Precisamos repensar a nossa abordagem quanto à proteção da privacidade na internet. Atualmente, os formuladores de políticas vêm se aprofundando na ideia de consentimento informado como um meio para proteger a privacidade. Por exemplo, em diversos países, as empresas são obrigadas por lei a obter o consentimento de um indivíduo antes de fazer uso dos seus dados; com base nessas requisitos de consentimento informado, a lei tem por objetivo empoderar as pessoas a fazerem escolhas de privacidade tendo em vista os (...) seus melhores interesses. No entanto, estudos comportamentais colocam em cheque a eficácia desta abordagem de empoderamento como um meio para proteger a privacidade. Este artigo defende uma abordagem conjunta de proteção e empoderamento dos indivíduos para aprimorar a proteção da privacidade. Este artigo aborda problemas práticos do consentimento informado como um meio para proteger a privacidade, e ilustra problemas com os atuais regulamentos de proteção à privacidade dos dados, concernentes à segmentação comportamental. Primeiramente, discutem-se os problemas de privacidade relativos à segmentação comportamental, e o papel central do consentimento informado ao abrigo da lei de proteção à privacidade. Em seguida, enfatizam-se os problemas práticos referentes ao consentimento informado. Por fim, o artigo argumenta que os formuladores de políticas devem dar mais atenção aos regulamentos que protegem as pessoas, e menos aos que as empoderam. INFORMED CONSENT: WE CAN DO BETTER TO DEFEND PRIVACYAbstractWe need to rethink our approach to defend privacy on the internet. Currently, policymakers focus heavily on the idea of informed consent as a means to defend privacy. For instance, in many countries the law requires firms to obtain an individual’s consent before they use data about her. With such informed consent requirements, the law aims to empower people to make privacy choices in their best interests. But behavioural studies cast doubt on this approach’s effectiveness, as people tend to click OK to almost any request they see on their screens. To improve privacy protection, this article argues for a combined approach of protecting and empowering the individual. (shrink)

In the European Union, the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) provides comprehensive rules for the processing of personal data. In addition, the EU lawmaker intends to adopt specific rules to protect confidentiality of communications, in a separate ePrivacy Regulation. Some have argued that there is no need for such additional rules for communications confidentiality. This Article discusses the protection of the right to confidentiality of communications in Europe. We look at the right’s origins to assess the rationale for protecting it. (...) We also analyze how the right is currently protected under the European Convention on Human Rights and under EU law. We show that at its core the right to communications confidentiality protects three individual and collective values: privacy, freedom of expression, and trust in communication services. The right aims to ensure that individuals and organizations can safely entrust communication to service providers. Initially, the right protected only postal letters, but it has gradually developed into a strong safeguard for the protection of confidentiality of communications, regardless of the technology used. Hence, the right does not merely serve individual privacy interests, but also other more collective interests that are crucial for the functioning of our information society. We conclude that separate EU rules to protect communications confidentiality, next to the GDPR, are justified and necessary. (shrink)

This book investigates a number of central problems in the philosophy of Charles Peirce grouped around the realism of his semiotics: the issue of how sign systems are developed and used in the investigation of reality. Thus, it deals with the precise character of Peirce's realism; with Peirce's special notion of propositions as signs which, at the same time, denote and describe the same object. It deals with diagrams as signs which depict more or less abstract states-of-affairs, facilitating reasoning about (...) them; with assertions as public claims about the truth of propositions. It deals with iconicity in logic, the issue of self-control in reasoning, dependences between phenomena in their realist descriptions. A number of chapters deal with applied semiotics: with biosemiotic sign use among pre-human organisms: the multimedia combination of pictorial and linguistic information in human semiotic genres like cartoons, posters, poetry, monuments. All in all, the book makes a strong case for the actual relevance of Peirce's realist semiotics. (shrink)

The paper gives a detailed reconstruction and discussion of Peirce’s doctrine of propositions, so-called Dicisigns, developed in the years around 1900. The special features different from the logical mainstream are highlighted: the functional definition not dependent upon conscious stances nor human language, the semiotic characterization extending propositions and quasi-propositions to cover prelinguistic and prehuman occurrences of signs, the relations of Dicisigns to the conception of facts, of diagrammatical reasoning, of icons and indices, of meanings, of objects, of syntax in Peirce’s (...) logic-as-semiotics. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Response to Øivind Varkøy, “The Concept of ‘Bildung’”Frederik PioThe process of Bildung has to do with something that “becomes.” The dimension of moving and developing makes the Bildung-metaphor of ‘the journey’ come into focus in Øivind Varkøy’s paper. As Varkøy states in his article, in relation to the Bildung concept one can see that “[the] relation between what is known in everyday life and what is new, unknown, (...) and strange, can in a sense be regarded as the meaning and intention of the concept.”This tension between that which is known and that which is unknown is handled by means of the metaphor of the journey. The journey is about leaving one’s homeground behind. The homeground is all that which is known. Then there is a venture into something not yet known. And then finally the individual returns home, enriched with a new experience, as a deeper and more encompassing human being. This is the blueprint of ‘the journey.’Thus the metaphor of the journey tells us that the crucial Bildung-factor is connected with a transgression of all that is familiar and well-known. So an experience is conducive to a process of Bildung to the extent that a transgression [End Page 97] occurs. That is as a movement that takes place beyond that in our ordinary lives which is all too well-known. Varkøy puts it this way:To have an experience is to be stricken, shaken, and affected. In this way, an experience is something which exceeds all boundaries, it notifies the arrival of something new and unknown. The subject is jerked out of its usual pattern and meets something that makes it look at itself with new eyes, experience its own subjectivity from unfamiliar quarters. Such experiences, such journeys, mean that we come into contact with important sides and dimensions of our way of being human.This translates into an educational context where a focus is on subject content “which enable[s] the students ‘to make journeys’... so that students can thereby not only emerge as educated music educationalists, but also as cultured (bilded) people.”All this belongs to the dimension of freedom. But as mentioned by Varkøy, Bildung is also about that which is authoritative and un-free. Thus Varkøy mentions Jon Fosse who found that “Norwegian schools certainly need a dose of Harold Bloom” and his book The Western Canon.So we have a tension between freedom (the journey into the unknown) and that which is un-free: the score we all have to settle with a great tradition that was there long before we arrived here and broke the surface of existence. In continuation of this I sense that Varkøy is touching upon a theme that tells us this: Today a process of Bildung should neither reject the tradition (to become anti-traditional). Nor should a process of Bildung become something that is just blindly reproducing the tradition and its values. So, it is not about being either anti-traditional or completely traditional, but about a quality which could be termed un-traditional. Varkøy says it like this:It is true to say... that the concept of Bildung’s cultural heritage perspective does not nescessarily mean a one-sided backwards glance focusing upon old masterworks... but also that it can to a considerable extent open up for focusing on the new and unknown.”So the Bildung concept contains simultaneously a directedness towards the past and a tradition which is authoritative, coupled with a directedness towards the future: and all that which is new and unknown, the open horizon of existence. It is in the light of this double directedness that Varkøy questions whether “the concept ‘cultural heritage’ should be considered, as something static or as something which is continually moving and developing.”So the past and our cultural heritage and the masterworks our cultural heritage is based upon, do not belong to bygone days. They do not belong to a finished [End Page 98] past. On the contrary, it is all still with us. That is how I read Varkøy. And this reading has a tremenduous resemblence to... (shrink)

A key question in the philosophy of logic is how we have epistemic justification for claims about logical entailment (assuming we have such justification at all). Justification holism asserts that claims of logical entailment can only be justified in the context of an entire logical theory, e.g., classical, intuitionistic, paraconsistent, paracomplete etc. According to holism, claims of logical entailment cannot be atomistically justified as isolated statements, independently of theory choice. At present there is a developing interest in—and endorsement of—justification holism (...) due to the revival of an abductivist approach to the epistemology of logic. This paper presents an argument against holism by establishing a foundational entailment-sentence of deduction which is justified independently of theory choice and outside the context of a whole logical theory. (shrink)

In the current world of education, politics and public opinion, musical experience is increasingly threatened. It is designated ever more as an expendable luxury. This kind of general trend has hardly left the thinking in the field of music and music education untouched. Inspiration comes from the technical rationality of our time. This rationality affects an oblivion of ontology. In this article we discuss this trend related to Martin Heidegger’s thinking concerning the human existence in the world, artworks and notions (...) like “being” (Sein) and “oblivion-of-being” (Seinsvergessenheit). We think that it is possible to see this “oblivion-of-being” in relation to the trend in cultural and educational politics as well as in music educational thinking to focus on the instrumental usefulness of learning music. (shrink)

Complex and urgent challenges including climate change and the significant decline in biodiversity provide a broad agenda for interdisciplinary scholars interested in the implications facing businesses, humanity, and other species. Within this context of sustainability, persistent conflicts between key paradigms create substantial barriers against—but also opportunities for—developing new conceptual approaches and theoretical models to understand and respond to these critical issues. Here, I revisit paradigmatic tensions to assess their impact on research and debate on sustainability, ethics, and business. Drawing on (...) relational ontology and values of nature that recognise humanity’s tight embeddedness within the planetary ecosystem, I examine how conceptualising sustainability as the _pursuit of life_ might generate new insights for research and practice into the wider transformation needed to sustain and restore socioecological systems. The aim here, however, is not to reconcile these paradigmatic tensions but instead use them as a fruitful lens for examining the implications for sustainability, while acknowledging the inherent ethical dilemmas for individuals, organisations, and society. (shrink)

We propose simple nonlinear mathematical models for the legal concept of balancing of interests. Our aim is to bridge the gap between an abstract formalisation of a balancing decision while assuring consistency and ultimately legal certainty across cases. We focus on the conflict between the rights to privacy and to the protection of personal data in Art. 7 and Art. 8 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (EUCh) against the right of access to information derived from Art. 11 EUCh. (...) These competing rights are denoted by ( \(i_1\) ) _right to privacy _ and ( \(i_2\) ) _access to information_; mathematically, their indices are respectively assigned by \(u_1\in [0,1]\) and \(u_2\in [0,1]\) subject to the constraint \(u_1+u_2=1\). This constraint allows us to use one single index _u_ to resolve the conflict through balancing. The outcome will be concluded by comparing the index _u_ with a prior given threshold \(u_0\). For simplicity, we assume that the balancing depends on only selected legal criteria such as the social status of affected person, and the sphere from which the information originated, which are represented as inputs of the models, called legal parameters. Additionally, we take “time” into consideration as a legal criterion, building on the European Court of Justice’s ruling on the right to be forgotten: by considering time as a legal parameter, we model how the outcome of the balancing changes over the passage of time. To catch the dependence of the outcome _u_ by these criteria as legal parameters, data were created by a fully-qualified lawyer. By comparison to other approaches based on machine learning, especially neural networks, this approach requires significantly less data. This might come at the price of higher abstraction and simplification, but also provides for higher transparency and explainability. Two mathematical models for _u_, a time-independent model and a time-dependent model, are proposed, that are fitted by using the data. (shrink)

SUMMARYThe history of the law of nations is generally seen as a synonym for the history of the laws of war. Yet, a strictly bilateral perspective can distort our interpretation of early modern diplomacy. The Peace of Utrecht inaugurated an era of relative stability in the European state system, based on balance-of-power politics and anti-hegemonic legal argumentation. Incidental conflicts ought to be interpreted against this background. Declarations of war issued in 1718, 1719 and 1733 during the War of the Quadruple (...) Alliance and the Polish Succession should not be read as doctrinal surrogates for trials between two parties, but as manifestos in a European arena. (shrink)

While the epistemic significance of disagreement has been a popular topic in epistemology for at least a decade, little attention has been paid to logical disagreement. This monograph is meant as a remedy. The text starts with an extensive literature review of the epistemology of (peer) disagreement and sets the stage for an epistemological study of logical disagreement. The guiding thread for the rest of the work is then three distinct readings of the ambiguous term ‘logical disagreement’. Chapters 1 and (...) 2 focus on the Ad Hoc Reading according to which logical disagreements occur when two subjects take incompatible doxastic attitudes toward a specific proposition in or about logic. Chapter 2 presents a new counterexample to the widely discussed Uniqueness Thesis. Chapters 3 and 4 focus on the Theory Choice Reading of ‘logical disagreement’. According to this interpretation, logical disagreements occur at the level of entire logical theories rather than individual entailment-claims. Chapter 4 concerns a key question from the philosophy of logic, viz., how we have epistemic justification for claims about logical consequence. In Chapters 5 and 6 we turn to the Akrasia Reading. On this reading, logical disagreements occur when there is a mismatch between the deductive strength of one’s background logic and the logical theory one prefers (officially). Chapter 6 introduces logical akrasia by analogy to epistemic akrasia and presents a novel dilemma. Chapter 7 revisits the epistemology of peer disagreement and argues that the epistemic significance of central principles from the literature are at best deflated in the context of logical disagreement. The chapter also develops a simple formal model of deep disagreement in Default Logic, relating this to our general discussion of logical disagreement. The monograph ends in an epilogue with some reflections on the potential epistemic significance of convergence in logical theorizing. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:A Response to Cathy Benedict, “Naming Our Reality: Negotiating and Creating Meaning in the Margin.”Frederik PioIn this paper we are offered a reflection on the historical and present marginalization of music education. As Cathy Benedict says, "What of this marginalization and what of its possibilities? I would like to suggest in this paper that this marginalized status partly reflects our own complicity as we have historically allowed others (...) to speak for us." The field of music education in other words is suffering from a lack of independence. She goes on to say, "music educators have copied the perceived successes of the basic disciplines instead of striving for transformation." However, the radical transformation which is called for seems to lie neither in the integration of music education as part of general education nor in the isolation of music education for she adds, "if we continue to 'concern ourselves with possible future scenarios for music education as part of general education' and in a music education vacuum, then we will probably continue to construct what 'could be' in the guise of what has 'always been.'"The assumption seems to be that music education belongs in the margin, for Benedict also adds, "it is misguided to think of our goal as simply to place music education as part of general education." Instead it is the margin that is claimed to be ripe with possibillities of transformation: "It is true that we need to envision 'what could be' scenarios for music education as part of general education.... It seems more important, though, even imperative, to grapple with the systemic issues that continually haunt us." From the margin music education "must begin narratives with the other disciplines." In other words, the margin seems to be the place from which one can "go about facilitating the creation of liminal space [End Page 69] and facilitate the habits of mind that will relativize taken-for-granted beliefs." It is from the margin that the transformations asked for can be carried out.The margin however has been infected with a dominance which stems from outsiders: "This margin... is our standpoint and a perspective from which we have allowed a worldview to be constructed for us." So the tension regarding the status of music education, between autonomy and integration, is not resolved.At the same time music education must become free. That means tearing loose from the "hidden hegemonic structures that inevitably serve to obscure the purpose of education" while an integrative effort on behalf of music education is called for in relation to general education: "In many cases, we have allowed other disciplines to name what we are and can be. We have crafted and named our importance in a version of their eyes." Consequently what is demanded here is that we craft a version of our field according to our own eyes. So far the field of music education has been marginalized (isolated), but it has never-the-less created itself according to the eyes of outsiders.On behalf of the field of music education, Benedict however seems to ask for a new productive or transformative kind of autonomy (exercised from the margin). The challenge then must now be to create the field of music education in our own eyes. Then perhaps the margin becomes the borderline between autonomy and integration.It would be helpful if Benedict could shed some light on the concept of 'the margin' positioned within a field of tension between autonomy (isolation) and integration. In other words, is the margin a place which has until now remained undiscovered? Does it mark out the limit between isolation and integration (on behalf of the field of music education)?Given the state of things described above the agenda created in the margin is seen as liberatory and transformative: "the space we need to facilitate is liberatory with change as a given not a goal oriented end-point" (emphasis added). In other words a liberation is called for which amounts to an attempt to oppose an oppression: "the field of music education has in fact manifested several characteristics of an oppressed society" (emphasis added). But what is meant by this reference to a liberation/oppression... (shrink)

The critical intention of this article does not focus on a comprehensive socio-cultural evaluation of gambling. Rather, its perspective is guided towards ways of picturing gambling and the subject of the gambler in different theoretical contexts. It is argued that one might expand philosophical conceptions of practical self-determination by taking an interdisciplinary look at gambling. However, such an attempt runs into the danger of painting an overly simplistic picture of self-control as self-continence, which can be found in theoretical approaches pathologizing (...) the gambler. In order to avoid such an outcome, an interdisciplinary analogy combining psychoanalytical and philosophical thought is presented. This analogy brings together the perspectives of the analysand and the gambler. By confronting these scenarios of human agency, it is shown that practical self-determination depends on instances of daring that can be related to certain gambling practices, too. The interdisciplinary view on gambling highlights its potentials for self-exploration, without neglecting the fact that an appropriate realization of such a self-exploration requires experiential and interpersonal conditions that often collide with the harsh reality of gambling practices. (shrink)

This paper discusses the Uniqueness Thesis, a core thesis in the epistemology of disagreement. After presenting uniqueness and clarifying relevant terms, a novel counterexample to the thesis will be introduced. This counterexample involves logical disagreement. Several objections to the counterexample are then considered, and it is argued that the best responses to the counterexample all undermine the initial motivation for uniqueness.

On the basis of the Suppes–Sneed structuralview of scientific theories, we take a freshlook at the concept of refutability,which was famously proposed by K.R. Popper in 1934 as a criterion for the demarcation of scientific theories from non-scientific ones, e.g., pseudo-scientificand metaphysical theories. By way of an introduction we argue that a clash between Popper and his critics on whether scientific theories are, in fact, refutablecan be partly explained by the fact Popper and his criticsascribed different meanings to the term (...) theoryThen we narrow our attention to one particular theory,namely quantum mechanics, in order to elucidate general matters discussed. We prove that quantum mechanics is irrefutable in a rather straightforward sense, but argue that it is refutable in a more sophisticated sense, which incorporates someobservations obtained by looking closely at the practiceof physics. We shall locate exactly where non-rigourous elements enter the evaluation of a scientific theory – thismakes us see clearly how fruitful mathematics isfor the philosophy of science. (shrink)

Cette introduction présente et contextualise les articles publiés dans la section spéciale dont le but est d’analyser l’interprétation de la pensée hellénistique chez les philosophes continentaux très influents tels que : Agamben, Arendt, Blumenberg, Foucault, Heidegger et Stiegler. Les articles prêtent une attention particulière à trois directions de recherche. Ils examinent tout d’abord l’influence de la pensée hellénistique sur ces auteurs et la façon dont ils ont interprété, utilisé et mésinterprété l’héritage des philosophies hellé-nistiques. Deuxièmement, les articles analysent les hypothèses (...) in-terprétatives et les préjugés qui ont caractérisé ces interprétations. Enfin, ils nous permettent de comprendre plus clairement pourquoi plusieurs philosophes continentaux se sont intéressés à la philosophie ancienne. Les rédacteurs invités résument les conclusions pro-visoires de cette section spéciale en soulignant que les interprétations continentales de la pensée hellénistique représentent un thème particulièrement intéressant dans le cadre de la recherche historico-philosophique actuelle. (shrink)

Anecdotal evidence seems to suggest that firms are responding differently to the mounting concerns over environmental degradation and climate change. While a few studies at individual firm level do exist, relatively little is known about the longitudinal development of corporate environmental strategy at the population level of firms. Employing KLD data we explore the evolution of environmental strategy among a sample of S&P500 corporations over the period 1997 to 2006. We theoretically ground our study in Burgelman’s (1991) autonomous and induced (...) perspectives of strategy-making. Our findings suggest widespread inertia among firms to adjust to the changing socio-institutional environment. (shrink)

I argue that forgiveness necessarily involves overcoming resentment to which we are entitled when wronged. My view calls into question the standard understanding of forgiveness according to which resentment is no longer warranted once the transgressor apologizes or makes amends in some other way. If forgiveness entails relinquishing unwarranted resentment, as the standard account has it, then it is not freely given, since one must relinquish unwarranted resentments. On my view, forgiveness remains elective since one chooses to relinquish resentment to (...) which one has every right irrespective of whether the transgressor apologizes. (shrink)

Two different concepts of iconicity compete in Peirce's diagrammatical logic. One is articulated in his general reflections on the role of diagrams in thought, in what could be termed his diagrammatology — the other is articulated in his construction of Existential Graphs as an iconic system for representing logic. One is operational and defines iconicity in terms of which information may be derived from a given diagram or diagram system — the other has stronger demands on iconicity, adding to the (...) operational criterion a demand for as high a degree of similarity as possible and may be termed optimal iconicity. Peirce himself does not clearly distinguish these two iconicity notions, a fact that has caused some confusion. By isolating them, we get a clearer and more refined conceptual apparatus for analyzing iconic signs, from pictures to logic. (shrink)

We study a logic for deontic necessity and sufficiency, as originally proposed in van Benthem :36–41, 1979). Building on earlier work in modal logic, we provide a sound and complete axiomatization for it, consider some standard extensions, and study other important properties. After that, we compare this logic to the logic of “obligation as weakest permission” from Anglberger et al. :807–827, 2015).

The aim of this paper is threefold. Firstly, §1 and §2 introduce the novel concept logical akrasia by analogy to epistemic akrasia. If successful, the initial sections will draw attention to an interesting akratic phenomenon which has not received much attention in the literature on akrasia (although it has been discussed by logicians in different terms). Secondly, §3 and §4 present a dilemma related to logical akrasia. From a case involving the consistency of Peano Arithmetic and Gödel’s Second Incompleteness Theorem (...) it’s shown that either we must be agnostic about the consistency of Peano Arithmetic or akratic in our arithmetical theorizing. If successful, these sections will underscore the pertinence and persistence of akrasia in arithmetic (by appeal to Gödel’s seminal work). Thirdly, §5 concludes by suggesting a way of translating the dilemma of arithmetical akrasia into a case of regular epistemic akrasia; and further how one might try to escape the dilemma when it’s framed this way. (shrink)

En 2007, le philosophe danois Frederik Stjernfelt a donné une nouvelle vigueur aux études sur les diagrammes en publiant son opus majeur Diagrammatology. Ce terme a acquis l’extension d’une sous-discipline à part entière à l’intérieur des études sémiotiques. La diagrammatologie fédère aujourd’hui des recherches venues des sciences cognitives aussi bien que du post-structuralisme, des mathématiques et des études littéraires. Frederik Stjernfelt explique comment la diagrammatologie résulte pour lui d’une redéfinition de certains concepts fondamentaux (ceux de signe, de proposition (...) et de diagramme au premier chef) amorcée par le père du pragmatisme, Charles S. Peirce. (shrink)

Default logic has been a very active research topic in artificial intelligence since the early 1980s, but has not received as much attention in the philosophical literature thus far. This paper shows one way in which the technical tools of artificial intelligence can be applied in contemporary epistemology by modeling a paradigmatic case of deep disagreement using default logic. In §1 model-building viewed as a kind of philosophical progress is briefly motivated, while §2 introduces the case of deep disagreement we (...) aim to model. On the heels of this, §3 defines our formal framework, viz., a refined Horty-style default logic. §4 then uses the framework to model deep disagreement, and finally §5 provides a critical discussion of the result. (shrink)

Environmental philosophers are often concerned to show that non-sentient things, such as plants or ecosystems, have interests and therefore are appropriate objects of moral concern. They deny that mentality is a necessary condition for having interests. Yet they also deny that they are committed to recognizing interests in things like machines. I argue that either machines have interests (and hence moral standing) too or mentality is a necessary condition for inclusion within the purview of morality. I go on to argue (...) that the aspect of mentality necessary for having interests is more complicated than mere sentience. (shrink)

In a recent paper, Jeanne Peijnenburg and David Atkinson [ Studia Logica, 89:333-341 ] have challenged the foundationalist rejection of infinitism by giving an example of an infinite, yet explicitly solvable regress of probabilistic justification. So far, however, there has been no criterion for the consistency of infinite probabilistic regresses, and in particular, foundationalists might still question the consistency of the solvable regress proposed by Peijnenburg and Atkinson.

We present a logic, $$\mathbf {ELI^r}$$ ELI r, for the discovery of deterministic causal regularities starting from empirical data. Our approach is inspired by Mackie’s theory of causes as INUS-conditions, and implements a more recent adjustment to Mackie’s theory according to which the left-hand side of causal regularities is required to be a minimal disjunction of minimal conjunctions. To derive such regularities from a given set of data, we make use of the adaptive logics framework. Our knowledge of deterministic causal (...) regularities is, as Mackie noted, most often gappy or elliptical. The adaptive logics framework is well-suited to explicate both the internal and the external dynamics of the discovery of such gappy regularities. After presenting $$\mathbf {ELI^r}$$ ELI r, we first discuss these forms of dynamics in more detail. Next, we consider some criticisms of the INUS-account and show how our approach avoids them, and we compare $$\mathbf {ELI^r}$$ ELI r with the CNA algorithm that was recently proposed by Michael Baumgartner. (shrink)

Deprivation offers a plausible explanation for the badness of death, so fear is not unreasonable. But horror at the prospect of one's death is not just extreme fear because horror is structurally different than fear. Horror requires a different explanation. For Sartre, horror is possible only in unique circumstances. I argue that Sartre's view, when combined with the subjective incomprehensibility of one's annihilation, can explain horror and other negative emotions that are not contingent on deprivation. Further, I argue that while (...) fear can be reasonable if one's death will deprive, Lucretius's Symmetry Argument shows that horror is unreasonable. (shrink)

For moral realists moral judgments will be a kind of factual judgment that involves the basically reliable apprehension of an objective moral reality. I argue that factual judgments display at least some degree of conceptual sensitivity to error, while moral judgments do not. Therefore moral judgments are not a kind of factual judgment.

Keine ausführliche Beschreibung für "Erkenntnis und Wertung" verfügbar.

Recent data have provided evidence for an unrecognised ancient lineage of green plants that persists in marine deep-water environments. The green plants are a major group of photosynthetic eukaryotes that have played a prominent role in the global ecosystem for millions of years. A schism early in their evolution gave rise to two major lineages, one of which diversified in the world's oceans and gave rise to a large diversity of marine and freshwater green algae (Chlorophyta) while the other gave (...) rise to a diverse array of freshwater green algae and the land plants (Streptophyta). It is generally believed that the earliest-diverging Chlorophyta were motile planktonic unicellular organisms, but the discovery of an ancient group of deep-water seaweeds has challenged our understanding of the basal branches of the green plant phylogeny. In this review, we discuss current insights into the origin and diversification of the green plant lineage. (shrink)

Nietzsche ne peut que se tuer lui-même pour tuer son père ; et, en se tuant, il ne fait que tuer un père déjà mort. Est-ce à dire que Nietzsche va mourir de ne pouvoir tuer son père?