The work now presented to the reader supposes careful students of the philosophy of the mind, with access to the books which profess to treat of it. It is a plea for English Philosophy and its great master. It consists of two parts.

Les recueils des « lois sacrées » effectué par Sokolowski et Lupu sont incontestablement un instrument de travail de premier rang pour l’étude de la religion grecque. Pourtant, les documents dans ces recueils ne sont pas classés sur des critères juridiques. La présente étude vise à proposer une classification de documents en question conformément aux autorités qui les ont émis : conseils fédéraux en charge de sanctuaires panhelléniques, cités, subdivisions du corps civique (dèmes, tribus), associations privées (phratries, génè, orgéônes) et (...) donations à des autorités publiques ou à des associations privées. Il s’intéresse également aux différents moyens de faire respecter les normes concernant les pratiques religieuses, et analyse la signification de l’expression ta patria et sa relation avec les différents niveaux d’autorité religieuse. (shrink)

In a recent book, K. Lambert argues that philosophers should adopt Mally's Principle of Independence (the principle that an object can have properties even though it lacks being of any kind) by abandoning a constraint on true predications, namely, that all of the singular terms in a true predication denote objects which have being. The constraint may be abandoned either by supposing there is a true predication in which one of the terms denotes a beingless object (Meinong) or by supposing (...) there is a true predication in which one of the terms denotes nothing at all (free logic). However, Lambert's conclusions can be undermined by showing that the data he produces in support of his position can be explained by either of two recent theories of abstract and nonexistent objects, both of which are couched in languages which conform to the traditional constraint. (shrink)

Cette étude examine cinq principaux changements de méthodologie qui se trouvent dans cinq documents-clé de Vatican II, afin de discerner à quel point ces documents sont cohérents avec ou différents des principales caractéristiques de méthodologie de la période du concile. L'article commence par une introduction à trois approches théologiques en voque dans les écrits catholiques romains au temps du concile: néo-scolastique, transcendantalisme et correlationisme. La conscience historique est aussi examinée comme une note importante de méthode théologique. L'article examine ensuite Sacrosanctum (...) Concilium, Lumen Gentium, Dei Verbum, Dignitatis Huamnae et Gaudium et Spes en vue de ces données. L'étude identifie six changements méthodologiques notoires dans les documents: la mise en sourdine de la néo-scolastique du 19e siècle, la transformation de la néo-scolastique grâce aux ressources bibliques, la montée de questions centrales à la méthode transcendentale, des essais tardifs mais importants de raisonnement transcendental, une corrélation toujours croissante de mode confessionel, une conscience historique en développement. En conclusion, les A. affirment une évolution méthodologique dans Vatican II qui pourrait valider une évolution continue de la méthode théologique aujourd'hui. (shrink)

This article and checklist present the contents of the Spencer Album of Marcantonio Raimondi prints, long considered to be lost. By examining its composition and tracing its provenance from the Spencer collection at Althorp House to the John Rylands Library, Manchester, we offer new insight into how attitudes toward Marcantonio Raimondi‘s work evolved during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, particularly in Great Britain. Our article also explores Victorian collecting practices and the importance of the graphic arts for Mrs Rylands‘s vision (...) for the Library to be dedicated to her late husband‘s memory. (shrink)

"Pioneers of Evolution" is a 1896 treatise by English Edward Clodd within which he explores the early proponents of evolution and the scientific answers to the origin of humankind. Looking at the world of such notable figures as Charles Darwin and Gerbert Spencer, this fascinating volume is not to be missed by those with an interest in evolution and the history of related ideas. Contents include: "Pioneers of Evolution From Thales to Lucretius," "The Arrest of Enquiry," "From the Early (...) Christian Period to the Time of Augustine," "From Augustine to Bacon," "The Renascence of Science," "Modern Evolution," "Darwinism and Wallace," "Herbert Spencer," "Thomas Henry Huxley," etc. Edward Clodd (1840 - 1930) was an English writer, banker, and anthropologist famous for his various and notable literary and scientific friends, including the likes of Edward Fitzgerald, Samuel Butler, Andrew Lang, and others. Other notable works by author include: "The Childhood of the World" (1872), "Jesus of Nazareth" (1880), and "Nature Studies" (1882). Many vintage books such as this are increasingly scarce and expensive. It is with this in mind that we are republishing this volume now in an affordable, modern, high-quality edition complete with a specially-commissioned new biography of the author. (shrink)

Government can control conflicts of interest in business firms by either issuing obligatory commands to behave in a specified way or by creating incentives to alter private behavior. In order to choose between these two approaches, we also need to know something about the nature of the subject firms and the way that they are likely to respond to particular stimuli. Legislators and legal scholars often rely on intuition to predict the behavior of firms, but this will not suffice for (...) such a complex situation. Fortunately, there is a well-developed body of scholarship that addresses organizational behavior; unfortunately, like many bodies of scholarship, it contains rival and conflicting approaches. This article discusses four of these approaches to organizational behavior: the nexus of contracts theory, an application of rational choice theory to corporations; decision theory; general systems theory and its recent autopoetic variants; and new institutionalism. It then uses each of these approaches to predict the way that firms will respond to obligatory commands and behavior incentives. The specific cases it discusses are the U.S. Sentencing Commission’s Organizational Sentencing Guidelines, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, and contemporary compliance theory’s idea of reasonable, responsive, or cooperative enforcement. (shrink)

Morality is not declining in the modern world. Instead, a new morality is replacing the previous one. Centered on individual self-fulfillment, and linked to administrative government, it permits things the old morality forbid, like sex for pleasure, but forbids things the old morality allowed, like intolerance and equality of opportunity.

Museums influence society’s ideas about canons in relation to art and the aesthetic. Such canons, as represented in museum exhibitions and collections, have sometimes been criticized for exclusion of artists from some groups. These artists include members of racial minorities, women, and others. It may be objected that there is a danger in some such criticism. Group membership might, it may be said, come to matter too much in choices by museums, rather than what should matter, producing and appreciating work (...) of the highest artistic or aesthetic value. (shrink)

THE PHILOSOPHIC POSITION of which this essay is a partial expression shows science to be realistic in certain circumstances and antirealistic in others. But the position is not so irenic as this beginning might suggest. For one thing, the realism upon which this view of science depends, which I call radical realism, is different from any of the versions proposed over the years by the forces of realism in that controversy. For another, the antirealism envisioned for some of the multiform (...) occasions of science is not in the least a version of the well-known antirealism of the linguistic consensus but rather a modified antirealism that paradoxically depends for its clarity and force on that same radical realism. I have given some account of radical realism in earlier papers and books, but its full application to science is left for a forthcoming book. The present paper makes the point that it is impossible to reach a just settlement of the realism vs antirealism case--whether construed narrowly, as an issue for philosophy of science, or broadly, as an issue for the entire rational enterprise--if it is tried in the venue of the linguistic consensus. (shrink)

In this essay I will assume that all well-developed discussions of the authenticity of responsibility are metaphysical ones. But as I intend to make use of the notion of being at a number of crucial points, I will call responsibility ontic responsibility rather than metaphysical responsibility. If ontic responsibility should be authentic, both social responsibility and its most important particular instance, legal responsibility, will be qualified by it, and we shall not be able to capture their full meaning in terms (...) of de facto accountability. As for moral responsibility, its status will also depend upon whether or not ontic responsibility is authentic. Indeed, many readers might prefer to say that "ontic responsibility" is simply another name for moral responsibility--that the question whether we are so constituted in our ontological natures as to make accountability appropriate, just, and seemly is merely the question whether moral responsibility is authentic. But there are some grounds for thinking that ontic responsibility is a wider category and that, if it is authentic, moral responsibility is a special case of it--ontic responsibility exercised in certain well-defined and very important circumstances. It is clear, for instance, that ontic responsibility covers all acts whatsoever, or at least all acts that admit of degree of excellence, so that all our work in science, in the arts, and indeed in the entire practical-productive sphere comes under it. Thus, all Max Planck's work in science from his 1879 doctoral dissertation to his famous 1900 paper would exemplify it. But most of us would probably say that only some of the ontically responsible acts performed in the course of his scientific work were also instances of moral responsibility--perhaps only those which involved relations with other persons. At any rate, in this essay I will assume that, if ontic responsibility is authentic, moral responsibility is a special case of it. It will be clear, then, that we want the notion of ontic responsibility to function in many of the ways in which the notion of free will functions in other settings. We shall see that there is some advantage in thus avoiding that vexed notion in what follows. (shrink)