The democratic egalitarian ideal requires that everyone should enjoy equal power over the world through voting. If it is improper to vote twice in the same election, why should it be permissible for dual citizens to vote in two different places? Several possible excuses are considered and rejected.

The genre of public service advertisements that appear with two- and four-year cyclical regularity is familiar. Cameras pan across scenes of marines hoisting the flag on Iwo Jima, a bald eagle soaring in splendid flight, rows of grave markers at Arlington. The somber-voiced announcer remonstrates: “ They did their part; now you do yours.” Once again it is the season to fulfill one's civic duty, to vote.

When Congress passed the 19th Amendment in 1919 granting women voting rights, 13 western states had already adopted woman suffrage. Only 2 states outside the West had done so. Using event history analysis, the authors investigate why woman suffrage came early to the western states. Alan Grimes's hypotheses, that native-born, western men were willing to give women the vote to remedy western social problems and to increase the number of women in the region, receive little support in our analysis. (...) Rather, this study finds that woman suffrage came to the West because of the mobilization of the western suffrage movements and because of political and gendered opportunities existing in that region. (shrink)

The field of deliberative democracy now generally recognizes the co-dependence of deliberation and voting. The field tends to emphasize what deliberation accomplishes for vote-based decisions. In this paper, we reverse this now common view to ask: In what ways does voting benefit deliberation? We discuss seven ways voting can complement and sometimes enhance deliberation. First, voting furnishes deliberation with a feasible and fair closure mechanism. Second, the power to vote implies equal recognition and status, both morally (...) and strategically, which is a condition of democratic deliberation. Third, voting politicizes deliberation by injecting the strategic features of politics into deliberation—effectively internalizing conflict into deliberative processes, without which they can become detached from their political environments. Fourth, anticipation of voting may induce authenticity by revealing preferences, as what one says will count. Fifth, voting preserves expressions of dissent, helping to push back against socially induced pressures for consensus. Sixth, voting defines the issues, such that deliberation is focused, and thus more likely to be effective. And, seventh, within contexts where votes are public—as in representative contexts, voting can induce accountability, particularly for one’s claims. We then use these points to discuss four general types of institutions—general elections, legislatures, minipublics, and minipublics embedded in referendum processes—that combine talking and voting, with the aim of identifying designs that do a better or worse job of capitalizing upon the strengths of each. (shrink)

The Kyoto Protocol on global warming has provoked great controversy in part because it calls for heavier burdens on wealthy countries than on developing countries in the effort to control climate change. The U.S. Senate voted unanimously to oppose any agreement that does not require emissions reductions in low-income countries. The ethics of this position are examined in this paper which shows that there are good moral reasons for supporting the provisions of the Kyoto Protocol. Such a conclusion follows easily (...) from considerations of distributive justice but can also be supported by more narrowly self-interested arguments. (shrink)

There are two classic principles for deciding who should have a right to vote on the laws, the All Affected Principle and the All Subjected Principle. This article is devoted, firstly, to providing a sympathetic reconstruction of the All Subjected Principle, identifying the most credible account of what it is to be subject to the law. Secondly, it shows that that best account still suffers some serious difficulties, which might best be resolved by treating the All Subjected Principle as a (...) subset of the All Affected Principle with which the All Subjected Principle must in any case be supplemented. (shrink)

Musical life became disrupted in 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Many musicians and venues turned to online alternatives, such as livestreaming. In this study, three livestreamed concerts were organized to examine separate, yet interconnected concepts—agency, presence, and social context—to ascertain which components of livestreamed concerts facilitate social connectedness. Hierarchical Bayesian modeling was conducted on 83 complete responses to examine the effects of the manipulations on feelings of social connectedness with the artist and the audience. Results showed that in concert (...) 1, where half of the participants were allowed to vote for the final song to be played, this option did not result in the experience of more agency. Instead, if their preferred song was played (regardless of voting ability) participants experienced greater connectedness to the artist. In concert 2, participants who attended the concert with virtual reality headsets experienced greater feelings of physical presence, as well as greater feelings of connectedness with the artist, than those that viewed a normal YouTube livestream. In concert 3, attendance through Zoom led to greater experience of social presence, but predicted less connectedness with the artist, compared to a normal YouTube livestream. Crucially, a greater negative impact of COVID-19 (e.g., loneliness) predicted feelings of connectedness with the artist, possibly because participants fulfilled their social needs with this parasocial interaction. Examining data from all concerts suggested that physical presence was a predictor of connectedness with both the artist and the audience, while social presence only predicted connectedness with the audience. Correlational analyses revealed that reductions in loneliness and isolation were associated with feelings of shared agency, physical and social presence, and connectedness to the audience. Overall, the findings suggest that in order to reduce feelings of loneliness and increase connectedness, concert organizers and musicians could tune elements of their livestreams to facilitate feelings of physical and social presence. (shrink)

The current proxy voting system in the United States has become the subject of considerable controversy. Because institutional investment managers have the authority to vote their clients’ proxies, they have a fiduciary obligation to those clients. Frequently, in an attempt to fulfill that obligation, these institutional investors employ proxy advisory services to manage the thousands of votes they must cast. However, many proxy advisory services have conflicts of interest that inhibit their utility to those seeking to discharge their fiduciary (...) duties. In this article, we describe the current proxy advisory network as an example of how current notions of conflicts of interest fall short when explaining the behavior of an interconnected set of market players whose remit is to act in the best interests of their investors. We discuss what participants in this system should do to bring transparency and accuracy to the proxy advice industry. (shrink)

Institutional investors are increasingly becoming active owners through voting their shares and engaging in dialogue with investee companies to improve corporate environmental, social and corporate governance (ESG) performance. This article applies a model of stakeholder salience to the shareholder context, analysing the attributes of power, legitimacy and urgency, to determine the factors that are likely to enhance shareholder salience. It is found that a strong business case and the values of the managers of investee companies are likely to be (...) the most important contributors to shareholder salience. (shrink)

May's theorem famously shows that, in social decisions between two options, simple majority rule uniquely satisfies four appealing conditions. Although this result is often cited in support of majority rule, it has never been extended beyond decisions based on pairwise comparisons of options. We generalize May's theorem to many-option decisions where voters each cast one vote. Surprisingly, plurality rule uniquely satisfies May's conditions. This suggests a conditional defense of plurality rule: If a society's balloting procedure collects only a single vote (...) from each voter, then plurality rule is the uniquely compelling electoral procedure. To illustrate the conditional nature of this claim, we also identify a richer informational environment in which approval voting, not plurality rule, is supported by a May-style argument. (shrink)

Political philosophers rarely take on the topic of political corruption, despite the fact that corruption is so costly to human wellbeing, and so clearly separates well-governed from poorly governed polities. Ceva and Ferretti's book is the most complete attempt to remedy this deficit to date. Their key contribution is to conceptualize institutions in such a way that the offices they define link clearly to public ethics. Officeholders are accountable for their power mandate, not just within a hierarchy, but ethically, because (...) their duties serve the public purposes that justify the institution. This said, their approach works best for impartial institutions in which the public duties of offices are clear and actionable, such as professional bureaucracies. We also need an ethically driven conception of political corruption for political institutions that contain and channel political partiality, especially democratic institutions within which the ethical purposes of public legislation are argued, deliberated, and voted. Extending a public ethics account of political corruption to democratic institutions can and should be a next step in this important project. (shrink)

The beginning of the journey -- What this book is about : using ideas from mathematics, economics, and physics to tackle the big questions in philosophy : what is real? what can we know? what is the difference between right and wrong? and how should we live? -- Reality and unreality -- On what there is -- Why is there something instead of nothing? the best answer I have : mathematics exists because it must and everything else exists because it (...) is made of mathematics, with an excursion into artificial intelligence -- Unfinished business -- Unfinished business from chapter two : the nature and purpose of economic models -- How Richard Dawkins got it wrong -- Why Dawkins's argument against intelligent design can't be right and a mathematical analysis of the arguments for the existence of God -- Belief -- Daydream believers -- Most beliefs are ill-considered because most false beliefs are costless to hold -- The next several chapters will explore the consequences of this observation before we return to the question of where our beliefs and knowledge come from -- Unfinished business -- Unfinished business from the preceding chapter : how color vision works, sound, and water waves, the sheer craziness of economic protectionism -- Do believers believe? -- Our ill-considered beliefs about religion : why I believe that almost nobody is deeply religious -- On what there obviously is -- Our ill-considered beliefs about free will, ESP, and life after death -- Diogenes's nightmare -- How is legitimate disagreement possible if you're arguing with someone who is as intelligent and informed as you are, shouldn't you put just as much weight on your opponent's arguments as your own? -- The fact that we persist in disagreeing is strong evidence that we don't really care what's true -- Knowledge -- Knowing your math -- Where mathematical knowledge comes from and logic and why evidence and logic are not enough -- Unfinished business -- Unfinished business from the preceding chapter : the tale of hercules and the hydra, with an excursion into the lore of very large numbers -- Incomplete thinking -- Godel's incompleteness theorem and what it doesn't say about the limits of human knowledge -- The rules of logic and the tale of a Potbellied pig -- The power of logical thought, with excursions into the most counterintuitive theorem in all of mathematics and the tale of a potbellied pig -- The rules of evidence -- What we can and can't learn from evidence, with excursions into the value of preschool and how internet porn prevents rape -- The limits to knowledge -- What physics does and doesn't tell us about what we can and cannot know -- Understanding Heisenberg's uncertainty principle -- Unfinished business -- The oddness of the quantum world and why it matters to game theorists -- Right and wrong -- Telling right from wrong -- Some hard questions about right and wrong and about life and death -- The economist's golden rule -- A rule of thumb for good behavior -- How to be socially responsible -- Putting the rule of thumb into practice -- On not being a jerk -- Goofus and gallant on immigration policy -- The economist on the playground -- Our ill-considered beliefs about fairness in the market place and in the voting booth, contrasted with our carefully considered beliefs about fairness on the playground -- Unfinished business -- How ancient talmudic scholars anticipated modern economic theory -- The life of the mind -- How to think -- Some basic rules for clear thinking, mostly about economics, but also about arithmetic, neurobiology, sin, and eschewing blather -- What to study -- Advice to college students : stay away from the English department and approach the philosophy department with caution, with an excursion into the remarkable life of Frank Ramsey. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Law’s Virtue: Fostering Autonomy and Solidarity in American Society by Cathleen KavenyEric E. SchnitgerLaw’s Virtue: Fostering Autonomy and Solidarity in American Society By Cathleen Kaveny WASHINGTON, DC: GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2012. 304 PP. $29.95In Law’s Virtue, Cathleen Kaveny calls those in Western liberal countries to rethink their fundamental framework of ethics and law through the guiding principles of autonomy and solidarity, understood through the Catholic context of Thomistic (...) virtue. The law operates not as the fence of individual isolation as it does in Enlightenment rights theory, whereby liberty is preserved through negative restraint, but as the teacher of a limited form of the virtues of prudence and justice (52). The law teaches this thin form of prudence through autonomy, which Kaveny takes from Joseph Raz as “the capacity to be the ‘part-author’ of one’s own life” (53). Solidarity, pulling from Pope John Paul II, correlates to a learned justice, in that it “attend[s] to the unseen members” of the community (54). It recognizes that the good of the community and the good of individual members are inexorably intertwined.The opening epigram of the preface, which sets the tone for the whole work, is a quotation from Isidore of Seville found in Aquinas: “Law shall be virtuous, just, possible to nature, according to the custom of the country, suitable to place and time, necessary, useful; clearly expressed, lest by its obscurity it lead to misunderstanding; framed for no private benefit, but for the common good” (xi). Kaveny argues that the phrases “possible to nature” and “custom of the country” need more attention in pluralist, democratic societies, because law is morally formed by its constituent community and there are deep disagreements within those communities. This gives a direction for how Catholics, and all citizens, should attempt to influence laws in these democracies. Because the law is a form of consensus over time, it should use severe sanctions such as criminal law only to reinforce the consensus that it represents. Tort and tax law are less severe tools that can encourage the moral direction of society, which, when used well, maintain the consensus of the law but still allow it to be a moral teacher.Kaveny’s practical thinking in this text does have some seeds of radical change. When she moves to the practicalities of life issues in the law—such as abortion, euthanasia, and genetics—she argues that the “entire fabric of the Anglo-American legal system” needs to add the concept of the “vulnerable” person to the “reasonable person” (79). In addition, her reframing of life issues contends that the Catholic view of issues like abortion is too different from [End Page 212] the “custom of the country” to make a change to the virtues and practices of other citizens. Instead, attention to the support necessary for families and social difficulties of economic poverty represents a way of using the law as a moral teacher while recognizing its limits (89, 156, 209). The book concludes with an incisive look at voting, in which Kaveny argues that the idea of issues-based voting is wrongheaded; instead, she urges voters to consider that they are voting for an individual who will take a broad moral stance and make a broad set of decisions (197 ff.).The quality of Kaveny’s clear thinking and moral consistency makes this book a pleasure to read—even for those who may disagree about the nature of the law or the virtues that Christians should bring to political, legislative, and judicial systems. This text, from its depth of legal and theological commitments, sets a high bar for further dialogue.Eric E. SchnitgerFuller Theological SeminaryCopyright © 2015 Society of Christian Ethics... (shrink)

How does the experience of busyness impact democratic political life? My hunch is that those reading this essay might very well offer the following answer: busyness means that we relegate political activities to the bottom of a long and sometimes tedious laundry list of “things to get done.” In fact, many of us no longer even bother to include the basic activities of citizenship –getting informed about the issues, deliberating with our peers about matters of common concern, attending a political (...) meeting, or even voting —on the list in the first place. Like this author, many of you probably feel somewhat guilty about this as well, and thus try to compensate in some way or another… At worst, busyness generates political disinterest and apathy: many of our fellow citizens openly describe the most fundamental form of democratic participation, the vote, as “a waste of time.” At best, it seems to privilege an acceleration of political activity: we seek speedy and rapidly consummated types of involvement that do not unduly add to the enormous time pressures we already feel. Unfortunately, it remains unclear whether even such high-speed forms of citizen involvement are normatively satisfactory. Can liberal democracy flourish when a growing number of us avoid the responsibilities of citizenship altogether, while even those of us who try to remain politically involved insist that they be dealt with quickly and painlessly? In this essay, I hope at the very least to deepen our understanding of this quagmire. If I am not mistaken, it provides a useful starting point for examining one of the core challenges of contemporary political life: how can we make sure that busyness and citizenship coexist in a potentially fruitful, though by no means necessarily harmonious, relationship? (shrink)

In response to the dozen essays published here, which relate my 1964 paper on “The Nature of Belief Systems in the Mass Publics” to normative requirements of democratic theory, I note, inter alia, a major misinterpretation of my old argument, as well as needed revisions of that argument in the light of intervening data. Then I address the degree to which there may be some long‐term secular change in the parameters that I originally laid out. In the final section, I (...) provide a case study of public understanding of factual trends in federal tax policy in recent decades which seems commendably veridical on average. The preferences of the public thereon add up to a remarkably clear popular mandate. But this mandate seems to disappear rather magically in the voting booth, probably due to a combination of limited contextual information on the public side, and considerable skill on the elite side in manipulating apparent political realities. (shrink)

The say-on-pay regulation in the Dodd-Frank Act requires publicly-traded U.S. firms to hold a nonbinding, advisory shareholder vote on executive compensation. Advocates claim that SOP voting gives shareholders a mechanism to hold managers and boards more accountable. Critics contend that SOP votes may simplistically reflect shareholders’ reactions to the overall value of CEO compensation or the firm’s net income. However, based on prior research, we contend that market participants’ SOP votes are likely to consider current income attributes. For example, (...) the market punishes firms that do not meet or beat benchmarks such as analyst earnings expectations, and that shareholders scrutinize the quality of the income sources of firms that consistently meet/beat analyst expectations. We thus expect that more shareholders will provide ‘agree’ SOP votes for a firm that consistently meets/beats analyst forecasts and does so when net income does not include nonrecurring gains. Further, we consider whether perceptions about the fairness of CEO compensation play a mediating role in the relationship between the interaction of these two current income attributes and SOP votes. Results from an experiment using evening MBA students as participants indicates that the two current income attributes significantly interact with respect to the percentage of agree SOP votes, and that compensation fairness perceptions fully mediate this relationship. Further, the mediating effect of compensation fairness perceptions is robust to including CEO-level and other determinants found in prior research. We conclude with a discussion of our findings and their implications for public policy and research. (shrink)

This paper generalises the classical Condorcet jury theorem from majority voting over two options to plurality voting over multiple options. The paper further discusses the debate between epistemic and procedural democracy and situates its formal results in that debate. The paper finally compares a number of different social choice procedures for many-option choices in terms of their epistemic merits. An appendix explores the implications of some of the present mathematical results for the question of how probable majority cycles (...) (as in Condorcet's paradox) are in large electorates. (shrink)

Sunstein's Infotopia offers four reasons for thinking that information-pooling via mechanical aggregation of votes is superior to discursive sharing of opinions. This article focuses on two of them—the Common Knowledge Effect and Group Polarisation—showing that both phenomena might have perfectly good Bayesian explanations. Far from constituting 'errors', both can actually contribute to truth-tracking in ways that cannot be accomplished via mechanical aggregation of votes alone.

Margaret Brazier has argued that, in the literature on reproductive technology, women's “right” to reproduce is privileged, pushed, and subordinated to patriarchal values in such a way that it amounts to women's old “duty” to reproduce, dressed up in modern guise. I agree that there are patriarchal assumptions made in discussions of whether women have a right to select which embryos to implant or which fetuses to carry to term. Forcing ourselves to see women as active, rational decisionmakers tends to (...) counteract any lingering patriarchal assumptions. But rational decisionmaking requires information. Voting wisely requires information about the candidates. Taking women's reproductive rights seriously means taking seriously women's need for relevant information to make rational decisions, including decisions about which embryos to implant or alter. I argue that preimplantation genetic profiles and prenatal test information should be made available to prospective parents, especially prospective mothers, unless doing so threatens to harm the resulting child or the larger society in specifiable and important ways. (shrink)

Jeffrey Moriarty argues for a return to a robust notion of stakeholder theory involving direct procedural voting by stakeholders. He asserts that such voting offers the best possible chance of restraining firm behavior and taking into account all stakeholder interests. I argue, however, that Moriarty proceeds with an overly narrow conception of democracy, ignoring problems that arise from procedural voting. Specifically, paradoxes in voting procedures, the tyranny of the majority, and the inefficacy of representation advantage well-organized (...) and moneyed interests. A stakeholder democracy may in fact undermine the very interests that Moriarty seeks to promote. (shrink)

It is a long‐standing debate within political philosophy generally whether we want our political outcomes to be right or whether we want them to be fair; while democratic theory has traditionally taken the latter focus, democracy can be defended in the former way as well; how that can be done is the subject of this chapter and the next. For epistemic democrats, the aim of democracy is to ‘track the truth’, while for procedural democrats, the aim is to embody certain (...) procedural virtues. When voters are choosing between only two options, both epistemic and procedural standards point in the same direction, and in that case, Condorcet's jury theorem reassures both epistemic and procedural democrats that the correct outcome is most likely to win a majority of votes; however, where there are three or more options on the table, recommendations of the different strands of democratic theory diverge. In these cases, plurality voting is arguably the simplest and possibly the most frequently used voting rule, and this chapter demonstrates that the Condorcet jury theorem can indeed be generalized from majority voting over two options to plurality voting over many options; other decision rules, Condorcet pairwise criteria, Borda count procedures, and the Hare and Coombs systems have also been shown to have considerable truth‐seeking powers. This chapter addresses the question of which of these alternative possible democratic decision rules are the most reliable truth‐tracker in the more general ‘many‐option’ case. (shrink)

James Bohman’s work involves a paradigm shift in how we conceive democracy in complex, pluralized, globalized contexts comprised of multiple, overlapping constituencies that often have broad extension in space and time. He breaks with theories that view democracy as comprised of a bounded demos legislating for itself, and which conceptualize democracy as ways of organizing territorial, state-organized political entities. Elements of a progressive democratic theory that travels across borders should be built out of three ideas: a nonutopianism that pays close (...) attention to the “circumstances of politics”; institutions that enable nondomination, which helps to push conflict resolution toward the democratic media of deliberation, bargaining, compromise, and voting; and reflexive institutions that enable the deliberative generation, revision, and renewal of collective procedures and decisions, and which organize the creativity, intelligence, and energy of individuals. (shrink)

The Federalist, justifying the Electoral College to elect the president, claimed that a small group of more informed individuals would make a better decision than the general mass. But the Condorcet Jury Theorem tells us that the more independent, better-than-random voters there are, the more likely it will be that the majority among them will be correct. The question thus arises as to how much better, on average, members of the smaller group would have to be to compensate for the (...) epistemic costs of making decisions on the basis of that many fewer votes. This question is explored in the contexts of referendum democracy, delegate-style representative democracy, and trustee-style representative democracy. (shrink)

This book, first published in 2006, examines the incentives at work in a wide range of institutions to see how and how well coordination is achieved by informing and motivating individual decision makers. The book examines the performance of agents hired to carry out specific tasks, from taxi drivers to CEOs. It investigates the performance of institutions, from voting schemes to kidney transplants, to see if they enhance general well being. The book examines a broad range of market transactions, (...) from auctions to labor markets, to the entire economy. The analysis is conducted using specific worked examples, lucid general theory, and illustrations drawn from news stories. Of the seventy different topics and sections, only twelve require a knowledge of calculus. The second edition offers new chapters on auctions, matching and assignment problems, and corporate governance. Boxed examples are used to highlight points of theory and are separated from the main text. (shrink)

Complaints are common about the arbitrary and conservative bias of special-majority rules. Such complaints, however, apply to asymmetrical versions of those rules alone. Symmetrical special-majority rules remedy that defect, albeit at the cost of often rendering no determinate verdict. Here what is formally at stake, both procedurally and epistemically, is explored in the choice between those two forms of special-majority rule and simple-majority rule; and practical ways are suggested of resolving matters left open by symmetrical special-majority rules – such as (...) ‘judicial extrapolation’ or ‘subsidiarity’ in a federal system. (shrink)

Thucydides reports that in 414/13, after severe losses in Sicily, Nikias wrote to Athens, asking to be replaced in command and saying that it was necessary either to recall the expedition from the island or to send a new army as a reinforcement. The Athenians, however,[When the Athenians had heard his letter,] instead of relieving him of his command, chose two members of the force in Sicily, Menandros and Euthydemos, to act as additional commanders until the selection and arrival of (...) other colleagues, so that the position of sole commander would not cause Nikias suffering in his illness. They also voted to send another force, both military and naval, composed of Athenians on the muster-roll and of their allies. After the selection of Demosthenes, the son of Alkisthenes, and Eurymedon, the son of Thoukles, as Nikias' colleagues, they sent Eurymedon forthwith, around the winter solstice, to Sicily with ten ships and one hundred and twenty talents in silver …. (shrink)

Proposals to lower the age of voting, to 15 for example, are regularly met with worries that people that age are not sufficiently ‘competent’. Notice however that we allow people that age to sign binding legal contracts, provided that those contracts are co-signed by their parents. Notice, further, that in a democracy voters are collectively ‘joint authors’ of the laws that they enact. Enfranchising some less competent voters is no worry, the Condorcet Jury Theorem assures us, so long as (...) the electorate's competence averaging across all voters remains better-than-random. (shrink)

When denial of medical treatment is being used as a lever to move people out of the country, ethicists and healthcare professionals should speak out.An ugly feature of political life throughout the Western world, and beyond, is the suspicion towards, and maltreatment of, migrants from poor to rich countries. People who would otherwise be horrified at being labelled racist nevertheless find it acceptable to support practices which can range from stigmatisation to confinement in brutalising conditions in “reception” and “removal” centres.1–5An (...) hour spent searching through government and NGO websites concerned with the treatment of asylum seekers and refugees in developed world countries is an hour well spent – but profoundly depressing. This is not only because of the frankly Orwellian language used by the governments of the UK and Australia , or because of the conditions and treatment meted out, but also because of the apparent support these practices have among the voting public. In the pointedly optimistic reports of Her Majesty’s Inspector of Prisons, for example, one can find praise for the fact …. (shrink)

Shows how Bayesian thinking should make democratic outcomes so rationally compelling. Bayes's formula provides a mathematical expression for specifying exactly how we ought rationally to update our a priori beliefs in light of subsequent evidence, and the proposal is that voters are modelled in like fashion: votes, let us suppose, constitute ‘reports’ of the voter's experiences and perceptions; further suppose that voters accord ‘evidentiary value’ to the reports they receive from one another through those votes; and further suppose that voters (...) are rational, and that part and parcel of their being rational is being prepared to revise their opinions in light of further evidence. In this process, each of us treats our own experiences and perceptions as one source of evidence, and regards our own report as right; in that sense, we are perfectly sincere when we vote in a particular way, although we also acknowledge that our own experiences and perspectives are particular and peculiar, and hence our own perceptions are themselves inconclusive; because of that, voters striving to behave rationally should sincerely want to adjust their a priori beliefs in the light of all other experiences and perceptions that are reported at an election. Bayesian updating of that sort may well lead people who started out believing one way to end up believing the opposite way, just so long as sufficiently many votes‐cum‐reports point in that different direction; in other words, Bayesian reasoning can, and in politically typical cases ought to, provide people with a compelling reason to accede to the majority verdict. In this way, Bayesianism ‘rationalizes’ majority rule in a pretty strong sense; indeed if anything, it underwrites majoritarianism too strongly. (shrink)

This is the first of four chapters on value democracy, and focuses on ‘input democracy’, which aims to give everyone a ‘voice’, rather than necessarily an equal ‘say’ over the ultimate outcome, and stands in contrast to ‘output democracy’. The two terms mark a distinction between a concern with the early and late stages of the political process, and can be viewed as who gets a vote versus how votes are aggregated; they are, of course, causally connected; while the two (...) models are thus empirically intertwined, they are analytically distinct, and the analytics can sometimes be of practical consequence as well. After sketching the central concerns of the two models generically, Schumpeter's model is presented as the paradigmatically output‐oriented account. What might be regarded as a paradigmatically input‐oriented model is then sketched to contrast with it; this, although an analytic construct, is loosely modelled on and represented by the sort of ‘consultative democracy’ characteristic of the Nordic countries and, indeed, of ‘corporatist’ and ‘consociational’ democracies worldwide. The different sections of the chapter are: Against a Preoccupation with Outputs; Institutional Embodiments: Contrasting the Limiting Cases—Schumpeterian democracy and consultative democracy; and Why Inputs Matter, Democratically. (shrink)

Democratic inclusion used to be regarded as mainly a matter of expanding the franchise: if democracy was viewed as a merely mechanical process of taking a vote, aggregating votes, and declaring a winner, all that had to be done was to bring everyone in, give them a vote and let them look after themselves in the ensuing electoral fray. However, as concerns with social exclusion have broadened, faith in that simplistic model of democratic inclusion has waned. Mere inclusion, as per (...) the mechanistic model of aggregative democracy, is not enough to meet all the new concerns—some affected interests will always be left out through those sorts of processes. The author argues that ‘democratic deliberation within’ offers the best way—and with the necessarily mute interests discussed in the next chapter, the only way—to address those new democratic concerns. The different sections of the chapter are: The Importance of Inclusion; Underlying Intuitions; The Hidden Costs of Inclusion Talk; The Political Functions of Inclusion Talk; Toward a Non‐Exclusive Concept of Political Authority; and ‘Democratic Deliberation Within’ as a Concomitant, and a Substitute. (shrink)

This is the last of four chapters on belief democracy, and discusses how to rationalize persistent opposition in the light of Wollheim's paradox, and Bayesian considerations that make it utterly irrational for anyone ever to continue disagreeing once everyone has voted. The first section demonstrates that none of the easy and obvious ways of extending the Bayesian framework rationalize majoritarianism without derationalizing ongoing opposition. Next, various ways of moving beyond Bayes to overcome the paradox of persisting opposition are put forward; (...) these include repudiating Bayesian reasoning altogether, assuming that disagreement betokens unreliability, assuming that smaller groups are inherently more reliable, and assuming that each election is different; none of these produce the required result. Finally, political arguments are put forward more explicitly to see whether they can rationalize ongoing opposition; these include the crucial role of opposition in democratic politics, proceduralism, denying propositional content, biased perception, strategic voting, segmented information pools, and different interests. In the light of what has been presented overall, the author puts forward his own explanation, which suggests that what is wrong with Bayesian models that ask us to update our beliefs in the light of others’ votes is that those votes mix facts and values, and only one of these can reasonably be taken into account in updating our beliefs; thus, it is the epistemic power of majorities when dealing with shared facts that underwrites the rationality of majority rule, but their lack of epistemic authority when it comes to matters of evaluations that underwrites the rationality of persisting opposition. (shrink)

Persons registered to vote in Seattle, Washington for the November, 1986 general election and a September, 1987 primary election were randomly assigned to treatments in two telephoneconducted experiments that sought to increase voter tumout. The experiments applied and extended a "self-prophecy” technique, in which respondents are asked simply to predict whether or not they will perform a target action. In the present studies, voting registrants were asked to predict whether or not they would vote in an election that was (...) less than 48 hours away. This technique, which previously increased turnout in a small study done during the 1984 U.S. Presidential election, was again effective among moderate prior-turnout voters in the second of the present much larger experiments. The failure of the effect in Experiment 1 was plausibly a ceiling effect due to very high turnout for a U.S. Senate contest in the 1986 election. Successful applications of the self· prophecy technique are facilitated by social desirability of the target action (which leads subjects to predict that they will perform it). However, social desirability of the target behavior is not a sufficient condition for the effect, as indicated by an unexpected nonoccurrence of the effect among low prior-tumout voters in Experiment 2. (shrink)

In my book J. S. Mill: Moral, Social and Political Thought I explained the absence of a standalone chapter on women's rights by explaining that for Mill no special explanation of why women should have the right to vote, work in the careers of their choice, etc., was needed; they should have these rights for the same reasons as men. The real lacuna, I admitted, was the absence of a chapter on Mill's views on marriage and the family. This chapter (...) remedies that deficiency. (shrink)

Solidarity is supposed to facilitate collective action. We argue that it can also help overcome false consciousness. Groups practice if they pool information about what is in their true interest and how to vote accordingly. The more numerous can in this way overcome the but only if they are minimally confident with whom they share the same interests and only if they are better-than-random in voting for the alternative that promotes their interests. Being more cohesive and more competent than (...) the Masses, the Elites can employ the same strategy perhaps all the more effectively. But so long as the Masses practice epistemic solidarity they will almost always win, whether or not the Elites do. By enriching the traditional framework of the Condorcet Jury Theorem with group-specific standards of correctness, we investigate how groups can organize to support the alternatives truly in their interests. (shrink)

As more wind energy projects are constructed and placed into operation, their potential downsides are becoming more apparent to a larger number of people. One of the most contentious issues is that of the potential loss of property values for those who happen to own homes close to these projects. This issue may be more parochial and therefore seemingly less important than larger global issues, such as energy independence, sustainability, or global warming. But for those most directly affected by these (...) projects, it can serve as a single proxy for all the other local concerns with wind turbines, such as noise, visual pollution, and health. Moreover, rural homeowners vote in high numbers, and in those locations where there is still local control of wind energy projects, the local politicians will eventually reflect those concerns. The wind energy industry counters these concerns by quoting from a series of industry and government studies that claim to show that proximity to wind turbines does not materially affect home prices. However, their efforts at allaying the concerns of the local homeowners have not been very successful. This article discusses some of the reasons why the industry has been unsuccessful at quelling these concerns, including an evaluation of the evidence from both sides of the wind energy debate as a homeowner might see it and ends with suggestions on how the industry might allay these concerns. (shrink)

Does the desirability of social institutions for public goods provision depend on the extent to which they include mechanisms for endogenous enforcement of cooperative behavior? We consider alternative institutions that vary the use of direct punishments to promote social cooperation. In one institution, subjects participate in a public goods experiment in which an initial stage of voluntary contribution is followed by a second stage of voluntary, costly sanctioning. Another institution consists of the voluntary contribution stage only, with no subsequent opportunity (...) to sanction. In a third stage subjects vote for which institution they prefer for future interactions: do they prefer one that does allow sanctions or one that does not allow sanctions? Our results show that even though sanctions are frequently used when available, the clear majority of individuals vote for the institution that does not allow sanctions. Thus, a distinction is required between the principles that guide the choice of institutions and the principles that apply to actions guided by institutions. Our results indicate that it is the wealth generated by the institution that determines its desirability. (shrink)

On November 8, 1994, Oregon became the first state in the nation to legalize assisted suicide. Passage of Proposition 16 was a milestone in the campaign to make assisted suicide a legal option. The culmination of years of effort, the Oregon vote followed on the heels of failed referenda in California and Washington, and other unsuccessful attempts to enact state laws guaranteeing the right to suicide assistance. Indeed, in 1993, four states passed laws strengthening or clarifying their ban against assisted (...) suicide. No doubt, Proposition 16 is likely to renew the effort to legalize assisted suicide at the state level.The battle over assisted suicide is also unfolding in the courts. Litigation challenging Proposition 16 on the grounds that it violates the equal protection clause is ongoing in Oregon. More significantly, three cases, two in federal courts and one in Michigan state court, have been brought to establish assisted suicide as a constitutionally protected right. (shrink)

Empirical electoral research in Germany has reached a high level of quality both with regard to theoretical approaches and methodological issues. Moreover, it is strongly linked to other disciplines in political science such as comparative political studies or political communication and also highly integrated in international electoral research. However, a changing context of voting and internal deficits are imposing challenges on electoral research in Germany which should be met in the next years and decades. Still, these challenges can also (...) be regarded as perspectives for future electoral research. This paper thus describes the current standing of empirical electoral research in Germany and gives a detailed account of the challenges resulting from this. Further, using the example of the German Longitudinal Election Study (GLES) we show how these challenges can be and are actually met. (shrink)

A recent spate of exposés about Mao Zedong's China, in English and Chinese, announces a finality to the tendency toward the temporal-spatial conflation of twentieth-century Chinese and global history. This sense was confirmed when the New York Times reported in late January 2006 that George W. Bush's recent bedtime reading had been Jung Chang and Jon Halliday's Mao: The Unknown Story,1 or when, later in 2006, according to a column in the British paper The Guardian, “the Council of Europe's parliamentary (...) assembly voted to condemn the ‘crimes of totalitarian communist regimes’, linking them with Nazism.”2 The temporal-spatial conflation hence is,…. (shrink)

Much ink has been spilled in the last years on whether voting is a duty that citizens ought to discharge in a democracy that aspires to be acceptably just. In this essay, I concentrate on whether a moral duty to participate in elections logically entails that people ought to vote simpliciter or well. I propose that voting well – i.e. with information and a sense of justice – is the electoral duty that we should value. Voting as (...) such is not – at least, not if we care about the substantive quality of democratic outcomes, not only about equality of participation. As a matter of fact, voting well seems to be a more adequate form of political participation than simply voting under varied normative conceptions of democracy, as I will show. At the same time, while we can't freely choose not to follow a moral duty to vote well just because we're not inclined to do so, we have to allow for the possibility that some individuals will not be in a good position to act on it. I conclude by discussing admissible reasons for this inability with respect to our citizenship responsibilities. (shrink)

Epistemic justifications for democracy have been offered in terms of two different aspects of decision-making: voting and deliberation, or ‘votes’ and ‘talk.’ The Condorcet Jury Theorem is appealed to as a justification in terms votes, and the Hong-Page “Diversity Trumps Ability” result is appealed to as a justification in terms of deliberation. Both of these, however, are most plausibly construed as models of direct democracy, with full and direct participation across the population. In this paper, we explore how these (...) results hold up if we vary the model so as to reflect the more familiar democratic structure of a representative hierarchy. We first recount extant analytic work that shows that representation inevitably weakens the voting results of the Condorcet Jury Theorem, but we question the ability of that result to shine light on real representative systems. We then show that, when we move from votes to talk, as modeled in Hong-Page, representation holds its own and even has a slight edge. (shrink)

Self-interest voting is irrational when it has even a small cost, but it can be rational for those who care about others; its expected utility (EU) may exceed its cost. For cosmopolitan voters (those who care about outsiders), the EU of voting increases with the number of affected others. The EU of voting for the good of the world now and in the future can thus be large. In some cases, the EU of parochial voting (e.g., (...) considering only one's nation) may not cross the cost threshold, but cosmopolitan voting can cross it. I apply these principles to various kinds of voting. And I compare voting to charity. Voting has the advantage of enlisting the coercive power of the state, but charity can be more focused on effective policies. I discuss campaign contributions, and I conclude with a discussion of the existence of utilitarian voters. (shrink)