der gewöhnliche Kausalitätsbegriff nicht erläutert werden kann, ohne den Begriff des absichtlichen Eingreifens in natürliche Verläufe ins Spiel zu bringen. Vorliegende Versionen dieser Theorie sind allerdings von schwerwiegenden Einwänden betroffen (Zirkularität, Anthropomorphismus). Um sie zu entkräften, muß die interventionistische Theorie in der richtigen Weise mit der kontrafaktischen Theorie der Kausalität kombiniert werden. Nur so läßt sich ein begrifflicher Rahmen aufspannen, in dem die durch menschliches Zutun und die ohne menschliches Zutun geschehenden Veränderungen in der Körperwelt gleichermaßen Platz finden, ohne daß neben der gewöhnlichen Ereigniskausalität eine zweite Art von Verursachung („Akteurskausalität“, „Kausalität aus Freiheit“) angenommen werden muß. (shrink)

1. Semantische Vagheit 2. Bivalenz und Wahrheitsgrade 3. Zutreffen und Wahrsein 4. Mehrwertigkeit und andere Holzwege 5. Wahrheit und Genauigkeit: Einige Beispiele 6. Die Platon-Herberger-Kontroverse 7. Der Parameter der Auflösung 8. Auflösungsgrade statt Wahrheitsgrade 9. Ein der Annahme von Wahrheitsgraden komplementärer Fehler 10. Wahrheitsrelativismus, Kontextualismus, Supervaluationismus 11. Noch einmal: Wahrheit und Vagheit -/- .

INTRODUCTION "Badness can be got easily and in abundance : the road is smooth, and she dwells very near. But in front of goodness, the immortal gods have ...

Thema der Arbeit ist die Frage, ob eine naturalistische Revolutionierung unseres Selbstverständnisses sprachlich möglich ist. Nach der sprachlichen Möglichkeit wird gefragt, weil nach dem linguistic turn kein Naturalisierungsprogramm ohne den Anspruch auskommt, dass eine Reduktion, Elimination oder Uminterpretation bestimmter Diskurse über den Menschen möglich sei: Die Diskurse über den Menschen sollen an den naturalistischen Diskurs assimiliert werden. Wodurch dieser sich auszeichnet, ist nicht einfach zu bestimmen, doch ist die Intuition nicht von der Hand zu weisen, dass wir über Erfahrungen, die (...) unser Selbstverständnis als denkende und handelnde Subjekte betreffen, in einer ‚anderen Sprache‘, zumindest in anderen Begriffen reden als über Naturdinge. Bei dieser Dualisierung spielt unser intentionalistisches Idiom, also unsere Rede von Wünschen, Überzeugungen, Absichten etc. die entscheidende Rolle. Der naturalistische Diskurs über den Menschen lässt sich in erster Linie negativ bestimmen: durch die Abwesenheit intentionaler Begriffe. In der Auseinandersetzung mit dem Naturalismus werden drei Diskussionsstränge zusammengeführt, die bisher nicht systematisch aufeinander bezogen worden sind. Ausgebend von einer kritischen Darstellung einflussreicher naturalistischer Positionen der Gegenwart und ihrer begrifflichen Konflikte wird die sprachendualistische Gegenstrategie vorgestellt, die dem Naturalismus eine kategorienfehlerhafte Verletzung von Diskursgrenzen vorwirft. Diese Auseinandersetzung mündet in eine Diskussion über die kognitive Funktion von Metaphern, die die vom Sprachendualismus aufgestellten Diskursgrenzen überschreiten. Der sprachendualistischen Intuition steht bei näherer Betrachtung eine zweifache Komplizierung entgegen, die man das „anthropomorph-physiomorphe Paradox“ nennen kann, das Paradox von anthropomorphem Naturverständnis und physiomorphem (oder naturalistischem) Selbstverständnis des Menschen. Es ist vielfach aufgewiesen worden, dass wir einerseits oft in anthropomorpher Weise über Naturdinge reden, andererseits in physiomorpher Weise über uns selbst und unsere mentalen Prozesse. Dieses Wechselspiel von Projektionen ist in unser Selbst- und Naturverständnis zu tief eingelassen, als dass man einen der beiden Züge einfach sprach-, metaphysik- oder ideologiekritisch verbieten könnte. In der Arbeit wird die Überzeugung vertreten, dass sich dieses Syndrom von Anthropomorphismus und Physiomorphismus nur aufklären lässt, wenn man das Naturalismusthema mit dem Sprachendualismusthema und dem Metaphernthema systematisch zusammenführt und sie ineinander verschränkt. Das Hauptergebnis der Arbeit besteht in dem Nachweis, dass die verschiedenen Naturalisierungsprojekte, ob reduktiv oder eliminativ, jeweils in einem angebbaren Punkt ihre Grenze finden. Dieser Punkt ist das intentionale Idiom, in dem sich unser Verständnis menschlicher Handlungen ausdrückt. Dieses Idiom scheint so universal in die Diskurse der Humanwissenschaften auszustrahlen, dass Naturalisten immer wieder auf das Konzept der Handlungsintentionalität zurückgreifen, meist in metaphorischer Form. (shrink)

Journal Name: Cognitive Linguistics Issue: Ahead of print.

Ein Homunkulus im philosophischen Sprachgebrauch ist eine postulierte menschenähnliche Instanz, die ausdrücklich oder unausdrücklich zur Erklärung der Arbeitsweise des menschlichen Geistes herangezogen wird. Als Homunkulus-Fehlschluß wird die Praxis bezeichnet, Prädikate, die auf kognitive oder perzeptive Leistungen einer ganzen Person zutreffen, auch auf Teile von Personen oder auf subpersonale Vorgänge anzuwenden, was typischerweise zu einem Regreß führt. Der vorliegende Beitrag erörtert den Homunkulus-Fehlschluß zunächst in argumentationstheoretischer Hinsicht und stellt dabei ein Diagnoseschema auf. Dann werden zwei Anwendungsfelder erörtert: Instanzenmodelle der Psyche (Platon, (...) Freud) sind ihrer Natur nach homunkulusgefährdet, denn es ist aufgrund der holistischen Zuschreibungsbedingungen mentaler Fähigkeiten schwer plausibel zu machen, wie eine innerpsychische Instanz den ihr zugedachten Beitrag leisten soll, ohne über eine eigene Psyche zu verfügen. Der zweite Anwendungsfall ist das Problem des invertierten Netzhautbildes in der Philosophie der Wahrnehmung, das wissenschafts- und philosophiegeschichtlich eingebettet und unter besonderer Berücksichtigung von Descartes diskutiert wird. Schließlich werden offensive Rechtfertigungen homunkularer Redeweisen erörtert und größtenteils zurückgewiesen. -- The homunculus fallacy is committed when someone tries to explain how the human mind works by postulating a little man within the mind or the brain. Homunculi are rarely posited with one’s eyes open. Rather, the fallacy occurs when predicates that properly apply to cognitive or perceptual achievements of persons get applied to subpersonal processes or to parts of persons (e.g., brains). The paper suggests a pattern for diagnosing homunculus fallacies. After taking a look at Freud’s and Platon’s homuncular metapsychologies, a case study is discussed in detail: the problem of the inverted retinal image which plagued the philosophy of perception since Kepler formulated it in 1604. It is argued that the irradiation patterns on the retina are not images, on pain of committing the homunculus fallacy. The paper closes with the repudiation of some frank apologies of homuncular explanations. (shrink)

On a general level, this paper proposes a critical analysis of one of the attempts to make bridges between economics and moral and political philosophy. A priori, we may expect that formal methods may lead to clearer and more rigorous arguments, and may facilitate practical applications. However, this paper illustrates how precision is bought at the price of becoming tautological. Therefore, the statement that "it is already widely recognized that formal methods derived from economics can contribute to ethics" (Broome 1989: (...) ix) seems hasty. The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses some philosophical background assumptions which underlie a decision theoretic argument in favour of utilitarianism. Section 3 recalls briefly John Harsanyi's decision theoretic arguments in favour of utilitarianism. It then focuses on the crucial assumption of separability in order to show that separability can always be saved as an assumption if one applies the strategy of dispersion. Section 4, finally, shows how the theorem may indeed reconcile the concern for equality and utilitarianism, at the price of becoming futile. (shrink)

Das Maschinenmodell des Menschen wurde im Aufklärungsmaterialismus des 17. und 18. Jahrhunderts philosophisch etabliert. Die Mechanisten beanspruchten, die Funktionsweise des menschlichen Körpers, später auch die seines Geistes, in nichtmetaphysischer und nichtteleologischer Weise erklären zu können. Entgegen der communis opinio haben viele Mechanisten niemals antiteleologische Positionen vertreten. Die anderen haben ihre Ansprüche nicht einlösen können. Statt teleologische Beschreibungen überflüssig zu machen, haben sie, oft ungewollt und unbemerkt, in ihren eigenen Theorien auf teleologische Konzepte zurückgegriffen.

1. Ein klassischer Einwand gegen die libertarische Freiheitsauffassung 2. Eine Flurbereinigung: Buridan-Situationen 3. Freiheit zur Unvernunft 4. Freiheit zur Unmoral 5. Du kannst, weil du sollst? 6. Freiheit als Zwei-Wege-Vermögen.