UK government policies for social inclusion through engaging with the learning society aim at repositioning people as capable participants in their social worlds. These policies at first sight appear to be aimed at a sophisticated restructuring of social contexts as well as at an enhancing of individual learning. However there is a degree of conceptual confusion within these policies. In this paper we explore some of the tensions evident in a study of a family learning centre in an English city. (...) In the exploration we examine the extent to which the tools offered by sociocultural and activity theory (SAT) can assist in resolving that conceptual confusion and how SAT itself might need to develop in order to analyse complex and sustained forms of intervention. (shrink)

The modal object calculus is the system of logic which houses the (proper) axiomatic theory of abstract objects. The calculus has some rather interesting features in and of itself, independent of the proper theory. The most sophisticated, type-theoretic incarnation of the calculus can be used to analyze the intensional contexts of natural language and so constitutes an intensional logic. However, the simpler second-order version of the calculus couches a theory of fine-grained properties, relations and propositions and serves as a framework (...) for defining situations, possible worlds, stories, and fictional characters, among other things. In the present paper, we focus on the second-order calculus. The second-order modal object calculus is so-called to distinguish it from the second-order modal predicate calculus. Though the differences are slight, the extra expressive power of the object calculus significantly enhances its ability to resolve logical and philosophical concepts and problems. (shrink)

In the course of his long development, Kant's concept of matter changed somewhat, while his concept of scientific explanation changed considerably. Both developments achieved a coherent integration in Kant's Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science. Using this developmental background, the present paper argues that the Foundations should be interpreted as an attempted rational reconstruction of the mechanics of Newton and Euler. Kant attempted to do this by constructing a concept of matter that would confer a Leibnizian intelligibility on Newtonian mechanics, and (...) also accord with Kant's theories on the nature of concepts and their role in scientific explanation. (shrink)

avant propos This paper is basically Keenan (1992) augmented by some new types of properly polyadic quantification in natural language drawn from Moltmann (1992), Nam (1991) and Srivastav (1990). In addition I would draw the reader's attention to recent mathematical studies of polyadic quantiicationz Ben-Shalom (1992), Spaan (1992) and Westerstahl (1992). The first and third of these extend and generalize (in some cases considerably) the techniques and results in Keenan (1992). Finally I would like to acknowledge the stimulating and constructive (...) discussions ofthe earlier paper with many scholars, notably Dorit Ben-Shalom, Jaap van der Does, Hans Kamp, Uwe Mormich, Arnim von Stechow, Mats Rooth, and Ede Zimmermann. And I repeat here the acknowledgment in the earlier paper to Jim Lambek, Ed Stabler and two anonymous referees for Linguistics and Philosophy (the latter responsible for substantial improvements in the proofs - see footnote 10). (shrink)

CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION: A NEW UNIVERSITY AND THE CHALLENGE OF THE NEW SCIENCE Despite the recent and continuing controversy concerning the proper role of ...

If beliefs are a map by which we steer, then, ceteris paribus, we should want a more accurate map. However, the world could be structured so as to punish learning with respect to certain topics—by learning new information, one’s situation could be worse than it otherwise would have been. We investigate whether the world is structured so as to punish learning specifically about moral nihilism. We ask, if an ordinary person had the option to learn the truth about moral nihilism, (...) ought she to take it? We argue, given plausible assumptions about ordinary human preferences, she should not. (shrink)

This book is a treatise on time and on background independence in physics. It first considers how time is conceived of in each accepted paradigm of physics: Newtonian, special relativity, quantum mechanics (QM) and general relativity (GR). Substantial differences are moreover uncovered between what is meant by time in QM and in GR. These differences jointly source the Problem of Time: Nine interlinked facets which arise upon attempting concurrent treatment of the QM and GR paradigms, as is required in particular (...) for a background independent theory of quantum gravity. A sizeable proportion of current quantum gravity programs - e.g. geometrodynamical and loop quantum gravity approaches to quantum GR, quantum cosmology, supergravity and M-theory - are background independent in this sense. This book's foundational topic is thus furthermore of practical relevance in the ongoing development of quantum gravity programs. This book shows moreover that eight of the nine facets of the Problem of Time already occur upon entertaining background independence in classical (rather than quantum) physics. By this development, and interpreting shape theory as modelling background independence, this book further establishes background independence as a field of study. Background independent mechanics, as well as minisuperspace (spatially homogeneous) models of GR and perturbations thereabout are used to illustrate these points. As hitherto formulated, the different facets of the Problem of Time greatly interfere with each others' attempted resolutions. This book explains how, none the less, a local resolution of the Problem of Time can be arrived at after various reconceptualizations of the facets and reformulations of their mathematical implementation. Self-contained appendices on mathematical methods for basic and foundational quantum gravity are included. Finally, this book outlines how supergravity is refreshingly different from GR as a realization of background independence, and what background independence entails at the topological level and beyond. (shrink)

IMAGINING and remembering, two of the most frequent and fundamental acts of mind, have long been unwelcome guests in most of the many mansions of philosophy. When not simply ignored or over-looked, they have been considered only to be dismissed. This is above all true of imagination, as first becomes evident in Plato’s view that the art of making exact images tends to degenerate into the making of mere semblances. Kant, despite the importance he gives to imagination in the first (...) edition of The Critique of Pure Reason, nevertheless considers images to be lowly "monograms" that are unruly and thus untrustworthy. In more recent times, Sartre, who is nearly as ambivalent as Kant on the subject, has stressed imagination’s "essential poverty"—its character as "debased thought"—while Ryle, in covert counterpoint, has attempted to conceive imagining as parody and pretense: as mere make-believe. (shrink)

Discusses Indian Buddhist philosophy in three phases of its development.

Is the purpose of political philosophy to articulate the moral values that political regimes would realize in a virtually perfect world and show what that implies for the way we should behave toward one another? That model of political philosophy, driven by an effort to draw a picture of an ideal political society, is familiar from the approach of John Rawls and others. Or is political philosophy more useful if it takes the world as it is, acknowledging the existence of (...) various morally non-ideal political realities, and asks how people can live together nonetheless? The latter approach is advocated by “realist” thinkers in contemporary political philosophy. In Value, Conflict, and Order, Edward Hall builds on the work of Isaiah Berlin, Stuart Hampshire, and Bernard Williams in order to establish a political realist’s theory of politics for the twenty-first century. The realist approach, Hall argues, helps us make sense of the nature of moral and political conflict, the ethics of compromising with adversaries and opponents, and the character of political legitimacy. In an era when democratic political systems all over the world are riven by conflict over values and interests, Hall’s conception is bracing and timely. (shrink)

This paper responds to an essay by Elena Ferrante on male literary figures acknowledging the influence of female ones. She poses a question about her reception by males which I address.

In her paper ‘An Awkward Relationship: the Case of Feminism and Anthropology’, Marilyn Strathern argues that feminist research cannot produce a paradigm shift in social anthropology. I reconstruct her arguments and evaluate them, revealing that they are insufficient for ruling out this possibility.

On one conception of practical rationality, being rational is most fundamentally a matter of avoiding incoherent combinations of attitudes. This conception construes the norms of rationality as codified by rational requirements, and one plausible rational requirement is that you not be akratic: that you not judge, all things considered, that you ought to ϕ while failing to choose or intend to ϕ. On another conception of practical rationality, being rational is most fundamentally a matter of thinking or acting in a (...) way that’s informed by your practical reasons. This second conception construes the norms of rationality in terms that appear to allow the possibility of rational akrasia, since your capacity to act on your reasons can function at a level that need not involve deliberative judgment. Though their treatments of akrasia make them seem incompatible, I’ll argue that the two conceptions of rationality are not incompatible. It is possible to accommodate the core insight motivating defenses of ‘rational’ akrasia within the conception of rationality as codified by requirements of rational coherence. (shrink)

This paper presents two accounts of how Oedipus might have arrived at the answer to the Sphinx's riddle by proceeding methodically.

This paper describes a kind of poem which reveals an exception to the instruction to know thyself.

Każde nowe zjawisko literackie zagraża tożsamości literatury, ale i jej tożsamość potwierdza. Nowość inicjuje zmianę hierarchii tematów, powoduje deregulację norm wysłowienia, wzmaga zamieszanie pośród gatunków, wymusza rewizję granic oddzielających literaturę od nieliteratury i paraliteratury oraz komunikację werbalną od niewerbalnej. Najgłębsze wstrząsy i najgwałtowniejsze zwroty nie niszczą jednak uniwersalnego modelu literackości, dlatego pozostaje on nieodmiennie atrakcyjny dla pisarzy, tłumaczy, czytelników, krytyków, historyków i teoretyków sztuki słowa. Spośród wielu teorii „tego, co literackie”, wyróżnia się teoria sprzecznościowa. Powtarza się ona w kolejnych epokach (...) i poetykach, utworach i manifestach – zachowawczych i nowatorskich, rodzimych i wzorowanych na inwencji cudzej. Literackość polega tu na zawieszeniu obowiązującej poza sztuką słowa formalno-logicznej normy niesprzeczności(lex contraditionis), wedle której nie mogą być uznane za równocześnie prawdziwe dwa przeciwstawne sądy na temat tego samego przedmiotu, ujęte w tym samym trwaniu. W komunikacji praktycznej nie jest dopuszczalne, by jednocześnie było A i nie-A; w komunikacji literackiej jest to nieodzowne. Nie chodzi tylko o sądy, ale o napięcia między aktywnymi w danym dziele literackim składnikami: sztucznością a naturalnością mowy, porządkiem a chaosem fabuły, eksperymentem a wznowieniem chwytów oswojonych, bezstronną obserwacją a stronniczą oceną świata, jego widzialnością a niewidzialnością, wyrażalnością a niewyrażalnością intuicji autorskich, orientacją realistyczną a imaginatywną itd. Model sprzecznościowy jest otwarty dla odmiennych stylów i poetyk – z uwagi na gradacyjny charakter wyzwalanych w literaturze energii. (shrink)

This essay examines the terms of the Judicial Oath sworn by the judges in the Athenian courts during the classical period. There is general agreement that the oath contained four basic clauses: to vote in accordance to the laws and decrees of the Athenian people, to vote about matters pertaining to the charge, to listen to both the accuser and defendant equally, and to vote or judge with one’s most fair judgment . Some scholars believe that the fourth clause gave (...) judges the right to vote according to their conscience and to ignore the law if they found it unjust. The first part of the essay shows that this clause gave judges the right to make decisions solely on the basis of their most just judgment only where the laws gave no clear guidance. It was a default clause invoked only twice in the extant orations; it was never used as justification to ignore the written laws. The second part addresses the view that the courts took political factors into account during trials. Although some trials involved leading politicians, the courts were bound by their oath to decide whether the defendant was guilty of the charge brought by the accuser. The only part of a trial where a defendant might mention his political achievements or his public largesse was at during the assessment of the penalty in a trial on a public charge. (shrink)

Dismantling Glorydeals with the poetry written about the honors and horrors of battle by the very soldiers who put their lives on the line. Focusing on American and English poetry from World Wars I and II and the Vietnam War, Lorrie Goldensohn presents the move from a poetry largely bound to trench warfare to a global war poetry dominated by air power, invasion, and occupation. Civilians, prisoners, and children enter this poetry in new and compelling ways, as do issues of (...) race and gender, changing and complicating the representation of war, and expanding the scope of antiwar thinking. (shrink)