This paper challenges the conventional wisdom dominating the social sciences and philosophy regarding temporal discounting, the practice of discounting the value of future utility when making decisions. Although there are sharp disagreements about temporal discounting, a kind of standard model has arisen, one that begins with a normative standard about how we should make intertemporal comparisons of utility. This standard demands that in so far as one is rational one discounts utilities at future times with (...) an exponential discount function. Tracing the justification for this standard through economics, philosophy and psychology, I’ll make what I believe is the best case one can for it, showing how a non-arbitrariness assumption and a dominance argument together imply that discounting ought to be exponential. Ultimately, however, I don’t find the case compelling. Non-exponential temporal discounting is often rational. If this is correct, Instead of trying to ‘fix’ non-exponential discounting because it is irrational and associated with negative life outcomes, we might instead focus attention on why the conditions obtain that make such discounting rational. (shrink)

The best justification of time-discounting is roughly that it is rational to care less about your more distant future because there is less of you around to have it. I argue that the standard version of this argument, which treats both psychological continuity and psychological connectedness as reasons to care about your future, can only rationalize an irrational—because exploitable—form of future discounting.

This paper examines explore the issues of intergenerational equity raised by climate change. A number of different reasons have been suggested as to why current generations may legitimately favor devoting resources to contemporaries rather than to future generations. These - either individually or jointly - challenge the case for combating climate change. In this paper, I distinguish between three different kinds of reason for favoring contemporaries. I argue that none of these arguments is persuasive. My answer in each case (...) appeals to the concept of human rights. It maintains that a human rights-centered perspective to climate change enables us to address each of these reasons. (shrink)

While broadly in agreement with the conclusion that the exponentially discounted utility model (EDU) is not a universally valid rationality standard, I want to defend some intertemporal rationality criteria related to EDU, which Craig Callender might not share. My commentary explores the tension between these intuitions and Callender's arguments. In the first place, I show that many of the concerns that he raises are in fact compatible with intertemporal consistency (and sometimes even with EDU). Secondly, I rebut those arguments that (...) directly challenge consistency. I conclude that while we disagree on the rationality of consistency, we can nevertheless agree on its non-universality and its limited justification of policy interventions. (shrink)

discounting the future' is one on which philosophers and economists have divergent professional views. There is a lot of talking at cross-purposes across the disciplinary divide here; but there is a fair bit of confusion (I think) within disciplines as well. My aim here is essentially clarificatory. I draw several distinctions that I see as significant: • between inter-temporal and intergenerational questions • between price (discount rate) and quantity (inter-temporal and intergenerational allocations) as the ethically relevant magnitude, and (...) • between price change and preference change as the primary instrument of change. I show that discounting does not violate the principle of inter-temporal and intergenerational neutrality, but I also cast some doubt on whether making adequate allowance for future generations has really been the problem that economists and philosophers seem to have taken it to be. Key Words: discount rates • intergenerational justice • future generations • `feasibility' analysis. (shrink)

Ramsey famously pronounced that discounting “future enjoyments” would be ethically indefensible. Suppes enunciated an equity criterion implying that all individuals’ welfare should be treated equally. By contrast, Arrow accepted, perhaps rather reluctantly, the logical force of Koopmans’ argument that no satisfactory preference ordering on a sufficiently unrestricted domain of infinite utility streams satisfies equal treatment. In this paper, we first derive an equitable utilitarian objective based on a version of the Vickrey–Harsanyi original position, extended to allow a variable (...) and uncertain population with no finite bound. Following the work of Chichilnisky and others on sustainability, slightly weakening the conditions of Koopmans and co-authors allows intergenerational equity to be satisfied. In fact, assuming that the expected total number of individuals who ever live is finite, and that each individual’s utility is bounded both above and below, there is a coherent equitable objective based on expected total utility. Moreover, it implies the “extinction discounting rule” advocated by, inter alia, the Stern Review on climate change. (shrink)

In carrying out cost-benefit or cost-effective analysis, a discount rate should be applied to some kinds of future benefits and costs. It is controversial, though, whether future health is in this class. I argue that one of the standard arguments for discounting (from diminishing marginal returns) is inapplicable to the case of health, while another (favouring a pure rate of time preference) is unsound in any case. However, there are two other reasons that might support a positive (...) discount rate for future health: one relating to uncertainty, and the other relating to the instrumental benefits of improved health. While the latter considerations could be modelled via a discount rate, they could alternatively be modelled more explicitly, in other ways; I briefly discuss which modelling method is preferable. Finally, I argue against the common claims that failing to discount future health would lead to paradox, and/or to inconsistency with the way future cash flows are treated. (shrink)

Ross Harrison; IV*—Discounting the Future, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 82, Issue 1, 1 June 1982, Pages 45–58, https://doi.org/10.1093/aristo.

This article concentrates on the critique by John Rawls and Derek Parfit of the use of a discount rate in economics. In a presentation of the basic economics underlying the use of a discount rate, the inherently problematic nature of people’s preferences with respect to time are highlighted. The second part discusses the role of the discount rate in economic optimal growth models. An outline of the economic theory of optimal growth is provided, pointing out how Rawls’s analysis of justice (...) between generations fits nicely into this economic discussion, thus explaining his interest in the discount rate. For Rawls the basic problem with the discount rate is that one variable is caught between two objectives: guaranteeing an efficient and at the same time a fair solution. Finally Derek Parfit’s analysis of the use of discount rates is examined. Parfit points out that a discount rate is often used as a crude rule of thumb which wrongly represents our reasons for discounting. The article concludes with a discussion of a study undertaken by a number of respected economists for the IPCC which exhibits all the mistakes that Parfit warns us against. (shrink)

Scrutinizes a class of accounting prices that has been the object of regular misunderstanding: social discount rates. The topic is over 40 years old, yet controversy rages over matters that have long been settled, involving as they do technical economics. Many who express views on social discount rates overlook the literature and make incorrect claims. I point to a few as the occasions warrant.

Discounting future costs and benefits is often defended on the ground that our descendants will be richer. Simply to treat the future as better off, however, is to commit an ecological fallacy. Even if our descendants are better off when we average across climate change scenarios, this cannot justify discounting costs and benefits in possible states of the world in which they are not. Giving due weight to catastrophe scenarios requires energetic action against climate change.

We consider future cash flows that are contingent both on dates in time and on uncertain states. The decision maker (DM) values the cash flows according to its decision criterion: Here, the payoffs’ expectation with respect to a capacity measure. The subjective measure grasps the DM’s behaviour in front of the future, in the spirit of de Finetti’s (1930) and of Yaari’s (1987) Dual Theory in the case of risk. Decomposition of the criterion into two criteria that represent (...) the DM’s preferences on uncertain payoffs and time contingent payoffs are derived from Ghirardato’s (1997) results. Conditional Choquet integrals are defined by dynamic consistency (DC) requirements and conditional capacities are derived, under some conditions on information. In contrast with other models referring to DC, ours does not collapse into a linear one because it violates a weak version of consequentialism. (shrink)

Policymakers and institutions have developed an increasing interest in applying principles from cognitive science to encourage individuals to adopt behaviors, attitudes and perspectives that enable them to reach higher levels of personal and collective well-being. We focused on the value of nudging people to adopt a broader farsighted view when making their day-to-day decisions, overcoming the temporal discounting bias which leads them to prefer smaller immediate gains to larger future rewards. Following recent advances in the literature, we tried (...) to mitigate this myopia promoting the connection that individuals feel between their present and future selves through a nudge which capitalizes on their natural tendency to illusory superiority. We defined and tested a paradigm to exploit persuasively this optimistic bias to mitigate temporal discounting through the mediation of an increased future self-continuity. Implications for well-being and public policies are discussed. (shrink)

Time discounting is the phenomenon that a desired result in the future is perceived as less valuable than the same result now. Economic theories can take this psychological fact into account in several ways. In the economic literature the most widely used type of additive time discounting is exponential discounting. In exponential discounting, the fall of valuation depends by a constant factor on the length of the delay period. It is well known, however, that exponential (...) time discounting often does not describe well how people actually behave. Most people are averse to short delays in gratification now, while their future selves may not mind a bit of extra waiting. This behaviour can be described well by non-exponential discounting functions such as hyperbolic discounting. In hyperbolic discounting, valuations fall rapidly for small delay periods, but the fall gets slower for longer delay periods. Hyperbolic discounting captures phenomena such as procrastination, addiction and in general inconsistency over time. This chapter investigates whether forms of non-exponential discounting, in particular close to the so called Quasi-Hyperbolic model, could also be characterized in terms of dynamically consistent choices when individuals discount the welfare of future selves as well as their payoffs. (shrink)

Intertemporal decision-making is important for both economy and physical health. Nevertheless, in daily life, individuals tend to prefer immediate and smaller rewards to delayed and larger rewards, which is known as delay discounting (DD). Episodic future thinking (EFT) has been proven to influence DD. However, there is still no inconsistent conclusion on the effect of negative EFT on DD. Considering the perceived controllability of negative EFT may address the issue (Controllability refers to the extent to which progress and (...) result of an event could be controlled by ourselves). In the current study, we manipulated EFT conditions (baseline, neutral EFT, negative-controllable EFT and negative-uncontrollable EFT), delayed time (i.e. 1 week, 1 month, 3 months, 6 months, 1 year and 3 years) and reward magnitude (small, large). We mainly found that when experiencing negative-uncontrollable EFT compared to negative-controllable EFT in the delayed time of 6 months with large rewards, individuals chose more delayed rewards, suggesting that negative-uncontrollable EFT effectively reduced DD under conditions of both large-magnitude reward and longer delayed time. The current study provides new insight for healthy groups on optimising EFT. In that case, individuals are able to gain long-term benefits in financial management and healthcare. (shrink)

A central point of debate over environmental policies concerns how future costs and benefits should be assessed. The most commonly used method for assessing the value of future costs and benefits is economic discounting. One often-cited justification for discounting is uncertainty. More specifically, it is risk aversion coupled with the expectation that future prospects are more risky. In this paper I argue that there are at least two reasons for disputing the use of risk aversion (...) as a justification for discounting when dealing with longterm decisions, one technical and one ethical. Firstly, I argue that technically, it implies an inconsistency between theory and practice. And secondly, I argue that discounting for uncertainty relies on a form of individualism which, while reasonable in standard microeconomic theory where an agent chooses how to spread her own consumption over her own lifetime, is inappropriate in the context of intergenerational social decisions. (shrink)

Utility discounting in intertemporal economic modelling has been viewed as problematic, both for descriptive and normative reasons. However, positive utility discount rates can be defended normatively; in particular, it is rational for future utility to be discounted to take into account model-independent outcomes when decision-making under risk. The resultant values will tend to be smaller than descriptive rates under most probability assignments. This also allows us to address some objections that intertemporal considerations will be overdemanding. A principle for (...) utility discount rates is suggested which is rooted in probability discounting. Utility discounting is defended against objections from Parfit (1984) and Broome (2005); Broome (2012). A sample utility discount rate is estimated. [Open access]. (shrink)

When assessing the cost effectiveness of health care programmes, health economists typically presume that distant events should be given less weight than present events. This article examines the moral reasonableness of arguments advanced for positive discounting in cost-effectiveness analysis both from an intergenerational and an intrapersonal perspective and assesses if arguments are equally applicable to health and monetary outcomes. The article concludes that behavioral effects related to time preferences give little or no reason for why society at large should (...) favour the present over the future when making intergenerational choices regarding health. The strongest argument for discounting stems from the combined argument of diminishing marginal utility in the presence of growth. However, this hinges on the assumption of actual growth in the relevant good. Moreover, current modern democracy may be insufficiently sensitive to the concerns of future generations. The second part of the article categorises preference failures (which justify paternalistic responses) into two distinct groups, myopic and acratic. The existence of these types of preference failures makes elicited time preferences of little normative relevance when making decisions regarding the social discount rate, even in an intrapersonal context. As with intergenerational discounting, the combined arguments of growth and diminishing marginal utility offer the strongest arguments for discounting in the intrapersonal context. However, there is no prima facie reason to assume that this argument should apply equally to health and monetary values. To be sure, selecting an approach towards discounting health is a complex matter. However, the life-or-death implications of any approach require that the discussion not be downplayed to merely a technical matter for economists to settle. (shrink)

Temporal discounting is a technical operation in climate change economics. When discount rates are positive, economic evaluation treats future benefits as less important than equivalent present benefits. This chapter explains and critically evaluates four different reasons economists have given for tying discount rates to the interest rates we observe in real-world markets. I suggest that while philosophers have correctly criticized three of these reasons, their criticisms of the fourth miss the mark. This is because philosophers have not taken (...) heed of the distinct analytical framework in which the fourth reason arises. (shrink)

People differ in the extent to which they discount the values of future rewards. Behavioural economists measure these differences in terms of functions that describe rates of reduced valuation in the future – temporal discounting – as these vary with time. They measure differences in preference for risk – differing rates of probability discounting – in terms of similar functions that describe reduced valuation of rewards as the probability of their delivery falls. So-called ‘impulsive’ people, including (...) people disposed to addiction, tend to choose rewards in patterns that are described by unusually steeply sloped discount functions. The empirical literature is ambivalent as to whether this applies to pathological gamblers (PGs) who manifest most other behavioural patterns associated with addiction, with different, equally careful studies suggesting opposite conclusions (Petry & Casarella 1999; Holt, Green & Myerson 2003). This puzzle may arise from the fact that most previous experiments on discounting behaviour were not designed so as to allow effects of high temporal discounting to be distinguished from effects of low probability discounting. (Addiction has sometimes been associated with the latter because it seems to involve, at least in the starting addict, under appreciation of risk.) Our research project investigates both forms of discounting behaviour and their relationship to severity of risk of PG in a community sample of South African gamblers. (shrink)

This study investigated the differences between past and future temporal discounting in terms of neural activity in relation to temporal distance. Results show that brain regions are engaged differently in past and future temporal discounting. This is likely because past temporal discounting requires memory reconstruction, whereas future temporal discounting requires the processing of uncertainty about the future. In past temporal discounting, neural activity differed only when preferences were made between rewards received (...) one hour prior and rewards received further in the past. The peak amplitudes of P2 and P3 varied as the temporal distance increased from 2 weeks to 50 years. In future temporal discounting, neural activity differed only when preferences were evaluated between two delayed rewards. The delay conditions and had a significant influence on P2 and N2. Findings indicate the existence of different decision-making systems operating in past and future temporal discounting. (shrink)

Future-biased individuals systematically prefer pleasures to be in the future and pains to be in the past. Empirical research shows that negative future-bias is robust: people prefer more past pain to less future pain. Is positive future-bias robust or fragile? Do people only prefer pleasures to be located in the future, compared to the past, when those pleasures are of equal value, or do they continue to prefer that pleasures be located in the (...) class='Hi'>future even when past pleasures outweigh future ones? Some arguments against the rationality of future-bias require positive future-bias to be robust, while others require it to be fragile. We empirically investigate and show that positive future-bias is robust. (shrink)

This paper formulates and axiomatizes utility models for denumerable time streams that make no commitment in regard to discounting future outcomes. The models address decision under certainty and decision under risk. Independence assumptions in both contexts lead to additive or multiplicative utilities over time periods that allow unambiguous comparisons of the relative importance of different periods. The models accommodate all patterns of future valuation. This discount-neutral feature is attained by restricting preference comparisons to outcome streams or probability (...) distributions on outcome streams that differ in at most a finite number of periods. (shrink)

Recent experiments suggest that search direction causally affects the discounted valuation of delayed payoffs. Comparisons between options can increase individuals’ patience toward future payoff options, while searching within options instead promotes impatient choices. We further test the robustness and specificity of this relationship using a novel choice task. Here individuals choose between pairs of delayed payoffs instead of single delayed outcomes. We observe a relationship between search styles and temporal discounting that are the opposite of those previously reported. (...) Integrators – those who tend to compare attributes within alternatives – discount and choose more slowly than comparators – those who are more likely to compare between alternatives. This finding supports and augments the view that individuals’ search strategy is predictive of subsequent discount rates. In particular, the direction of this relationship is further modifiable based on the spatial layout and varying information within an individual’s decision-making environment. (shrink)

This paper defends the claim that mere temporal proximity always and without exception strengthens certain moral duties, including the duty to save – call this view Robust Temporalism. Although almost all other moral philosophers dismiss Robust Temporalism out of hand, I argue that it is prima facie intuitively plausible, and that it is analogous to a view about special obligations that many philosophers already accept. I also defend Robust Temporalism against several common objections, and I highlight its relevance to a (...) number of practical policy debates, including longtermism. My conclusion is that Robust Temporalism is a moral live option, that deserves to be taken much more seriously in the future. (shrink)

Large-scale, self-sufficient space colonization is a plausible means of efficiently reducing existential risks and ensuring our long-term survival. But humanity is by and large myopic, and as an intergenerational global public good, existential risk reduction is systematically undervalued, hampered by intergenerational discounting. This paper explores how these issues apply to space colonization, arguing that the motivational and psychological barriers to space colonization are a special—and especially strong—case of a more general problem. The upshot is not that large-scale, self-sufficient space (...) colonization will never occur, but that, absent institutional change, the conditions under which it is most likely to occur are precisely those conditions where the threat of suffering risks might be most high. (shrink)

Should we remain neutral between our interests and those of future generations? Or are we ethically permitted or even required to depart from neutrality and engage in some measure of intergenerational discounting? This Article addresses the problem of intergenerational discounting by drawing on two different intellectual traditions: the social welfare function (“SWF”) tradition in welfare economics, and scholarship on “prioritarianism” in moral philosophy. Unlike utilitarians, prioritarians are sensitive to the distribution of well-being. They give greater weight to (...) well-being changes affecting worse-off individuals. Prioritarianism can be captured, formally, through an SWF which sums a concave transformation of individual utility, rather than simply summing unweighted utilities in utilitarian fashion. The Article considers the appropriate structure of a prioritarian SWF in intergenerational cases. The simplest case involves a fixed and finite intertemporal population. In that case, I argue, policymakers can and should maintain full neutrality between present and future generations. No discount factor should be attached to the utility of future individuals. Neutrality becomes trickier when we depart from this simple case, meaning: (1) “non-identity” problems, where current choices change the identity of future individuals; (2) population-size variation, where current choices affect not merely the identity of future individuals, but the size of the world’s future population (this case raises the specter of what Derek Parfit terms “the repugnant conclusion,” i.e., that dramatic reductions in the average level of individual well-being might be compensated for by increases in population size); or (3) an infinite population. The Article grapples with the difficult question of outfitting a prioritarian SWF to handle non-identity problems, population-size variation, and infinite populations. It tentatively suggests that a measure of neutrality can be maintained even in these cases. (shrink)

Climate change is projected to have very severe impacts on future generations. Given this, any adequate response to it has to consider the nature of our obligations to future generations. This paper seeks to do that and to relate this to the way that inter-generational justice is often framed by economic analyses of climate change. To do this the paper considers three kinds of considerations that, it has been argued, should guide the kinds of actions that one generation (...) should take if it is to treat both current and future people equitably. In particular it examines the case for what has been termed pure time discounting, growth discounting and opportunity cost discounting; and it assesses their implications for climate policy. It argues that none of these support the claims of those who think they give us reason to delay aggressive mitigation policies. It also finds, however, that the second kind of argument can, in certain circumstances, provide support for passing on some of the costs of mitigation to future generations. (shrink)

The social discount rate – the rate at which future benefit flows from government investment are discounted to present value – has been a frequent subject of technical debate among professional economists. From a broader perspective, however, the selection of an appropriate rate enjoins consideration of questions that define the very contours of our public philosophy. It carries implicit assumptions about the nature of citizenship, the relation between public and private spheres, and, most singularly, the status of a political (...) society as it is located in time. A key determinant of intertemporal economic allocation, the social discount rate provides a unique registry of a polity's historical consciousness and perceptions of its intergenerational obligations. Yet the highly technical nature of the debate over the discount rate has proven inhospitable to scholars otherwise inclined to investigate its ethical dimensions. Some, notably A. K. Sen, have begun to address these philosophical issues, though much territory remains to be explored. (shrink)

This paper studies the interaction between savagean uncertainty and time preferences. We introduce a variation of the discounted subjective expected utility model, where time preferences are state dependent. Before uncertainty is resolved, the individual is unsure about the discount factor that will be used, even when evaluating certain payoffs. The model can account for the present bias and diminishing impatience, even if the future is discounted geometrically. The present bias disappears when the immediate payoff becomes uncertain. Although preferences are (...) not stationary, choices may be time consistent. (shrink)

The concept of time discounting introduces weights on future goods to make these less valu- able. Famously, both the specic functional form of time discounting and its normative sta- tus are contested. To address these problems, this paper provides a measurement-theoretic framework of representation for time discounting. The general representation theorem char- acterises time discounting factors as ratio-scale representations of dierences in temporally extended prospects. This framework of representation is used to reconsider interpretations of time (...) discounting factors such as time preferences, uncertainty and preference change. It also allows to compare these interpretations with regards to their normative appeal, the kinds of reductionism regarding time and preference they imply and the specic functional form of time discounting they suggest. Farther, multiple-self interpretations of decision-makers become available, such that a time discounting factor represents the degree of connectedness between temporal selves in a person. (shrink)

An influential thought-experiment by Derek Parfit sought to establish that people have a preference for unpleasant events to lie in the past rather than the future. In recent discussions of Parfit’s argument, this purported preference is modelled as a discounting phenomenon, as is the tensed emotion of relief, which Arthur Prior argued demonstrated that there is an objective metaphysical difference between the past and the future. Looking at recent work demonstrating some psychological past/future asymmetries that are (...) more clearly instances of discounting I argue that this existing philosophical literature fails to distinguish between what are clearly two quite different psychological phenomena. This affects recent attempts to respond to Prior’s metaphysical argument, because it is not clear that they have identified the right phenomenon to be explained. It also affects Parfit’s thought-experiment, because the purported unitary ‘preference’ may in fact be an amalgam of these two quite different psychological phenomena. (shrink)

Future-bias is preferring some lesser future good to a greater past good because it is in the future, or preferring some greater past pain to some lesser future pain because it is in the past. Most of us think that this bias is rational. I argue that no agents have future-biased preferences that are rationally evaluable—that is, evaluable as rational or irrational. Given certain plausible assumptions about rational evaluability, either we must find a new conception (...) of future-bias that avoids the difficulties I raise, or we must conclude that future-biased preferences are not subject to rational evaluation. (shrink)

The social rate of discount--that is, the way decision makers today evaluate future consequences of collective activity--raises difficult issues of intergenerational justice. When benefits are discounted at the present rate the United States government requires, serious efforts to promote public health over the long term will fail cost-benefit tests. No consensus exists among theorists to establish fair rates; philosophers support discounting with economic arguments that economists reject, while economists no less paradoxically support the concept using philosophical arguments that (...) philosophers disavow. A new emphasis on the role of consumers' and citizens' time preferences, however, will keep open rather than close debates on the social discount rate. (shrink)

Temporal discounting is the tendency to devalue temporally distant rewards. Past studies have examined the k-value, the indifference point, and the area under the curve as dependent measures on this task. The current study included these three measures and a fourth measure, called the interest rate total score. The interest rate total score was based on scoring only those items in which the delayed choice should be preferred given the expected return based on simple interest rates. In addition, associations (...) with several individual difference measures were examined including intelligence, executive functions (inhibition, working memory, and set-shifting), thinking dispositions (Need for Cognition and Consideration of Future Consequences) and engagement in substance use and gambling behavior. A staircase temporal discounting task was examined in a sample of 99 university students. Replicating previous studies, temporal discounting increased with longer delays to reward and decreased with higher reward magnitudes. A hyperbolic function accounted for variance in temporal discounting better than an exponential function. Reaction time at the indifference point was significantly longer than at the other choice points. The four dependent measures of temporal discounting were all significantly correlated and were also significantly associated with our individual difference measures. That is, the tendency to wait for a larger delayed reward on all of the temporal discounting measures was associated with higher intelligence, higher executive functions and more consideration of future consequences. Associations between our measures of temporal discounting and outcomes related to substance use and gambling behavior were modest in our university sample. (shrink)

The standard argument for longtermism assumes that we should care as much about far future people as about our contemporaries. I challenge this assumption. I first consider existing interpretations of ‘temporal discounting’, and argue that such discounting seems either unwarranted or insufficient to block the argument. I then offer two alternative reasons to care less about far future people: caring as much about them as about our contemporaries would make our lives less authentic and less meaningful. (...) If I’m right, this undermines at least the strongest versions of longtermism. Plausibly, we should do much more for the far future than we’re currently doing. Still, we often ought to act for contemporaries’ sakes, even if longtermist actions would expectably do more good. (shrink)

Rachlin introduces a new theory before exhausting its predecessor. His earlier model of future-discounting may be developed by integrating over the duration of extended rewards and punishers. The difference in value of an event within a pattern over the event in isolation derives from the deprivation provided by the pattern; yet the pattern attracts because acute rewards are more potent than incremental deprivations.

This chapter introduces several distinctions relevant to what is called the “discounting problem”, since the issue is how (future) costs and benefits are discounted to make them comparable in present terms. The author defends the claim that there are good reasons to adopt Ramsey-style discounting in the context of climate change: the Ramsey rule is robust, flexible, and well-understood. An important distinction involved in discounting—“descriptivism” and “prescriptivism”—is discussed. It is argued that, even if we adopt prescriptivism, (...) and accept that this means there is need for moral experts in parameter assignments, there is a significant issue. The type of moral expertise required for the discounting problem will not involve knowledge of moral theory—thus making moral philosophy unhelpful in terms of making particular parameter assignments, despite these being substantive moral judgments. (shrink)

It is more difficult to feel emotions for future generations than for those who currently exist, and this seems to be one of the reasons why we struggle to care for the future. According to a number of authors, who have recently focused on the psychological flaws that prevent us from dealing with transgenerational issues, the main problem is “future discounting”. Challenging this common view, we argue that the main reason we struggle to care about (...) class='Hi'>future generations lies in two features of our daily emotions: the «identified victim effect» and the decrease in empathy for people who are different from us. These traits give rise to two puzzles we call the problem of the indeterminateness of future persons and the problem of dissimilarity. After having analyzed these problems of our moral psychology, we show how they allow us to account for some differences in affectivity towards a number of entities that do not currently exist, such as future generations, past generations and fictional characters. Bearing in mind the real limits of our emotions when dealing with future people, we sketch an alternative proposal on how to develop emotions to provide citizens of liberal democracies with a motivation to act in favor of future generations. (shrink)

Delay discounting is a common phenomenon in daily life, which refers to the subjective value of a future reward decreasing as a function of time. Previous studies have identified several cortical regions involved in delay discounting, but the neural network constructed by the cortical regions of delay discounting is less clear. In this study, we employed resting-state functional magnetic resonance imaging (RS-fMRI) to measure the spontaneous neural activity in a large sample of healthy young adults and (...) used the Monetary Choice Questionnaire to directly measure participants’ level of delay discounting. To identify the neural network of delay discounting at rest, we used an individual difference approach to explore brain regions whose spontaneous activities were related to delay discounting across the whole brain. Then, these brain regions served as seeds to identify the neural network of delay discounting. We found that the fractional amplitude of low-frequency fluctuations (fALFF) of the left insula were positively correlated to delay discounting. More importantly, its connectivity to the anterior cingulate cortex was read out for participants’ behavioral performance in the task of delay discounting. In short, our study provides empirical evidence that insula-anterior cingulate cortex connectivity may serve as a part of the neural network for delay discounting. (shrink)