Human consciousness is widely understood to be underpinned by rich and diverse functional networks, whose breakdown results in unconsciousness. Candidate neural correlates of anesthetic-induced unconsciousness include: (1) disrupted frontoparietal functional connectivity; (2) disrupted brain network hubs; and (3) reduced spatiotemporal complexity. However, emerging counterexamples have revealed that these markers may appear outside of the state they are associated with, challenging both their inclusion as markers of conscious level, and the theories of consciousness that rely on their evidence. In this study, (...) we present a case series of three individuals in disorders of consciousness (DOC) who exhibit paradoxical brain responses to exposure to anesthesia. High-density electroencephalographic data were recorded from three patients with unresponsive wakefulness syndrome (UWS) while they underwent a protocol of propofol anesthesia with a targeted effect site concentration of 2 μg/ml. Network hubs and directionality of functional connectivity in the alpha frequency band (8–13 Hz), were estimated using the weighted phase lag index (wPLI) and directed phase lag index (dPLI). The spatiotemporal signal complexity was estimated using three types of Lempel-Ziv complexity (LZC). Our results illustrate that exposure to propofol anesthesia can paradoxically result in: (1) increased frontoparietal feedback-dominant connectivity; (2) posterior network hubs; and (3) increased spatiotemporal complexity. The case examples presented in this paper challenge the role of functional connectivity and spatiotemporal complexity in theories of consciousness and for the clinical evaluation of levels of human consciousness. (shrink)

Currently fashionable among critics of enlightenment thought is the charge that Kant's ethics fails to provide an adequate account of character and its formation in moral and political life. G. Felicitas Munzel challenges this reading of Kant's thought, claiming not only that Kant has a very rich notion of moral character, but also that it is a conception of systematic importance for his thought, linking the formal moral with the critical, aesthetic, anthropological, and biological aspects of his philosophy. The first (...) book to focus on character formation in Kant's moral philosophy, it builds on important recent work on Kant's aesthetics and anthropology, and brings these to bear on moral issues. Munzel traces Kant's multifaceted definition of character through the broad range of his writings, and then explores the structure of character, its actual exercise in the world, and its cultivation. An outstanding work of original textual analysis and interpretation, _Kant's Conception of Moral Character_ is a major contribution to Kant studies and moral philosophy in general. (shrink)

Open peer commentary on the article “The Autopoiesis of Social Systems and its Criticisms” by Hugo Cadenas & Marcelo Arnold. Upshot: I discuss two aspects of Cadenas & Arnold’s target article. The first concerns some clarifications of the sociological importance of the concept of autopoiesis and the second the criticisms of this concept and its applications in the social sciences.

Reprint. Originally published: 1959; 1st Princeton/Bollingen pbk. ed. published: 1970.

The aim of this paper is to challenge the claim that the neural activity commonly referred to as 'readiness potential' constitutes evidence for the unconscious initiation of action. Although I accept that such neural activity seriously challenges the commonly held view that one's sense of volition is causally efficacious, I nevertheless contend that much of our everyday engagement with the world is consciously initiated. Thus, a distinction is made between awareness and what the awareness is of: the latter constituting the (...) conscious decision to act in accordance with one's goal, or what I have termed intentional project. Initiation of an action in accordance with one's intentional project grounds the action in meaning, something that would be lacking in an exclusively unconscious decision to act. (shrink)

At W.D. 202–12 Hesiod relates his ανος for the edification of the recalcitrant βασιλες, who must themselves admit the truth of the fable's moral . A hawk has seized a nightingale, and crushes her cries of misery by saying that she is in the claws of one who is πολλν ρείων and who is therefore at liberty to dispense with her as he pleases: anyone who tries to resist κρείσσονες is mad, for he has no chance of winning and merely (...) adds physical pain to the shame of defeat. Just what were the βασιλες to have made of this? Hesiod's most recent editor claims that ‘Hesiod does not manage to make it [the ανος] into a lesson for them [the kings]’, and ‘can only proceed by saying “Well, don't you behave like that” ’. (shrink)

Wegner (2002) fails to (1) distinguish conscious will and voluntariness; (2) account for everyday willed acts; and (3) individuate thoughts and acts. Wegner incorrectly implies that (4) we experience acts as willed only when they are caused by unwilled thoughts; (5) thoughts are never true causes of actions; and (6) we experience ourselves as first performing mental acts which then cause our intentional actions.

Fabvla misere mutila: this notice in the Oxford edition, reinforced in the critical apparatus, warns the reader against the transmitted text of the Heradidae. It tends to perpetuate the view which Wilamowitz, following up the hints of G. Hermann and A. Kirchhoff, propounded in 1882. The sweeping assurance of his famous article gave it a publicity which makes a detailed rehearsal superfluous. Wilamowitz throughout his life stuck to the opinion that ‘wir lesen die Herakliden in der Bearbeitung eines Regisseurs’. Dissentient (...) voices have been raised from time to time. M. Pohlenz in 1930 even proposed an interpretation of the Heradidae which quietly discarded the thesis of Wilamowitz. Nevertheless the latter appears still to hold the field at least in the English-speaking countries. If it is correct, the Heradidae of Euripides is beyond our reach. This conclusion has indeed, quite recently, been drawn by H. D. F. Kitto. (shrink)

Reviewer gives a survey of the new phylogenetic theory of language recently published by Prof. Dr. G. Révész, founder and director of the Laboratory for experimental psychology of the University of Amsterdam ). The starting-point of the theory is the conception of "contact", defined by the author as the innate trend to be together or to co-operate, common to all socially living beings. This "theory of contact" is developed by the author in different directions and gives rise to the distinction (...) 1. of three degrees of communication: cry , call and word , 2. of three periods in the development of language: a pre-phase , a primevalphase and a final phase and 3. of three main functions of language: impelling , indication and interrogation , and leads to the conclusion that most probably the oldest form of human intercourse was restricted to the function of impelling . Prof. R. lays great stress on the in his opinion unsurmountable barrier between human and animal forms of communication. (shrink)