In Defence of Intertemporal Consistency. A Discussion of Craig Callender’s ‘The Normative Standard for Future Discounting’

Australasian Philosophical Review 5 (3):266-276 (2021)
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Abstract

While broadly in agreement with the conclusion that the exponentially discounted utility model (EDU) is not a universally valid rationality standard, I want to defend some intertemporal rationality criteria related to EDU, which Craig Callender might not share. My commentary explores the tension between these intuitions and Callender's arguments. In the first place, I show that many of the concerns that he raises are in fact compatible with intertemporal consistency (and sometimes even with EDU). Secondly, I rebut those arguments that directly challenge consistency. I conclude that while we disagree on the rationality of consistency, we can nevertheless agree on its non-universality and its limited justification of policy interventions.

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Till Grüne-Yanoff
Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm

Citations of this work

Response to Critics.Craig Callender - 2021 - Australasian Philosophical Review 5 (3):309-321.

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References found in this work

Why We Should Reject S.Derek Parfit - 1984 - In Reasons and Persons. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
The Constitution of Selves.Christopher Williams & Marya Schechtman - 1998 - Philosophical Review 107 (4):641.
The Normative Standard for Future Discounting.Craig Callender - 2021 - Australasian Philosophical Review 5 (3):227-253.
Taking Plans Seriously.Michael Bratman - 1983 - Social Theory and Practice 9 (2-3):271-287.
A concept of progress for normative economics.Philippe Mongin - 2006 - Economics and Philosophy 22 (1):19-54.

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