This paper examines H.A. Prichard's defense of the view that moral duty is underivative, as reflected in his argument that it is a mistake to ask “Why ought I to do what I morally ought?”, because the only possible answer is “Because you morally ought to.” This view was shared by other philosophers of Prichard's period, from Henry Sidgwick through A.C. Ewing, but Prichard stated it most forcefully and defended it best. The paper distinguishes three stages in Prichard's argument: one (...) appealing to his conceptual minimalism, one an epistemological argument that parallels Moore's response to skepticism about the external world, and one arguing that attempts to justify moral duties on non-moral grounds distort the phenomena by giving those duties the wrong explanation or ground. The paper concludes by considering Prichard's critique of ancient ethics and in particular the ethics of Aristotle. The paper is broadly sympathetic to Prichard's position and arguments; its aim is partly to make a case for him as a central figure in the history of ethics. (shrink)

Purpose: The method of diagnosing diabetic retinopathy (DR) through artificial intelligence (AI)-based systems has been commercially available since 2018. This introduces new ethical challenges with regard to obtaining informed consent from patients. The purpose of this work is to develop a checklist of items to be disclosed when diagnosing DR with AI systems in a primary care setting. -/- Methods: Two systematic literature searches were conducted in PubMed and Web of Science databases: a narrow search focusing on DR and a (...) broad search on general issues of AI-based diagnosis. An ethics content analysis was conducted inductively to extract two features of included publications: (1) novel information content for AI-aided diagnosis and (2) the ethical justification for its disclosure. -/- Results: The narrow search yielded n = 537 records of which n = 4 met the inclusion criteria. The information process was scarcely addressed for primary care setting. The broad search yielded n = 60 records of which n = 11 were included. In total, eight novel elements were identified to be included in the information process for ethical reasons, all of which stem from the technical specifics of medical AI. -/- Conclusions: Implications for the general practitioner are two-fold: First, doctors need to be better informed about the ethical implications of novel technologies and must understand them to properly inform patients. Second, patient's overconfidence or fears can be countered by communicating the risks, limitations, and potential benefits of diagnostic AI systems. If patients accept and are aware of the limitations of AI-aided diagnosis, they increase their chances of being diagnosed and treated in time. (shrink)

In his invited essay for Business & Society’s 60th anniversary, Archie B. Carroll (2021, p. 16) refers to human rights as “a topic that holds considerable promise for CSR [corporate social responsibility] researchers in the future.” The objective of this article is to unpack this promise. We (a) discuss the momentum of business and human rights (BHR) in international policy, national regulation, and corporate practice, (b) review how and why BHR scholarship has been thriving, (c) provide a conceptual framework to (...) analyze how BHR and corporate social responsibility (CSR) relate to each other, and (d) provide a research agenda outlining how BHR can expand business and society scholarship in general and one of its foundational constructs, CSR, in particular, beyond the current confines of the business and society field. (shrink)

Using agent‐based modelling, Harrington, Kleber, Reubold, Schiel & Stevens (2018) develop a unified model of sound change based on cognitive processing of human speech and theories of how social factors constrain the spread of change throughout a community. They conclude that many types of change result from how biases in the phonetic distribution of phonological categories are transmitted via accommodation processes between individuals in interaction.

The executive board of the Academy for Ethics in Medicine and two AEM working groups formulated standards and recommendations for clinical ethics consultation in 2010, 2011, and 2013. These guidelines comply with the international standards like those set by the American Society for Bioethics and Humanities. There is no empirical data available yet that could indicate whether these standards and recommendations have been implemented in German hospitals. This desideratum is addressed in the present study. We contacted 1.858 German hospitals between (...) September 2013 and January 2014. A follow-up survey was conducted between October 2014 and January 2015. The data of the initial survey and the follow-up survey were merged and evaluated. The statements of the participants were compared with the standards and recommendations. The standards of the AEM concerning the tasks of clinical ethics consultation are employed by a majority of participants of the study. Almost all of these participants document their consultation activities by means of protocols or entries in the patient file. There are deviations from the recommendations of the AEM working groups regarding the drafting of statutes, activity reports, and financial support. The activities of clinical ethics consultation predominantly comply with the standards of the AEM and recommendations for the documentation. The recommendations for evaluation should be improved in practice. This applies particularly for activity reports in order to evaluate the activities. Internal evaluation could take place accordingly. (shrink)

Two decades ago, the introduction of the Implicit Association Test (IAT) sparked enthusiastic reactions. With implicit measures like the IAT, researchers hoped to finally be able to bridge the gap between self-reported attitudes on one hand and behavior on the other. Twenty years of research and several meta-analyses later, however, we have to conclude that neither the IAT nor its derivatives have fulfilled these expectations. Their predictive value for behavioral criteria is weak and their incremental validity over and above self-report (...) measures is negligible. In our review, we present an overview of explanations for these unsatisfactory findings and delineate promising ways forward. Over the years, several reasons for the IAT’s weak predictive validity have been proposed. They point to four potentially problematic features: First, the IAT is by no means a pure measure of individual differences in associations but suffers from extraneous influences like recoding. Hence, the predictive validity of IAT-scores should not be confused with the predictive validity of associations. Second, with the IAT, we usually aim to measure evaluation (“liking”) instead of motivation (“wanting”). Yet, behavior might be determined much more often by the latter than the former. Third, the IAT focuses on measuring associations instead of propositional beliefs and thus taps into a construct that might be too unspecific to account for behavior. Finally, studies on predictive validity are often characterized by a mismatch between predictor and criterion (e.g., while behavior is highly context-specific, the IAT usually takes into account neither situation nor domain). Recent research, however, also revealed advances addressing each of these problems, namely (1) procedural and analytical advances to control for recoding in the IAT, (2) measurement procedures to assess implicit wanting, (3) measurement procedures to assess implicit beliefs, and (4) approaches to increase the fit between implicit measures and behavioral criteria (e.g., by incorporating contextual information). Implicit measures like the IAT hold an enormous potential. In order to allow them to fulfill this potential, however, we have to refine our understanding of these measures, and we should incorporate recent conceptual and methodological advancements. This review provides specific recommendations on how to do so. (shrink)

Die Wissensvermittlung in Gesundheitsethik ermöglicht es Auszubildenden der Pflege, sich in ihrer zukünftigen Tätigkeit bei Entscheidungsprozessen des Behandlungsteams hinsichtlich pflegeethischer Fragestellungen einzubringen. Vor diesem Hintergrund wurde anhand der vorliegenden Studie die Entwicklung moralischer Positionen sowie pflegeethischer Kenntnisse von Pflegeauszubildenden sichtbar gemacht. An zwei Krankenpflegeschulen (Berlin und Fürth) wurden im Rahmen einer Panelstudie von August 2010 bis März 2011 Daten einer ersten Querschnittserhebung von Auszubildenden in der Pflege erhoben. Für die Studie wurde ein strukturierter Fragebogen verwendet. Die Studienteilnahme erfolgte freiwillig. Alle (...) Auszubildenden hatten vor der Befragung in unterschiedlichem Umfang Unterricht in Gesundheitsethik erhalten. An beiden Standorten zeigten die Teilnehmenden einen Zuwachs an pflegeethischen Kenntnissen. Auszubildende, die bislang keine praktische Erfahrung mit Sterbehilfe gemacht hatten, zeigten Schwierigkeiten in der theoretischen Handhabung dieser Maßnahmen. Für alle Auszubildenden zeigte sich ein allgemeiner Trend zu einer Befürwortung des partizipativen Interaktionsmodells und damit zu einer Förderung der Patientenselbstbestimmung. Zugleich schätzten die Studienteilnehmenden die Fähigkeiten von Patienten, medizinisch richtige Therapieentscheidungen zu treffen, als gering ein. Die Ausbildung in Gesundheitsethik besitzt ein großes Potential, Kenntnisse zu vermitteln und dadurch die ethische Kompetenzentwicklung zu befördern. Unsere Ergebnisse werfen die Frage auf, inwieweit es einer Integration praktischer Erfahrungen mit Fragestellungen der Gesundheitsethik bedarf, um eine praxisrelevante und wissenschaftlich fundierte Wissensvermittlung zu gewährleisten. (shrink)

We are in a time of rapid change on multiple levels. Change can be seen as positive by one group and negative by another. As a result, different perspectives on any given change can draw completely different conclusions. In these proceedings we want to address different approaches to change from all kinds of perspectives within the realm of citizen science and participatory research. We discuss both active, transformative change, and the observation of change monitored by citizen science in all kinds (...) of disciplines. We highlight the potential of citizen science to be a change maker in research and society, and as a tool to manage the change happening around us. The proceedings "Change - The transformative power of citizen science" showcase a selection of topics that have been presented and discussed at the ECSA/ACSC 2024 double conference in Vienna and highlight the transformative power, citizen science can have. (shrink)

This volume contains selected essays in moral and political philosophy by Thomas Hurka. The essays address a wide variety of topics, from the well-rounded life and the value of playing games to proportionality in war and the ethics of nationalism. They also share a common aim: to illuminate the surprising richness and subtlety of our everyday moral thought by revealing its underlying structure, which they often do by representing that structure on graphs. More specifically, the essays all give what (...) the first in the volume calls "structural" as against "foundational" analyses of moral views. Eschewing the grander ambition of grounding our ideas about, say, virtue or desert in claims that use different concepts and concern some other, allegedly more fundamental topic, they examine these ideas in their own right and with close attention to their details. As well as illuminating their individual topics, the essays illustrate the insights this structural method can yield. (shrink)

Nietzsche is often regarded as a paradigmatically anti-theoretical philosopher. Bernard Williams has said that Nietzsche is so far from being a theorist that his text “is booby-trapped not only against recovering theory from it, but, in many cases, against any systematic exegesis that assimilates it to theory.” Many would apply this view especially to Nietzsche’s moral philosophy. They would say that even when he is making positive normative claims, as against just criticizing existing morality, his claims have neither the content (...) nor the organization characteristic of moral theory. (shrink)

Trust is widely regarded as a critical component to building artificial intelligence (AI) systems that people will use and safely rely upon. As research in this area continues to evolve, it becomes imperative that the research community synchronizes its empirical efforts and aligns on the path toward effective knowledge creation. To lay the groundwork toward achieving this objective, we performed a comprehensive bibliometric analysis, supplemented with a qualitative content analysis of over two decades of empirical research measuring trust in AI, (...) comprising 1’156 core articles and 36’306 cited articles across multiple disciplines. Our analysis reveals several “elephants in the room” pertaining to missing perspectives in global discussions on trust in AI, a lack of contextualized theoretical models and a reliance on exploratory methodologies. We highlight strategies for the empirical research community that are aimed at fostering an in-depth understanding of trust in AI. (shrink)

to appear in Larry May, ed., War and Political Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

Continues the discussion of theoretical and practical perfection by examining the considerations that give some beliefs and intentions more quality and therefore value than others. It argues that Aristotelian considerations about rationality as essential to humans require measures of quality to be formal, considering only formal properties of beliefs and ends rather than their substantive content. There are two such measures: the extent of a belief's or end's content in space, time, and objects involved, and the degree to which different (...) beliefs and ends are organized in a hierarchical structure. Together, these measures value explanatorily organized knowledge, a unified life, and complex, difficult activities such as games. (shrink)

The rhetoric of Principia Ethica, as of not a few philosophy books, is that of the clean break. Moore claims that the vast majority of previous writing on ethics has been misguided and that an entirely new start is needed. In its time, however, the book’s claims to novelty were widely disputed. Reviews in Mind, Ethics, and The Journal of Philosophy applauded the clarity of Moore’s criticisms of Mill, Spencer, and others, but said they were “not altogether original,” had for (...) the most part “already been brought out by other critics,” and were even “the standard criticisms.”1 To the Mind reviewer, “The book indicates throughout how strongly the author has been affected by Sidgwick’s views.”2 Hastings Rashdall rejected as historically inaccurate Moore’s claim that only Sidgwick before him had recognized that “good” is indefinable: “To say nothing of writers who (like Mr. Moore and myself) learned the doctrine largely from Sidgwick, I should contend that it was taught with sufficient distinctness by Plato ..., Aristotle, and a host of other writers who have studied in their school.”3 Rashdall also described Moore’s principle of organic unities as just “a new and striking way of stating a very old truth.”4 Some recent commentators have taken a similar line. Bernard Williams has said that much of Principia Ethica comes from Sidgwick,5 while Thomas Baldwin, discussing the book’s substantive values, has said the principle of organic unities “was expressly stated by Bradley,” while “McTaggart had for some years extolled the value of love, and the value of art is a central theme of romanticism.”. (shrink)

In cells, microtubules (MTs) assemble from α/β‐tubulin subunits at nucleation sites containing the γ‐tubulin ring complex (γ‐TuRC). Within the γ‐TuRC, exposed γ‐tubulin molecules act as templates for MT assembly by interacting with α/β‐tubulin. The vertebrate γ‐TuRC is scaffolded by γ‐tubulin‐interacting proteins GCP2‐6 arranged in a specific order. Interestingly, the γ‐tubulin molecules in the γ‐TuRC deviate from the cylindrical geometry of MTs, raising the question of how the γ‐TuRC structure changes during MT nucleation. Recent studies on the structure of the vertebrate (...) γ‐TuRC attached to the end of MTs came to varying conclusions. In vitro assembly of MTs, facilitated by an α‐tubulin mutant, resulted in a closed, cylindrical γ‐TuRC showing canonical interactions between all γ‐tubulin molecules and α/β‐tubulin subunits. Conversely, native MTs formed in a frog extract were capped by a partially closed γ‐TuRC, with some γ‐tubulin molecules failing to align with α/β‐tubulin. This review discusses these outcomes, along with the broader implications. (shrink)

Objective. To determine the effectiveness of the "I take care of myself" program for self-care in schoolchildren. Methods. Quasi-experimental study with a single pre-post test group, with the participation of 120 sixth grade students of the primary level of the Educational Institution of San Pedro - Huánuco, Peru 2022, in which the "I take care of myself" Program was applied. The data collection instrument was the self-care practices scale. In the hypothesis test, the Wilcoxon statistical test was used. Results. It (...) was found that the average score obtained in self-care before the application of the "I take care of myself" program was 3.7, and after this it was 4.0, finding significant differences in the pretest and posttest with p≤0.000. Likewise, there were significant differences in the dimensions of self-care such as practices related to universal self-care requirements, practices related to development self-care requirements, and practices related to self-care requirements in case of health deviation, all with p≤0.05. Conclusions. There are significant differences in self-care after applying the "I take care of myself" program in schoolchildren of the Educational Institution of San Pedro - Huánuco. (shrink)

Mutations in the CEBPA gene are present in 10–15% of acute myeloid leukemia (AML) patients. The most frequent type of mutations leads to the expression of an N‐terminally truncated variant of the transcription factor CCAAT/enhancer‐binding protein alpha (C/EBPα), termed p30. While initial reports proposed that p30 represents a dominant‐negative version of the wild‐type C/EBPα protein, other studies show that p30 retains the capacity to actively regulate gene expression. Recent global transcriptomic and epigenomic analyses have advanced the understanding of the distinct (...) roles of the p30 isoform in leukemogenesis. This review outlines direct and indirect effects of the C/EBPα p30 variant on oncogenic transformation of hematopoietic progenitor cells and discusses how studies of N‐terminal CEBPA mutations in AML can be extrapolated to identify novel gain‐of‐function features in oncoproteins that arise from recurrent truncating mutations in transcription factors. (shrink)

Light of the Nations is a philosophical work written by the Jewish intellectual and eminent biblical commentator Obadiah Sforno (ca. 1475-1550). His treatise, an apology for both Jewish and universal monotheistic beliefs, was published in Hebrew in 1537 under the title Or 'Ammim and was translated by the author into Latin as Lumen Gentium in 1548. Written in the style of a classical medieval Scholastic summa, the treatise's multilingual and multicultural dimensions reveal key humanist ideas that prevailed in the cities (...) of northern Italy during the early modern period, while also speaking to its author's abiding exegetical rationality. (shrink)

Thomas Hurka presents the first full historical study of an important strand in the development of modern moral philosophy. His subject is a series of British ethical theorists from the late nineteenth century to the mid-twentieth century, who shared key assumptions that made them a unified and distinctive school. The best-known of them are Henry Sidgwick, G. E. Moore, and W. D. Ross; others include Hastings Rashdall, H. A. Prichard, C. D. Broad, and A. C. Ewing. They disagreed on (...) some important topics, especially in normative ethics. Thus some were consequentialists and others deontologists: Sidgwick thought only pleasure is good while others emphasized perfectionist goods such as knowledge, aesthetic appreciation, and virtue. But all were non-naturalists and intuitionists in metaethics, holding that moral judgements can be objectively true, have a distinctive subject-matter, and are known by direct insight. They also had similar views about how ethical theory should proceed and what are relevant arguments in it; their disagreements therefore took place on common ground. -/- Hurka recovers the history of this under-appreciated group by showing what its members thought, how they influenced each other, and how their ideas changed through time. He also identifies the shared assumptions that made their school unified and distinctive, and assesses their contributions critically, both when they debated each other and when they agreed. One of his themes is that that their general approach to ethics was more fruitful philosophically than many better-known ones of both earlier and later times. (shrink)

Just because an angel is better than a stone, it does not follow that two angels are better than one angel and one stone. So said Aquinas (Summa contra Gentiles III, 71), and the sentiment was echoed by Leibniz. In section 118 of the Theodicy he wrote: "No substance is either absolutely precious or absolutely contemptible in the sight of God. It is certain that God attaches more importance to a man than to a lion, but I do not know (...) that we can bc sure that he prefers one man to an entire species of lions." Even Kant was bitten by this bug. In one of his pre-Critical works he was moved to say, à propos of lice, that even though they “may in our eyes be as worthless as you like, nevertheless it is of more consequence to Nature to conserve this species as a whole than to conserve a small number of members of a superior species." In these passages Aquinas, Leibniz, and Kant gave expression to a distinctive and interesting view about the value of animal species and animal populations. At its simplest, this is the view that there is a special value in the existence of animal species or in the existence of a wide variety of different animal species. But the view also goes deeper than this. An animal species, after all, is nothing over and above the individual animals which make it up, and the value which it contributes to the world must therefore be some function of the values contributed by those individual animals. At the deepest level, what the view expressed by Aquinas, Leibniz, and Kant holds is that the value which an individual animal contributes to thc world is not constant but varies with the number.. (shrink)

What are virtue and vice, and how do they relate to other moral properties such as goodness and rightness? This book defends a perfectionist account of virtue and vice that gives distinctive answers to these questions. The account treats the virtues as higher‐level intrinsic goods, ones that involve morally appropriate attitudes to other, independent goods and evils. Virtue by itself makes a person's life better, but in a way that depends on the goodness of other things. This account was accepted (...) by many early twentieth‐ century consequentialists, including Franz Brentano, G. E. Moore, Hastings Rashdall, and W. D. Ross. The book elaborates it further than has been done before, describing its mathematical structure, connecting it to individual virtues and vices, and applying it to specific issues such as the morality of fantasy and the proper roles of private charity and the welfare state. While doing so, it argues for the account's superiority over rival views of virtue, including those defended under the heading of “virtue ethics.”. (shrink)

In his chapter ‘Aristotle on Virtue: Wrong, Wrong, and Wrong’, Thomas Hurka advances penetrating criticisms of some of the core theses of the Aristotelian approach to virtue. Hurka challenges the Aristotelian tendency to blur the distinction between the good and the right by making the virtues, which are constitutive of a person’s goodness, objects of praise or blame. He puts into question the Aristotelian doctrine of the mean and the idea that vice can always be explained in terms (...) of either excess or deficiency. Most importantly, he challenges what he calls the foundational egoism of Aristotelian virtue theory, according to which a virtuous person’s ultimate reason for being virtuous is grounded in their concern for their own flourishing. Hurka contrasts his criticism with a sketch of his own recursive theory of virtue, which is opposed to the Aristotelian approach in crucial respects and thus suggests itself as an attractive alternative to it. (shrink)

Perfectionism is one of the leading moral views of the Western tradition, defended by Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Leibniz, Hegel, Marx, Nietzsche, and Green. Defined broadly, it holds that what is right is whatever most promotes certain objective human goods such as knowledge, achievement, and deep personal relations. Defined more narrowly, it identifies these goods by reference to human nature, so the human good consistsin developing the properties fundamental to human beings. If it is fundamental to humans to be rational (Aristotle), (...) to labor (Marx), or to exercise power (Nietzsche), developing these traits is best. This book tries to formulate the most defensible version of perfectionism using contemporary analytic techniques. It first examines narrow perfectionism, asking what kind of properties human nature consists in (distinctive? essential?); how these properties are identified; and what they are. It then explores issues relevant to both broad and narrow perfectionism, including whether each person should pursue just his own perfection or everyone's; how perfectionist goods are compared and aggregated; and in what particular times they are. On the last topic it develops an “Aristotelian” theory of the value of theoretical and practical rationality, as embodied in beliefs and ends with specified formal properties. The book closes by examining perfectionism's implications for political questions about liberty and equality. (shrink)

Serena Olsaretti brings together new essays by leading moral and political philosophers on the nature of desert and justice, their relations with each other and with other values.

Using Bernard Suits’s brilliant analysis (contra Wittgenstein) of playing a game, this paper examines the intrinsic value of game-playing. It argues that two elements in Suits’s analysis make success in games difficult, which is one ground of value, while a third involves choosing a good activity for the property that makes it good, which is a further ground. The paper concludes by arguing that game-playing is the paradigm modern (Marx, Nietzsche) as against classical (Aristotle) value: since its goal is intrinsically (...) trivial, its value is entirely one of process rather than product, journey rather than destination. (shrink)

This paper challenges the widely held view that ‘good for’, ‘well-being’, and related terms express a distinctive evaluative concept of central importance for ethics and separate from ‘simply good’ as used by G. E. Moore and others. More specifically, it argues that there's no philosophically useful good-for or well-being concept that's neither merely descriptive in the sense of naturalistic nor reducible to ‘simply good’. The paper distinguishes two interpretations of the common claim that the value ‘good for’ expresses is distinctively (...) ‘subject-relative’. One concerns the ground of this value, or the properties that make something good for you; it says these must involve some relation to you. The other concerns the resulting value itself, or what supervenes on this ground; it says that too involves a relation. Neither interpretation, the paper argues, yields a significantly distinct evaluative concept. The ethically fundamental evaluative concept is just ‘simply good’. (shrink)

Nietzsche is often regarded as a paradigmatically anti-theoretical philosopher. Bernard Williams has said that Nietzsche is so far from being a theorist that his text “is booby-trapped not only against recovering theory from it, but, in many cases, against any systematic exegesis that assimilates it to theory.” Many would apply this view especially to Nietzsche’s moral philosophy. They would say that even when he is making positive normative claims, as against just criticizing existing morality, his claims have neither the content (...) nor the organization characteristic of moral theory. (shrink)

In the mid twentieth century the philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein famously asserted that games are indefinable; there are no common threads that link them all. "Nonsense," says the sensible Bernard Suits: "playing a game is a voluntary attempt to overcome unnecessary obstacles." The short book Suits wrote demonstrating precisely that is as playful as it is insightful, as stimulating as it is delightful. Suits not only argues that games can be meaningfully defined; he also suggests that playing games is a central (...) part of the ideal of human existence, so games belong at the heart of any vision of Utopia. Originally published in 1978, The Grasshopper is now re-issued with a new introduction by Thomas Hurka and with additional material (much of it previously unpublished) by the author, in which he expands on the ideas put forward in The Grasshopper and answers some questions that have been raised by critics. (shrink)

I became interested in normative ethics in my last term as a philosophy undergraduate at the University of Toronto. Influenced by a traditional conception of the discipline, I’d till then studied mostly history of philosophy, with a special interest in, of all things, Hegel. But seeing the value of a balanced philosophy program, I enrolled in an ethics seminar in the winter of 1975. I’d studied the ethics of Plato, Leibniz, Hegel, and others in my history courses, but this was (...) my first exposure to contemporary thought on the subject. The seminar had only one other student, and since he was fairly quiet I had something close to a one-on-one tutorial with the instructor, Wayne Sumner – another contributor to this volume. I was immensely taken both by Wayne’s teaching and by the seminar’s topic, which was utilitarianism. Our study of it included both theoretical questions such as act- vs. ruleutilitarianism and applied ones such as our obligations to future generations. I found all these questions intellectually engaging and also humanly important, given their connection to live ethical issues – in short, I was hooked. I was especially impressed by two non-utilitarian texts we read. One was the last chapter of G. E. Moore’s Principia Ethica, meant to illustrate a non- 1 utilitarian or ideal consequentialist theory. I was attracted by Moore’s general account of the good, which values states such as love and aesthetic appreciation alongside pleasure, and saw in his principle of organic unities a far clearer statement of ideas I had encountered in more pretentious form in Hegel. The second was Chapter 2 of W. D. Ross’s The Right and the Good, which defends a pluralist deontology against consequentialism. I thought Ross’s criticisms of consequentialism were right on the mark, and again clearly and precisely expressed. I had no idea these texts were largely passé in current discussions of the subject. At this time I was applying to graduate programs in philosophy, and given my new interest decided to specialize in ethics.. (shrink)

Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) are becoming increasingly important as scientific tools, as they excel in various scientific applications beyond what was considered possible. Yet from a certain vantage point, they are nothing but parametrized functions fθ(x)\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\varvec{f}_{\varvec{\theta }}(\varvec{x})$$\end{document} of some data vector x\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\varvec{x}$$\end{document}, and their ‘learning’ is nothing but an iterative, algorithmic fitting of the parameters to data. Hence, what could be special about (...) them as a scientific tool or model? I will here suggest an integrated perspective that mediates between extremes, by arguing that what makes DNNs in science special is their ability to develop functional concept proxies (FCPs): Substructures that occasionally provide them with abilities that correspond to those facilitated by concepts in human reasoning. Furthermore, I will argue that this introduces a problem that has so far barely been recognized by practitioners and philosophers alike: That DNNs may succeed on some vast and unwieldy data sets because they develop FCPs for features that are not transparent to human researchers. The resulting breach between scientific success and human understanding I call the ‘Actually Smart Hans Problem’. (shrink)

According to Michael Dummett, we may think of the meaning of an expression as given by the principles governing the use we make of it. The principles regulating our linguistic practices can then be grouped into two broad categories (Dummett 1973: 396, 1991: 211). We might state them as follows: I-principles: state the circumstances under which an assertion of a sentence containing the expression in question is warranted. E-principles: state the consequences of asserting a sentence containing the expression. In the (...) case of the logical constants, we may associate a constant's I-principles with the set of its introduction rules and its E-principles with the set of its elimination rules (Dummett 1973: 454).1. (shrink)

Values typically come in pairs. Most obviously, there are the pairs of an intrinsic good and its contrasting intrinsic evil, such as pleasure and pain, virtue and vice, and desert and undesert, or getting what one deserves and getting its opposite. But in more complex cases there can be contrasting pairs with the same value. Thus, virtue has the positive form of benevolent pleasure in another’s pleasure and the negative form of compassionate pain for his pain, while desert has the (...) positive form of happiness for the virtuous and the negative form of pain for the vicious. (shrink)

A distinguished group of philosophers discuss a wide range of issues about games, sport, and play - a topic largely neglected in recent philosophical literature. They ask consider what games and sports have in common, pose questions about their value, and add philosophical voices to the on-going debates in game studies.