This paper reframes the issue of appropriation, extraction, and dispossession through AI—an assemblage of machine learning models trained on big data—in terms of enclosure and foreclosure. While enclosures are the product of a well-studied set of operations pertaining to both the constitution of the sovereign State and the primitive accumulation of capital, here, I want to recover an older form of the enclosure operation to then contrast it with foreclosure to better understand the effects of current algorithmic rationality. (...) I argue that the act of enclosing is to be understood as a set of fundamental operations that consist in producing structural distinctions between inside and outside, inclusion and exclusion—whether by drawing lines on a map, constructing border walls, or by algorithmically categorizing and (mis)recognizing people and things. Tracking the transformation of an enclosure-logic into one of foreclosure, I show how current AI perpetuates and at the same time expends forms of extraction, exclusion, and dispossession toward a totalizing horizon. For, while the outside is essential and constitutive to the logic of enclosure, foreclosure, by contrast, is characterized by the “totalizing desire” to not leave anything out of it. The totalizing desire to move beyond the logic of the enclosure forecloses that the enclosure has just gotten bigger and that the operations of exclusion have been masked and displaced, making them harder to contest. (shrink)

This paper reframes the issue of appropriation, extraction, and dispossession through AI—an assemblage of machine learning models trained on big data—in terms of enclosure and foreclosure. While enclosures are the product of a well-studied set of operations pertaining to both the constitution of the sovereign State and the primitive accumulation of capital, here, I want to recover an older form of the enclosure operation to then contrast it with foreclosure to better understand the effects of current algorithmic rationality. (...) I argue that the act of enclosing is to be understood as a set of fundamental operations that consist in producing structural distinctions between inside and outside, inclusion and exclusion—whether by drawing lines on a map, constructing border walls, or by algorithmically categorizing and (mis)recognizing people and things. Tracking the transformation of an enclosure-logic into one of foreclosure, I show how current AI perpetuates and at the same time expends forms of extraction, exclusion, and dispossession toward a totalizing horizon. For, while the outside is essential and constitutive to the logic of enclosure, foreclosure, by contrast, is characterized by the “totalizing desire” to not leave anything out of it. The totalizing desire to move beyond the logic of the enclosure forecloses that the enclosure has just gotten bigger and that the operations of exclusion have been masked and displaced, making them harder to contest. (shrink)

Peter Linebaugh’sStop, Thief!aims to ‘join the alarm against neoliberalism’ by invoking the bloody history of enclosure. The essays collected in this book range in their focus from Karl Marx’s intellectual formation, to the history of the Luddites, to the privatisation of Mexicanejidos. Linebaugh’s idiosyncratic style, resisting abstraction and high theory, inscribes the nuances of the class struggle into the context of the commons. It effectively makes the case for a renewed focus on enclosure today.

Martin Heidegger and Vincent Scully, writing from very different positions, agree that the enclosure of human life and the disclosure of a moral universe are the chief functions of architecture, and they agree further that the traditional house best exemplifies the first function and the Greek temple the second. The culture of technology has emptied the home of many substantial engagements, and it has reduced the monumental structures, the high-rises and expressways, to instrumental status. Architects need to understand the (...) cultural force of technology, the ways buildings shape the conduct of our lives, and the responsibilities that follow from the comprehension of contemporary culture. (shrink)

This book is a profound and eagerly anticipated investigation into what is left of a monotheistic religious spirit—notably, a minimalist faith that is neither confessional nor credulous. Articulating this faith as works and as an objectless hope, Nancy deconstructs Christianity in search of the historical and reflective conditions that provided its initial energy. Working through Blanchot and Nietzsche, re-reading Heidegger and Derrida, Nancy turns to the Epistle of Saint James rather than those of Saint Paul, discerning in it the primitive (...) essence of Christianity as hope. -/- The “religion that provided the exit from religion,” as he terms Christianity, consists in the announcement of an end. It is the announcement that counts, however, rather than any finality. In this announcement there is a proximity to others and to what was once called parousia. But parousia is no longer presence; it is no longer the return of the Messiah. Rather, it is what is near us and does not cease to open and to close, a presence deferred yet imminent. -/- In a demystified age where we are left with a vision of a self-enclosed world—in which humans are no longer mortals facing an immortal being, but entities whose lives are accompanied by the time of their own decline—parousia stands as a question. Can we venture the risk of a decentered perspective, such that the meaning of the world can be found both inside and outside, within and without our so-immanent world? -/- The deconstruction of Christianity that Nancy proposes is neither a game nor a strategy. It is an invitation to imagine a strange faith that enacts the inadequation of life to itself. Our lives overflow the self-contained boundaries of their biological and sociological interpretations. Out of this excess, wells up a fragile, overlooked meaning that is beyond both confessionalism and humanism. (shrink)

Utopian thinking, and utopias as a genre, flourished as forms of the imaginary until recently. The emergence of the genre, with Thomas More, emphasizing spatial arrangement and with Louis-Sébastien Mercier invoking future orientation, I argue, is illuminated by placing them next to the economic enclosures of their time. Their utopias, however, closed off both the individual and time from the capitalist changes around them, allowing for little or no variation or expression of self. Thus, their imagined virtuous societies actually sought (...) to foreclose the future and other spaces. The paradox is that capitalist development, with its admitted inequities and horrors, favored an expansive self and vital societies, which carry with them their own virtues. In spite of the ameliorative tendencies of utopias, their limitations, that is, their closed-mindedness, slowly but surely discredited the genre itself. Its place has been taken today by science fiction, futurist studies and the exercise of the imaginary in terms of social science. (shrink)

Advocates of biomimicry encourage a new industrial paradigm that ostensibly leaves behind the crude violence of Francis Bacon, the domination of nature-as-machine, and a history of toxic production processes that have given rise to a present and coming climate crisis. As part of a broader trend towards the conceptualization and development of a ‘bioeconomy’, we argue here that biomimicry produces ‘nature’ in new ways. At face value, these new approaches to valuing nature may seem less violent and exploitative. Yet, new (...) natures can and are tortured in new ways. We argue that biomimicry produces ‘nature’ through well-worn logics of resource enclosure and privatization, focusing upon two fundamental shifts in how nonhuman life is figured and put to work: (1) the production of nature as intellectual property (as opposed to raw materials); (2) the production of nature as an active subject (as opposed to a passive receptacle or vehicle). (shrink)

Starting from the analysis of Marx’s Chapter 26 of the first volume of Capital, this article describes Marxian emphasis on the extremely violent aspects—a list of the main cases is also provided—of the so-called “enclosures” as fundamental procedures that favored the “primitive accumulation”, that is, the first social and economic step that led to capitalism. The “enclosures” that characterized the primitive accumulation process, violently expropriating peasants, razing their cottages and dwellings, are illustrated in detail. At the same time, we will (...) describe what we call the “moral bubble”, created by the narratives—morally edifying—about enclosures, only devoted to the emphasis on the positive economic and social outcomes: the moral bubble acts as a powerful conceptual device capable of concealing the violence that accompanies enclosures. The second part of the article stresses the fact that the mechanism of enclosures can be traced back not only to violently expropriating common lands in which the peasants flourished but also to the violent processes against women to have them basically reduced to machines for the production of new workers, in the framework of the new “patriarchy of the wage”. The importance of the so-called “new enclosures” is further delineated after having shown how enclosures express the historical and general tendency of capitalistic accumulation and not only of the primitive one. The violent aspects of primitive accumulation, and so of primitive enclosures, are described as the main characters of every phase of the recent capitalist globalization, marked by continuous and unprecedented assault on the commons, perpetrated by the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, coronavirus lockdown and, currently, also by the paradoxical economic effects of the interplay between the green era and Ukraine war–global food and energy crisis. Finally, the last section provides insight on what we called the “terminal enclosure” related to the aggression of the ultimate common good: water. (shrink)

This article examines the confessional booth as an architected space that, by serving as a geo-epistemological enclosure, prefigures digital forms of data capture and production. In conversation with critical scholarship about ‘confessional culture,’ it analyzes how confessionals and digital enclosures embody different historical iterations of a cultural technique that promises absolution – understood as a cleansing process of transparent exposure. It argues that, with digital enclosures, the renunciative self-mortification that lies at the heart of classic Christian confession is reprogrammed (...) into what Byung-Chul Han calls a ‘pornographic self-presentation.’ The self-death dealt by the confessional thus becomes an apparently voluntary self-exploitation for the social media subject. In both cases, however, absolution governs via rituals of cathartic transparency, submitting interiority to processes of legible exteriorization and articulating the subject via an exhibitive logic that blurs the boundaries between communicative freedom and compulsory self-exposure. (shrink)

Les injonctions institutionnelles de science ouverte tendent à renforcer les processus d’enclosure, de capture et d’accumulation de la valeur par les entreprises de la connaissance, ainsi que des usages mortifères des travaux scientifiques. Des chercheurs ont proposé l’élaboration d’une licence d’usage, appelée UsageRight, qui fasse « membrane semi-perméable » pour une communauté d’usage vertueuse des travaux scientifiques. Cette proposition est envisagée ici depuis une situation d’étude en « sciences humaines », articulée à un cas de déresponsabilisation et d’extractivisme universitaires.

Inspired by recent anti-roads protests in Britain, I attempt to articulate a radical environmental ethos and, at the same time, to produce a cogent moral analysis of the dialectic between environmental destruction and protection. In this analysis, voiced in terms of a spatial metaphoric, an “ethics of place,” I seek to subvert the hegemony of modernity’s formal systematization and codification of values whilestill conserving something of modernity’s critical heritage: to reconstitute ethics in order to counter the current enclosure of (...) the moral field within economistic and legal bureaucratic frameworks and institutions. (shrink)

Longtemps réfractaire à l’action apostolique des femmes, l’Église catholique s’est réformée à l’époque moderne grâce aux efforts de femmes d’exception qui ont multiplié les fondations d’ordres et de monastères nouveaux ou (ré) introduit la stricte observance de la Règle dans les communautés anciennes. Ces religieuses n’ont pu le faire qu’au prix d’incessants voyages qui ont mené certaines jusqu’aux confins du royaume et en Nouvelle-France dans des conditions rendues difficiles par leur statut de femmes encloses. En voyage, les religieuses doivent rester, (...) envers et contre tout, des “ épouses de Christ ” vouées à une vie intérieure et souffrante que détaille une littérature hagiographique ou autobiographique abondante. (shrink)

This article drafts a phenomenology of artifice, an interpretation of Human Being and Human Practice, based on the extraordinary claim that design is not the initiator of change, creation and diversity, but it is the essential humanistic quality to compensate the irresistible precession, to regulate the inevitable transformation and divergence of the World. Inspired by the Sufism conception of Human Being, the argument here relies on the theory of a gradual disclosure from the kernel of Universal Man, the complete and (...) Perfect Man of unity and continuity, down to the local man of differences, discontinuity and diversity. Sufism presents a phenomenology of appearing, describing a process of disclosure motivated by a mystical passion ‘to be known’, where in the beginning the Being is manifested on the Universal Man, that then degraded and diversified down to the local man, its Self, his or her community and his or her instruments. The article presents the Universal Man disclosing, and the local man enclosing in three grades that are aligned in conditional priority where the former enables the later one: (1) The Proximate Potentials, (2) The Mediate Linguals and (3) The Distant Actuals. The enclosed species of those layers are introduced as the primal categories of artefacts: (a) future contemplations out of the potentials, (b) present conversations out of the linguals and (c) past constructions out of the actuals. Towards the end, the article carries the discussion on how the Ur-Disclosure brings the inevitable conditional precedence of the future over the past; the future potentials come before the linguals of now and the past actuals follow after. So, it is claimed that anything new principally deviates from the future, from something already exists potentially on the proximate grade, where the Universal Man degrades into the unitary Selves. In the conclusion, it is proposed that design processes can not disclose, create and image anything but enclose, cover and regulate the genesis. The theory of gradual disclosure from the Universal Man to the local individual mainstreams the experience of ability presenting potential ability as a universal human experience that can be actualized by proper practice. (shrink)

In this text I suggest the possibility of the strategic-philosophical closeness between Husserl and Kracauer,by closely reading Husserl’s Third Logical Investigation and Kracauer’s essay «The Mass Ornament». Although the both thinkers come from the traditionally different and often mutually opposing philosophical schools, neither of them simply dismisses or crosses out the position they criticize. To the contrary, I propose that both thinkers exaggerate the seeming self-evidentiality of the phenomenon they analyze. In the Third Logical Investigation Husserl rearticulates the whole-part relation (...) as it is conceived within the formal ontology and psychologistic logic. The connection between parts is available to us only as the relational tension, which is «accumulated» in the mutuality between the irreparably self-enclosed parts. Fusion is therefore a modification in the unfolding of the relation between parts, where every «term in relation» conditions another one through its own positional completion, while being conditioned by another term. The phenomenological analysis, which is conducted through the intensification of the fixity of the above-mentioned poles, is «measured» by the inability of these poles to be self-evidentially isolated and subsequently reconciled. In the second part of my essay I pay attention to Kracauer’s suggestion that the vitality of the mass ornament is reflected in the contextual insignificance of its parts. Kracauer addresses the problem of mass depersonalization through the close and sarcastic inspection of the role of abstract rationality in the capitalist mode of production. This close inspection adopts the strategy of exaggeration, where the critical distance must not be considered beyond its ability to disclose the selfobscuring apparatus of the mass performances and spectacles. This disclosure, as Kracuaer suggests,must therapeutically lead through the center of the mass ornament, and not away from it. (shrink)

Nancy’s deconstruction of Christianity mainly consist of a reworking of Christian and traditional philosophical notions, a process by which he demonstrates how these notions have virtually exhausted themselves. He has examined how such notions contain, as their very condition, the possibility of their own exhaustion. As a result, Nancy’s project of a deconstruction of Christianity is actually a ‘reading’ of Christianity deconstructing itself, i.e. of Christianity’s raison d’être containing at the same time the possibility of its own exhaustion. Or as (...) Derrida would have phrased it, Christianity’s construction generates its deconstruction at the same time. This text tries to summarise the outlines of such deconstruction and its the rise in Nancy’s work, from his earlier publications up until La déclosion in 2005. (shrink)

The theological revivification of the concept of gift and gift exchange in the last two decades has provoked questions on how notions of divine superabundance can be translated into economics. In this article, I relate the thinking of Paul Ricoeur, John Milbank, Philip Goodchild and Albino Barrera to a specific economic reform that entails seeing land enclosure as inimical to the stability and fairness of an economy. I refer to the political economy of Henry George which takes land value (...) taxation to be its centrally defining principle for a just economy. (shrink)

Food charity in the United States has grown into a critical appendage of agro-food supply chains. In 2016, 4.5 billion pounds of food waste was diverted through a network of 200 regional food banks, a fivefold increase in just 20 years. Recent global trade disruptions and the COVID-19 pandemic have further reinforced this trend. Economic geographers studying charitable food networks argue that its infrastructure and moral substructure serve to revalue food waste and surplus labor in the capitalist food system. The (...) political–legal framework undergirding this revaluation process however is still poorly understood. Drawing on a 6-year institutional ethnography of the food banking economy in West Virginia, this paper takes a supply-side approach to examine the material and moral values driving the expansion of food waste recovery as hunger relief. Empirically, it focuses on the laws, contracts and fiscal incentives regulating charitable food procurement at the U.S. Department of Agriculture and Feeding America. The assemblage of government agencies, private businesses and non-profit organizations enrolled into this gift economy at different scales I argue, serves to enclose food waste into a public–private governance structure that regulates food surpluses and ensures these will not disrupt the scarcity logics driving profitability along primary food circuits. (shrink)

This chapter presents an alternative interpretation of the open fields based on historical research in the last thirty years. Open fields were an efficient institution for meeting the needs of small-scale, grain growing farmers. However, market capitalism undermined the open field community from within, which precipitated its demise.

Prominent radical democrats have in recent times shown a vivid interest in the commons. Ever since the publication of Governing the Commons by Elinor Ostrom, the commons have been associated with a self-governing and self-sustaining scheme of production and burdened with the responsibility of carving out an autonomous social space independent from both the markets and the state. Since the commons prove on a small empirical scale that self-governance, far from being a utopian ideal, is and long has been a (...) lived reality, a few authors have attempted to turn them into the conceptual matrix of their own account of radical democracy. Negri and Hardt, on one hand, Laval and Dardot, on the other, have jointly coined the term ‘the common’ (in the singular) to suggest that the self-governance quintessential to the commons could be turned into a general democratic principle. Though this is an attractive theoretical prospect, I will contend that it fails to account for an important contradiction between the two theoretical frameworks it connects. Whereas the governance of the commons depends on harmonious cooperation between all stakeholders which in turn relies on a strong sense of belonging to a shared community, radical democracy is highly suspicious of any attempt to build a totalizing community and constantly emphasizes the decisive role of internal agonistic conflicts in maintaining a vibrant pluralism. I will further contend that the short-sightedness of radical democrats on this issue may be partially explained by the strong emphasis in the commons literature on a related but distinct conflict, that which opposes the commoners to the movement of enclosures. I will argue, however, that this conflict is not of an agonistic nature and does little to preserve the dynamism and the constant self-criticism proper to the radical democrat regime. (shrink)

The commons is frequently taken to be a model of democracy. Yet, the problems of overuse and enclosure that plague common-pool resources suggest that democratic norms of inclusion, equality, and pluralism may not be realized in practice. Existing contractarian accounts of the democratic value of the commons tend to assume equality of power and clear boundaries between users and non-users. Alternative accounts that emphasize practices of commoning assume a shared social identity that appears incompatible with pluralism. These accounts provide (...) little insight into how common-pool resource regimes marked by inequalities of power might be democratized for the long-term. In contrast, I argue that the idea of treaty can serve as the basis for a democratic theory of the commons that justifies exclusion of those who would oppress marginalized groups, facilitates polycentric governance, and creates opportunities for deliberation and contestation. I illustrate the argument with reference to disputes over fisheries between the Mi’kmaq, non-Indigenous peoples, and the Canadian state. (shrink)

This article claims that an ‘enclosure of the commons’ is underway, which reaches far beyond intellectual property, to a point where, through profiling, ‘identity’ has itself become enclosed property that can be owned by another. With a detour through the natures of both money and innovation, this paper looks at the imperative driving ‘intellectual property rights.’ By introducing the notion of biopiracy, it shows how ‘invasion of privacy’ is justified, and ends with “a world of rapacious, state-aided ‘privatization’” of (...) enclosed identity: the ultimate identity theft. (shrink)

Metal roof enclosure system is an important part of steel structure construction. In recent years, it has been widely used in large-scale public or industrial buildings such as stadiums, airport terminals, and convention centers. Affected by bad weather, various types of accidents on metal roofs frequently occurred, causing huge property losses and adverse effects. Because of wide span, long service life and hidden fault of metal roof, the manual inspection of metal roof has low efficiency, poor real-time performance, and (...) it is difficult to find hidden faults. On the basis of summarizing the working principle of metal roof and cause of accidents, this paper classifies the fault types of metal roofs in detail and establishes a metal roof monitoring and fault diagnosis system using distributed multisource heterogeneous sensors and Zigbee wireless sensor networks. Monitoring data from strain gauge, laser ranging sensor, and ultrasonic ranging sensor is utilized comprehensively. By extracting time domain feature, the data trend characteristics and correlation characteristics are analyzed and fused to eliminate erroneous data and find superficial faults such as sensor drift and network interruption. Aiming to the hidden faults including plastic deformation and bolt looseness, an SVM fault diagnosis algorithm based on RBF kernel function is designed and applied to diagnose metal roof faults. The experimental results show that the RBF-SVM algorithm can achieve high classification accuracy. (shrink)

From the Editor’s Introduction: -/- THE INTERNAL LIMITATIONS OF HUMAN UNDERSTANDING -/- We carry, unavoidably, the limits of our understanding with us. We are perpetually confined within the horizons of our conceptual structure. When this structure grows or expands, the breadth of our comprehensions enlarges, but we are forever barred from the wished-for glimpse beyond its boundaries, no matter how hard we try, no matter how much credence we invest in the substance of our learning and mist of speculation. -/- (...) The limitations in view here are not due to the mere finitude of our understanding of ourselves and of the world in which we live. They are limitations that come automatically and necessarily with any form of understanding. They are, as we shall see, part and parcel of any organization or ordering of data that we call information. -/- The consequences of these limitations are varied: As a result of them, hermeneutics cannot help but be hermetic; scientific theories of necessity are circumscribed by the boundaries of the ideas that define them; formal systems must choose between consistency and comprehensiveness; philosophical study, because it includes itself within its own proper subject matter, is forced to be reflexive in its self-enclosure. The fundamental dynamic shared by all forms of understanding testifies to an internal limitative keystone. (shrink)

I examine three kinds of criticism directed at philosophical genealogy. I call these substantive, performative, and semantic. I turn my attention to a particular substantive criticism that one may launch against essay two of On the Genealogy of Morals that turns on how Nietzsche answers “the time-crunch problem”. On the surface, there is evidence to suggest that Nietzsche accepts a false scientific theory, namely, Lamarck’s Inheritability Thesis, in order to account for the growth of a new human “organ”—morality. I demonstrate (...) that the passages interpreted by some scholars to prove that Nietzsche is a Lamarckian can be reinterpreted along Darwinian lines. I demonstrate that Nietzsche hits upon the right drivers of phenotypical change in humans, namely, torture and enclosures (e.g., walls of early states), but misinterprets their true impact. Nietzsche believes that these technologies are responsible for producing what I call “culture-serving memory” and the bad conscience by causing emotions that once were expressed outwardly to turn inward causing the “psychological digestion” of the human animal. In reality, however, these mechanisms are conducive to breeding a particular type of individual, namely, one who is docile, by introducing artificial and unconscious selective pressures into the environment of early humans. In showing that Nietzsche’s genealogical account of memory and bad conscience is not underpinned on a false scientific theory and is consistent with Neo-Darwinism, I deflect a potentially fatal blow regarding the veracity of Nietzsche’s genealogies. -/- . (shrink)

This article explores Derrida's suggestion in Of Grammatology that deconstruction might be considered a positive science. The implication here is that ‘no outside of text’ does not evoke an enclosure whose limits can't be breached, an enclosure that discovers human exceptionalism in linguistic and technological capacities. Instead, this sense of a system and its involvements (différance) is already entangled in any ‘atom’ of its expression, whereby ‘no outside of text’ can be read as ‘no outside of Nature’. The (...) logic that informs and justifies the conventional separations between nature and culture, ideation and matter, and human and non-human, are thereby confounded; the dimensions of efficacy, as well as the vexed question of intention appear as non-local (systemic); and the very notion of language – what it is and how it works – is distributed in ways that give rise to the same quandaries that surround the quantum problematic. Indeed, at the end of this meditation the difference between the humanities and the sciences, especially in its current configuration as the impasse of ‘the two cultures’, can no longer be sustained. (shrink)

Basing ourselves on the writings of Hans Jonas, we offer to psychosomatic medicine a philosophy of life that surmounts the mind-body dualism which has plagued Western thought since the origins of modern science in seventeenth century Europe. Any present-day account of reality must draw upon everything we know about the living and the non-living. Since we are living beings ourselves, we know what it means to be alive from our own first-hand experience. Therefore, our philosophy of life, in addition to (...) starting with what empirical science tells us about inorganic and organic reality, must also begin from our own direct experience of life in ourselves and in others; it can then show how the two meet in the living being. Since life is ultimately one reality, our theory must reintegrate psyche with soma such that no component of the whole is short-changed, neither the objective nor the subjective. In this essay, we lay out the foundational components of such a theory by clarifying the defining features of living beings as polarities . We describe three such polarities: 1) Being vs. non-being: Always threatened by non-being, the organism must constantly re-assert its being through its own activity. 2) World-relatedness vs. self-enclosure: Living beings are both enclosed with themselves, defined by the boundaries that separate them from their environment, while they are also ceaselessly reaching out to their environment and engaging in transactions with it. 3) Dependence vs. independence: Living beings are both dependent on the material components that constitute them at any given moment and independent of any particular groupings of these components over time. We then discuss important features of the polarities of life: Metabolism; organic structure; enclosure by a semi-permeable membrane; distinction between "self" and "other"; autonomy; neediness; teleology; sensitivity; values. Moral needs and values already arise at the most basic levels of life, even if only human beings can recognize such values as moral requirements and develop responses to them. (shrink)

Capitalist socialism? -- Crisis as shock therapy -- The structure of enemy propaganda -- Human, all too human-- -- The "new spirit" of capitalism -- Between the two fetishisms -- Communism, again! -- The new enclosure of the commons -- Socialism or communism? -- The "public use of reason" -- --in Haiti -- The capitalist exception -- Capitalism with Asian values-- in Europe -- From profit to rent -- "We are the ones we have been waiting for.".

One of the strongest strands in Nancy's philosophy is an attempt to rethink community and the very idea of the social in a way that does not ground these ideas in some individual subject or subjectivity. The fundamental argument of this book is that being is always 'being with', that 'I' is not prior to 'we', that existence is essentially co-existence. He thinks this being together, not as a comfortable enclosure in a pre-existing group, but as a mutual abandonment (...) and exposure to each other, one that would preserve the 'I' and its freedom in a mode of imagining community as neither a 'society of spectacle' nor via some form of 'authenticity'. (shrink)