It is commonly accepted – not only in the philosophical literature but also in daily life – that ignorance is a failure of some sort. As a result, a desideratum of any ontological account of ignorance is that it must be able to explain why there is something wrong with being ignorant of a true proposition. This article shows two things. First, two influential accounts of ignorance – the Knowledge Account and the True Belief Account – do not satisfy this (...) requirement. They fail to provide a satisfying normative account of the badness of ignorance. Second, this article suggests an alternative explanation of what makes ignorance a bad cognitive state. In a nutshell, ignorance is bad because it is the manifestation of a vice, namely, of what Cassam calls “epistemic insouciance”. (shrink)

COVID-19 vaccine refusal seems like a paradigm case of irrationality. Vaccines are supposed to be the best way to get us out of the COVID-19 pandemic. And yet many people believe that they should not be vaccinated even though they are dissatisfied with the current situation. In this paper, we analyze COVID-19 vaccine refusal with the tools of contemporary philosophical theories of responsibility and rationality. The main outcome of this analysis is that many vaccine-refusers are responsible for the belief that (...) they should not be vaccinated and epistemically rational in holding it. This is an important result because it provides insights into the legitimacy of certain public health policies. In particular, this result shows that a public health policy that would abandon the project of convincing certain vaccine-refusers with reasons – e.g., by simply making vaccination compulsory – is prima facie illegitimate. (shrink)

“Doing Gender,” West and Zimmerman's landmark article, highlighted the importance of social interaction, thus revealing the weaknesses of socialization and structural approaches. However, despite its revolutionary potential for illuminating how to dismantle the gender system, doing gender has become a theory of gender persistence and the inevitability of inequality. In this article, the author argues that we need to reframe the questions to ask how we can undo gender. Research should focus on when and how social interactions become less gendered, (...) whether gender can be irrelevant in interaction, whether gendered interactions always underwrite inequality, how the institutional and interactional levels work together to produce change, and interaction as the site of change. (shrink)

Situations where it is not obvious which of two incompatible actions we ought to perform are commonplace. As has frequently been noted in the contemporary literature, a similar issue seems to arise in the field of beliefs. Cases of doxastic divergence are cases in which the subject seems subject to two divergent oughts to believe: an epistemic and a practical ought to believe. This article supports the moderate pragmatist view according to which subjects ought, all things considered, to hold the (...) practically right belief in, at least, some cases of doxastic divergence. Unlike many defences of pragmatism, this paper does not aim to overcome exclusivism (briefly, the view that only epistemic, but not practical, considerations have an influence on what a subject ought to believe). Another major challenge that pragmatism faces is to show that the epistemic and the practical ought to believe are comparable. This article makes a case for their comparability. (shrink)

The standard view of ignorance is that it consists in the mere lack of knowledge or true belief. Duncan Pritchard has recently argued, against the standard view, that ignorance is the lack of knowledge/true belief that is due to an improper inquiry. I shall call, Pritchard’s alternative account the Normative Account. The purpose of this article is to strengthen the Normative Account by providing an independent vargument supporting it.

Language research has come to rely heavily on large‐scale, web‐based datasets. These datasets can present significant methodological challenges, requiring researchers to make a number of decisions about how they are collected, represented, and analyzed. These decisions often concern long‐standing challenges in corpus‐based language research, including determining what counts as a word, deciding which words should be analyzed, and matching sets of words across languages. We illustrate these challenges by revisiting “Word lengths are optimized for efficient communication” (Piantadosi, Tily, & Gibson, (...) 2011), which found that word lengths in 11 languages are more strongly correlated with their average predictability (or average information content) than their frequency. Using what we argue to be best practices for large‐scale corpus analyses, we find significantly attenuated support for this result and demonstrate that a stronger relationship obtains between word frequency and length for a majority of the languages in the sample. We consider the implications of the results for language research more broadly and provide several recommendations to researchers regarding best practices. (shrink)

Hypotheticals, conditionals, and their connecting relation, implication, dramatically changed their meanings during the nineteenth and early part of the twentieth century. Modern logicians ordinarily do not distinguish between the terms hypothetical and conditional. Yet in the late nineteenth century their meanings were quite different, their ties to the implication relation either were unclear, or the implication relation was used exclusively as a logical operator. I will trace the development of implication as an inference operator from these earlier notions into the (...) first third of the twentieth century using as the starting point the ideas primarily of R. Whately and W. Hamilton before discussing the work of the transitional logicians, A. De Morgan and G. Boole on these topics. Then we discuss the relevant views of four prominent but relatively unknown nineteenth century British logicians, W.E. Johnson, J.N. Keynes, E.E.C. Jones, and H. MacColl, as well as those of the more influential logicians, W.S. Jevons and J. Venn, closing with a section on ‘implication as inference’ where we explore some key ideas of B. Russell and sketch the work of D. Hilbert, P. Hertz, and G. Gentzen who together are responsible for the development of the modern ideas related to the subjects of this paper. (shrink)

Dans le cadre de notre thèse, nous avons confronté les Lais de Marie de France datant du xiie siècle qui présentent la particularité alors inédite d’avoir pour auteur une femme et le Genji Monogatari de Murasaki Shikibu (une femme également), écrit au xie siècle au Japon, qui fait aussi figure d’exception dans un paysage scriptural majoritairement masculin, a fortiori pour une œuvre d’une telle ampleur. Le rapprochement entre les deux œuvres était avant tout motivé par une thématique de fond, l’imaginaire (...) féminin, déployé dans deux cultures géographiquement et sociologiquement éloignées, cependant immergées dans un milieu élitiste, celui de la Cour. Ce choix s’inscrivait surtout dans la perspective d’une approche mythocritique plutôt que strictement littéraire, dont l’intérêt se situait en deçà du cadre du texte, puisqu’il puisait dans la mythologie fondatrice des deux cultures, source de l’émergence d’un imaginaire féminin à des époques chiches de féminité. Or, cette analyse, que nous avons qualifiée de contrastive, a permis l’ouverture de la réflexion sur d’autres perspectives que seul autorisait un tel rapprochement ; elle a également cherché à distinguer, parmi les motifs communs aux deux textes, ceux qui relevaient d’une universalité (contextuelle) de ceux qui relevaient d’une commune origine eurasiatique. La réflexion était axée sur la notion d’altérité selon une acception très large mais concentrée sur la représentation par l’imaginaire féminin de l’Autre sexe et d’un Ailleurs avant tout textuel et narratif. (shrink)

Depuis la fin des années 1960, le Québec a été le théâtre d’un déploiement sans précédent de discours, de revendications et de pratiques féministes. Dans cette mouvance, le mouvement des femmes s’est progressivement imposé comme un acteur significatif de la scène québécoise, en raison même du poids de sa présence sur le terrain, de la pertinence et de la diversité de ses luttes,..

Examines from a Jewish point of view such topics as love, sex, marriage, business ethics, health and medicine, the environment, faith, birth control, civil disobedience, scholarship, and death.

Sommes-nous, au moins occasionnellement, responsables de nos croyances ? Une chose est sûre, en pratique, nous considérons souvent que tel est le cas. Mais l’attribution d’une telle responsabilité est problématique dans la mesure où les croyances ne sont pas des états mentaux que nous contrôlons comme nous contrôlons, par exemple, nos actions. Cet article est consacré à préciser, à expliquer et à défendre l’affirmation selon laquelle les croyances ne sont pas des états mentaux que nous pouvons acquérir « à volonté (...) » . Dans un deuxième temps, nous expliquons brièvement pourquoi la vérité de cette affirmation n’empêche pas que nous soyons, au moins occasionnellement, responsables de ce que nous croyons. (shrink)

Part of a series of highly entertaining books on the history of sinning. Eating too much is one of the Western world's greatest problems, but relatively few people would consider it a crime against God. Yet even as gluttony has ceased to be an evil, food and dieting have become a cultural obsessions, with millions of pounds expended on mortifying the flesh with punishing diet and exercise regimes. This brief history of gluttony traces the changing cultural attitudes towards food and (...) pleasure, scarcity and abundance. It reveals how notions of saintliness and purity have helped form modern views of enjoyment, self-mortification, and ultimately nutrition. Restaurant-goers and readers of gourmet magazines rationalize their pursuit of too much food in many ways, but does a slight tinge of guilt makes your meal taste that much better? This book provides the answer, thoroughly exploring humankind's attempts to quell its chief survival strategy - eating. (shrink)

Spoken communication occurs in a “noisy channel” characterized by high levels of environmental noise, variability within and between speakers, and lexical and syntactic ambiguity. Given these properties of the received linguistic input, robust spoken word recognition—and language processing more generally—relies heavily on listeners' prior knowledge to evaluate whether candidate interpretations of that input are more or less likely. Here we compare several broad-coverage probabilistic generative language models in their ability to capture human linguistic expectations. Serial reproduction, an experimental paradigm where (...) spoken utterances are reproduced by successive participants similar to the children's game of “Telephone,” is used to elicit a sample that reflects the linguistic expectations of English-speaking adults. When we evaluate a suite of probabilistic generative language models against the yielded chains of utterances, we find that those models that make use of abstract representations of preceding linguistic context (i.e., phrase structure) best predict the changes made by people in the course of serial reproduction. A logistic regression model predicting which words in an utterance are most likely to be lost or changed in the course of spoken transmission corroborates this result. We interpret these findings in light of research highlighting the interaction of memory-based constraints and representations in language processing. (shrink)

According to a classical view, suspension of judgement is, like belief and disbelief, a cognitive state. However, as some authors (Crawford 2022; Lord 2020; McGrath 2021a, 2021b; Sosa 2019, 2021) have pointed out, to suspend judgement is also to perform a certain mental action. The main goal of this article is to defend a precise account of the action that we take when we suspend our judgement: the Preventing Account. The Preventing Account has both the advantage of (i) accounting for (...) familiar situations in which subjects suspend judgements and (ii) of explaining the tendency, which is widespread in the philosophical tradition (from sceptics to pragmatists), to consider suspension of judgement as something that is (at least, to some degree) difficult to achieve. (shrink)

The value problem of knowledge is one of the prominent problems that philosophical accounts of knowledge are expected to solve. According to the credit solution, a well-known solution to this problem, knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief because the former is creditable to a subject’s cognitive competence. But what is “credit value”? How does it connect to the already existing distinctions between values? The purpose of the present paper is to answer these questions. Its most important conclusion is (...) that credit value is not—contrary to what the upholders of the credit solution have frequently claimed—final value. (shrink)

In the recent epistemological literature much has been written about the nature of suspending judgement or agnosticism. There has also been a surge of recent interest in the nature of ignorance. But what is the relationship between these two epistemically significant states? Prima facie, both suspension and ignorance seem to involve the lack of a correct answer to a question. And, again prima facie, there may be some intuitive attraction to the idea that when one is ignorant whether p, one (...) ought to suspend judgement whether p. In this paper we will explore a range of different possible normative connections between ignorance and suspension of judgement. We will also discuss how both ignorance and suspension are related to having inconclusive evidence. As we will see, the issues can become quite complex due to the fact that there are different, competing views about the nature of ignorance and also about the nature of suspension. Moreover, there are importantly different kinds of epistemic norms. Our overall aim then will be to systematically chart how these different choices will impact the possible normative connections between ignorance and suspension. (shrink)

A la manière des expériences perceptuelles qui nous présentent des formes, des couleurs, des sons, des textures, etc. les émotions nous présentent des propriétés évaluatives. Ainsi, les émotions constituent un type d’expérience perceptuelle spécifique, un type qui nous donne accès à des valeurs (plutôt qu’à des propriétés non axiologiques). Cette théorie d’origine meinongienne doit beaucoup Christine Tappolet qui y consacre un second livre Emotions, Values and Agency que tous les amoureux des choses vraiment bien faites ne pourront qu’apprécier. Cet article (...) est consacré à deux problèmes auxquels est confronté le partisan de la théorie perceptuelle des émotions, c’est-à-dire, de la théorie selon laquelle les émotions constituent un type spécifique d’expériences perceptuelles. Ce sont les problèmes de la justification et de la rationalité des émotions. Loin d’ignorer ces difficultés, Tappolet y consacre une partie de son premier chapitre (pages 31-45). Cette contribution a plus précisément deux objectifs. Le premier est de montrer pourquoi la justification ne pose pas un problème aussi sérieux que la rationalité à la théorie perceptuelle des émotions. Son second but est d’expliquer pourquoi je doute que la solution de Tappolet au problème de la rationalité fonctionne. (shrink)

Lewis Carroll: Logic Charles L. Dodgson, 1832-1898, was a British mathematician, logician, and the author of the ‘Alice’ books, Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland and Through the Looking Glass and What Alice Found There. His fame derives principally from his literary works, but in the twentieth century some of his mathematical … Continue reading Lewis Carroll: Logic →.

Three clinical cases of very ill neonates exemplifying extreme ethical situations for nurses are interpreted through Arendt's concepts of life and natality, and Agamben's critique of bare life. Agamben's notions of form-of-life, as the inseparability of zoe/bios, and testimony are offered as the potential foundation of nursing ethics.

The Nuffield Council on Bioethics introduced an ‘intervention ladder’ to guide policymakers on public health interventions.1 The ladder’s vertical structure represents an ordering of interventions, from least to most intrusive. In his article, Paetkau acknowledges that this ladder is ‘a useful tool’ (p. 1) for evaluating public health interventions.2 However, he objects that its focus on individual behaviour is too narrow and obscures ‘interventions that operate on the level of systems rather than individuals’ (p. 2). To be sure, some of (...) the interventions on the original ladder do involve what might ordinarily be seen as ‘system’ or environmental changes. For instance, we might encourage active transport by building dedicated cycle lanes. However, these measures still have their intended effects through altering individual choices. What Paetkau means by a ‘systemic intervention’ is specifically one that improves public health without changing individual behaviour change (pp. 2–3). For example, reducing pollution or improving public health infrastructure. He suggests that, because the Nuffield ladder focuses on individual behaviour, it may lead policymakers to overlook these possibilities. Paetkau proposes broadening the ladder to include systemic interventions. This results in what he calls a ‘stairway’ (p. 3). It …. (shrink)

Publication du matériel amphorique recueilli dans le remblai au moyen duquel on a comblé vers 330 le puits monumental de la place au Nord-Est du Passage des Théores. Exceptés de rares fragments du ve siècle, l'ensemble du matériel date du ive siècle. On a dénombré près de 1500 amphores, dont 82 % sont d'origine thasienne, avec une nette prédominance de l'amphore biconique par rapport à l'amphore «en toupie». Les amphores importées viennent surtout de Grèce de l'Est (Chios et Samos) et (...) de Grèce du Nord (Mendè essentiellement), et, à un degré moindre, de la Mer Noire (Sinope notamment). (shrink)

Η Ιπποκρατική Συλλογή παρέχει δύο τύπους πληροφοριών σχετικά με τα αγγεία : άλλοτε συμπληρώνει τις πληροφορίες που υπάρχουν για ήδη γνωστά σχήματα αγγείων (χύτρες με διάτρητα πώματα) και άλλοτε αναφέρει σπάνια ονόματα αγγείων (« φακός », « άρυστήρ », « βομβυλιός »), αλλά που τα συνδέει με συγκεκριμένες χρήσεις* επομένως, η λειτουργία που αποδίδεται στα αγγεία αυτά, μέσα από κείμενα χρονολογημένα με ακρίβεια, καθώς και η εξέταση του συνόλου όπου αναφέρονται, βοηθά ασφαλώς στον ακριβέστερο καθορισμό του σχήματος τους. Γίνεται προσπάθεια (...) να βρεθεί μια πλήρης απεικόνιση των όρων που χρησιμοποιούνται για την κεραμική της εποχής της Ιπποκρατικής Συλλογής. (shrink)

Au xvie siècle, l’autobiographie et le récit de voyage étaient étroitement liés et suivirent pendant quelques décennies une évolution parallèle. Thomas Platter l’aîné essaya de fournir dans sesMémoires la description d’une vie exemplaire retraçant ses expériences multiples sur les routes d’Europe. Son fils Felix nous laissa un ouvrage disparate (un mélange de journal, de récit de voyage et de mémoires) où l’auteur paraît omniprésent. Sa conception de l’écriture autobiographique rappelle celle de Montaigne. Le jeune frère Thomas suivit rigoureusement les règles (...) émises par les théoriciens du voyage, condamnant toute opinion subjective. Les ouvrages des Platter nous donnent le meilleur exemple de l’évolution du genre (auto-)biographique entre la Renaissance classique et le Baroque dit sauvage. (shrink)

Ce chapitre discute de la justification des croyances testimoniales, c’est-à-dire de la justification des croyances que nous adoptons en nous appuyant sur le témoignage d’autrui. Plus précisément, la question à laquelle cette contribution s’intéresse est celle des conditions nécessaires et suffisantes de la justification des croyances testimoniales. Il y a deux manières classiques, et soi-disant antagonistes, d’y répondre: la réponse réductionnisme et la réponse non-réductionniste. L’objectif de ce chapitre est d’une part de présenter ces deux réponses, d’autre part, d’expliquer pourquoi (...) ce prétendu antagonisme n’en est pas un. Le plan est le suivant. La première partie de ce chapitre est consacrée à distinguer les croyances testimoniales des croyances perceptuelles (section 1. et 1.1). Dans la seconde partie (section 2 à 2.3), nous présentons la réponse réductionniste et la réponse non-réductionniste ainsi que quelques-unes des objections les plus importantes adressées à chacune d’elles. La troisième partie explique pourquoi le prétendu antagonisme entre le réductionnisme et le non-réductionnisme n’en est pas un en exploitant ce que nous appelons « la thèse du malentendu » (3 à 3.2). (shrink)

Cette contribution a deux objectifs principaux. Le premier est de montrer que les intuitions sont caractérisées par ce que j’appellerai « une capacité rationnelle », c’est-à-dire, qu’elles sont susceptibles d’être évaluées quant à leur rationalité ou leur irrationalité. Le second objectif de cet article est d’étayer l’hypothèse selon laquelle les intuitions seraient des états affectifs proches des émotions — et non pas des états doxastiques ou des expériences perceptuelles —, en montrant qu’une telle conception affective des intuitions est seule capable (...) de rendre compte de la spécificité phénoménologique, la modularité, et la capacité rationnelle des intuitions. This article has two purposes. First, it wants to show that intuitions possess, what I shall call, “a rational capacity” : they are mental states susceptible to be assessed as rational or irrational. Second, this contribution aims at providing some evidence supporting the view that intuitions are affective states similar to emotions rather than doxastic or perceptual states. Such an affective account of the intuitions is the only one able to capture the specific phenomenology, the modularity and the rational capacity of the intuitions. (shrink)

Le présent article revient sur l’expression en vieil islandais vargr í véum (« loup dans les sanctuaires »). En comparant différents récits de tels loups, notamment le mythe de l’enchaînement de Fenrir, l’article montre que plutôt qu’une vieille catégorie préchrétienne dénotant le sacrilège, l’expression doit être comprise comme un moyen discursif servant à marginaliser son objet. Elle devait ainsi s’avérer utile pour des auteurs médiévaux et donc chrétiens au moment où ceux-ci pensaient des problèmes tels que les hiérarchies sociales ou (...) encore la centralisation de l’état. (shrink)

This first part of this chapter presents the virtue-reliabilist answer to the classical value problems of knowledge. According to this solution, the reason why knowledge is a better cognitive state than what falls short of it —viz. mere true and true+Gettierized beliefs— is as follows: when a subject knows, she deserves credit for her true belief. The second part of this chapter is devoted to showing that this solution cannot be extended to solve the " new " value problem, that (...) is to say, the problem of explaining why some higher form of knowledge — what Sosa calls full knowledge— is better than some lower form of knowledge, viz. Sosa's animal knowledge. The basic problem for Sosa is that, when a subject fully knows, it is not necessarily the case that she deserves more credit than when she merely has animal knowledge. (shrink)

In this paper the very earliest relationship of mother and newborn will be described phenomenologically through an interlacing of Donald Winnicott''s work on maternal holding with Maurice Merleau-Ponty''s concepts of flesh and chiasm. Merleau-Ponty''s thinking suggests that the holding relationship described by Winnicott is formed as much by the infant''s holding of the mother as it is by mother''s holding of her infant. Both flex and bend towards each other and inscribe each other yet retain their own particularity. Further specification (...) and articulation of the lived body of both arises from the ongoing overlapping and sedimenting of past and current touches, movements, sounds, and sightings initiated internally and externally. Examples drawn from fieldwork and secondary sources will illustrate this ongoing embodied relationship. (shrink)

This paper critically evaluates current conceptions of pregnancy as a possession of either mother or infant. In opposition to the more common stance that marks birth as the beginning of intercorporeality and perception, pregnancy is instead phenomenologically delineated as a chiasmic relationship between mother and her pre‐infant from a Merleau‐Pontian perspective. This paper maintains that during pregnancy a mother‐to‐be and her pre‐infant are deepened and modified through their intertwining.

Argumentation mining aims to automatically detect, classify and structure argumentation in text. Therefore, argumentation mining is an important part of a complete argumentation analyisis, i.e. understanding the content of serial arguments, their linguistic structure, the relationship between the preceding and following arguments, recognizing the underlying conceptual beliefs, and understanding within the comprehensive coherence of the specific topic. We present different methods to aid argumentation mining, starting with plain argumentation detection and moving forward to a more structural analysis of the detected (...) argumentation. Different state-of-the-art techniques on machine learning and context free grammars are applied to solve the challenges of argumentation mining. We also highlight fundamental questions found during our research and analyse different issues for future research on argumentation mining. (shrink)

The Nuffield Council on Bioethics introduced an ‘intervention ladder’ to guide policymakers on public health interventions. 1 The ladder’s vertical structure represents an ordering of interventions, from least to most intrusive. In his article, Paetkau acknowledges that this ladder is ‘a useful tool’ (p. 1) for evaluating public health interventions. 2 However, he objects that its focus on individual behaviour is too narrow and obscures ‘interventions that operate on the level of systems rather than individuals’ (p. 2). To be sure, (...) some of the interventions on the original ladder do involve what might ordinarily be seen as ‘system’ or environmental changes. For instance, we might encourage active transport by building dedicated cycle lanes. However, these measures still have their intended effects through altering individual choices. What Paetkau means by a ‘systemic intervention’ is specifically one that improves public health _without_ changing individual behaviour change (pp. 2–3). For... (shrink)

In several papers (2013, 2014, 2015) Conor McHugh defends the influential view that doxastic responsibility, viz. our responsibility for our beliefs, is grounded in a specific form of reasons-responsiveness. The main purpose of this paper is to show that a subject’s belief can be responsive to reasons in this specific way without the subject being responsible for her belief. While this specific form of reasons-responsiveness might be necessary, it is not sufficient for doxastic responsibility.