[Multiple authors] In this paper, we propose a general architecture that is based on fast/slow solvers and a metacognitive component. We then present experimental results on the behavior of an instance of this architecture, for AI systems that make decisions about navigating in a constrained environment. We show how combining the fast and slow decision modalities allows the system to evolve over time and gradually pass from slow to fast thinking with enough experience, and that this greatly helps in decision (...) quality, resource consumption, and efficiency. (shrink)

We find a simple counterfactual acceptable, it is argued, to the extent that (i) our probability of the consequent under the thought experiment of counterfactually supposing the antecedent is high, (ii) provided the latter is on-topic with respect to the former. Counterfactual supposition is represented by Lewisian imaging. Topicality, by an algebra of subject matters. A topic-sensitive probabilistic logic is then provided, to reason about the acceptability of simple counterfactuals.

The idea of a distinctively political normativity came under sustained fire lately. Here I formulate, test, and reject a moderate and promising way of conceiving it. According to this conception, political normativity is akin to the kind of normativity at play in all-things-considered judgments, i.e., those judgments that weight together all the relevant reasons to determine what practical rationality as such requires to do. I argue that even when we try to conceive political normativity in this all-things considered way, and (...) even when we do not concede from the get-go that moral reasons necessarily trump or overrides normative reasons of a different kind, political normativity is still reducible to morality, because the peculiar content of all-things-considered political oughts remain explainable through general moral principles and contextual facts that do not obtain exclusively in political scenarios, but in many others too. If my arguments are correct, I provide political realists with one more reason to withdraw from the metaethical battle over the idea of a distinctively political normativity and show that the moralist approach is defensible against a prima facie promising, but ultimately untenable, alternative. (shrink)

The traditional approach to the analysis of knowledge sees it as a true belief meeting further conditions. I discuss an empirical challenge to this traditional approach, which I call the argument from development. Briefly, the argument is that belief cannot be conceptually prior to knowledge because children acquire the concept of knowledge first. Several prominent scientists and philosophers have argued that this latter claim is supported by many findings with infants and young children. Here, I defend the traditional approach by (...) raising three challenges to the argument from development: the competence-performance challenge, the double-standard challenge, and the underdetermination challenge. I conclude that the developmental data are fully compatible with children acquiring the concept of belief first. In closing, I also argue that further research is needed to investigate when children acquire a concept of knowledge. (shrink)

In the creation of maps, scientific knowledge related to mathematics and physics combines with knowledge specific to graphic or artistic disciplines. Since all maps are artifacts whose aesthetic qualities convey information that simultaneously engages the fields of ontology, epistemology, and politics, they are objects of undeniable interest for philosophical inquiry. This introduction to the 5th issue of the Journal for the Philosophy of Language, Mind, and the Arts reviews the latest literature and key topics surrounding the relationship between philosophy, cartography (...) and mapmaking. (shrink)

This paper intends to verify the extent and effectiveness of the transforming appropriation of the Derridean concept of ‘differance’ by Stiegler with respect to the problems that, according to Stiegler, make this creative critical operation necessary; in particular with respect to the most recent question concerning the possibility of thinking about and putting into practice a ‘neganthropological différance’ capable of facing the ecological crisis that today seems to threaten the very existence of life on earth. The paper goes back to (...) Technics and Time 1. to analyze the distinction between ‘vital difference’ and ‘noetic difference’ that constitutes the condition of possibility of the ‘neganthropological différance.’ In this perspective, the distinction proposed by Stiegler seems to re-propose the hierarchically oriented oppositional structure that characterizes metaphysical thought and in particular the opposition between man and animal, attributing to the human being the ability to free himself from the constraints of his biological-natural condition. Finally, the paper attempts to account for the repercussions of this approach on the very possibility of an effective response to the ecological crisis, concluding with a provocation regarding the role that theory can and must play with regard to such an urgent and far-reaching problem. (shrink)

We formally investigate immediate and mediate grounding operators from an inferential perspective. We discuss the differences in behaviour displayed by several grounding operators and consider a general distinction between grounding and logical operators. Without fixing a particular notion of grounding or grounding relation, we present inferential rules that define, once a base grounding calculus has been fixed, three grounding operators: an operator for immediate grounding, one for mediate grounding – corresponding to the transitive closure of the immediate grounding one – (...) and a grounding tree operator, which enables us to internalise chains of immediate grounding claims without losing any information about them. We then present an in-depth proof-theoretical study of the introduced rules by focussing, in particular, on the question whether grounding operators can be considered as logical operators and whether balanced rules for grounding operators can be defined. (shrink)

In the field of life science there is a growing awareness of the metaphorical tenor of many of its key concepts and the problems that arise from them, as in the now-controversial case of the genetic ‘program’. In the seminar Life Death (2019) Derrida addresses this question from Georges Canguilhem’s difficulties in establishing a clear distinction between metaphor and concept, precisely with regard to the notion of ‘program’, concluding that this difficulty ‘demand[s] a recasting of this division and of the (...) law of this division’ between metaphor and concept. Beginning with these pages from Life Death, the present essay aims to reconstruct the deconstruction of this opposition and its epistemological consequences by going back to the Derridean essay ‘White Mythology’ (1971), to which Derrida refers in the seminar and in which the question of metaphor in the life sciences had been addressed in a critical confrontation with Bachelard and Canguilhem. (shrink)

Due to its innovative content, Duns Scotus’ thought spread rapidly, thanks above all to the contribution of his pupils and disciples, who immediately undertook to edit his writings and to rework and disseminate his thought. In this process of dissemination of Scotism, a very important role was played by Antonius Andreae, a Spanish Franciscan and a Scotist. His importance is mainly historical. The widespread diffusion of Scotus’ metaphysical thought - at least in a first phase - is essentially linked to (...) his name: many authors of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries will know Duns Scotus’ metaphysical thought through the mediation of his Questiones in xii libros Metaphisice. This paper examines Andreae’s discussion concerning the subject of metaphysics (Questiones, I, q. 1), trying to show in what sense and in what way he contributed to providing a simplified yet systematic formulation of some of Duns Scotus’ doctrines. (shrink)

Le présent volume sur Dionysos est issu d’un colloque qui a eu lieu à l’université de Varsovie en janvier 2019, dans le cadre du National Programme for the Development of Humanities financé par le ministère polonais de la Science et de l’Éducation supérieure. Il se concentre sur un aspect spécifique du dieu grec, celui de son rapport avec la politique et l’autorité. Dans une brève introduction (p. 1–5), Filip Doroszewski et Dariusz Karlowicz rappellent que, par-delà l’imaginaire nietzschéen d...

Kim’s Ontological Physicalism (OP) presents itself as a naturalistic and monistic metaphysical framework, aligned with the causal closure of the universe and rejecting causally efficacious “exotic” properties. The foundational ontology is, in turn, monistic and materialistic, positing that the universe is composed solely of material particulars: bits of matter. In this work, we identify a notable tension between OP’s intended model and the one OP specifies. Initially, we show how the theory inevitably becomes entangled with higher-order entities, not just particulars. (...) Kim introduces the Supervenience Argument (SA) to counteract the possibility of higher-order entities being causally efficacious. While SA proves to be a plausible strategy, it is ultimately inadequate: not only SA is a petitio principii against emergence, but it is also unsound and invalid. Therefore, we propose a formal strategy to restore its ontological effectiveness. Unfortunately, at a closer look, even this strategy falls short as it unwarrantedly assumes the logicality and invariance of those equivalence relations (such as identity, similarity, and congruence) which are crucial for specifying the theory’s model as composed of particulars. (shrink)

Can artificial agents act? Conceptual constellation for a de-humanised theory of action This paper embarks on an exploration of the concept of agency, traditionally ascribed to humans, in the context of artificial intelligence (AI). In the first two sections, it challenges the conventional dichotomy of human agency and non- human instrumentality, arguing that advancements in technology have blurred these boundaries. In the third section, the paper introduces the reader to the philosophical perspective of new materialism, which assigns causal power to (...) matter itself. This perspective suggests that agency is an emergent property of material configurations, prompting a re-evaluation of nonhuman agency. The fourth and fifth section revisit the legacy of cybernetics to understand systemic properties and feedback mechanisms, while re-admitting in the discourse also linear conditioning (discarded by new materialism) and assigning it a role in system dynamics. In the sixth section, in the light of the conceptual background examined so far, the paper proposes a revision of determinism (again partly in opposition to the new materialism and its indeterministic view) that can include both linear conditioning and circular interactions. The seventh section is devoted to propose a novel theory of action that includes AI systems – and artificial entities in general – as agents that can impact their environment and human systems. The exploration concludes with a discussion on the implications of this perspective for our understanding of action and responsibility in the age of AI. (shrink)

The paper investigates Paolo Parrini’s use of Johann Friedrich Herbart’s notion of Bearbeitung der Begriffe (“treatment of concepts”) to outline a philosophical perspective integrating heterodox Kantian elements into contemporary conceptual engineering. It first presents Herbart’s functionalist, anti-foundationalist reading of Kant, centered on defining philosophy as the treatment of scientific concepts through analysis and synthesis. It then analyzes how Parrini traces the Herbartian metaphilosophical approach along a philosophical tradition connecting post-Kantian epistemology to 20th-century analytic philosophy. Across more than twenty years of (...) research, Parrini defines the «Herbartian component» of analytical philosophy as the potential source of a philosophical program against the reduction of philosophy to mere conceptual analysis. According to Parrini, Herbart’s key insight is that conceptual engineering involves not just analysis but also synthetic reconstruction, interpreting concepts as logical components constitutive of the thinking subject’s perpetual re-orientation within experience’s shifting dynamics. Parrini highlights the ethical responsibility implicit in engineering concepts conceived this way. The paper concludes by suggesting that Herbart’s and Parrini’s contribution to contemporary conceptual engineering would make conceptual engineering more apt to the ethical tasks traditionally attributed to philosophy from a Kantian perspective. (shrink)

The discussion will begin with a narrative introduction, which will fo¬cus on the first occurrence in literature of testimony of a cyber-rape. From this introduction, the main philosophical issues involved in these phenom¬ena will emerge. This introduction will be followed by a brief discussion of the different forms of cyber-rape, which will refer, in particular, to feminist literature on the subject. Subsequently, the chapter will enter the heart of the philosophical dis¬cussion, addressing the first of the topics to which it (...) is dedicated: the nature of acts of sexual and gender-based online violence. Three sections will be devoted to dismantling those arguments that, even accepting that The Dangerous Liaison cyber-rape is a moral wrong, it cannot be considered on the same level as rape. Then, having established that the seriousness of a “virtual” rape is com¬parable to that of a physical rape, it will show how the former occurs more frequently (but is not conceptualised as “real”) than the latter. This will be attributed to an asymmetry between the seriousness of the act and its common perception. Finally, the chapter will go on to question the reasons for this asymme¬try, first exploring the hypothesis—long held by many scholars—of ano¬nymity as a catalyst for violence, only to partially discard it in the face of more recent evidence and replace it with a more convincing explanatory hypothesis. In general, the aim of this chapter is to make a feminist contribution from the perspective of philosophy of technology to the issue of cyber-rape. Tools provided by philosophy of technology will be tested in order to, on the one hand, dismantle the idea that there can be such a thing as a virtual agency that is “less serious” than the real one, and, on the other hand, explore the ways in which digital technologies affect the perception of personal responsibility. (shrink)

This paper investigates the doctrine of man’s essence and resurrection defended by the late Muʿtazilī Rukn al-Dīn b. al-Malāḥimī al-Khwārazmī (d. 536/1141). His anthropology combines substance reductionism and function organicism. Even though man is not a unitary substance additional to the sum of his atomic parts, the specific arrangement of parts we call “man” exhibits functions that are indivisible and irreducible (they are not sums of functions predicable of the indi­vidual parts). When it comes to resurrection, Ibn al-Malāḥimī abandons the (...) recreation model, the standard view of the Muʿtazilīs, in favor of the reassembly model, which he claims to be adherent to the manifest meaning of the Qur’ān as well as capable of answering an objection concerning continuity of identity (there is no way to discriminate between the resur­rected individual and an equivalent copy). For Ibn al-Malāḥimī, the identity of the resurrected becomes unproblematic once we accept that the material parts of the body persist from the moment of death to that of resurrection: when exactly reassembled, such parts unequivocally identify the individual. (shrink)

In questo contributo tenterò di rispondere ad una domanda fondamentale e assai complessa: la concezione di Dio come Esse Ipsum Subsistens rischia una deriva verso il monismo parmenideo? L’indagine verterà dapprima sul superamento di Aristotele della visione parmenidea e poi si concentrerà sulla metafisica dell’essere di Tommaso d’Aquino che, se correttamente intesa, non rischia affatto una deriva verso il monismo ontologico. Saranno infatti presentati alcuni passi che comprovano come il concetto centrale della concezione di Tommaso, quello di partecipazione, garantisca proprio (...) dal rischio del monismo, a patto che si intenda la presenza di Dio negli enti non in un senso quantitativo. (shrink)

Self-deception is a common phenomenon. Most traditional accounts of self-deception agree that self-deception is doxastic as it involves the acquisition of a false belief. Thus, it seems that any adequate doxastic theory of self-deception should be accompanied by a theory of belief acquisition. In this article, I argue that the mainstream doxastic view in the self-deception literature, namely motivationalism, presupposes a Cartesian theory of belief acquisition. I present and discuss the alternative Spinozan theory of belief acquisition and argue that self-deceptive (...) beliefs are likely to be acquired in a Spinozan way. If this is correct, the causal route to self-deception proposed by motivationalists, which runs from evidence to belief, needs to be inverted. I offer a novel take on motivationalism based on Spinozan belief acquisition, which I call Spinozan self-deception. I discuss theoretical advantages of the novel view over motivationalism as well as some of the phenomena it may help explain. (shrink)