We appreciate Meynen’s examination of ethical implications of using neurotechnologies to decode neural data and make inferences about cognitive processes. Here, we address three issues that we beli...

Groups are ubiquitous in our lives. But while some of them are highly structured and appear to support a shared intentionality and even a shared agency, others are much less cohesive and do not seem to demand much of their individual members. Queues, for example, seem to be, at a given time, nothing over and above some individuals as they exemplify a certain spatial arrangement. Indeed, the main aim of this paper is to develop the more general thought that at (...) a given time, a group is nothing over and above some individual members as they exemplify a certain complex condition. The general conception of groups that emerges is able to accommodate a variety of constraints on a reasonable answer to the question of what are groups. (shrink)

Philosophers often explain what could be the case in terms of what is, in fact, the case at one possible world or another. They may differ in what they take possible worlds to be or in their gloss of what is for something to be the case at a possible world. Still, they stand united by the threat of paradox. A family of paradoxes akin to the set-theoretic antinomies seem to allow one to derive a contradiction from apparently plausible principles. (...) Some of them concern the interaction between propositions and worlds, and they appear to afford the means to map classes of propositions into propositions – or, likewise, classes of worlds into worlds – in a one-to-one fashion that leads to contradiction. Yet another family of paradoxes threaten the view that whatever could exist does, in fact, exist, which is in line with modal realism, for example. This article aims to survey and identify the source of each family of paradoxes as well as to outline some responses to them. (shrink)

Two semantic theories of proper names are explained and assessed. The theories are Burge’s treatment of proper names as complex demonstratives and Larson and Segal’s quasi-descriptivist account of names. The two theories are evaluated for empirical plausibility. Data from deficits, processing models, developmental studies and syntax are all discussed. It is concluded that neither theory is fully confirmed or refuted by the data, but that Larson and Segal’s theory has more empirical plausibility.

This article seeks to contribute to a vision for leadership in business based on a recovery of virtue. The vision for leadership articulated here draws principally on the writings of the classical philosopher Aristotle and of the contemporary philosopher Josef Pieper. Without discounting the ever-increasing complexity of modern business, this essay will attempt to reconstruct Aristotle’s emphasis on virtue and moral character, and argues for the philosopher’s relevance to modern management and corporate leadership. The paper concludes that the message of (...) virtue is a message of hope and attempts to find plain language to articulate its value to those engaged in business or concerned with the formulation of government policy. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This essay has three goals. The first is to introduce the notion of fundamentality and to argue that physicalism can usefully be conceived of as a thesis about fundamentality. The second is to argue for the advantages of fundamentality physicalism over modal formulations and that fundamentality physicalism is what many who endorse modal formulations of physicalism had in mind all along. Third, I describe what I take to be the main obstacle for a fundamentality-oriented formulation of physicalism: ‘the problem (...) of abstracta’, which asks how physical can accommodate phenomena such as mathematics and universals, and which modal formulations do not face. I canvas three solutions: the inapt for ground solution, the concrete restriction, and the contingency restriction. (shrink)

Journal of Mathematical Logic, Ahead of Print. Given a structure [math] and a stably embedded [math]-definable set [math], we prove tameness preservation results when enriching the induced structure on [math] by some further structure [math]. In particular, we show that if [math] and [math] are stable (respectively, superstable, [math]-stable), then so is the theory [math] of the enrichment of [math] by [math]. Assuming simplicity of [math], elimination of hyperimaginaries and a further condition on [math] related to the behavior of algebraic (...) closure, we also show that simplicity and NSOP1 pass from [math] to [math]. We then prove several applications for tame expansions of weakly minimal structures and, in particular, the group of integers. For example, we construct the first known examples of strictly stable expansions of [math]. More generally, we show that any stable (respectively, superstable, simple, NIP, NTP2, NSOP1) countable graph can be defined in a stable (respectively, superstable, simple, NIP, NTP2, NSOP1) expansion of [math] by some unary predicate [math]. (shrink)

We show that if a first-order structure${\cal M}$, with universe ℤ, is an expansion of (ℤ,+,0) and a reduct of (ℤ,+,<,0), then${\cal M}$must be interdefinable with (ℤ,+,0) or (ℤ,+,<,0).

A hugely important book that rediscovers three crucial, but long overlooked themes in German idealism: mythology, madness and laughter.

We shall introduce in this paper a language whose formulas will be interpreted by games of imperfect information. Such games will be defined in the same way as the games for first-order formulas except that the players do not have complete information of the earlier course of the game. Some simple logical properties of these games will be stated together with the relation of such games of imperfect information to higher-order logic. Finally, a set of applications will be outlined.

The study aims at expanding the idea of knowledge beyond the notion of descriptive knowledge. It examines a pluralism of scientific, philosophical, literary, and aesthetic forms of knowledge. This pluralism is not relativistic but complementary. Different ways of knowing enrich each other thus facilitating a more comprehensive and differentiated conception of the world.".

We give three counterexamples to the folklore claim that in an arbitrary theory, if a complete type p over a set B does not divide over $C\subseteq B$, then no extension of p to a complete type over $\operatorname {acl}(B)$ divides over C. Two of our examples are also the first known theories where all sets are extension bases for nonforking, but forking and dividing differ for complete types (answering a question of Adler). One example is an $\mathrm {NSOP}_1$ theory (...) with a complete type that forks, but does not divide, over a model (answering a question of d’Elbée). Moreover, dividing independence fails to imply M-independence in this example (which refutes another folklore claim). In addition to these counterexamples, we summarize various related properties of dividing that are still true. We also address consequences for previous literature, including an earlier unpublished result about forking and dividing in free amalgamation theories, and some claims about dividing in the theory of generic $K_{m,n}$ -free incidence structures. (shrink)

In NIP theories, generically stable Keisler measures can be characterized in several ways. We analyze these various forms of “generic stability” in arbitrary theories. Among other things, we show that the standard definition of generic stability for types coincides with the notion of a frequency interpretation measure. We also give combinatorial examples of types in NSOP theories that are finitely approximated but not generically stable, as well as ϕ-types in simple theories that are definable and finitely satisfiable in a small (...) model, but not finitely approximated. Our proofs demonstrate interesting connections to classical results from Ramsey theory for finite graphs and hypergraphs. (shrink)

Moral repair is an important way for firms to heal moral relationships with stakeholders following a transgression. The concept is rooted in recognition theory, which is often used to develop normative perspectives and prescriptions, but the same theory has also propelled a view of moral repair as premised on negotiation between offender and victim(s), which involves the complex social construction of the transgression and the appropriate amends. The tension between normative principles and socioconstructivist implementation begs the question how offending firms (...) should approach moral repair. Addressing this question, we develop a two-level conceptualization of moral repair, distinguishing between procedural and substantive levels of practice, which accommodate normativity and socioconstructivism, respectively. In so doing, we enrich the literature by 1) promoting conceptual clarity, 2) refining understanding of the moral repair process, and 3) suggesting the use of a unified, configurational approach to studying (nonlinear) relations between amends and moral outcomes. (shrink)

The Russell–Myhill theorem threatens a familiar structured conception of propositions according to which two sentences express the same proposition only if they share the same syntactic structure and their corresponding syntactic constituents share the same semantic value. Given the role of the principle of universal instantiation in the derivation of the theorem in simple type theory, one may hope to rehabilitate the core of the structured view of propositions in ramified type theory, where the principle is systematically restricted. We suggest (...) otherwise. The ramified core of the structured theory of propositions remains inconsistent in ramified type theory augmented with axioms of reducibility. This is significant because reducibility has been thought to be perfectly consistent with the ramified approach to the intensional antinomies. Nor is the addition of reducibility to ramified type theory sufficient to restore other intensional puzzles such as Prior’s paradox or Kripke’s puzzle about time and thought. (shrink)

We argue that not all cases of before-effect involve causation and ask how to demarcate cases of before-effect in which the events that follow exert causal influence over the before-effect from cases in which they do not.

In this paper we show that first-order languages extended with partially ordered connectives and partially ordered quantifiers define, under a certain interpretation, their own truth-predicate. The interpretation in question is in terms of games of imperfect information. This result is compared with those of Kripke and Feferman.

The concept of representation in public law is attracting more and more interest; specially gives many problems in the Parliament how representation, so as a representative institution. In this place is plained a principal problem: the new function of Parliament and the roll of parliamentary's Government control. We assist to the end of the dogma of the separation of powers. So we need to distinguish between control by the Parliament and control in the Parliament; the first are less effective because (...) significate the Government control of his own majority; the second is the critical capacity of minorities against the Government; this last are a effective control who's should create public opinion. This does not imply the suppression of public representation idea. By suggesting a revision of these idea does not mean that they should disappear. It seems wise to conserve the concept of representation providing it refer to the particular situation of the autoritas and his decision, whenever he appers as a victim of the procers in which take part the after side of problem: the souveragnity. (shrink)

El presente trabajo se propone subrayar la relevancia filosófica del amor acudiendo al desarrollo analítico que del mismo realiza Harry G. Frankfurt. Para ello nos valdremos de la categorización que establece Bennett Helm y encuadraremos la teoría de Frankfurt dentro de una categoría concreta: la del amor como «gran preocupación» [«robust concern»]. Esto nos servirá para atender a la psicología moral de dicho autor y al peso decisivo que el amor juega en la misma; revestido aquel, como afirma Frankfurt, de (...) una autoridad tal que dota de sentido último a nuestro razonamiento práctico. Finalmente, y expuesta la relevancia del amor dentro de todo este proceso, se procederá a discutir de la mano de Jonathan Lear si el amor posee la autoridad que Frankfurt le asigna. (shrink)

This paper appeals to the phenomenon of dreaming to provide a novel defense against arguments from evil. The thrust of the argument is as follows: when we wake up after a nightmare we are often filled entirely with relief, and do not consider ourselves to have actually suffered very much at all; and since it is epistemically possible that this whole life is simply a dream, it follows that it is epistemically possible that in reality there is very little suffering. (...) This epistemic possibility decisively undermines a key premise of both logical and evidential arguments from evil. (shrink)

Achille Mbembe’s book Critique of Black Reason has attracted scholarly interest and commentaries. In a conversation that took place between David Theo Goldberg and Mbembe, both men discuss some of the themes that are raised in the book. This paper examines that conversation and focuses on the idea of the archive and how the dehumanisation, damage, destruction and death that racism has visited on many black people can be resurrected, dusted down and repaired. I have used Mbembe’s idea of blackness (...) as a way into the archive to retrieve and retell a particular story and, in doing so, to repair the damage to the life of an African American man, as only writing can do. I revive the humanity and dignity of that life against the brutal racism that ultimately claimed it. This is a requiem for Mr Wilson. (shrink)

Achille Mbembe’s latest book addresses some of the existential concerns of the modern age and the power structures that have shaped them. Modernity’s allure has created a false belief in the idea of progress while concealing a destructive streak in human activities. He warns that there is trouble ahead unless humans chart a different course. But is this the lamentation of a Jeremiad or a timely intervention in the current state of the world?

We introduce several senses of the principle ofcompositionality. We illustrate the difference between them with thehelp of some recent results obtained by Cameron and Hodges oncompositional semantics for languages of imperfect information.

Independence‐Friendly logic introduced by Hintikka and Sandu studies patterns of dependence and independence of quantifiers which exceed those found in ordinary first‐order logic. The present survey focuses on the game‐theoretical interpretation of IF‐logic, including connections to solution concepts in classical game theory, but we shall also present its compositional interpretation together with its connections to notions of dependence and dependence between terms.

This paper explores several topics related to Woodin’s HOD conjecture. We improve the large cardinal hypothesis of Woodin’s HOD dichotomy theorem from an extendible cardinal to a strongly compact cardinal. We show that assuming there is a strongly compact cardinal and the HOD hypothesis holds, there is no elementary embedding from HOD to HOD, settling a question of Woodin. We show that the HOD hypothesis is equivalent to a uniqueness property of elementary embeddings of levels of the cumulative hierarchy. We (...) prove that the HOD hypothesis holds if and only if every regular cardinal above the first strongly compact cardinal carries an ordinal definable [Formula: see text]-Jónsson algebra. We show that if the HOD hypothesis holds and HOD satisfies the Ultrapower Axiom, then every supercompact cardinal is supercompact in HOD. (shrink)

Xenophon’s anecdote concerning the exchange of clothes between a big boy and a little boy in Cyropaedia offers a valuable framework for understanding his conception of justice and the problematics of administering it. Interpreters have erred by assuming that Cyrus’ teacher, as well as Socrates in Memorabilia, simply identifies the just with the lawful. Rather than identifying the two, both characters argue that the law is just; but they differ widely in their explanations of what makes the law just. For (...) Cyrus’ teacher, the obligation to observe the law rests on a universal pre-legal ban on violence; for Socrates statutory law is to be obeyed for utilitarian reasons. Socrates’ view thus justifies both the teacher’s insistence that Cyrus obey the law—since the law is of benefit to the community—and also Cyrus’ decision to violate the law to achieve a just and beneficial redistribution. But it offers no justification for a universal ban on violence. In conformity with the Socratic principle, Cyrus avoids violence as far as possible, but only for the prudential reasons expressed by his mother. Once he acquires the power to coerce, Cyrus uses it to enforce the principle of proportional equality and meritorious redistribution he had approved in his judgment of the actions of the big boy. (shrink)

As it has historically been the case with many pandemics, the Covid-19 experience will induce many philosophers to reconsider the value of medical practice. This should be a good opportunity to critically scrutinize the way medical research and medical interventions are carried out. For much of its history, medicine has been very inefficient. But, even in its contemporary forms, a review of common protocols in medical research and medical interventions reveal many shortcomings, especially related to methodological flaws, and more importantly, (...) conflicts of interests due to profit incentives. In the face of these problems, we propose a program of “gentle medicine”. This term, originally formulated by philosopher Jacob Stegenga, describes a form of medicine in which physicians intervene less than they currently do. As part of this general program, we advance a series of reform recommendations that could be enacted both by medical staff in their everyday practice, but also by public health officials and policymakers. (shrink)

It is argued that alcoholism, and substance addiction generally, is a disease. It is not of its nature chronic or progressive, although it is in serious cases. It is better viewed as a psychological disease than a neurological one. It is argued that each time an alcoholic takes a drink, this is the result of choice; however, in cases of serious affliction, such choices are compulsive and may be called 'involuntary' in that they are made against the subject's will, motivated (...) by an overwhelmingly powerful desire that he wishes he did not have and not to act on. Alternative accounts in terms social learning theory and behavioral economics are critiqued. The conception of alcoholism as a tripartite disease composed of a 'physical allergy,' a mental obsession, and a 'spiritual malady' is defended from a contemporary scientific point of view. (shrink)

Studying evidence law as part of naturalized epistemology means using the tools and results of the sciences to evaluate evidence rules based on the accuracy of the verdicts they are likely to produce. In this chapter, we introduce the approach and address skeptical concerns about the value of systematic empirical research for evidence scholarship, focusing, in particular, on worries about the external validity of jury simulation studies. Finally, turning to applications, we consider possible reforms regarding eyewitness identifications and character evidence.

The paper argues that there are two main kinds of joint action, direct joint bringing about (or performing) something (expressed in terms of a DO-operator) and jointly seeing to it that something is the case (expressed in terms of a Stit-operator). The former kind of joint action contains conjunctive, disjunctive and sequential action and its central subkinds. While joint seeing to it that something is the case is argued to be necessarily intentional, direct joint performance can also be nonintentional. Actions (...) performed by social groups are analyzed in terms of the notions of joint action (basically DO and Stit).A precise semantical analysis of the aforementioned kinds of joint action is given in terms of time-trees. With each participant a tree is connected, and the trees are joined defining joint possible worlds in terms of state-expressing nodes from the trees. Sentences containing DO and Stit are semantically evaluated with respect to such joint possible worlds. Intentional joint actions are characterized in terms of the notion of we-intention (joint intention), characterized formally by means of a special operator. (shrink)

In his article The Foundations of Mathematics (1925) Ramsey was concerned with the nature of the statements of 'pure mathematics' and the way these statements differ from those in empirical sciences. He thought that the answer given to these questions by Hilbert and the formalist school according to which mathematical statements are meaningless formulas, is unsatisfactory for several reasons, which will not be discussed here. He also expressed serious doubts about the intuitionist program developed by Brouwer and Weyl. It is (...) the logicist school of Frege, Russell and Whitehead, which attempted to reduce mathematics to few logical concepts, that came closest to Ramsey’s views, although he was not completely satisfied with it, either. (shrink)

We show that a coherent theory of partially ordered connectives can be developed along the same line as partially ordered quantification. We estimate the expressive power of various partially ordered connectives and use methods like Ehrenfeucht games and infinitary logic to get various undefinability results.

Our first encounter with Socrates in the Symposium is bizarre. Aristodemus, surprised to run into Socrates fully bathed and with his sandals on, asks him where he is going “to have made himself so beautiful (kalos)” (174a4, Rowe trans.). Socrates replies that he is on his way to see the lovely Agathon, and so that “he has beautified himself in these ways in order to go, a beauty to a beauty (kalos para kalon)” (174a7–8). Why does Socrates, who in just (...) a few moments will be lost in contemplation out on the front porch, care about being beautiful? His remark to Aristodemus is clearly in some sense ironic, but on the other hand, he really has taken unusual care with his physical appearance. Later, in his encomium to love, he will claim that beauty has this effect on lovers: the beauty of the beloved causes the lover to disdain his former way of life and “give birth” to beautiful “offspring.” Is the image of the squat and snub-nosed Socrates all freshly scrubbed and kitted out a comic foreshadowing, or a debunking, of his serious speech? Does Socrates really believe in the transformative power of beauty? (shrink)

In this essay I consider the relationship between Heidegger’s famous “turn” and realism. I begin with Heidegger’s critique of the problem of an external world, and I describe how this critique anticipates New Realism. I then provide a reconstruction of Heidegger’s self-critique of Being and Time, showing how this work exhibits a higher-order antirealism. Next, I show how Heidegger’s turn is motivated by the inadequacy of this earlier anti-realism. In his philosophy of the event he moves towards a realist ontology (...) by developing concepts such as “destiny”, which he understands to be independent of human attitudes. Nevertheless, Heidegger ultimately falls back into an anti-realism, because Being still remains dependent upon the involvement of human beings. I therefore conclude this essay by briefly arguing for my own version of New Realism, according to which objects are meaningful in a way that is independent of our attitudes towards them. (shrink)

Michael Walzer’s article ‘Political action: the problem of dirty hands’ initiated a new wave of discussion over a persistent problem in moral philosophy: are there situations in which ethical rules must be relaxed so as to bring about a greater good? In this article, we consider whether this ‘dirty hands’ approach may be applied to our current climate crisis. One proposed solution to the problem of global warming is the administration of moral enhancements to the population. Assuming that the administration (...) of moral enhancements is a necessary condition in the prevention of a climate crisis, Parker Crutchfield argues that this procedure ought to be covert. This implies lying to the public, and such dishonesty amounts to immoral behavior. We conclude that despite the severity of global warming, there is no justification for a dirty hands approach. Lying to the public in order to save the planet would probably create bigger problems, and it would ultimately be very counterproductive in trying to save the planet. (shrink)