In the philosophy of memory there is a tension between a preservationist and a constructivist view of memory reflected in the debate between causalism and simulationism. Causalism is not only committed to the claim that there must be an appropriate causal connection between the remembered event and the content represented at retrieval but also that such connection is possible because of a content-preserving memory trace. Simulationism, by contrast, rejects the need for an appropriate causal condition and, thereby, makes the appeal (...) to memory traces unnecessary. In this paper I argue that while the are strong conceptual arguments and empirical evidence to support a constructivist view of memory, the empirical evidence also suggest that the initial formulation of simulationism needs to be revised. In particular, I argue, first, that simulationism’s commitment to a single cognitive system for mental time travel is likely wrong, and second, that simulationism cannot get rid of memory traces altogether, as they are still explanatorily indispensable when it comes to explaining a large number of memory-related phenomena. At the end, I end up suggesting a way of thinking about memory traces that, I think, is compatible with simulationism and a constructivist view of memory. If the view I put forth is on the right track, then an updated version of simulationism can help to dispel the dichotomy between causalism and simulationism as a false one. (shrink)

Some theorists think that the more we get to know about the neural underpinnings of our behaviors, the less likely we will be to hold people responsible for their actions. This intuition has driven some to suspect that as neuroscience gains insight into the neurological causes of our actions, people will cease to view others as morally responsible for their actions, thus creating a troubling quandary for our legal system. This paper provides empirical evidence against such intuitions. Particularly, our studies (...) of folk intuitions suggest that (1) when the causes of an action are described in neurological terms, they are not found to be any more exculpatory than when described in psychological terms, and (2) agents are not held fully responsible even for actions that are fully neurologically caused. (shrink)

People frequently entertain counterfactual thoughts, or mental simulations about alternative ways the world could have been. But the perceived plausibility of those counterfactual thoughts varies widely. The current article interfaces research in the philosophy and semantics of counterfactual statements with the psychology of mental simulations, and it explores the role of perceived similarity in judgments of counterfactual plausibility. We report results from seven studies (N = 6405) jointly supporting three interconnected claims. First, the perceived plausibility of a counterfactual event is (...) predicted by the perceived similarity between the possible world in which the imagined situation is thought to occur and the actual world. Second, when people attend to differences between imagined possible worlds and the actual world, they think of the imagined possible worlds as less similar to the actual world and tend to judge counterfactuals in such worlds as less plausible. Lastly, when people attend to what is identical between imagined possible worlds and the actual world, they think of the imagined possible worlds as more similar to the actual world and tend to judge counterfactuals in such worlds as more plausible. We discuss these results in light of philosophical, semantic, and psychological theories of counterfactual thinking. (shrink)

In this research, a sliding mode regulator with sine mapping is suggested for the stabilization of electricity generators being affected by magnet interaction nonlinearities and generator nonlinearities. To reach this goal, our suggested regulator has the following contributions: it starts from the sliding mode regulator with the modifications that the saturation mapping is used to reach a smoother performance instead of the signum mapping, and the sine mapping is applied to reach an upper bound in the proportional gain error, it (...) is used to reach some chosen constant behaviors for the angle position, angle speed, and current in the electricity generators, and its stabilization is ensured based on the Lyapunov approach. We show the simulation of the suggested regulator in two electricity generators. (shrink)

The expression “repressed memory” was introduced over 100 years ago as a theoretical term purportedly referring to an unobservable psychological entity postulated by Freud's seduction theory. That theory, however, and its hypothesized cognitive architecture, have been thoroughly debunked—yet the term “repressed memory” seems to remain. In this paper, I offer a philosophical evaluation of the meaning of this theoretical term as well as an argument to question its scientific status by comparing it to other cases of theoretical terms that have (...) either survived scientific change—such as “atom” or “gene”—or that have perished, such as “black bile.” Ultimately, I argue that “repressed memory” is more like “black bile” than “atom” or “gene” and, thus, recommend its demotion from our scientific vocabulary. (shrink)

Recent evidence suggests that if a deterministic description of the events leading up to a morally questionable action is couched in mechanistic, reductionistic, concrete and/or emotionally salient terms, people are more inclined toward compatibilism than when those descriptions use non-mechanistic, non-reductionistic, abstract and/or emotionally neutral terms. To explain these results, it has been suggested that descriptions of the first kind are processed by a concrete cognitive system, while those of the second kind are processed by an abstract cognitive system. The (...) current paper reports the results of three studies exploring whether or not considerations about possible future consequences of holding an agent responsible at a present time affect people’s judgments of responsibility. The results obtained suggest first that the concrete system does not produce compatibilist judgments of responsibility unconditionally, even when facing appropriately mechanistic, reductionistic, emotionally loaded and concretely worded deterministic scenarios. Second, these results suggest that considerations about possible future consequences for innocent third parties that may follow as a result of holding an agent responsible affect people’s judgment as to whether or not the agent is responsible for what she did. Finally, it is proposed that these results compliment extant evidence on the so-called “Side-effect effect”, as they suggest that emotional reactions toward possible future side effects influence people’s judgment of responsibility. The impact of these results for philosophy and moral psychology is discussed. (shrink)

Traduções de textos do filósofo pragmatista John Dewey, de 1894 e 1895, em que apresenta e desenvolve sua teoria de emoções.

El término competencias profesionales se define en la actualidad, como la posesión por parte del individuo de los conocimientos, destrezas y actitudes necesarias para realizar su actividad. El actual estudio tiene como objetivo profundizar en el análisis de la literatura sobre las competencias profesionales con un enfoque de formación y desarrollo de la expresión escrita en las universidades médicas. Con la revisión documental, se corroboró que en estas instituciones, el tratamiento de los contenidos de los programas de las asignaturas, no (...) garantizan el desarrollo de las competencias profesionales, atendiendo a que los currículos están diseñados por habilidades lo que trae como resultado que sus egresados no cuenten con el desarrollo adecuado de tales competencias, en particular las que garantizan la práctica afectiva de la expresión escrita. Professional competencies are currently defined as an individual's knowledge, skills and attitudes required to work in a specific profession. The current study aimed to further examine the literature related to professional skills with a focus on the development of writing in medical universities. Through document review, it was confirmed that in these institutions, the syllabi do not ensure the development of professional competencies since curricula are skills based. This in turn hinders the proper development of professional competencies, particularly those that guarantee strong writing practices. (shrink)

Empirical data from studies with both heterosexual and homosexual individuals have consistently indicated different tendencies in mating behavior. However, transgenders’ data are often overlooked. This exploratory study compared levels of sociosexuality and self-esteem between transgenders and non-transgender (cisgender) individuals. The aim was to verify whether either sexual genotype or gender self-perception had more influence on the examined variables in transgenders. Correlations between self-esteem and sociosexuality levels were also investigated. The sample consisted of 120 Brazilian individuals (51 transgenders) from both sexes. (...) Sociosexuality scores indicated mostly sex-typical patterns for transgenders of both sexes across the construct’s three dimensions (behavior, attitude, and desire), except for female-to-male transgenders’ behavioral sociosexuality. Unique associations between the dimensions of sociosexuality were found for transgender participants. No differences in self-esteem were observed and no correlations between self-esteem and sociosexuality were found. The results suggest that transgenders’ sociosexuality is largely influenced by their sexual genotype despite their incongruent gender self-perception and that the relationships between behavior, attitude, and sociosexual desire are different from those observed in cisgenders. (shrink)

Although organic standards and certification schemes have a crucial role in ensuring quality, safety, and sustainability within food systems, there is a need to critically analyze their implications on human capabilities within alternative food networks (AFNs). Therefore, this paper draws upon the capability approach to analyze the implications of three governance mechanisms (i.e., third-party, social control, and hybrid certification) on human flourishing within AFNs in Ceará, Brazil. The three cases primarily build on 66 interviews with farmers, consumers, AFN owners and (...) employees, certifying officials, governmental and non-governmental representatives, and researchers. Third-party certification has some positive effects in terms of material, political, and environmental capabilities and many negative effects regarding social/cultural capabilities. Social control certification bolsters material, social/cultural, political, and environmental capabilities for the benefit of farmers and consumers. Hybrid certification increases the material control, political power, social legitimacy, and environmental governance of market intermediaries. The findings can help scholars, practitioners, and policymakers rethink the role of organic standardization and certification in fostering fundamental human capabilities and tackling inequalities within AFNs. (shrink)

Hoerl & McCormack propose a two-system account of temporal cognition. We suggest that, following other classic proposals where cognitive systems are putatively independent, H&M's two-system hypothesis should, at a minimum, involve a difference in the nature of the representations upon which each system operates, and a difference in the computations they carry out. In this comment we offer two challenges aimed at showing that H&M's proposal does not meet the minimal requirements and.

In its purpose of rethink the relation between truth and method, the philosophical hermeneutics recovers the philosophical problem of the comprehension, privileging as main reference the truth experience of art as an ontological occurrence, which singularity enlarges the knowledge building about the human reality and drives a critic to the methodological model of the scientific modern rationality. The aim of this work is to analyze the character of ontological opening of the art as a truth experience and human formation, considering (...) the nature of its declarative language and the way of being of its own unhide (aletheia). As an expression of finitude, how the art declaration, in its come-to-talk, is determinant for a formation hermeneutics? It is shown the explicit of the art’s updating declaration in its ontological truth character as an experience of game, symbol and party. It is highlighted the hermeneutical relation between the art and formation emphasizing the hermeneutical experience of art in its horizon of opening, dialogical iteration and growing of meaning questions about the human existential reality. (shrink)

This paper is focused on dismissive metaontological views about ontology. The paper's first section deals with radical dismissivism: a view which I interpret as Carnap's. The second section approaches moderate dismissivism: a view which I interpret as Hirsch's. My first claim is stated in section three: that there are significant differences between the mentioned authors. However, current literature on metaontology, not only does not emphasize such differences, but also insinuates that they do not exist. The authors I have in mind (...) here are Eklund and Bennett. In the fourth section, I compare Carnap's radical dismissivism with Hirsch's moderate dismissivism. My second claim is stated in section five: that Carnap's radical dismissivism is more persuasive than Hirsch's moderate one. (shrink)

In this paper we argue that defenders of Frankfurt-style counterexamples to the Principle of Alternative Possibilities do not need to construct a metaphysically possible scenario in which an agent is morally responsible despite lacking the ability to do otherwise. Rather, there is a weaker (but equally legitimate) sense in which Frankfurt-style counterexamples can succeed. All that's needed is the claim that the ability to do otherwise is no part of what grounds moral responsibility, when the agent is indeed morally responsible.

Este artículo se propone indagar la presencia de las cosas sensibles a la luz de los trabajos de la fenomenología temprana. Para ello se elaborará una reflexión desde las problemáticas que algunos pensadores del círculo de Gotinga esbozaron en el contexto de las tesis husserlianas referentes a la Abschattung. Así, distinguiremos entre las cosas y su trazo sensible, detectando las posibilidades de su mutua vinculación y desvinculación fenoménica. Por esta vía, se identificará una relación triple en la que la cosa (...) empírica aparece, compuesta por las cualidades sensibles, las sensaciones del sujeto percipiente y su ubicación espacial, para examinar cuál de tales instancias explica el necesario vínculo entre trazo sensible y cosa como posibilidad de su aparecer efectivo en la realidad. Se concluirá que hay un ajuste a priori entre las cualidades y las propiedades cósicas que permitirá comprender la función presentativa del trazo sensible de las cosas. (shrink)

A key premise of the kalam cosmological argument is that the universe began to exist. However, while a number of philosophers have offered powerful criticisms of William Lane Craig’s defense of the premise, J.P. Moreland has also offered a number of unique arguments in support of it, and to date, little attention has been paid to these in the literature. In this paper, I attempt to go some way toward redressing this matter. In particular, I shall argue that Moreland’s philosophical (...) arguments against the possibility of traversing a beginningless past are unsuccessful. (shrink)

This essay presupposes that Friedrich Nietzsche and Rudolf Carnap champion contrasting reactions to the fact that, throughout history, persons have been engaged in metaphysical disputes. Nietzsche embraces a libertarian reaction that is in agreement with his anti-democratic aristocratic political views, whereas Carnap endorses an egalitarian reaction aligned with his democratic and socialist political views. After characterizing these reactions, the essay argues for two claims. The first claim is that the stated contrasting reactions are to be considered, not only by the (...) few scholars who are interested both in Nietzsche’s and Carnap’s writings, but by a far larger group that includes those who have addressed the continental-analytic gap; those who are concerned with the development of contemporary philosophy; and/or those who are interested in the writings of Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, David Lewis and/or Peter van Inwagen. The second claim is that we have to entertain a synthesis of Nietzsche’s libertarian and Carnap’s egalitarian reaction in order to overcome the continental-analytic gap. (shrink)

Besides the general agreement about the human capability of reflection, there is a large area of disagreement and debate about the nature and value of “reflective scrutiny” and the role of “second-order states” in everyday life. This problem has been discussed in a vast and heterogeneous literature about topics such as epistemic injustice, epistemic norms, agency, understanding, meta-cognition etc. However, there is not yet any extensive and interdisciplinary work, specifically focused on the topic of the epistemic value of reflection. This (...) volume is one of the first attempts aimed at providing an innovative contribution, an exchange between philosophy, epistemology and psychology about the place and value of reflection in everyday life. -/- Our goal in the next sections is not to offer an exhaustive overview of recent work on epistemic reflection, nor to mimic all of the contributions made by the chapters in this volume. We will try to highlight some topics that have motivated a new resumption of this field and, with that, drawing on chapters from this volume where relevant. -/- Two elements defined the scope and content of this volume, on the one hand, the crucial contribution of Ernest Sosa, whose works provide original and thought-provoking contributions to contemporary epistemology in setting a new direction for old dilemmas about the nature and value of knowledge, giving a central place to reflection. On the other hand, the recent developments of cultural psychology, in the version of the “Aalborg approach”, reconsider the object and scope of psychological sciences, stressing that “[h]uman conduct is purposeful”. (shrink)

While most people believe the best possible life they could lead would be an immortal one, so‐called “immortality curmudgeons” disagree. Following Bernard Williams, they argue that, at best, we have no prudential reason to live an immortal life, and at worst, an immortal life would necessarily be bad for creatures like us. In this article, we examine Bernard Williams' seminal argument against the desirability of immortality and the subsequent literature it spawned. We first reconstruct and motivate Williams' somewhat cryptic argument (...) in three parts. After that, we elucidate and motivate the three best (and most influential) counterarguments to Williams' seminal argument. Finally, we review, and critically examine, two further distinct arguments in favor of the anti‐immortality position. (shrink)

In this essay we consider the possibility of knowledge being transferred or transmitted via testimony. Initially, we present an introduction to the epistemology of testimony, by indicating their origin in a tradition that has John Locke, David Hume and Thomas Reid as their representatives. We present a version of the non-reductionist thesis. We show that the non-reductionist about knowledge must request from the speaker a testimonial epistemic performance that is truth conductive, as well as intellectual integrity from the listener.

The experimental interventions that provide evidence of causal relations are notably similar to those that provide evidence of constitutive relevance relations. In the first two sections, I show that this similarity creates a tension: there is an inconsistent triad between Woodward’s popular interventionist theory of causation, Craver’s mutual manipulability account of constitutive relevance in mechanisms, and a variety of arguments for the incoherence of inter-level causation. I argue for an interpretation of the views in which the tension is merely apparent. (...) I propose to explain inter-level relations without inter-level causation by appealing to the notion of fat-handed interventions, and an argument against inter-level causation which dissolves the problem. (shrink)