Moral realism and moral judgments

Erkenntnis 36 (1):103 - 112 (1992)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

For moral realists moral judgments will be a kind of factual judgment that involves the basically reliable apprehension of an objective moral reality. I argue that factual judgments display at least some degree of conceptual sensitivity to error, while moral judgments do not. Therefore moral judgments are not a kind of factual judgment.

Categories

Keywords

Reprint years

DOI

10.1007/bf00401966

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 101,667

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

My notes

Similar books and articles

Moral judgment and the content-attitude distinction.Uriah Kriegel - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (4):1135-1152.
Defusing Counterexamples against Motivational Internalism.Seungbae Park - 2016 - Filosofija. Sociologija 27 (1):23-30.
Moral judgment as a natural kind.Victor Kumar - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (11):2887-2910.
In Defense of Ordinary Moral Character Judgment.Evan Westra - 2020 - Erkenntnis 87 (4):1461-1479.
Nihilism and the Epistemic Profile of Moral Judgment.Jonas Olson - 2018 - In Aaron Zimmerman, Karen Jones & Mark Timmons (eds.), Routledge Handbook on Moral Epistemology. New York: Routledge.
Nihilism and the epistemic profile of moral judgment.Jonas Olson - 2018 - In Aaron Zimmerman, Karen Jones & Mark Timmons (eds.), Routledge Handbook on Moral Epistemology. New York: Routledge.
Realist-expressivism and the fundamental role of normative belief.David Copp - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (6):1333-1356.
Psychopathy and internalism.Victor Kumar - 2016 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46 (3):318-345.
Sentimentalism, Affective Response, and the Justification of Normative Moral Judgments.Kyle Menken - unknown

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
119 (#182,324)

6 months
13 (#267,677)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Frederik Kaufman
Ithaca College

Citations of this work

Add more citations

References found in this work

Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics.David Owen Brink - 1989 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Moral realism.Peter Railton - 1986 - Philosophical Review 95 (2):163-207.
Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics.Robert Shaver - 1992 - Philosophical Review 101 (2):458.
Self-Knowledge and Self-Identity.Sydney Shoemaker (ed.) - 1963 - Ithaca, N.Y.,: Cornell University Press.
Virtues and Vices.Phillipa Foot - 1997 - In Thomas L. Carson & Paul K. Moser (eds.), Morality and the good life. New York: Oxford University Press.

View all 9 references / Add more references