Quantum Mechanics notoriously faces a measurement problem, the problem that the unitary time evolution, encoded in its dynamical equations, together with the kinematical structure of the theory generally implies the non-existence of definite measurement outcomes. There have been multiple suggestions to solve this problem, among them the so called many worlds interpretation that originated with the work of Hugh Everett III. According to it, the quantum state and time evolution fully and accurately describe nature as it is, implying that under (...) certain conditions multiple measurement outcomes that are seemingly mutually exclusive can be realized at the same time – but as different 'worlds' contained in a global, quantum mechanical structure, sometimes referred to as 'the multiverse'. The many worlds interpretation has, however, been confronted with serious difficulties over the course of its development, some of which were solved by the advent of decoherence theory. The present thesis critically investi- gates the state of play on a key remaining problem of the many worlds interpretation, the problem of the meaning and quantification of probabilities in a quantum multiverse. Recent attempts of deriving the pivotal statistical ingredient of quantum mechanics, Born’s rule, from either principles of decision theory or from quantum mechanics alone, supplemented with a few general premises about probability are analyzed and their premises are scrutinized. It will be argued that, though both approaches yield promising results, they both ultimately fail to clearly establish the validity of Born’s rule in the context of the many worlds interpretation. It is hence suggested that further research on this problem is indicated. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work. This work is in the public domain (...) in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

In this paper, I question the dichotomy between fundamental moral disagreements, arising from divergences on moral principles, and superficial moral disagreements, that are expected to disappear under ideal epistemic circumstances. I claim that there are many other possibilities for moral disagreements, including moral disagreements that do not arise from different moral principles but would not disappear under ideal epistemic conditions. I describe two major kinds of such disagreements: semi-fundamental disagreements, which are made possible by the fact that the same moral (...) rules can be applied in different ways to the same situations, and non-morally fundamental moral disagreements, which arise by the fact that moral truths are not the only potentially non-factual truths. (shrink)

Psychiatrie und Psychotherapie sind Bereiche medizinischer Praxis, die in besonderer Weise ethische Fragen aufwerfen. Die Beiträge des Bandes hierzu werden durch zwei übersetzte Beiträge des polnischen Psychiaters Antoni Kępiński (1918-1972) erweitert. Diese eröffnen neue Perspektiven in der Diskussion um ethische Fragen in der Psychiatrie.

This paper aims to show that Deleuze’s ideas on space and extension are heavily in debt to Leibniz. The focus is on chapter five, ‘the Asymmetrical Synthesis of the Sensible’, of Difference and Repetition. Concepts such as ‘intensive magnitude’, ‘distance’, ‘order’ and most importantly ‘spatium’ are shown to have their origin in Leibniz’s philosophy. In order to do so, the article starts with Leibniz’s critique on Cartesian mechanics and how this leads Leibniz to a conception of space that goes beyond (...) the Cartesian concept of extension. The latter lacks difference, potentiality and individuality. Leibniz argues that the Cartesian homogeneous plenum should therefore be grounded in a deeper more substantial space: the spatium. Understood as such, space is not an absolute substance but a structure of relations between substances. Although Leibniz’s texts offer enough to understand this spatium, they do not explain how the genesis of extension out of space should be understood. It is on this point that Deleuze offers a fruitful interpretation of Leibniz by conceptualizing such a genesis in terms of difference. Extension is understood as a homogenization and externalization of the internal and pure differences in space. In the end, Leibniz helps us to understand Deleuze’s theory, while Deleuze offers us an enriching interpretation of Leibniz that succeeds where authors such as Yvon Belaval and Martial Gueroult have failed. (shrink)

Ethnographic study of the constitution of algorithms.

Quantum mechanics notoriously faces the measurement problem, the problem that if read thoroughly, it implies the nonexistence of definite outcomes in measurement procedures. A plausible reaction to this and to related problems is to regard a system's quantum state |ψ> merely as an indication of our lack of knowledge about the system, i.e., to interpret it epistemically. However, there are radically different ways to spell out such an epistemic view of the quantum state. We here investigate recent developments in the (...) branch that introduces hidden variables λ in addition to the quantum state |ψ> and has its roots in Einstein's views. In particular, we confront purported achievements of a concrete model that has been considered to serve as evidence for an epistemic view of the envisioned kind, as well as specific no-go results and their import. It will be argued that while an epistemic account of the particular kind is not straightforwardly ruled out by the no-go results, they demonstrate that the evidential character of the model(s) discussed rests on a rather shaky foundation, and that they make some achievements widely recognized in the literature appear worthy of doubt. (shrink)

In Theologie und Wissenschaft bei Petrus Aureoli, Florian Wöller offers an account of the theories of science and of theology as they emerge from Peter Auriol's (c. 1280-1322) commentaries on the Sentences.

t. 1. "Myśl i rzeczywistość" i inne pisma filozofizne.

Responding to recent concerns about the reliability of the published literature in psychology and other disciplines, we formed the X-Phi Replicability Project to estimate the reproducibility of experimental philosophy. Drawing on a representative sample of 40 x-phi studies published between 2003 and 2015, we enlisted 20 research teams across 8 countries to conduct a high-quality replication of each study in order to compare the results to the original published findings. We found that x-phi studies – as represented in our sample (...) – successfully replicated about 70% of the time. We discuss possible reasons for this relatively high replication rate in the field of experimental philosophy and offer suggestions for best research practices going forward. (shrink)

La philosophie expérimentale est un mouvement récent qui tente de faire progresser certains débats philosophiques grâce à l'utilisation de méthodes expérimentales. À la différence de la philosophie conventionnelle qui privilégie l'analyse conceptuelle ou la spéculation, la philosophie expérimentale préconise le recours aux études empiriques pour mieux comprendre les concepts philosophiques. Apparue il y a une dizaine d'années dans les pays anglo-saxons, cette approche constitue actuellement l'une des branches les plus dynamiques de la philosophie contemporaine. -/- L'objectif de cet ouvrage est (...) d'offrir un contact direct avec les travaux les plus connus et les plus discutés des philosophes expérimentaux. Il regroupe ainsi dix textes représentatifs de ce domaine jeune, mais déjà florissant, et couvre une large partie du champ philosophique contemporain (philosophie du langage, théorie de la connaissance, conscience, théorie de l'action, éthique et philosophie des sciences). (shrink)

À quoi les philosophes sont-ils bons ? Faire de la philosophie rend-il meilleur ? Les jugements esthétiques gardent-ils encore quelque secret, ou bien Kant a-t-il tout dit sur la question ? La culture et le statut socio-économique de votre professeur de philosophie a-t-il une influence sur ses options philosophiques ? Pourquoi avons-nous l'impression que la pensée ne saurait être un état de notre cerveau ? Que nous ne serions pas libres si nous n'étions qu'un tas de neurone ? C'est pour (...) répondre à ces questions (et à beaucoup d'autres) que philosophes et psychologues se sont alliés sous la bannière de la toute nouvelle « philosophie expérimentale ». Il s'agit de faire un peu de lumière sur ce qui se passe vraiment dans notre tête lorsque nous faisons de la philosophie et d'interroger l'origine de nos certitudes philosophiques. (shrink)

Education and Social Change sheds a new light on Florian Znaniecki's most original program of the sociology of education. The volume contains newly discovered reports from the research under the auspices of the Columbia University in the thirties, focused on educating to participate in democratic social order and cultural innovation. Preparation for cooperative interactions with leaders lies at the core of the analysis. Included are several texts published in English which clearly expound Znaniecki's analysis of social processes in education. (...) The key idea of transforming educational systems in the direction of self-education still proves relevant. (shrink)

Deep neural networks have become increasingly successful in applications from biology to cosmology to social science. Trained DNNs, moreover, correspond to models that ideally allow the prediction of new phenomena. Building in part on the literature on ‘eXplainable AI’, I here argue that these models are instrumental in a sense that makes them non-explanatory, and that their automated generation is opaque in a unique way. This combination implies the possibility of an unprecedented gap between discovery and explanation: When unsupervised models (...) are successfully used in exploratory contexts, scientists face a whole new challenge in forming the concepts required for understanding underlying mechanisms. (shrink)

According to tradition, logic is normative for reasoning. Gilbert Harman challenged the view that there is any straightforward connection between logical consequence and norms of reasoning. Authors including John MacFarlane and Hartry Field have sought to rehabilitate the traditional view. I argue that the debate is marred by a failure to distinguish three types of normative assessment, and hence three ways to understand the question of the normativity of logic. Logical principles might be thought to provide the reasoning agent with (...) first-personal directives; they might be thought to serve as third-personal evaluative standards; or they might underwrite our third-personal appraisals of others whereby we attribute praise and blame. I characterize the three normative functions in general terms and show how a failure to appreciate this threefold distinction has led disputants to talk past one another. I further show how the distinction encourages fruitful engagement with and, ultimately, resolution of the question. (shrink)

In 1982 Saul A. Kripke proposed a reconstruction of the central insights of Ludwig Wittgenstein's remarks on rule-following. The reconstruction prominently featured a sceptical challenge which soon was recognised as a new and very radical form of scepticism. According to the challenge there is no fact of the matter which constitutes meaning. As there is no such fact, the first-person authority people intuitively seem to have concerning what they mean is also baseless. In response to the sceptic, many solutions have (...) been proposed. This thesis is about one family of solutions, according to which facts about meaning are sui generis and can neither be reduced to other facts about the world nor to non-semantic facts about the human mind. The non-reductionist proposals by Colin McGinn and Crispin Wright will be assessed in detail and arguments against both will be introduced. The arguments stem only partially from Kripke himself, some are based on recent literature, others are completely new. The emerging situation will be used as a basis to propose an alternative non-reductionism about meaning-facts. (shrink)

Der dreibändige Mikrokosmos, 1856-1864 mit dem Untertitel Versuch einer Anthropologie erstmal erschienen, gehörte in der zweiten Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts zu den meistgelesenen philosophischen Werken. Sein Verfasser, der Mediziner und Philosoph Rudolph Hermann Lotze (1817-1881), entwirft darin während der Dekade des Materialismusstreits eine Position, die einerseits den Erkenntnissen der Naturwissenschaft oberste Priorität einräumt, andererseits aber aufzeigt, dass die Konstanten der althergebrachten Metaphysik - die Seele, Gott, ein höherer Sinn- und Zweckzusammenhang - durch sie nicht hinfällig werden. Lotzes Bestreben nach grundlegender (...) Analyse der Divergenzen zwischen den Bedürfnissen des Gemütes und den Ergebnissen menschlicher Wissenschaft führt dazu, dass er erstmalig die Leitfrage der modernen Philosophie des Geistes stellt: Wenn es empirisch ergründbare materielle Bedingungen sind, durch die subjektives Erleben überhaupt möglich wird, wie lässt sich dann das wechselseitige Verhältnis dieser beiden Größen sinnvoll bestimmen? Im Mikrokosmos findet sich hierzu eine Reihe von Argumenten, die die Körper-Geist-Debatten des 20. Jahrhunderts in wesentlichen Punkten antizipieren und mit denen sich auch heute noch deutlich machen lässt, wieso die Schlichtheit des naturalistischen Monismus schwerlich mit der Komplexität des Leib-Seele-Problems in Einklang zu bringen ist. (shrink)

There are basically four options to which state the limiting instant in a change from one state to its opposite belongs – only the first, only the second, both or none. This situation is usually referred to as the limit decision problem since all of these options seem troublesome: The first two alleged solutions are asymmetric and thus need something to ground this asymmetry in ; while the last two options leave the realm of classical logic. I argue that including (...) the debate about dispositions enables new options for solutions to the temporal limit decision problem. Metaphysical considerations function as a symmetry-breaker and thus remove the need for a non-classical solution. Dispositions bring about the changes in the world, so they constitute the metaphysical background for the instant of change. In particular, I argue that according to the triadic process account of dispositions, the limiting instant belongs to the second interval and only the second interval. (shrink)

Ganzheitslehren haben Hochkonjunktur. Einer ihrer scharfsten Kritiker war Karl Popper. Das Buch erzahlt die Geschichte eines Zerrissenen und wirft ein neues Licht auf einen der einflussreichsten Philosophen des 20. Jahrhunderts. Als einer der letzten Aufklarer zog Popper in einen aussichtslosen Kampf gegen die "holistische Verschworung", bei dem er sich immer tiefer in Widerspruche verstrickte. Hier wird zum ersten Mal das Grunddilemma in Poppers Oeuvre umfassend dargelegt. Es ist ein herausfordernder, gut lesbarer Streifzug durch unsere Geistesgeschichte zuruck zu den Wurzeln der (...) Ganzheitslehren mit einem besonderen Augenmerk auf die holistische Wende um 1900, die ihre Schatten bis in die Gegenwart wirft. (shrink)

Does phenomenal consciousness overflow access consciousness? Some researchers have claimed that it does, relying on interpretations of various psychological experiments such as Sperling's or Landman's, and crucially using alleged subjective reports from participants to argue in favor of these interpretations. However, systematic empirical investigations of participants' subjective reports are scarce. To fill this gap, we reproduced Sperling's and Landman's experiments, and carefully collected reports made by subjects about their own experiences, using questionnaires and interviews. We found that participants' subjective reports (...) do not support the overflow thesis, but rather suggest alternative interpretations of the experiments. (shrink)

Since at least Hume and Kant, philosophers working on the nature of aesthetic judgment have generally agreed that common sense does not treat aesthetic judgments in the same way as typical expressions of subjective preferences—rather, it endows them with intersubjective validity, the property of being right or wrong regardless of disagreement. Moreover, this apparent intersubjective validity has been taken to constitute one of the main explananda for philosophical accounts of aesthetic judgment. But is it really the case that most people (...) spontaneously treat aesthetic judgments as having intersubjective validity? In this paper, we report the results of a cross‐cultural study with over 2,000 respondents spanning 19 countries. Despite significant geographical variations, these results suggest that most people do not treat their own aesthetic judgments as having intersubjective validity. We conclude by discussing the implications of our findings for theories of aesthetic judgment and the purpose of aesthetics in general. (shrink)

Rule-following is a normative doing and therefore needs to be reconsidered in a metaethical framework. Rule-following will be discussed in the light of cognitivism and non-cognitivism. It will be shown that neither cognitivism nor non-cognitivism are sufficiently good accounts for conceptualizing rule-following, because they are held captive by a quasi-mechanistical picture of rule-following. This idea stems from Stanley Cavell´s and John McDowell´s approach to rule-following. McDowell appeals to the idea that we participate in “shared forms of life” and therefore are (...) able to follow rules correctly. I believe that his quietist view can be amplified by conceptualizing different modes of following a rule. We can also follow a rule e.g. ironically and still grasp the conceptual content of the rule adequately. (shrink)

'Identity' as a concept has many faces, and its very versatility in different contexts can make it hard to define. Florian Coulmas discusses the many meanings of this slippery concept, considering why individual and collective identities are important to us, and discussing the problems asserting individual identities can create.

This book explores the prospects of rivaling ontological and epistemic interpretations of quantum mechanics (QM). It concludes with a suggestion for how to interpret QM from an epistemological point of view and with a Kantian touch. It thus refines, extends, and combines existing approaches in a similar direction. -/- The author first looks at current, hotly debated ontological interpretations. These include hidden variables-approaches, Bohmian mechanics, collapse interpretations, and the many worlds interpretation. He demonstrates why none of these ontological interpretations can (...) claim to be the clear winner amongst its rivals. Next, coverage explores the possibility of interpreting QM in terms of knowledge but without the assumption of hidden variables. It examines QBism as well as Healey’s pragmatist view. The author finds both interpretations or programs wanting in certain respects. As a result, he then goes on to advance a genuine proposal as to how to interpret QM from the perspective of an internal realism in the sense of Putnam and Kant. -/- The book also includes two philosophical interludes. One details the notions of probability and realism. The other highlights the connections between the notions of locality, causality, and reality in the context of violations of Bell-type inequalities. (shrink)

We challenge an argument that aims to support Aesthetic Realism by claiming, first, that common sense is realist about aesthetic judgments because it considers that aesthetic judgments can be right or wrong, and, second, that becauseAesthetic Realism comes from and accounts for “folk aesthetics,” it is the best aesthetic theory available.We empirically evaluate this argument by probing whether ordinary people with no training whatsoever in the subtle debates of aesthetic philosophy consider their aesthetic judgments as right or wrong. Having shown (...) that the results do not support the main premise of the argument, we discuss the consequences for Aesthetic Realism and address possible objections to our study. (shrink)

In this paper, we argue that, barring a few important exceptions, the phenomenon we refer to using the expression “being moved” is a distinct type of emotion. In this paper’s first section, we motivate this hypothesis by reflecting on our linguistic use of this expression. In section two, pursuing a methodology that is both conceptual and empirical, we try to show that the phenomenon satisfies the five most commonly used criteria in philosophy and psychology for thinking that some affective episode (...) is a distinct emotion. Indeed, being moved, we claim, is the experience of a positive core value (particular object) perceived by the moved subject as standing out (formal object) in the circumstances triggering the emotion. Drawing on numerous examples, we describe the distinctively rich phenomenology characteristic of the experience as well as the far-reaching action-tendencies and functions associated with it. Having thus shown that the candidate emotion seem to satisfy the five criteria, we go on, in section three, to compare it with sadness and joy, arguing that it should not be confused with either. Finally, in section four, we illustrate the explanatory power of our account of “being moved” by showing how it can shed light on, and maybe even justify, the widespread distrust we feel towards the exhibition of ‘sentimentality’. On the whole and if we are right, we have uncovered an emotion which, though never or rarely talked about, is of great interest and no small importance. (shrink)