The ancient Greek philosopher Epicurus (340--271 BCEBCE), though often despised for his materialism, hedonism, and denial of the immortality of the soul, has at the same time been an ongoing source of inspiration for a great variety of subsequent philosophers, poets, and political thinkers. This volume offers authoritative discussions of all aspects of Epicurus's philosophy and then traces out some of its most important later influences throughout the Western intellectual tradition. Epicurean arguments are carefully placed in their ancient and (...) subsequent intellectual contexts, thus offering readers the opportunity of measuring them against a wide range of opponents---from Platonists, Aristotelians, and Stoics, to Hegel and Nietzsche, and finally on to such influential contemporary philosophers as Thomas Nagel, Bernard Williams, and Jacques Derrida. The volume offers separate and detailed discussions of two fascinating and ongoing sources of Epicurean arguments, the Herculaneum papyri and the inscription of Diogenes of Oenoanda, both of which are continually enriching our understanding of Epicureanism. Contributors have been able to make ample use of this new evidence in presenting the most current understanding of Epicurus's own views. By the same token, the second half of the volume is devoted to the extraordinary influence of Epicurean doctrines, often either neglected or misunderstood, in literature, political thought, scientific innovation, and in philosophy generally. Taken together, the contributions in this volume offer the most comprehensive and detailed account of Epicurus and Epicureanism available in English. (shrink)

Through a careful analysis of the ethics of Philodemus, this monograph offers the first book-length study of the Epicurean sage. It explores the different aspects of the sage’s way of life and offers a reconstruction of this Epicurean role model.

Stefan Szymik analyses New Testament texts in terms of polemic and anti-Epicurean rhetoric. To what extent and how did Epicurus and his philosophical thought influence the first Christian Churches? How did Christians react to Epicureanism? Although the New Testament only includes one account of an encounter between the Apostle Paul and the Epicureans (Acts 17:18), the probability of their contacts was high, given the popularity of Epicureanism in the Roman Empire in the first century CE. As a vital component (...) of Hellenistic-Roman culture, Epicureanism should be taken into account in research on the New Testament, becoming a point of reference and part of the content of comparative analyses. (shrink)

The Epicureans were committed to the priority of sensation and opposed the Platonic/Aristotelian view that definitions that display essences graspable only by reason should play a central role. To the Epicureans the so-called search for essences amounted to turning away from actual observation of things and indulging in speculation based on assumptions: instead one must conduct an inquiry about nature as the phenomena dictate. Epicurus held that the first or basic concepts of an inquiry need not be demonstrated for that (...) would open an infinite regress and might have held that the first concepts need not be defined for the definiens should be prior to the definiendum but nothing is prior to the basic concepts. Further, while explaining or defining each term is impossible (and perhaps involves infinite regress), explaining some is pointless. However, Epicureans were not opposed to providing descriptions so that there could be clear notions of words used, an investigation could proceed methodically, and all participants could agree on the subject matter. (shrink)

In Epicurean Meteorology Frederik Bakker discusses the meteorology as laid out by Epicurus and Lucretius, offering an updated and qualified account of Epicurean meteorology.

It is often assumed that Epicurean happiness can be achieved by everyone alike. This paper offers a corrective to this view. While it is true that the Epicureans abolish traditional differences among people like those between the sexes, social classes, and so on, they also maintain that there are people who are incapable of achieving happiness because they lack a certain bodily make-up or because they do not have the right ethnic or cultural origin.

Atheism was the most foundational challenge to early-modern French certainties. Theologians and philosophers labelled such atheism as absurd, confident that neither the fact nor behaviour of nature was explicable without reference to God. The alternative was a categorical naturalism, whose most extreme form was Epicureanism. The dynamics of the Christian learned world, however, which this book explains, allowed the wide dissemination of the Epicurean argument. By the end of the seventeenth century, atheism achieved real voice and life. This book (...) examines the Epicurean inheritance and explains what constituted actual atheistic thinking in early-modern France, distinguishing such categorical unbelief from other challenges to orthodox beliefs. Without understanding the actual context and convergence of the inheritance, scholarship, protocols, and polemical modes of orthodox culture, the early-modern generation and dissemination of atheism are inexplicable. This book brings to life both early-modern French Christian learned culture and the atheists who emerged from its intellectual vitality. (shrink)

This paper outlines the key points of the debate concerning theoretical perspectives on knowledge which had unfolded in the time of the most prominent epicurean and skeptical thinkers. The research begins with a few historical indications about Epicurusʼ contribution to the establishment of the aforementioned disputes and his motivation to assign crucial importance to the problem of the criteria of knowledge. At the same time, to some extent, it will become clear how a rival, skeptical school of thought developed (...) under the influence of that teaching. The intention is not to depict these two philosophical approaches in full, nor to capture their main features, but to offer some insight into specific areas of their mutual influence that have contributed to their unexpected convergence. As a result, we will see that, although quite diverse, these two Hellenistic positions reflect certain similarities, above all when it comes to the understanding of the nature and goal of philosophical research, the illustration of a happy life, as well as the answer to the question of what criteria we should follow in order to lead such a life. (shrink)

In this paper1, we explore some positive elements from the Epicurean position on mathematics. Is induction important in mathematical practice or useful in proof? Does atomism appear in mathematics and in what ways? Keywords: Epicurus, induction, Polya, proof, atomism.

The virtue of μεγαλοψυχία or greatness of soul is prominent in the works of Aristotle as well as in the Peripatetic and Stoic traditions. However, mention of μεγαλοψυχία is extremely rare in our surviving evidence for the Epicurean school. In this paper I reconstruct a viable Epicurean position on μεγαλοψυχία. I argue that the Epicureans have a distinctive account of the virtue that is compatible with their hedonist ethics, and that can also be seen as a reaction to (...) Aristotle. I also demonstrate that the Epicurean account relates closely to their critical engagement with the Cynics and their emphasis on the importance of friendship and generosity in the good life. (shrink)

This paper examines an ancient debate over the rationality of perception. What leads the Stoics to affirm, and the Epicureans to deny, that to form a sense-impression is an activity of reason? The answer, we argue, lies in a disagreement over what is required for epistemic success. For the Stoics, epistemic success consists in believing the right propositions, and only rational states, in virtue of their predicational structure, put us in touch with propositions. Since they identify some sense-impressions as criteria (...) of truth and thus as the basis for epistemic success, the Stoics maintain that sense-impressions must be rational. The Epicureans agree with the Stoics that sense-impressions function as criteria of truth, and also agree broadly on what it means for a state to be rational, but deny that sense-impressions are rational because (1) they think that epistemic success must be supported by a state that is necessarily error-free and (2) accept that rational states can be false. In reconstructing this debate, we refine the standard interpretation of the fundamental difference between Epicurean and Stoic epistemology and also develop parallels with epistemological debates today. One upshot is a more nuanced appreciation of the merits of Epicurean epistemology vis-à-vis the Stoics. (shrink)

The article discusses the accusation advanced by Plutarch and Cicero, according to which the Epicureans are unjust, as they would break the law to pursue pleasure if certain of impunity, and deals with this criticism by analyzing the Epicurean theory of law and justice and comparing it with friendship. The article argues that, from a doctrinal standpoint, philia has a higher place in the Epicurean’s priorities and a stronger efficacy than positive law in serving the naturally just. It (...) thus concludes that, as Plutarch and Cicero suspected, the Epicurean’s ultimate loyalty does not lie with positive law, in spite of its importance for social order, but rather with the naturally just, better secured by friendship. (shrink)

It is often assumed that Epicurean happiness can be achieved by everyone alike. This paper offers a corrective to this view. While it is true that the Epicureans abolish traditional differences among people like those between the sexes, social classes, and so on, they also maintain that there are people who are incapable of achieving happiness because they lack a certain bodily make-up or because they do not have the right ethnic or cultural origin.

This paper is dedicated to feelings (pathē) as criteria of truth and criteria of choice and avoidance in Epicureanism. The first section reviews two features of the other two Epicurean criteria of truth, perceptions and preconceptions: their non-rational and evident character. The second section extends the account to feelings, showing how, on the basis of their non-rational and evident character, feelings can be used to gain insights. The third section of the paper finally turns to feelings as criteria of (...) choice and avoidance. It examines some neglected textual evidence that shows that perceptions and feelings are closely connected to each other, that is, that Epicurean feelings are defined as perceptions and observances of themselves, shedding some new light on the joint role of feelings and perceptions in choices and avoidances. (shrink)

The paper discusses the manner and extent to which Epicurean ethics can serve as a general philosophy of life, capable of supporting philosophical practice in the form of philosophical counseling. Unlike the modern age academic philosophy, the philosophical practice movement portrays the philosopher as a personal or corporate adviser, one who helps people make sense of their experiences and find optimum solutions within the context of their values and general preferences. Philosophical counseling may rest on almost any school of (...) philosophy, ranging — in the Western tradition from Platonism to the philosophy of language or logic. While any specialist school of philosophy may serve valuable purposes by elucidating specific aspects of one’s experiences and directing future action, the more ‘generalist’ the philosophy used as the basis for counseling is, the broader and more far-reaching its potential impact on the person undergoing counseling. Epicurean ethics is a prime example of a philosophy of life that is suitable for philosophical counseling today. Its closer examination reveals that, contrary to superficial opinion, it is not opposed to Stoicism and may in fact incorporate Stoicism and its antecedent virtues (including many Christian virtues) in a simple yet comprehensive practical system of directions for modern counseling. (shrink)

Epicureanism theorizes an infinite universe of moving particles, with no divine purpose and no life after death. Happiness depends on simple needs satisfied to provide tranquility of mind. This volume presents a comprehensive collection of the surviving works and wise sayings of Epicurus together with the great systematic account of Epicurean natural science in Lucretius's ON THE NATURE OF THE UNIVERSE.

The Epicurean view is that there is nothing bad about death, and we are wrong to loathe it. This paper distinguishes several different such views, and shows that while some of them really would undermine our loathing of death, others would not. It then argues that any version that did so could be at best vacuously true: If there is nothing bad about death, that can only be because there is nothing bad about anything.

This paper provides a comprehensive study of the Epicurean theory of ‘preconception’. It addresses what a preconception is; how our preconception of the gods can be called innata, innate; the role played by epibolai ; and how preconceptions play a semantic role different from that of ‘sayables’ in Stoicism. The paper highlights the conceptual connections between these issues, and also shows how later Epicureans develop Epicurus’ doctrine of preconceptions while remaining orthodox about the core of that doctrine.

Epicurean physics elaborates on a system of universal kinetics as regards the creation of the world. One of the main principles is that there is no genesis without motion. The human being, as all other beings, is the product of the motion of atoms within the cosmic void. Due to a sudden swerve in the motion of some atoms, it can be upheld, according to the Epicureans and Lucretius, that there is no determinism in the universe and the human (...) being is capable of free will. The atomic motions and the swerves also take place in the space of the human soul. Lucretius, in the De Rerum Natura, follows with precision the content of the Epicurean dogmas, and divides the soul into an irrational part, which he calls anima, and a rational one, animus, according to the distinction between ψυχή and διάνοια. (shrink)

The Hellenistic philosophers and schools of philosophy are emerging from the shadow of Plato and Aristotle and are increasingly studied for their intrinsic philosophical value. They are not only interesting in their own right, but also form the intellectual background of the late Roman Republic. This study gives a comprehensive and readable account of the principal doctrines of the Stoics, Epicureans and various sceptical traditions from the death of Alexander the Great in 323 B.C. to around 200 A.D. Discussions are (...) arranged topically in order to address underlying issues and to make clear what the different schools have in common and how they differ. At the same time the coherence of each system as a whole is emphasized. (shrink)

Mitchell defends the Epicurean account of friendship. I argue that since Epicureans are hedonists who hold that all pleasures are good and all pains are bad, Epicureans would desert their friends in circumstances in which standing by their friends causes them pain.

The fundamental problem of Epicurean philosophy is understood as the problem of being human in a mechanical universe, which brings out the philosophical importance of Epicurus and guards against treating him as a museum piece. This interpretation of Epicurean ethics is developed against the background of a critical discussion of earlier interpretations. Although the whole range of the tetrapharmakos is covered in the book, as well as the Epicurean social philosophy of justice and friendship, the argument focuses (...) on Epicurus' understanding of the nature of pleasure, and pain and on the distinction between kinetic and katastematic pleasure. (shrink)

Epicurus thought that the conventional values of Greek society—in particular, its celebration of luxury and wealth—often led people astray. It is by rejecting these values, reducing our desires, and leading a moderately ascetic life that we can attain happiness. But Epicurus’ message is also pertinent for those of us in modern Western culture, with an economy based on constant consumption and an advertising industry that molds us to serve that economy by enlarging our desires. This paper begins with an outline (...) of some of the basic tenets of Epicurean ethics, followed by an explanation of how these tenets lead to an Epicurean diagnosis of what ails modern consumers and of the cure they would propose. The paper closes with a consideration of recent psychological research in well-being and how it supports the Epicurean position. (shrink)

Many Epicurean arguments for the claim that death is nothing to us depend on the ‘Experience Constraint’: the claim that something can only be good or bad for us if we experience it. However, Epicurus’ commitment to the Experience Constraint makes his attitude to will-writing puzzling. How can someone who accepts the Experience Constraint be motivated to bring about post mortem outcomes?We might think that an Epicurean will-writer could be pleased by the thought of his/her loved ones being (...) provided for after his/her death. Warren has argued that this does not dissolve the puzzle, since it involves a hope which the Epicurean should take to be empty just as the fear of death is empty. However, if it is a necessary condition of an emotion’s being empty that it involve accepting a claim which is not only false but also harmful it is not clear that this hope is indeed ‘empty’: there is a crucial disanalogy between fearing death and hoping for the prosperity of one’s children here. And if emptiness does... (shrink)

Epicurus is one of the first social contract theorists, holding that justice is an agreement neither to harm nor be harmed. He also says that living justly is necessary and sufficient for living pleasantly, which is the Epicurean goal. Some say that there are two accounts of justice in Epicurus -- one as a personal virtue, the other as a virtue of institutions. I argue that the personal virtue derives from compliance with just social institutions, and so we need (...) to attribute only one account of justice to Epicurus. I show how this interpretation makes sense of claims about justice by Epicurus and his followers, including Hermarchus, Lucretius, and Diogenes of Oinoanda. (shrink)

Most ancient philosophers accept that dreams have prophetic powers enabling humans to relate somehow to a world beyond their own. The only philosophers known to make a clean and explicit break with that tradition are the Epicureans, beginning with Epicurus himself and reaching his last eminent follower, Diogenes of Oinoanda. They openly reject the idea that dreams mediate between the divine and the human realms, or between the world of the living and the world of the dead. They demystify the (...) phenomenon of dreaming by explaining sleeping and dreaming in terms of their materialistic physical theory. Importantly, they examine dreams and their content from different perspectives and explore their relevance to our lives. The general aim of this paper is to offer a synthetic account of the Epicurean view about dreaming and dreams, advance certain new hypotheses that seem worthy of consideration, and show how Epicurus and his followers integrate dream theory into their philosophy as a whole. (shrink)

Epicurus is strongly committed to psychological and ethical egoism and hedonism. However, these commitments do not square easily with many of the claims made by Epicureans about friendship: for instance, that the wise man will sometimes die for his friend, that the wise man will love his friend as much as himself, feel exactly the same toward his friend as toward himself, and exert himself as much for his friend's pleasure as for his own, and that every friendship is worth (...) choosing for its own sake. These claims have led some scholars to assert that Epicurus inconsistently affirms that friendship has an altruistic element. I argue that the Epicurean claims about friendship can be reconciled with egoism and hedonism in psychology and ethics. Friendship is valuable because having friends provides one with security more effectively than any other means, and having confidence that one will be secure in the future either is identical to ataraxia, or the grounds on which one has it. (shrink)

Though Epicurus recommends that his followers eschew politics and live “unnoticed” apart from society, he also recommends that they live in communion with other Epicureans. I show that both pieces of this seemingly contrasting advice function to help the Epicurean achieve her goal, tranquility. Politics is (usually) to be avoided because it disrupts tranquility; but the Epicurean community of friends supports and strengthens the ability to reach tranquility, secure from the challenges that beset the traditional, non-Epicurean political (...) community. (shrink)

If one wants to know what happened in Hellenistic poetic theory, Philodemus' survey of poetic theories in the fifth book of his On Poems is an excellent guide. Even though the survey is well preserved, it has been neglected. Jensen, who published the first complete edition of On Poems 5 in 1923, did not discuss this part of the text; and it has been treated only briefly by others. This is a pity because, as Philodemus shows, the Hellenistic period was (...) an era of great diversity and innovation in literary theory. Philodemus gives evidence of: a refined and highly systematic critical vocabulary; a new concern with verbal form; a new notion of mimesis; and in general, a great proliferation of theories that present alternatives to those of Plato and Aristotle. Hellenistic literary theorists studied Plato and Aristotle critically; some revised or elaborated their views, whereas others opposed them. Ancient poetic theory did not come to a standstill with Aristotle any more than philosophy did. (shrink)

The opponents of Epicureanism in antiquity, including Cicero, Plutarch and Lactantius, succeeded in establishing a famous cliché: the theoretical and practical disinterest of Epicurus and the Epicureans in political communities. However, this anti-Epicurean literature did not provide considerations of Epicurean political theory or the testimonies about Epicurean lifestyle. Therefore, the purpose of this book is to shed light on the contribution of Epicurean thought to political life in the ancient world. Incorporating the most up-to-date archaeological material, (...) including papyri which have been recovered from Herculaneum and the Greek epigraphy of the Roman Epicureans, this volume will bring to the foreground new testimonies surrounding the public activities of the Epicureans. In this way, the reader will learn that Epicurean political theory is, in fact, a crucial ingredient of its philosophy. As a result, this connection creates an ongoing dialogue with the Greek philosophical tradition, revealing the presence of Plato in the Epicurean political model. (shrink)

This paper argues that although Epicureans will never marry for love, they may find it therapeutic to marry for sex: Epicureans may marry in order to limit anxiety about securing a sexual partner if they are prone to such anxiety and if they believe their prospective partner will satisfy them sexually. The paper shows that Epicureans believe that the process of obtaining sex can be a major source of anxiety, that it is acceptable for the sage to marry under certain (...) circumstances, and that the desire for sex alone is free of the groundless assumptions that fuel love. Epicureans would therefore approve of marrying to alleviate sexual anxiety. (shrink)

The Epicureans advocate a moderately ascetic lifestyle on instrumental grounds, as the most effective means to securing tranquility. The virtuous person will reduce his desires to what is natural and necessary in order to avoid the trouble and anxiety caused by excessive desire. So much is clear from Epicurus' general ethics. But the later Epicurean Philodemus fills in far more detail about the attitude a wise Epicurean will take toward wealth in his treatise On Property Management. This paper (...) explores some of Philodemus' distinctive doctrines and argues that Philodemus' position on crafts is an improvement on the Socratic and Aristotelian positions that he is reacting against. Philodemus rejects both constraints on what counts as a genuine craft proposed by Socrates in the Gorgias: that a craft aims at a genuine good, and that it is based on a grasp of the nature of its subject. Philodemus also rejects the attempts of Xenophon and Theophrastus to preserve an important place for the craft of property management, conceived of as aiming at maximizing your wealth, within the Socratic and Aristotelian ethical tradition that puts virtue and virtuous activity at the center of the happy life. According to Philodemus, cultivating and exercising the traditional technê of property management is actually incompatible with being a virtuous person and obtaining happiness. (shrink)

Lucretius follows his symmetry argument that one should not fear death with a dialectical strategy, the squandering argument. The dialectical presumption behind the squandering argument is that its audience is not an Epicurean, so squanders their life. The question is whether the squandering argument works on lives that by Epicurean standards are not squandered.

The paper explores the extent to which Epicurean ethics as a general philosophy of life can be integrated in a composite pragmatist approach to philosophical counseling. Epicureanism emerged in a historical era that was very different from the modern time and addressed a different philosophical ethos of the time. This alone makes it difficult for Epicureanism to satisfy all of the normative criteria for a modern ethics. On the other hand, the paper discusses aspects of the modern ‘external’, duty- (...) and demand-driven ethics that may contribute to the emergence of some of the main issues for modern philosophical counseling. The author points out aspects of Epicurean ethics that are potentially powerful tools to address the issues of mood and meaning in philosophical counseling, and thus serve as a contemporary complement to a complex duty-bound, yet pragmatist view of ethics. (shrink)

Epicurean epistemology is usually summarised in a controversial thesis according to which all perceptions are true. Although it seems very problematic and counterintuitive, careful investigation of the main sources shows us that Epicurus ’ claim for the truth of perceptions is not so hasty but is supported with some serious arguments. In the paper, I examine the thesis according to which “all perceptions are true”, but my main focus is to analyse the content of Epicurean perception through the (...) following questions: what kind of content do Epicurean perceptions have; what are the proper objects of perception; can we ascribe to such content truth and falsity? In the first part, I say something general about the thesis and point out some basic characteristics of perceptions due to which they serve as a criterion of truth. Next I try to show that the proper objects of perceptions are eidola and not external objects because only in that case can Epicurus maintain the truth of all perceptions, including illusions, hallucinations, dreams and other misperceptions. In the third part, I argue that such Epicurean perceptual content can be explained by the modern notion of non-conceptual content, which helps us to understand the special feature of Epicurean perceptions and also the important difference between perception and belief in Epicurean epistemology. In the final part, I discuss the notion of alethes which I suggest implies that perception is “factive”. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work. This work is in the public domain (...) in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

Epicurean friendship begins in “utility”: the supplying of practical needs to others with an expectation of goodwill and assistance in return, with the trust that this exchange will continue throughout life by the habitual practice of the virtues. This reciprocal friendship is already a pleasure it creates feelings of security and regard from others. “Deeper friendship” and “affection,” involving shared pleasure in discourse and intimate companionship with an equal is consistently characterized by Epicurean writers as one of the (...) greatest pleasures life has to offer. There is a third level, at which reciprocal friendship is no longer relevant or necessary: the friendships of the gods, who have no needs their friends could supply, and who are friends for pure pleasure and affection; it exists also among humans, with our happy memory of lost friends, where utility is past and affection is at last left to reign alone. (shrink)

This essay offers a reading of a difficult passage in the first book of Lucretius' "De Rerum Natura" in which the poet first explains the Epicurean account of time and then responds to a worry about the status of the past (1.459-82). It identifies two possible readings of the passage, one of which is compatible with the claim that the Epicureans were presentists about the past. Other evidence, particularly from Cicero "De Fato", suggests that the Epicureans maintained that all (...) true assertions must have a contemporaneous truth-maker and that no contingent future-tensed assertions are true. It appears, however, that they did not assert a symmetrical view of past-tensed assertions. There is no compelling reason, therefore, to think that the Epicureans were presentists about the past. (shrink)

The purpose of this book is to trace the main developments in Greek philosophy during the period which runs from the death of Alexander the Great in 323 B.c. to the end of the Roman Republic. These three centuries, known to us as the Hellenistic Age, witnessed a vast expansion of Greek civilization eastwards, following Alexander's conquests; and later, Greek civilization penetrated deeply into the western Mediterranean world assisted by the political conquerors of Greece, the Romans. But philosophy throughout this (...) time remained a predominantly Greek activity. The most influential thinkers in the Hellenistic world were Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics. This book gives a concise critical analysis of their ideas and their methods of thought. The last book in English to cover this ground was written sixty years ago. In the interval the subject has moved on, quite rapidly since the last war, but most of the best work is highly specialized. There is a clear need for a general appraisal of Hellenistic philosophy which can provide those who are not specialists with an up-to-date account of the subject. Hellenistic philosophy is often regarded as a dull product of second-rate thinkers who are unable to stand comparison with Plato and Aristotle. This book will help to remove such misconceptions and arouse wider interest in a field which is fascinating both historically and conceptually. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to study the relationship between Epicureanism and pandemic priority-setting and to explore whether Epicurus's philosophy is compliant with the later developed utilitarianism. We find this aim interesting because Epicurus had a different way of valuing death than our modern society does: Epicureanism holds that death—understood as the incident of death—cannot be bad (or good) for those who die (self-regarding effects). However, this account is still consistent with the view that a particular death can be (...) bad for everyone else but those who die, such as family, friends, and society (other-regarding effects). During the pandemic, the focus has been on the number of deaths more than on the suffering and reduced well-being of those infected and the rest of society. However, since the pandemic requires prioritization, it is, on a utilitarian account, important to consider priorities that do the most good overall. In this article, we approach the harm of death from an Epicurean point of view, seeking to flesh out potential implications for pandemic priority-setting, and healthcare in general, using a case study of COVID-19 priority-setting. We also explore whether this would conflict with utilitarianism. We conclude that an Epicurean pandemic priority-setting approach would be different but, surprisingly, not radically different from many of the actual priority-setting decisions we saw under the COVID-19 pandemic. (shrink)

In ’Abortion and deprivation: a reply to Marquis’, Anna Christensen contends that Don Marquis’ influential ’future like ours’ argument for the immorality of abortion faces a significant challenge from the Epicurean claim that human beings cannot be harmed by their death. If deprivation requires a subject, then abortion cannot deprive a fetus of a future of value, as no individual exists to be deprived once death has occurred. However, the Epicurean account also implies that the wrongness of murder (...) is also not grounded in the badness of death, which is strongly counterintuitive. There is an alternative: we can save our intuitions by adopting a more moderate Epicurean account such as that proposed by David Hershenov, who grounds the wrongness of killing in the prevention of the benefit of further good life rather than in the badness of death. Hershenov’s account, however, is equally applicable to Marquis’ argument: abortion similarly prevents a fetus from enjoying the benefit of a future like ours. Consequently, we conclude that Christensen’s criticism of Marquis’ argument fails to undermine his reasoning. (shrink)

In Living for Pleasure, philosopher Emily Austin offers a lively, jargon-free tour of Epicurean strategies for diminishing anxiety, achieving satisfaction, and relishing joys.