本书把最新反映邓小平哲学思想特色的论述分为:解放思想,实事求是,照辩证法办事,改革是解放和发展生产力的必由之路,面向世界,吸收人类文明成果等10部分加以编辑。.

This essay argues that individual-oriented informed consent is inadequate to protect human research subjects in mainland China. The practice of family-oriented decision-making is better suited to guide moral research conduct. The family’s role in medical decision-making originates from the mutual benevolence that exists among family members, and is in accordance with family harmony, which is the aim of Confucian society. I argue that the practice of informed consent for medical research on human subjects ought to remain family-oriented in mainland China. (...) This essay explores the main features of this model of informed consent and demonstrates the proper authority of the family. The family’s participation in decision-making as a whole does not negate or deny the importance of the individual who is the subject of the choice, but rather acts more fully to protect research subjects. (shrink)

To cope with the water deficit resulting from saline environment, plant cells accumulate three kinds of osmotica: salts, small organic solutes and hydrophillic, glycine-rich proteins. Salts such as NaCl are cheap and available but has ion toxicity in high concentrations. Small organic solutes are assistant osmotica, their main function is to protect cytoplasmic enzymes from ionic toxicity and maintain the integrity of cellular membranes. Hydrophillic, glycine-rich proteins are the most effective osmotica, they have some characteristics to avoid crystallization even in (...) high concentration, but because they are expensive they are not as commonly used as salts or organic solutes. In addition there is the question of whether the genetic information for growth in saline environment is present in all kinds of plants, both halophytes and nonhalophytes. (shrink)

In his recent book ‘Experiencing time’, Simon Prosser discusses a wide variety of topics relating to temporal experience, in a way that is accessible both to those steeped in the philosophy of mind, and to those more familiar with the philosophy of time. He forcefully argues for the conclusion that the B-theorist of time can account for the temporal appearances. In this article, I offer a chapter by chapter response.

In this paper, I try to make sense of the growing block view using Kit Fine’s three-fold classification of A-theoretic views of time. I begin by motivating the endeavor of making sense of the growing block view by examining John Earman’s project in ‘Reassessing the prospects for a growing block model of the universe’. Next, I review Fine’s reconstruction of McTaggart’s argument and its accompanying three-fold classification of A-theoretic views. I then consider three interpretations of Earman’s growing block model: the (...) hybrid growing block, the purely tensed growing block, and Michael Tooley’s growing block. I argue for three claims. First, Finean ‘standard’ versions of these views are less congenial to the growing blocker than ‘non-standard’ ones. Second, the hybrid view is problematic on either version. And third, ‘non-standard’ versions are not fully intelligible. I provide further support for the first and third of these claims and explain why I take them to support a minimal account of passage as succession, which undercuts some of the motivation for Earman’s project. Lastly, I answer three objections. (shrink)

本書從十個方面介紹了宋朝文化藝術的高度成就。第一章總體概述了宋朝社會形態和文化風氣，後九章，分別對理學、書法、宋畫、宋詞、宋瓷、名物、茶事、雅集、以及《清明上河圖》這九個代表性的宋朝文化藝術現象進行具 體論述，包括源流、發展、特色、代表人物、代表作品、後世影響等各個方面，從士大夫的雅文化到市井小民的俗文化，無不透露出宋人活躍的思想與豐富的精神世界。每一章的主講人都是在該領域造詣頗深的專家學者，通俗流 暢的語言，配以大量書畫器物圖片，幫助讀者理解和感受宋朝人文藝術的風雅魅力。.

With a previous paper (Niu & Wang, 1995), a general, hypothetical outline of the mechanism of carcinogenesis was proposed. With reference to the fact of starvation-induced hypermutation in micro-organisms, we propose that the hypoxia commonly seen in the cells at the centre of solid tumours might also result in hypermutation, and then p53-dependent programmed cell death. Like the apparently adaptive mutations in micro-organisms, only those genes (e.g. p53) that enable the cells to escape from apoptosis may be selected.

From the viewpoint of an evolutionary biologist, carcinogenesis should be looked upon as a protective mechanism against destruction of DNA. Because genes expressed in embryonic cells are covered and protected by heterochromatinization, they are the most appropriate ‘alternate genes’ compared to genes that are expressed already in somatic cells. When DNA-damage occurs, the embryonic genes can be activated. Some somatic cells exhibit some features of embryonic cells.

Elsewhere I have suggested that the B-theory includes a notion of passage, by virtue of including succession. Here, I provide further support for that claim by showing that uncontroversial elements of the B-theory straightforwardly ground a veridical sense of passage. First, I argue that the B-theory predicts that subjects of experience have a sense of passivity with respect to time that they do not have with respect to space, which they are right to have, even according to the B-theory. I (...) then ask what else might be involved in our experience of time as passing that is not yet vindicated by the B-theoretic conception. I examine a recent B-theoretic explanation of our ‘illusory’ sense of passage, by Robin Le Poidevin, and argue that it explains away too much: our perception of succession poses no more of a problem on the B-theory than it does on other theories of time. Finally, I respond to an objection by Oreste Fiocco that a causal account of our sense of passage cannot succeed, because it leaves out the ‘phenomenological novelty’ of each moment. (shrink)

I offer an interpretation and a partial defense of Kit Fine's ‘Argument from Passage’, which is situated within his reconstruction of McTaggart's paradox. Fine argues that existing A-theoretic approaches to passage are no more dynamic, i.e. capture passage no better, than the B-theory. I argue that this comparative claim is correct. Our intuitive picture of passage, which inclines us towards A-theories, suggests more than coherent A-theories can deliver. In Finean terms, the picture requires not only Realism about tensed facts, but (...) also Neutrality, i.e. the tensed facts not being ‘oriented towards’ one privileged time. However unlike Fine, and unlike others who advance McTaggartian arguments, I take McTaggart's paradox to indicate neither the need for a more dynamic theory of passage nor that time does not pass. A more dynamic theory is not to be had: Fine's ‘non-standard realism’ amounts to no more than a conceptual gesture. But instead of concluding that time does not pass, we should conclude that theories of passage cannot deliver the dynamicity of our intuitive picture. For this reason, a B-theoretic account of passage that simply identifies passage with the succession of times is a serious contender. (shrink)

Usually, the B-theory of time is taken to involve the claim that time does not, in reality, pass; after all, on the B-theory, nothing really becomes present and then more and more past, times do not come into existence successively, and which facts obtain does not change. For this reason, many B-theorists have recently tried to explain away one or more aspect(s) of experience that they and their opponents take to constitute an experience of time as passing. In this paper, (...) I examine three prominent proposals of this kind and argue that, though intriguing, the proposals undermine, to some extent, the assumption that there is an element of experience that B-theorists need to take to be illusory. (shrink)

Some naturalists feel an affinity with some religions, or with a particular religion. They may have previously belonged to it, and/or been raised in it, and/or be close to people who belong to it, and/or simply feel attracted to its practices, texts and traditions. This raises the question of whether and to what extent a naturalist can lead the life of a religious believer. The sparse literature on this topic focuses on religious fictionalism. I also frame the debate in these (...) terms. I ask what religious fictionalism might amount to, reject some possible versions of it and endorse a different one. I then examine the existing proposals, by Robin Le Poidevin, Peter Lipton, Andrew Eshleman and Howard Wettstein, and show that even on my version of religious fictionalism, much of what has been described by these authors is still possible. (shrink)

In order to establish his "school of principle" system of thought, which was founded on objective idealism, Zhu Xi proposed a theory of "investigating things and exhausting principles" [gewu qiongli]. This became the epistemological foundation for his system of thought. This epistemology formed an organic whole with his world view. On the one hand, his "theory-of-investigating-things" epistemology opened up pathways for his system of objective idealism; on the other hand, his "school-of-principle" system formed the theoretical foundation for his epistemology of (...) "investigating things" and gave this epistemology its obviously metaphysical characteristics. (shrink)

Division of labour is a marked feature of multicellular organisms. Margulis proposed that the ancestors of metazoans had only one microtubule organizing center (MTOC), so they could not move and divide simultaneously. Selection for simultaneous movement and cell division had driven the division of labour between cells. However, no evidence or explanation for this assumption was provided. Why could the unicellular ancetors not have multiple MTOCs? The gain and loss of three possible strategies are discussed. It was found that the (...) advantage of one or two MTOC per cell is environment-dependent. Unicellular organisms with only one MTOC per cell are favored only in resource-limited environments without strong predatory pressure. If division of labour occurring in a bicellular organism just makes simultaneous movement and cell division possible, the possibility of its fixation by natural selection is very low because a somatic cell performing the function of an MTOC is obviously wasting resources. Evolutionary biologists should search for other selective forces for division of labour in cells. (shrink)

Context: A central motivation behind various embodied, extended, and enactive (4E) approaches to cognition is to ground our understanding of minds and cognition within the biological structures that give rise to life. Because of this, their advocates often claim a natural kinship with dynamical and developmental systems theories. However, these accounts also explicitly or implicitly privilege individual organisms in ways that contrast with many of the insights of systems and developmental systems approaches to biology. Problem: The prioritization of individual organisms (...) within 4E approaches to cognition contrasts with the default entangled structure of biological systems associated with cognitive agency. We provide means for 4E cognitive science to move beyond an individual-centred view of cognitive agency. Method: We first identify and problematize individual-centredness within various predominant 4E approaches by comparison with biological research and developmental systems theory. Subsequently, we offer conceptual resources from the field of ecological research for understanding cognitive agency beyond the predominant focus on individual organisms. Results: Cognitive agency may be understood without privileging individual organisms by reading nonequilibrium maintenance in terms of a dynamic differentiation instead of individual organismic autonomy. This form of organizational structure corresponds to the notion of sympoiesis from ecological research. Implications: Approaching cognitive agency without privileging individual organisms should be invaluable to advocates of 4E cognition seeking to ground notions of cognition and mind within contemporary biological research. Constructivist content: We seek to expand upon existing constructivist perspectives on the organizing principles of cognitive agency, such as sensorimotor embodiment and autopoiesis, arguing that meta-organismic cognitive agents (including humans) embody distributed relations beyond the privileging of individual organisms. Key words: 4E cognition, autopoiesis, cognitive agency, developmental systems theory, enactivism, extended mind thesis, holobionts, sympoeisis. (shrink)

This article is an evaluation of Le Poidevin’s use of Carnap ’s stance on ontology within the philosophy of religion. Le Poidevin claims that 1) theists need to take God to be a putative entity within space-time in order for their claim that God exists to be meaningful, and that 2) instrumentalism about theology is viable. I argue that although Le Poidevin’s response to Carnap ’s argument is no less problematic than that argument itself, his position is in fact thoroughly (...) un-Carnapian. The upshot is that his discussion provides some support to atheism, but none to either of his two official conclusions. (shrink)

Enactive approaches to psychiatry have recently argued for an understanding of psychiatric conditions based within relational interactions between individuals and their environments. A central motivation for these enactive approaches is the goal of social integration: the integration of a naturalistic approach to psychiatric conditions with their broader sociocultural dimensions. One possible issue, however, is whether appeals to the autonomy and authenticity of relationally constituted enactive individuals can provide a means of adjudicating between harmful and beneficial social constraints upon individual behaviour. (...) This paper seeks to provide enactive approaches to psychiatry with a possible means of evaluating normative influences of social contexts beyond direct interactions with relationally constituted individuals. Some of the most significant influences of the sociocultural dimension of psychiatric conditions consist not in direct interaction with individuals, but in setting the terms for interactions and interactants alike. Insofar as some social influences precede and predefine dyadic relations between individuals and their social context, these cannot be accounted for as features of interactions, but must be assessed as independent structures of the sociocultural dimension. I will provide one potential means for enactive models to assess social norms using Canguilhem’s distinction between health and pathology. I will argue that Canguilhem’s conceptualization of health in terms of adaptive normative structure provides a potential tool for social integration which strongly complements enactive approaches to psychiatry. (shrink)

What, if anything, makes death bad for the deceased themselves? Deprivationists hold that death is bad for the deceased iff it deprives them of intrinsic goods they would have enjoyed had they lived longer. This view faces the problem that birth too seems to deprive one of goods one would have enjoyed had one been born earlier, so that it too should be bad for one. There are two main approaches to the problem. In this paper, I explore the second (...) approach, by Anthony Brueckner and John Martin Fischer, and suggest that it can be developed so as to meet deprivationists’ needs. On the resulting view, metaphysical differences between the future and the past give rise to a corresponding axiological difference in the intrinsic value of future and past experiences. As experiences move into the past, they lose their intrinsic value for the person. (shrink)

Comrade Hu Qili, on behalf of the Central Secretariat, has delivered a speech of congratulations at the Fourth Congress of the National Writers' Association. This speech is very important. In it, Comrade Hu Qili stated: "As regards the freedom of [artistic] creation, the Party and state should provide the necessary conditions [for it] and create the necessary environment and atmosphere. At the same time, the writers' own thoughts and feelings and their creative activities as a whole should be in step (...) with the environment of freedom provided by the Party and state." Demands are made on both sides. On the one hand, the Party and state should create the requisite conditions, environment, and atmosphere for literary creation. The civil liberties stipulated in the Constitution include the freedom of creation. For writers who are Party members, the rights of Party members, stipulated by the Party constitution and by the Party's criteria for political life, also include the right of freedom of creation. Many problems still exist in this respect; situations still exist wherein no active measures are being taken to create the conditions, environment, and atmosphere for writers to fully enjoy the freedom of creation due to them. [The authorities] in some localities even obstruct or willfully interfere with the realization of this freedom, or they suppress democracy, resort to persecution and retaliation, or employ crude and simplistic means to deal with writers and with artistic creation—a meticulous form of mental labor that has its own special regularities. The thorough solution of problems of this sort still requires great efforts on our part. On the other hand, Comrade Hu Qili also said in his congratulatory speech that the writers' own thoughts and feelings and their creative activities as a whole should be in step with the environment of freedom provided the Party and state. That is to say, they must remain in step with the Constitution, and where Party-member writers are concerned, they should remain in step with the Party constitution, and they should ensure the implementation of relevant stipulations in the Constitution and Party constitution. Many efforts must be made, whether by Party committees and governments at various levels or by the writers, to promote the healthy development and continued flourishing of socialist literature and art. Hence, the two sentences in Comrade Qili's congratulatory speech address the matter very comprehensively. (shrink)

In this paper I revisit a dispute between Mikel Burley and Robin Le Poidevin about whether or not the B-theory of time can give its adherents any reason to be less afraid of death. In ‘Should a B-theoretic atheist fear death?’, Burley argues that even on Le Poidevin’s understanding of the B-theory, atheists shouldn’t be comforted. His reason is that the prevalent B-theoretic account of our attitudes towards the past and future precludes treating our fear of death as unwarranted. I (...) examine his argument and provide a tentative defense of Le Poidevin. I claim that while Burley rightly spots a tension with a non-revisionary approach to our ordinary emotional life, he doesn’t isolate the source of that tension. The real question is how to understand Le Poidevin’s idea that on the B-theory, we and our lives are ‘eternally real’. I then suggest that there is a view of time that does justice to Le Poidevin’s remarks, albeit a strange one. The view takes temporal relations to be quasi-spatial and temporal entities to exist in a totum simul. (shrink)

Literary ontology is essentially a phenomenological issue rather than one of epistemology, sociology, or psychology. It is a theory of the phenomenological essence intuited from a sense of beauty, based on the phenomenological ontology of beauty, which puts into brackets the sociohistorical premises and material conditions of aesthetic phenomena. Beauty is the objectified emotion. This is the phenomenological definition of the essence of beauty, which manifests itself on three levels, namely emotion qua selfconsciousness, sense of beauty qua emotion, and sentiment (...) qua sense of beauty. Art on the other hand is the objectification of emotion whose most general and closest manner to humanity is literature and poetry. Poetry is the origin of language and the linguistic essence is a metaphor. Language as the house of being is both thinking and poetry. Literature expresses the essence of art in the most direct way and, in traditional Chinese aesthetic terminology, literature is the language of emotion conveyed by the writer based on his own emotion towards the language of scene. (shrink)

Emotions are believed to converge both through emotional mimicry and social appraisal. The present study compared contagion of anger and happiness. In Experiment 1, participants viewed dynamic angry and happy faces, with facial electromyography recorded from the zygomaticus major and corrugator supercilii as emotional mimicry. Self-reported emotional experiences were analyzed as emotional contagion. Experiment 2 manipulated social appraisal as the gaze of expression toward the target. The results showed that there was emotional contagion for angry and happy expressions both in (...) Experiment 1 and Experiment 2. Experiment 1 indicated an overt mimicry pattern for happy faces, but not for angry faces. Experiment 2 found an influence of social appraisal on angry contagion but not on happy diffusion. The two experiments suggest that the underlying processes of emotional mimicry and social appraisal are differentially relevant for different emotional contagion, with happiness processing following a mimicry-based path to emotional contagion, and anger processing requiring social appraisal. (shrink)

The three-volume set gives new insights into Hegel's dialectics and thereby his overall philosophical thought via a retracing of the origins of dialectics and an analysis of its logic structure, with the concept of the Nous highlighted as fundamental to this. The first volume explores two origins of Hegelian dialectics from ancient Greek philosophy, namely the linguistic spirit of Logos and the existentialist spirit of Nous, before illuminating how their binary opposition, division and unification constitutes the inner tension of Hegel's (...) dialectics and developing into the forms of thought that fashion the history of western philosophy. Focusing on self-negation and reflective form of dialectics, and representing spirits of Nous and Logos respectively, the second volume further explores their core functions in terms of subjectivity, free spirit and practicality. In the final volume, the author defines Hegel's dialectics as "a unity of three": logic, epistemology and ontology. This unification and the interrelation of three components demonstrates the internal feature of Hegel's dialectics as well as the connection and divergence between Hegel and Marx's philosophical thought. The title will appeal to scholars and students interested in Hegel and Marx's philosophy, German classical philosophy and Western philosophy. (shrink)

This essay reveals five points in which Heidegger misreads Hegel in "Hegel's Concept of Experience": (1) By forcedly introducing the concept of "will", he interprets Hegel's phenomenology of spirit into Metaphysics of Presence; (2) interprets concepts such as "statement" and "the road of skeptics" as the process of phenomenological reduction; (3) reduces Hegel's Sein to Seiende; (4) replaces "Contradiction" with "Ambiguity" so the active Dialectics become passive; (5) exaggerates conscious experience and puts it into a real ontology, regardless of the (...) significance of Logic and Encyclopedia of Philosophy. By an analysis of this misreading we can find the internal connection between Heidegger's thought and that of his philosophical forerunner, Hegel. /// 在"黑格尔的经验概念"一文中，海德格尔对黑格尔有五个方面的有意误读: (1)用强行引入的"意志"概念将黑格尔的精神现象学解释为在场的形而上学;(2) 将黑格尔的"陈述"、"怀疑之路"等概念解释为现象学还原的程序(3) 将黑格 尔的"存在(Sein) "贬为仅仅是指"存在者(4) 将"矛盾"置换为"模棱两 可使黑格尔的辩证运动从主动变为被动(5) 将意识的经验夸大为真正的本体 论，无视《逻辑学》和《哲学百科全书》的意义。通过分析这样的误i卖，有助于我 们了解海德格尔和黑格尔思想之间的内在联系。. (shrink)

We construct a causal-modeling semantics for both indicative and counterfactual conditionals. As regards counterfactuals, we adopt the orthodox view that a counterfactual conditional is true in a causal model M just in case its consequent is true in the submodel M∗, generated by intervening in M, in which its antecedent is true. We supplement the orthodox semantics by introducing a new manipulation called extrapolation. We argue that an indicative conditional is true in a causal model M just in case its (...) con- sequent is true in certain submodels M∗, generated by extrapolating M, in which its antecedent is true. We show that the proposed semantics can account for some important minimal pairs nicely and naturally. We also prove a theorem showing under what conditions intervention and extrapolation will yield the same result, and thus explain how counterfactual and indicative conditionals would behave in a causal-modeling semantics. (shrink)

本书包括《法学理论前沿与中国法学的发展》、《分工与秩序的关键展开》、《研究哈耶克宪政模式的几点关键性指出》等文章。.

本书包括《南询录》校注记、《南询录》校注、记录邓豁渠生平的文献资料、研究邓豁渠的两篇论文这四个部分的内容。.

This entry provides an overview of some key positions on God and time and discusses arguments for and against divine timelessness. The final section outlines some other philosophical contexts in which the concept of eternity can play a role.

Temporal ontology is the part of ontology involving the rival positions of presentism, eternalism, and the growing block theory. While this much is clear, it’s surprisingly difficult to elucidate the substance of the disagreement between presentists and eternalists. Certain events happened that are not happening now; what is it to disagree about whether these events exist? In spite of widespread suspicion concerning the status and methods of analytic metaphysics, skeptics’ doubts about this debate have not generally been heeded, neither by (...) metaphysicians, nor by philosophers of physics. This paper revisits the question in the light of prominent elucidation attempts from both camps. The upshot is that skeptics were right to be puzzled. The paper then explores a possible re-interpretation of positions in temporal ontology that links it to normative views about how we should live as temporal beings. (shrink)

This is a book of guidance rooted in the wisdom of ancient China. Bestselling author Deng Ming-Dao provides key poetic lines that distill the essence of Taoism, organizing them in the form of a journey. The material here is drawn from a variety of sources, including, the Yijing, 300 Tang Poems, and the full text of the Daodejing. As Deng Ming-Dao notes, "We walk the Way each day. We don't know what's ahead, and so it's helpful to have (...) the wisdom of others to guide us. They have left us a message to encourage us. They have spoken of the joys, griefs, and purity that we should embrace. Like good pathfinders, they give us direction and prepare us for what we might encounter. They let us walk for ourselves. We have a wonderful companion for the journey." This profound collection of ancient wisdom is the resource for those looking for daily sustenance and guidance on the path of life. -- inside front cover. (shrink)

Does time seem to pass, even though it doesn’t, really? Many philosophers think the answer is ‘Yes’—at least when ‘time’s passing’ is understood in a particular way. They take time’s passing to be a process by which each time in turn acquires a special status, such as the status of being the only time that exists, or being the only time that is present. This chapter suggests that, on the contrary, all we perceive is temporal succession, one thing after another, (...) a notion to which modern physics is not inhospitable. The contents of perception are best described in terms of ‘before’ and ‘after’, rather than ‘past’, ‘present, and ‘future’. (shrink)

Present-bias is the preference, all else being equal, for positive events to be located in the present rather than the non-present, and for negative events to be located in the non-present rather than the present. Very little attention has been given to present-bias in the contemporary literature on time biases. This may be because it is often assumed that present-bias is not a distinctive psychological kind; that what explains people’s being present-biased is just what explains them displaying various other time-biases. (...) According to this view, there is no need to investigate present-bias independently of investigating these other biases, since present-bias is really just a manifestation of these other biases. We call this the manifestation thesis. We take up the question of whether the manifestation thesis is true, and argue that it is not. Thus, by failing to investigate present-bias in its own right we are failing fully to understand the spectrum of ways in which people display time biases. In turn, we suggest, this may have implications for the ways we evaluate whether present-bias is rationally permissible. (shrink)

I respond to Jeffrey Bishop’s article ‘Arts of Dying and the Statecraft of Killing’, in this issue, and in particular to his remarks in support of the claim that assisted death should not be legalised.

Zusammenfassung Das Projekt einer philosophischen Umgestaltung des Daoismus begleitet mich schon seit langem als vorläufige Idee. In der 1995er Ausgabe der Philosophical Dynamics Nr. 4 veröffentlichte ich einen kurzen Artikel mit dem Titel Ein vorläufiger Überblick über die Umgestaltung der daoistischen Philosophie, der später als Vortrags Transkript in meine Vierzehn Vorlesungen über die Methodologie der Geschichte der Philosophie aufgenommen wurde. 邓晓芒: 道家哲学改造德临时纲要, 收入《哲学史方法论十四讲》, 重庆大学出版社, 2015 年, 第 246–283 页 [Deng Xiaomang: Siebte Vorlesung: Ein vorläufiger Überblick über die Transformation der (...) daoistischen Philosophie, in: Vierzehn Vorlesungen über die Methodologie der Geschichte der Philosophie, Chongqing: Verlag der Universität Chongqing, 2015, S. 246–283.]. Im Prozess der Kritik der traditionellen chinesischen Philosophie durch den Vergleich chinesischer und westlicher Kulturtraditionen kam ich auf die Idee, dass, wenn wir westliche Elemente in unsere traditionelle chinesische Kultur aufnehmen und ein neues Gedankengebäude errichten wollen, dieses Projekt als ein gemeinsamer Ausgangspunkt dienen kann. Während der moderne Neukonfuzianismus auf der „kreativen Transformation“ der Tradition des Konfuzianismus basiert, beruht meine Wiedergeburt der traditionellen chinesischen Kultur auf der Kritik am Konfuzianismus und der Umgestaltung der daoistischen Philosophie. Vor zwanzig Jahren jedoch befand sich dieses Projekt noch im Stadium einer Skizze und ich hatte keine Zeit, sie zu entwickeln, also nannte ich sie einen „vorläufigen Entwurf“. Im vorliegenden Aufsatz möchte ich diese Fragestellung auf den historischen Spuren der daoistischen Philosophie weiter vertiefen. (shrink)