Schupbach and Sprenger introduce a novel probabilistic approach to measuring the explanatory power that a given explanans exerts over a corresponding explanandum. Though we are sympathetic to their general approach, we argue that it does not adequately capture the way in which the causal explanatory power that c exerts on e varies with background knowledge. We then amend their approach so that it does capture this variance. Though our account of explanatory power is less ambitious than Schupbach and Sprenger’s in (...) the sense that it is limited to causal explanatory power, it is also more ambitious because we do not limit its domain to cases where c genuinely explains e. Instead, we claim that c causally explains e if and only if our account says that c explains e with some positive amount of causal explanatory power. (shrink)

In these replies, I react to comments on my paper “Facts about Incoherence as Non-Evidential Epistemic Reasons”, provided by Aleks Knoks, Sebastian Schmidt, Keshav Singh, and Conor McHugh. I discuss potential counterexamples to my claim that the fact that the subject’s doxastic attitudes are incoherent is an epistemic reason for her to suspend; whether such incoherence-based reasons bear on individual attitudes or only on combinations of attitudes; the prospects of restricting evidentialism about epistemic reasons to reasons to believe; whether incoherence-based (...) reasons are truly epistemic; the alleged normative and motivational expendability of incoherence-based reasons; the possibility of incoherence-based reasons to suspend without actual belief in the incoherent propositions; the relationship between suspension, inquiry, and incoherence; and the nature of suspension of judgment. (shrink)

I present an explanatory argument for the reasons-first view: It is superior to knowledge-first views in particular in that it can both explain the specific epistemic role of perception and account for the shape and extent of epistemic justification.

The technique of imaging was first introduced by Lewis, in order to provide a novel account of the probability of conditional propositions. In the intervening years, imaging has been the object of significant interest in both AI and philosophy, and has come to be seen as a philosophically important approach to probabilistic updating and belief revision. In this paper, we consider the possibility of generalising imaging to deal with uncertain evidence and partial belief revision. In particular, we introduce a new (...) logical criterion that any update rule should satisfy, and use it to evaluate a range of different approaches to generalising imaging to situations involving uncertain evidence. We show that none of the currently prevalent approaches to imaging allow for such a generalisation, although a lesser known version of imaging, introduced by Joyce, can be generalised in a way that mitigates these problems. (shrink)

There is a long-standing debate regarding the nature of the relationship between emotions and consciousness. Majority of existing computational models of emotions largely avoid the issue, and generally do not explicitly address distinctions between the conscious and the unconscious components of emotions. This paper highlights the importance of developing an adequately differentiated vocabulary describing the mental states of interest, and their features and components, for the development of computational models of the relationships between emotions and consciousness. We discuss current psychological (...) theories of emotion, highlighting specific points in the affective processes where links exist with consciousness, and possible roles played by each. We discuss examples of models that are beginning to address components of the interface between emotions and consciousness: models of social emotions, requiring explicit representations of the self; models of affective biases on attention; models of emotion and metacognition; and models of emotion regulation. We conclude with a discussion of some of the challenges associated with modeling mental states whose core distinguishing characteristic is an awareness of affective feelings, and highlight the importance of integrating the diverse approaches to emotion research and modeling currently existing within psychology and neuroscience. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Learning Music:Embodied Experience in the Life-WorldEva Alerby and Cecilia FermIn the present age, which is often signified as post-modern or knowledge-intensive, the calls for learning echo loud. Discussions of learning, as well as teaching, permeate almost all levels and arenas of our society, and have a sure place in every-day conversation as well as scientific debate. The concept of learning can be understood and explained in many different ways. (...) Our intention in this article is to make visible and discuss how learning music can be understood and explained from a life-world approach.By life-world approach we mean that learning is constituted by the experiences that we are having in the world. From that perspective it can be seen as a process which leads to some kind of change, whose utmost purpose is—consciously or unconsciously—to create meaning and make managing the world possible. In addition, we stress that learning does not arise nor is formed in a vacuum, but instead is found in complex contexts. In turn this creates the necessity of making learning situated and contextualized.1How one understands how music is learned is consequently influenced not only by what fundamental assumptions one holds about learning but also by prevailing views of music. Furthermore, how musical ability is regarded and whether musicality is accepted as an emotional or cognitive phenomenon is also [End Page 177] important. Other assumptions that need to be considered are whether or not it is possible to divide musicality into smaller parts and if that is the case, what is the relationship between these parts. One further question that has to be illuminated is the question about biological and social influences on musicality.2 According to Sture Brändström,3 musicality is sometimes divided into two categories—absolute contra relativistic musicality. The first category implies that musicality is regarded as a native ability, already existing within the human being, an ability that some people have and others lack. The second category reflects an approach that assumes that musicality is something everybody can acquire, it can be learned and appropriated. We will return later to this issue.These questions reveal a dualistic approach, specifically: whether musicality is an emotional or a cognitive phenomenon, or absolute or relative, which in turn leads to the question of whether or not learning music is constituted within or outside the human being. To expose problems related to this dualistic approach in music education, we will examine musical learning using life-world phenomenology as a theoretical framework, a brief description of which follows.Phenomenology: A Way of ThinkingAt the turn into the twentieth century, the German philosopher, Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), named his philosophical approach phenomenology, and with that the development of modern phenomenology began. Phenomenology is both a method and a way of thought.4 He distinguished the fundamental principle of phenomenology as—'back to the things themselves.' According to Husserl it is through experiences that we gain access to things themselves. The concept of experience was essential to his formulation, and it became a key signature for the whole of phenomenology. His starting-point was how the world is experienced in a subjective way, and the aim was to find a way to describe the meaning of these subjective experiences. In other words, phenomenology has been summarized as a description of how the world is experienced by the person in the world.Various thinkers have interpreted phenomenology in different ways. Jan Bengtsson5 emphasized that phenomenological method should be named in the plural as methods. The phenomenology of the life-world, which was developed as an alternative to the so-called epoché, the special method of transcendental phenomenology, is a philosophy of the life-world without transcendental reduction. It is the life-world that constitutes the basis of our lives. It is the everyday world of our experiences, which we take for granted and where we live our lives. In other words it is the life-world that constitutes people's being-in-the-world.6 Through our existence we experience the concrete world in all its complexity, which is both historically and contextually dependent. Consequently... (shrink)

Cursory review of the reception of Adorno's unfinished Aesthetic Theory up to the present suggests that an introduction to the book's major concerns, its structure (or lack thereof), and its concepts is missing to this date. Going back to Fredric Jameson's watershed contribution Late Marxism: Adorno, Or, the Persistence of the Dialectic (1990), the article attempts to provide the introduction missing to date. It is organized around key concepts of Adorno's Aesthetic Theory, beginning with the guiding juxtaposition of Kant's formalist (...) aesthetics vs. Hegel's content aesthetics and the various notions of the End of Art, followed by two sections on art and its respective others (from the culture industry and art appreciation to nature and natural beauty), and concluding with the axiom of suffering and its impact on the key notions of semblance, expression, and mimesis. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In this paper I propose that examining Locke’s response to skepticism requires us to consider at least three distinct senses in which skepticism appears on the horizon of the Essay. Skepticism is addressed, directly or indirectly, (i) as a general outcome of philosophical inquiry, (ii) as a methodical decision to doubt, and also (iii) as the result of a particular problem that challenges the claim to knowledge. I think that by examining how Locke reacts to such issues, we get (...) a more accurate and nuanced picture of Locke’s relationship to skeptical philosophy. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Il Mostro e il sapiente: Studi sull'erotica grecaEva CantarellaRiccardo Vattuone. Il Mostro e il sapiente: Studi sull'erotica greca. Studi di Storia 11. Bologna: Pàtron, 2004. 345 pp. 15 black-and-white figs. Paper, €24."Il mostro e il sapiente" (the monster and the wise man), referred to in the title of Riccardo Vattuone's book, are, respectively, the loathed figure of the modern pedophile and an elected official who stands almost as (...) a symbol of wisdom, the great Athenian legislator Solon. Each of them, as Vattuone observes in the introduction, "loves" boys. No one, however, has ever for this reason considered the wise man Solon to be a monster, as today's media tend to view the modern pedophile. Thus it is clear from the title and made explicit in the foreword (7–10) that Vattuone is not merely interested in the past. As he repeats several times, "It is the past that puts the most significant questions to the contemporary age, and not vice-versa" (9, and passim). In this case, the past that interrogates the present is the pederastic relationship, and the question that this has asked Vattuone is whether or not there is a relationship between so-called Greek love and modern pedophilia. According to Vattuone, from the nineteenth century on, the immense quantity of literature about the pederastic relationship oscillates between radical condemnation and attempts to defend the past by "distancing it" (8). Il Mostro e il sapiente, he declares, was written to get away from this "ideological hypocrisy" and to dispel, if possible, "the suspicion that behind the contemporary pedophile there lurk the worst vices, the most obvious repressions of Western culture... and that that person is a creation of the system, constructed as a scapegoat for the unspeakable Other" (9).The following eight chapters are therefore dedicated to this objective. In the first, "Osservazioni preliminari: i crimini di Solone" (Preliminary Observations: the Crimes of Solon), Vattuone begins with an epigram of Straton (AP 12.246) to contest—in my opinion correctly—the reading of pederasty that he calls "anesthetic," according to which the pais would have experienced his relationship with the adult as a kind of social obligation, without feeling desire or pleasure. It is not only the adult that loves and desires, says Vattuone. Pederasty implies reciprocity of affection. On this point, as I observed years ago, I believe it very likely that Vattuone is approaching the truth. (See E. Cantarella, Bisexuality in the Ancient World [2d ed., Yale University Press, 2002], xii–xiii, and, at greater length, "A proposito di C. Calame, L'Amour en grece," Annales ESC 1999.)The second chapter, "Pais kalos. Una bellezza incomparabile" (Pais Kalos. An Incomparable Beauty), argues, correctly, against the idea that the boy's attractions depend on his resemblance to a woman. The scarce contact that Greek [End Page 461] men had with women has nothing to do with the reasons for which the paides from the age of approximately twelve to seventeen years were irresistible to the Greek man. Though their face and gaze might be soft, their body structure and ethos were virile. Pederasty was a relationship between males, among other things allowed and culturally valued only within the age limits to which an ample and exhaustive part of the chapter is dedicated.The third chapter, "Eros, un 'dovere' sociale?" (Eros, a Social "Duty?"), goes into the erotic aspect of the relationship, dedicating ample space to the problem of the so-called origins of pederasty. The Greeks considered that pederasty originated with a crime (the rape of Chrysippus), and modern scholars, according to Vattuone, have followed this line of thinking, concentrating their efforts on the attempt—this is a leitmotif of the book—to save the Greeks from accusations of immorality and perversion. A long section of criticism follows, attacking hypotheses of the historic-psychoanalytic type and those that link the social role of pederasty to "rites of passage," with the objective, according to Vattuone, of distancing it from us and the present world. I do not agree, however. As I have pointed out elsewhere, to connect a sexual relationship with a rite does not necessarily... (shrink)

The gendered assumptions embedded in the construction of the rational individual are well established in Western feminist thought but inapplicable to describe societies operating on different principles, such as East European state socialism. This article identifies the communist subject as the building block of communist political ideology and argues that this formulation was no less male biased than its counterpart, the rational individual under liberal capitalism. In state socialist Hungary this male bias came to be expressed differently: Women were integrated (...) into society through membership in a social group perceived as relatively homogeneous regarding interests and obligations and with gender-specific qualities and privileges. These qualities were considered inferior to men's since women—because of household responsibilities—were not capable of total devotion to the communist party. The author explores this construction of the female communist subject through a content analysis of classified materials from the archives of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party. (shrink)

To what extent can philosophy speak to and write about what is most fundamental to itself? This essay sorts through aspects of the problem of Plato's alleged "unwritten doctrine." The essay begins by moving back to Plato's teacher and the non-doctrinal investigations of Socrates, which are grounded in the positing of hypotheses and dialogic questioning. Following this move, the essay turns forward to Plotinus's later, more systematic presentations where the use of terms like “the one” and “the good” are not (...) only beyond being but “are” non-objects, unable to be intuited by the intellect. These terms serve as pointers to “what” can only be realized through the soul's blissful union with its non-objective source and ground. (shrink)

In the De Pythiae oraculis (397e) Plutarch mentions, according to the manuscript tradition, a bronze column of Hiero I of Syracuse, which stood in the sanctuary of Delphi and fell down on the day of his death. After retracing the interpretations of this passage both in the philological and archaeological studies and pointing out their problematic aspects, the author proposes a new reading of the text, suggesting that the monument involved was a statue of Hiero I instead of a column.

Das Verhältnis von Emotionen, Gefühl, Sprache und Bewusstsein wird aus verschiedenen Perspektiven betrachtet. Zum einen aus zweien, die versuchen, einen repräsentationstheoretischen Ansatz mit Sprache zu verbinden, wobei exemplarisch für einen neurowissenschaftlichen Ansatz Antonio Damasios Theorie betrachtet wird, und für die sprachanalytische Perspektive die von Michael Tye und Fred Dretske. Das Zusammenspiel von Empfindung, Gefühl und Bewusstsein wird dabei aus neurowissenschaftlicher und aus analytischer Sicht jeweils ganz unterschiedlich konzipiert, aber es wird deutlich, dass die Klärung des Zusammenwirkens dieser Aspekte zentral ist (...) für phänomenales Bewusstsein. Gemeinsam ist den beiden Ansätzen jedoch, dass sie weder die Rolle von Handlungszusammenhängen noch die Rolle des Anderen in ihre Überlegungen mit einbeziehen. Um Letzteres leisten zu können, wird in dieser Arbeit exemplarisch auf das Triangulationsmodell des Spracherwerbs zurückgegriffen wie es Michael Tomasello in seinen Arbeiten verwendet. Es wird speziell für Emotionen modifiziert, um zu erläutern wie es kommt, dass wir zwar einerseits Sprache benötigen, um Emotionen in spezifischer phänomenaler Weise zu erfahren, das wir andererseits aber schon etwas spüren müssen, worauf wir Sprache anwenden können. Es wird erläutert, dass das Triangulationsmodell im Falle von Emotionen nur anwendbar ist, weil es so etwas wie einen universal zugänglichen Emotionsausdruck gibt, der somit eine Voraussetzung dafür ist, dass wir subjektiv spezifische Emotionen erleben. Hierin unterscheidet sich dieser Ansatz auch von rein narrativen Emotionstheorien, mit denen es ansonsten Übereinstimmungen gibt. Denn es ist wichtig zu sehen, dass Emotionen nur deshalb eine spezifische Bedeutung für uns erhalten können, weil wir uns nur auf Grund des universalen Ausdrucks gemeinsam auf sie beziehen können. Da das Moment der Empfindung Teil der Referenzbeziehung ist, wird es auch Teil der Bedeutung des Begriffes für die jeweilige Emotion. Das Triangulationsmodell wird nicht nur herangezogen, um das Verhältnis von Sprache, Emotion und phänomenalem Erleben zu klären, sondern auch, weil es sich eignet, die Frage des Zusammenspiels der Genese von subjektiv erlebten Emotionen und der Selbstbewusstwerdung darzulegen. Abschließen wird erörtert, ob sich das trianguläre Modell des Spracherwerbs außer auf Emotionen auch auf Wahrnehmungsvorgänge wie Sehen, Hören, Riechen oder Tasten anwenden lässt. (shrink)

Kurt Gödel ist als genialer Mathematiker und Logiker bekannt, seltener als Autor einiger weniger philosophischer Aufsätze. Daher wird man erstaunt sein, wenn er mit der Rezeption antiker Philosophietraditionen in Verbindung gebracht wird. Diejenigen allerdings, welche wissen, dass Gödel im Grandjean Fragebogen 1975, drei Jahre vor seinem Tod, lediglich den Mathematiker Philipp Furtwängler sowie den Philosophiehistoriker Heinrich Gomperz als für ihn wichtige Lehrer benannt hat, und denen zudem bekannt ist, dass Heinrich Gomperz in Wien unter anderem antike Philosophiegeschichte gelehrt hat, mögen (...) eine Ahnung haben, wo die Quelle dieser Rezeption und der Anstoß für sie zu finden ist. Was sie beinhaltet, wird zu erläutern sein. (shrink)

Gefühl und Wissen wurden in der Philosophie meist als Gegensätze gesehen. So ist Wissen traditioneller Weise als begründete oder gerechtfertigte wahre Meinung definiert. Kann man, wenn man eine solche Definition zu Grunde legt, sagen, dass man weiß, dass man liebt? Was sollte als Begründung oder Rechtfertigung gelten können?

In the regeneration of shamanism in Buryatia, kinship and locale play a significant and, indeed, determining role. Shamans, as representatives of their clans and kinship lines, are the intermediaries between people and the sacred, between people and the spirits in nature, in particular spirits of a specific locale which is linked historically to a clan and to the ancestors who have been buried there. It is to these ancestral spirits as well as to the spirits of place that the clan (...) shaman makes entreaties and asks for blessings and protection from ill fortune.The historical relationship of the Buryat tribes to the present land of Buryatia and Ust‐Orda region and the kinship structure of these tribes as existent prior to the Soviet period is shown to have parallels with traditional spiritual territorial cults of Buryats. There is a clear‐cut link between Buryat social organization into hierarchical units of kinship structures along patrilineal descent lines and their conceptions of deities according to locality, that is, they traditionally conceived of protective deities as associated with wider or narrower territorial groupings which corresponded to the social groups of tribes, clans, villages, and families.Several cases of renewal of home and hearth through appeal to ancestral and local spirits by the clan shaman are presented. (shrink)

This paper presents results of a qualitative study focussed on reconstructingcurrent reception processes of Tibetan Buddhist teachings and practicesas well as its representatives by the Swiss public since the mid 1990’s. Byexamining public discourses on Tibetan Buddhism in Switzerland, the paperaddresses issues concerning the social construction, representation and (re-)production of cultural and religious difference. It is argued that public receptionand representation of Tibetan Buddhism in the media clearly – even if implicitly– reflects disputes about conceptions of one’s own religious, cultural (...) and nationalidentity as well as about collectively shared values. It is shown that publicdiscourse on Tibetan Buddhism in Switzerland is characterized by opposingtendencies: on the one hand, it is clearly dominated by well-known positiveimages and stereotypes, which might be regarded as elements of an establishedrepertoire of knowledge about Tibet, Tibetans and the “World Religion of Buddhism”and which are reproduced as a matter of course within public discussionson the topic. On the other hand, nevertheless, these dominant topoi arecurrently being questioned by various social actors and on various levels. Theseefforts at deconstructing popular images and perceptions of Tibetan cultural andreligious traditions, however, have relatively small impact on wider social processesof constructing religious and cultural alterity – not nearly as much, forexample, as the construction of an Islamic “Other” culminating in the minaretreferendum of 2009. (shrink)

As strategies of suspicion, skeptical philosophies are themselves suspicious. Despite of their routinely anti-systematic rhetoric, skeptics raise the suspicion of secretly playing into the hands of the ruling regime . In his book Skepticism and Epistemology: The Development and Application of the Skeptical Method in Philosophy, Tim Köhne argues at length that a stabilizing, affirmative trait in fact characterizes all argumentative strategies of radical skepticism, for in the final instance it is not doubt that motivates skepticism but instead the desire (...) for coherence or for a system that would rise beyond all doubt. (shrink)

These contributions, although undoubtedly philosophically relevant, are not in themselves philosophical. This is as it should be. I do not wish to imply that their unphilosophical character is a deficiency. They are legitimate and necessary enquiries, undertaken within a special field, although often ranging beyond a narrowly specialist interest. They display, in their best examples, the concrete working out and application of some or other theory, often programmatically stated, sometimes implied, or simply taken for granted. But there is little or (...) no enquiry into the principles of the critical and interpretative activity as such, so as to bring some order and consistency into the profusion of frequently incompatible theoretical assumptions. The rich but confused situation in Germany has not even produced an I. A. Richards to shock people, and there has been no growth of schools or theories of criticism. The need for clarification of the criteria employed in the critical endeavour is not often recognized. We find even in the more constructive proposals a striking vagueness of terminology, a noticeable and often embarrassing tendency to completely wild speculation. It is evident from the professional journals that "meta-critical" discussions and controversies are comparatively rare. (shrink)