In section 1 we present moral constructivism as a metaphysical project which grounds moral norms in the attitude of valuing by rational agents. In section 2 we establish that Kantian Constructivism – opposed to Humean Constructivism – seeks objective and universal moral norms through a process of rational construction and ratification of norms that does not draw on any kind of subjective attitude of valuing. In section 3 we explore whether Kant is a moral constructivist or moral realist, arguing that (...) he might be read as a proto-moral constructivist whose formulas impose standards of correctness upon our moral judgments, from which we formulate moral norms as necessary facts of reason. In section 4 we argue that: 1) vulnerabilities have moral relevance which adds merit to the project of finding objective moral norms, and 2) the inclusion of vulnerabilities as empirical contingencies is compatible with Kantian Constructivism. We do so by considering vulnerabilities a constitutive aspect of finite rational agents which must, therefore, be implied and considered in the process of moral construction. (shrink)

O presente texto refere-se à trajetória de três homens. Eles nasceram na mesma época, mas viveram cada um em uma cidade distinta. Um morava em Fortaleza, no Ceará, outro em Lisboa e o terceiro no Rio de Janeiro. O que os unia? Livros. Os três tiveram suas vidas marcadas pela edição, impressão e comercialização de livros e relacionadas, particularmente, pela publicação de uma coleção de livros: a Biblioteca do Povo e das Escolas. É dessa coleção e de como ela (...) se associa à vida desses três homens que este texto trata. É urna história que liga Lisboa, Rio de Janeiro e Fortaleza e que mostra que ainda há muito a se descobrir e percorrer nos caminhos dos livros no século XIX. (shrink)

Book reviews: VAUCHEZ, André. Francisco de Assis, Entre História e Memória. Tradução de José David Antunes e Noémia Lopes. Lisboa: Instituto Piaget, 2013. 431 p.

Com este artigo, procurámos expor a dinâmica que assiste à Filosofia do Conhecimento de Francisco Vieira de Almeida (1888-1962), Professor da Faculdade de Letras da Universidade de Lisboa de 1915 a 1958, por um lado, apresentada como acesso privilegiado à prática filosófica, por outro, entendida como exercício de sistematização que recusa a fixação num sistema, por fim, atravessada pela intenção de promover a osmose entre o conhecimento de «tipo-filosofia» e o de «tipo-ciência», surpreendendo a gestualidade dessa ética do (...) filosofar naquela que é tida, consensualmente, como sua obra-prima, Pontos de Referência, publicada em 1961. As sinuosidades particulares de uma tal pragmática, resistindo deliberadamente a todo o esforço de circunscrição, levaram-nos a cruzar um primeiro nível de leitura, orientado para evidenciar os traços gerais, e um segundo, ocupado com problemas de teor mais específico. (shrink)

Ponto de partida do artigo é a consideração de que o problema da relação entre Filosofia e Espiritualidade, ainda que problemático, é filosoficamente pensável e pode ser historicamente reconstruído. Com efeito, o artigo mostra de que modo o problema foi objecto de uma sistematização paradoxal, ainda que coerente e exemplar, por parte de S. Boaventura, cuja reflexão, tematizando a espiritualidade minorítica, radica em S. Francisco de Assis, ainda que também através da mediação de Santo António de Lisboa. Segundo (...) S. Boaventura, Deus manifesta-se de forma natural no livro da natureza mediante o Verbo incriado, cognoscível mediante a razão natural na ciência natural, que é a Filosofia; e revela-se sobrenaturalmente no livro da Escritura mediante o Verbo incarnado, cognoscível mediante a razão iluminada pela fé na ciência sobrenatural, que é a Teologia; mas também se comunica pessoalmente e concretamente no coração dos crentes mediante o Verbo inspirado, ou seja, o Cristo feito presente pelo Espírito Santo na "vida espiritual", num processo ascético-místico, cujo primeiro estádio é, paradoxalmente, a própria Filosofia, aqui entendida como a busca da sabedoria através das virtudes cardeais. Por outro lado, o artigo mostra também como o próprio paradigma da reedificação interior através das virtudes parece estabelecer um vínculo entre S. Francisco de Assis e Santo António de Lisboa, bem como entre os dois e S. Boaventura, o qual, hipotiza o autor do artigo, não só leu alguma coisa dos Sermões de Santo António, como deles retirou elementos para as suas reflexões mais maduras. /// The starting point of this article is the consideration that the problem of the relation between Philosophy and Spirituality, even if problematic, can be philosophically thought and historically reconstructed. In effect, the article shows how this problem was object of a paradoxical systematization, coherent and exemplar, on the part of Saint Bonaventure, whose reflection, typical of the Franciscan spirituality, is rooted in Saint Francis of Assisi, even if also through the mediation of Saint Anthony of Lisbon. According to Saint Bonaventure, God reveals Godself naturally in the Book of nature by means of the uncreated Logos, knowable through natural reason in the natural science, which is Philosophy; and God reveals Godself supernaturally in the Book of Scripture by means of the incarnated Logos knowable by means of reason illuminated by faith in the supernatural science, which is Theology; but God also communicates Godself personally and concretely in the hearts of the believers by means of the inspired Logos, i.e., the Christ made present through the Holy Spirit in the "spiritual life", in an ascetic-mystical process, whose first stage is, paradoxically, Philosophy itself, here understood as the search for Wisdom through the cardinal virtues. On the other hand, the article also shows how the paradigm of the interior edification through the virtues seems to establish a link between Saint Francis of Assisi and Saint Anthony of Lisbon, as well as between the two and Saint Bonaventure, who, according to the article, not only has read something of Saint Anthony's Sermons, but also has taken something from them for his mature reflexions. (shrink)

The moral enhancement of human beings is a constant theme in the history of humanity. Today, faced with the threats of a new, globalised world, concern over this matter is more pressing. For this reason, the use of biotechnology to make human beings more moral has been considered. However, this approach is dangerous and very controversial. The purpose of this article is to argue that the use of another new technology, AI, would be preferable to achieve this goal. Whilst several (...) proposals have been made on how to use AI for moral enhancement, we present an alternative that we argue to be superior to other proposals that have been developed. (shrink)

Can Artificial Intelligence be more effective than human instruction for the moral enhancement of people? The author argues that it only would be if the use of this technology were aimed at increasing the individual's capacity to reflectively decide for themselves, rather than at directly influencing behaviour. To support this, it is shown how a disregard for personal autonomy, in particular, invalidates the main proposals for applying new technologies, both biomedical and AI-based, to moral enhancement. As an alternative to these (...) proposals, this article proposes a virtual assistant that, through dialogue, neutrality and virtual reality technologies, can teach users to make better moral decisions on their own. The author concludes that, as long as certain precautions are taken in its design, such an assistant could do this better than a human instructor adopting the same educational methodology. (shrink)

This paper represents a step in the analysis of the key, but much-neglected role of affect and emotions as the originary source of the living present, as a foundational dimension of the moment-to-moment emergence of consciousness. In a more general sense, we may express the question in the following terms: there seems to be a growing consensus from various sources -- philosophical, empirical and clinical -- that emotions cannot be seen as a mere 'coloration' of the cognitive agent, understood as (...) a formal or un-affected self, but are immanent and inextricable from every mental act. How can this be borne out, beyond just announcing it? Specifically, what is the role of affect-emotion in the self-movement of the flow, of the. (shrink)

This paper considers, firstly, to what extent the administration of oxytocin can augment the capacity of empathy in human beings; and secondly, whether or not such practice ought to be allowed. In relation to the latter, the author develops an argument in favour of this intervention by virtue of its consistency with the belief that, if a therapeutic treatment is to be considered acceptable, it is essential that it maximizes the well-being of those affected and that it does not compromise (...) the autonomy of the patient. Having rejected several objections related to the nature of this intervention, the author finally questions its morality on the basis of a concern with its universalizability. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to address the question: Can an artificial neural network (ANN) model be used as a possible characterization of the power of the human mind? We will discuss what might be the relationship between such a model and its natural counterpart. A possible characterization of the different power capabilities of the mind is suggested in terms of the information contained (in its computational complexity) or achievable by it. Such characterization takes advantage of recent results based (...) on natural neural networks (NNN) and the computational power of arbitrary artificial neural networks (ANN). The possible acceptance of neural networks as the model of the human mind's operation makes the aforementioned quite relevant. (shrink)

Many of our daily activities are now made more convenient and efficient by virtual assistants, and the day when they can be designed to instruct us in certain skills, such as those needed to make moral judgements, is not far off. In this paper we ask to what extent it would be ethically acceptable for these so-called virtual assistants for moral enhancement to use subtle strategies, known as “nudges”, to influence our decisions. To achieve our goal, we will first characterise (...) nudges in their standard use and discuss the debate they have generated around their possible manipulative character, establishing three conditions of manipulation. Secondly, we ask whether nudges can occur in moral virtual assistants that are not manipulative. After critically analysing some proposed virtual assistants, we argue in favour of one of them, given that by pursuing an open and neutral moral enhancement, it promotes and respects the autonomy of the person as much as possible. Thirdly, we analyse how nudges could enhance the functioning of such an assistant, and evaluate them in terms of their degree of threat to the subject’s autonomy and their level of transparency. Finally, we consider the possibility of using motivational nudges, which not only help us in the formation of moral judgements but also in our moral behaviour. (shrink)

This article discusses some of the claims of the earlier and later versions of the Contemporary Theory of Metaphor (CTM) and addresses some of the criticism that has been leveled against it. It is argued that much of this criticism arises from common misconceptions as to the real claims made by the theory. However, CTM is still in need of further exploration and empirical support. In this connection, we identify some areas where research is still needed and supply our own (...) developments. We argue for a more complex classification of metaphor types, which takes into account various complementary taxonomic perspectives, including the nature of source and target and the genericity and complexity of the metaphoric operation. We also explore metaphor in relation to cognitive prominence and conceptual interaction issues. Finally, we deal with the problem of constraints on metaphor and make a proposal for three complementary kinds of constraint. (shrink)

This book presents the reader with a comprehensive and structured understanding of the ethics of Artificial Intelligence (AI). It describes the main ethical questions that arise from the use of AI in different areas, as well as the contribution of various academic disciplines such as legal policy, environmental sciences, and philosophy of technology to the study of AI. AI has become ubiquitous and is significantly changing our lives, in many cases, for the better, but it comes with ethical challenges. These (...) challenges include issues with the possibility and consequences of autonomous AI systems, privacy and data protection, the development of a surveillance society, problems with the design of these technologies and inequalities in access to AI technologies. This book offers specialists an instrument to develop a rigorous understanding of the main debates in emerging ethical questions around AI. The book will be of great relevance to experts in applied and technology ethics and to students pursuing degrees in applied ethics and, more specifically, in AI ethics. (shrink)

A reality-design gap in the conceptualization and practice of digital agriculture has been systematically reported in the literature. This condition is favored by the lack of understanding and inclusion of local worldviews around digital technologies. Informed by Amartya Sen’s capabilities approach, this study looks to bring stories of local appropriation to the spotlight. Based on a qualitative approach that included data collected through interviews with 73 households, the authors explored the way in which two selected communities of Colombian coffee growers (...) are engaged in the use of digital technologies in material and symbolic ways. Three emergent themes—a relational way of farming, (dis)connected machines, and nurtured families and communities – articulate multiple interactions between farmers, farms, institutional programs, and technologies, that originate local forms of digitalization (and non-digitalization). This study points out the relevant role of situated ideas of development in positioning technologies in or out of the farm, and broader digitalization agendas in or out of farmers’ life projects. At the same time, it presents a critique of notions of universality that drive unquestioned quests for technification. In contrast, building on a relational perspective, this study calls for embracing a perspective of multiplicity within notions of development and innovation. (shrink)

The study of Plato's dialogues has traditionally oscillated between two paradigms: one that portrays the dialogues as treatises expounding doctrines and one that sees them as purely skeptical, rhetorical, or literary. This collection of new essays by twelve noted Plato scholars illustrates the fruitfulness of breaking away from those paradigms, which have divided Platonic scholarship and led it to a number of dead ends. While the essays are diverse in their approaches, each seeks to find a 'third way' to understand (...) Plato, reading him as neither a dogmatist nor a skeptic but as a philosopher capable of reconciling the content and form of his writings. (shrink)

Utilitarianism has been able to respond to many of the objections raised against it by undertaking a major revision of its theory. Basically, this consisted of recognising that its early normative propositions were only viable for agents very different from flesh-and-blood humans. They then deduced that, given human limitations, it was most useful for everyone if moral agents did not behave as utilitarians and habitually followed certain rules. Important recent advances in neurotechnology suggest that some of these human limitations can (...) be overcome. In this article, after presenting some possible neuro-enhancements, we seek to answer the questions, first, of whether they should be accepted by a utilitarian ethic and, second, if accepted, to what extent they would invalidate the revision that allowed them to escape the objections. (shrink)

Traditionally, the field of science and technology studies (STS) considered the scientific laboratory as the central site of knowledge production and technological development. While providing rich analyses of the social construction of scientific knowledge and the role of non-human actors, STS scholars have often neglected the university – the very context in which laboratories themselves are embedded – as a relevant object of research. In this paper, we argue for re-introducing the university as a relevant category and object of analysis (...) by using the notion of epistemic virtues to link epistemic culture – traditionally the focus of STS – and epistemic structure – traditionally the focus of higher education studies. Advancing this line of argumentation, we make three analytical moves. First, we explore academic freedom as a specific version of negative liberty that extends beyond disciplinary boundaries. We suggest that academics continuously negotiate academic freedom considering culturally and socially situated epistemic virtues such as objectivity and neutrality. Second, we introduce the notion of humility to revisit scientific knowledge production more generally and academic freedom in particular. Finally, we argue that practicing humility leads to enacting the university as an infrastructure of becoming otherwise, thereby enriching our understanding of universities as distinct and highly complex social spaces with a logic of their own. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThis article discusses the complexity in ironic echoic mention from the perspective of Cognitive Linguistics. It builds on the scenario-based approach to irony where ironic meaning is treat...

El propósito de Levinas coincide con el intento moderno de recuperación de la verdad y del sentido aunque en una dirección y contenidos distintos. Si en Hegel la Aufhebung tendía a la Totalidad y lo Mismo , para Husserl será esencial la apertura de Mundo que tiene lugar ya en la experiencia de conciencia del ego trascendental, mientras que Heidegger, por su parte, primará la pregunta por el Ser. El intento de Levinas, en cambio, no será recomponer la relación entre (...) el yo, por un lado, y el mundo, lo absoluto, las cosas o el ser, por el otro, sino la recuperación de la relación entre yo-y-otro. No es un simple cambio en la dirección o en el contenido del sentido de la reflexión filosófica, sino un intento serio de encontrar una nueva significación, «otra manera que ser» que no termine siendo otro proyecto más de integración y síntesis. Lo que propone Levinas es una auténtica salida para la que traza el itinerario que va del ser al otro, recurriendo sencillamente a la experiencia que cotidianamente se nos impone a cada uno de nosotros con un peso incontestable, a saber: la presencia de las diferencias, de lo asimétrico, en definitiva, la manifestación del otro en tanto que otro. Es esta experiencia heterónoma ordinaria, esta vivencia diaria de la alteridad como dato primordial del fenómeno de la intersubjetividad el ámbito que ha intentado explorar nuestro autor. ¿Acaso es esta responsabilidad así sentida conjugable con una experiencia filosófica universal? ¿La responsabilidad puede llevarse hasta el límite de la substitución por el otro, hasta la de-posición del Yo sin identidad? ¿Qué tipo de relación puede darse con algo absolutamente asimétrico, exterior, previo e irreductible? ¿De dónde viene esa asignación apremiante de responsabilidad que llega hasta arrojarme en la obsesión y el asedio? ¿Cómo puede ser éticamente plausible un mandato tan traumatizante y violento que termina por convertir al sujeto en rehén, sustituido ya por los otros? ¿Es posible conciliar la libertad y la autónoma decisión del sujeto con una consideración de la subjetividad como «heme aquí», absoluta pasividad expuesta a los otros y vulnerabilidad de una piel que se ofrece al ultraje y la herida?. En definitiva: ¿es la subjetividad algo de lo que partimos o a lo que llegamos? (shrink)

William Paley ( Natural Theology , 1802) developed the argument-from-design. The complex structure of the human eye evinces that it was designed by an intelligent Creator. The argument is based on the irreducible complexity ("relation") of multiple interacting parts, all necessary for function. Paley adduces a wealth of biological examples leading to the same conclusion; his knowledge of the biology of his time was profound and extensive. Charles Darwin’s Origin of Species is an extended argument demonstrating that the "design" of (...) organisms can be explained by natural selection. Moreover, the dysfunctions, defects, waste, and cruelty that prevail in the living world are incompatible with a benevolent and omnipotent Creator. They come about by a process that incorporates chance and necessity, mutation and natural selection. In addition to science, there are other ways of knowing, such as art, literature, philosophy, and religion. Matters of value, meaning, and purpose transcend science. (shrink)

Francisco J. Gonzalez - Die Idee des Guten in Platons Politeia: Beobachtungen zu den mittleren Buchern - Journal of the History of Philosophy 43:3 Journal of the History of Philosophy 43.3 354-355 Thomas A. Szlezák. Die Idee des Guten in Platons Politeia: Beobachtungen zu den mittleren Büchern. Sankt Augustin: Academia, 2003. Pp. viii + 160. Cloth, € 24,50. The first part of this book consists of a series of lectures delivered at the University of Macerata in April 2000. These (...) lectures provide a detailed and illuminating analysis of the middle books of the Republic, with the focus naturally on the three great similes. Appended to these lectures are three previously published articles on the Cave Analogy, the Idea of the Good, and Rafael Ferber's supposedly "skeptical interpretation" of Plato . While some repetition is unavoidable in such a compilation, the different parts of the book for the most part complement and.. (shrink)

El presente ensayo explora el itinerario de la crítica que Nietzsche ejerció sobre el arte de Wagner en tres pasos. Primero, se trata de reconocer la juvenil admiración del filósofo por la ópera wagneriana entendida como un renacimiento del drama musical antiguo. Luego, se explora el tránsito hacia su desilusión en la clave de la influencia de Schopenhauer sobre Wagner. Finalmente, el ensayo remata en la crítica madura de Nietzsche sobre Wagner, donde se advierten los prolegómenos decimonónicos de la transformación (...) general del arte en espectáculo en el sentido contemporáneo. (shrink)

Resenha do Livro: EAGLETON, Terry. _Sobre o Mal_. Tradução de Fernando Santos. São Paulo: Editora Unesp, 2022, 152 p. ISBN 978-65-5711-142-0.

A teoria política medieval possui uma singularidade, pois trata de “dois poderes” distintos – reino e o sacerdócio –, sendo necessário definir como se dão as relações entre eles. Durante o debate entre Bonifácio VIII e Filipe, o Belo, foi importante a obra de João Quidort. Ele criticou a teoria da plenitude do poder, atribuída pelos curialistas ao papa, e procurou mostrar a diferença entre os modos de causalidade que explicam cada um dos dois poderes. PALAVRAS-CHAVE – Teoria política medieval. (...) Dois poderes. Plenitude do poder. João Quidort. Egídio Romano. ABSTRACT The medieval political theory has a singularity, for it deals with two distinct powers – kingdom and priesthood –, and it is necessary to define how the relations between these powers are given. During the debate between Boniface VIII and Philip, the Fair, the works of John Quidort was important. He criticized the theory of plentitude of power, which was held by the curialists to the pope, and aimed to show the difference between the manners of causality that explained each of the two powers. KEY WORDS – Medieval political theory. Two power. Plentitude of power. John Quidort. Giles of Rom. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Form and Argument in Late Plato ed. by Christopher Gill and Mary Margaret McCabeFrancisco J. GonzalezChristopher Gill and Mary Margaret McCabe, editors. Form and Argument in Late Plato. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996. Pp. xi + 345. Cloth, $65.00.This collection has the commendable aim of challenging the view that in Plato’s “late” works the dialogue form is a mere formality adding little to the argumentative content, a view (...) still widespread among “analytic” scholars. The qualification is necessary because this view has already been seriously challenged by “nonanalytic” interpreters. It is therefore surprising that the editors chose contributors who almost all “share the analytic’ approach which is prominent in Anglo-American scholarship on Plato,” despite their admission that this approach has focused more on arguments than on the dialogue form (2, 299–300). Why seek to reinvent the wheel without the help of those who have already invented it? As a result, while the volume certainly makes an important contribution to our understanding of the form of this group of dialogues, it is much more successful in providing helpful and illuminating readings of their argumentative content: the detailed and rigorous analyses of McCabe, Malcolm Schofield (both on the Parmenides), and Gail Fine (on the Theaetetus) deserve special mention. The aim of the present review, which could not even begin to do justice to what the volume provides in the latter area, is therefore limited to documenting its mixed success in addressing some fundamental questions about form that have already occupied nonanalytic scholars (perhaps too exclusively):1) Does the main speaker speak for Plato?Given the great variety of main speakers in the “late” dialogues (Socrates, Parmenides, the Eleatic Stranger, Timaeus, the Athenian Stranger), each with a distinct personality and a distinct method, no attempt to understand the form of these dialogues should avoid this question. Gill raises it (293–95) and Schofield provides the most explicit response in denying that any interlocutor in a Platonic dialogue “can be assumed to be merely a spokesman for Plato’s own views” (51). More importantly, the essays by Dorothea Frede (on the Philebus) and Catherine Osborne (on the Timaeus), probably the most valuable in the volume, show what results can be achieved without this assumption. On the other hand, Michael Frede (on the Sophist) and Christopher Rowe (on the Politicus; see 158 and cf. 172 n.48) simply assume without argument that the Eleatic Stranger = Plato. All other contributors make the “spokesman” assumption, either implicitly or explicitly (see Christopher Bobonich’s reading of the Laws, 254–55).2) What is the significance of the dramatic context, especially dramatic chronology and characterization?As often noted, the Parmenides is set in Socrates’ youth and is in this sense the earliest [End Page 311] dialogue, while the series Theaetetus-Sophist-Politicus is set immediately before Socrates’ trial and condemnation. McCabe and Schofield are silent about the first fact. M. Frede briefly discusses the second (146–47), but adds little to what has already been said by others. As for the characterization of specific interlocutors, this volume overall has surprisingly little to offer. The essays of D. Frede and Osborne, however, are exemplary in this area.3) Why did Plato choose to write these works as dialogues rather than as treatises?Bobonich, D. Frede, and Osborne succeed in demonstrating the significance and even necessity of the dialogue form, an extraordinary achievement given the dialogues they discuss. Osborne in particular brilliantly shows how the dialogue form undercuts the common tendency to read the Timaeus as a treatise on natural science. Other contributors are less successful in answering this question central to the volume’s task. Schofield takes himself to be reading the Parmenides as a dialogue (51) because he, unlike Vlastos, interprets the Third Man Argument (second version) in the wider context of other arguments in the dialogue, including those of the second half. But “reading arguments in context” is demanded by any philosophical text and has nothing per se to do with the dialogue form. Fine reads the first part of the Theaetetus as the dialectical elaboration and refutation of an opponent’s view (109), but this could just as well be... (shrink)

Este artículo es acerca del modo en que Henry David Thoreau concibe la filosofía, esto es, no como una cuestión meramente teórica sino como un asunto práctico y existencial, vinculado a una forma de vida. Sin embargo, a diferencia de la interpretación que hace Pierre Hadot de Walden, no entendemos esto como una reminiscencia a la manera de los antiguos de abordarla. Por el contrario, la presentamos como una inscripción del autor en una tradición inequívocamente moderna, aquella que concibe la (...) vida como un experimento y al filósofo como un experimentador. Esta lectura de la obra de Thoreau en clave experimental abre la filosofía a nuevas posibilidades, al situarla más allá de su carácter representacional y de la búsqueda de la verdad. Al mismo tiempo, permite matizar la imagen negativa de Thoreau que ha predominado desde los tiempos del autor, la de un moralista inflexible con frecuencia desdeñoso de la vida de los demás. (shrink)

Este trabajo tiene como principal objetivo el de lograr una comprensión de la filosofía en cuanto fundamento insoslayable para la teología. Sostiene, en pri-mer lugar, la necesidad de desarro-llar una teología más autocosciente en el sentido racional del σὺν λόγω, es decir, desde el programa ple-namente actual de la fides quarens intellectum. Defiende, en segundo lugar, que la filosofía solo puede entenderse partiendo de la pre-tensión que la ha animado desde el comienzo de su andadura: la bús-queda de la verdad (...) de las cosas. Y para este fin ten-drá necesariamente que dotarse de densidad metafísica suficiente y apostar por las tesis de un sano realismo cognoscitivo. Este estudio concluye con una reflexión, en ter-cer lugar, sobre el uso teológico de la filosofía. La tesis que se defiende es que sin el fundamento filosófico, la fe y la teología pierden lo más nuclear de su misión, la posibili-dad misma de presentarse todavía con algún rastro de significatividad para el hombre de hoy. (shrink)

This article analyzes whether state repression in post—civil war situations can be explained by dynamics associated with previous civil wars. It claims that in post—civil war situations the state can more easily resort to indiscriminate repression against social groups, relying on information related to the civil war. Two civil war dynamics are tested: preemptive indiscriminate violence to eliminate opposition by the defeated population and retaliation for crimes committed during the war. Using data from the first decade of the Francoist regime (...) in Spain, the author found that civil war dynamics, and not actual dissent, explain most of the country’s postwar violence. (shrink)

The importance of the size of a political community for the development of civic virtue has usually been related to the advantages of small size in the possibility of direct democracy and the fulfilment of the classical ideal of freedom as governing and being governed by turn. While these are important variables for the development of civic virtue, in this article it is argued that small size also matters because it allows the development of civic virtue by a reputation-building mechanism. (...) The correlate of this argument is that as the political community grows in size, this mechanism turns increasingly unfeasible. However, the article also claims that certain institutional devices for the spread of information about people's preferences can help the development of civic virtue even in big republics. This argument is illustrated with the example of the Roman censorship, an institution that flourished during the Roman Republican period. (shrink)

In modern political science, repeated elections are considered as the main mechanism of electoral accountability in democracies. More rarely, elections are considered as ways to select ‘good types’ of politicians. In this article it is argued that historical republican authors interpreted elections in this last sense. They viewed elections as a means to select what they often called the ‘natural aristocracy’, virtuous political leaders who would pursue the common good. This argument is presented in three steps. First, it is claimed (...) that republican authors did not consider retrospective accountability as one of the goals of electoral processes. Second, I present some evidence concerning the distinction in republican authors between two types of politicians, ‘good’ and ‘bad’. And, finally, I present some republican arguments about how elections could serve as a device for selecting the ‘good’ politicians. (shrink)