Emerging from the disruption of the First World War, surrealism confronted the resulting ‘crisis of consciousness’ in a way that was arguably more profound than any other cultural movement of the time._ _The past few decades have seen an expansion of interest in surrealist writers, whose contribution to the history of ideas in the twentieth-century is only now being recognised._ Surrealism: Key Concepts_ is the first book in English to present an overview of surrealism through the central ideas motivating the (...) popular movement. An international team of contributors provide an accessible examination of the key concepts, emphasising their relevance to current debates in social and cultural theory. This book will be an invaluable guide for students studying a range of disciplines, including Philosophy, Anthropology, Sociology and Cultural Studies, and anyone who wishes to engage critically with surrealism for the first time. _Contributors:_ Dawn Ades, Joyce Cheng, Jonathan P. Eburne, Krzysztof Fijalkowski, Guy Girard, Raihan Kadri, Michael Löwy, Jean-Michel Rabaté, Michael Richardson, Donna Roberts, Bertrand Schmitt, Georges Sebbag, Raymond Spiteri, and Michael Stone-Richards. (shrink)

Researchers do not owe their subjects the same level of care that physicians owe patients, but they owe more than merely what the research protocol stipulates. In keeping with the dynamics of the relationship between researcher and subject, they have limited but substantive fiduciary obligations.

The notion that it is useful to specify norms progressively in order to resolve doubts about what to do, which I developed initially in a 1990 article, has been only partly assimilated by the bioethics literature. The thought is not just that it is helpful to work with relatively specific norms. It is more than that: specification can replace deductive subsumption and balancing. Here I argue against two versions of reliance on balancing that are prominent in recent bioethical discussions. Without (...) meaning to address the substance or the overall merits of either view I criticize, I attack Gert, Culver and Clouser's implicit reliance on some overall dimension of balancing as a basis of resolving conflicts among norms and Beauchamp and Childress's residual acceptance of 'justified balancing'. The former authors' description of resolving conflicts depends upon a type of value commensurability that (as they otherwise seem to admit) does not obtain, while the latter authors' role for justified balancing would be better served by continued specification. (shrink)

I offer a philosophical account of shared grief, on which it is a process, undergone by a group, of recognising and accommodating significant possibilities that are lost to that group. In setting out from an understanding of grief’s distinctive characteristics, a philosophically interesting, metaphysically undemanding, and practically useful account of shared grief comes into view, that has broader consequences for understanding shared emotion.

As our interactions with nature occur increasingly within urban landscapes, there is a need to consider how ‘mundane nature’ can be valued as a route for people to connect to nature. The content of a three good things in nature intervention, written by 65 participants each day for five days is analysed. Content analysis produced themes related to sensations, temporal change, active wildlife, beauty, weather, colour, good feelings and specific aspects of nature. The themes describe the everyday good things in (...) nature, providing direction for those seeking to frame engaging conservation messages, plan urban spaces and connect people with nearby nature. (shrink)

In her book Social Goodness, Charlotte Witt gives an account of the normativity of social norms, crucially appealing to (and naming) social role normativity. Social role normativity is a distinctive kind of normativity that follows from social roles. For example, teachers ought to teach and students ought to do their homework. According to Witt's artisanal model of social role normativity, we should make sense of social role normativity by reference to artisanal roles, like being a carpenter. Just as carpenters have (...) skills, techniques, and expertise associated with their craft, social roles have skills, techniques, and expertise associated with them. The artisanal model presents the individual craftsperson, taught by a uniquely qualified expert, as the paradigm. Because of this, I argue that the artisanal model struggles to capture the messiness of the actual world, where expertise is distributed, unstable, and contested. To accommodate the real world, we should move away from Witt's individualistic artisanal model. Instead of focusing on individual artisans, our account of social role normativity should focus on communities and institutions that promote artisanal practices. (shrink)

The integrins are receptors for proteins of the extracellular matrix, both providing a physical link to the cytoskeleton and transducing signals from the extracellular matrix. Activation of integrins leads to tyrosine and serine phosphorylation of a number of proteins, elevation of cytosolic calcium levels, cytoplasmic alkalinization, changes in phospholipid metabolism and, ultimately, changes in gene expression. The recently discovered focal adhesion kinase localizes to focal contacts, which are sites of integrin clustering, and focal adhesion kinase can physically associate with integrins (...) in vitro. As integrins lack intrinsic catalytic activity, focal adhesion kinase is a candidate for a signaling molecule that is recruited by integrins in order to trigger the generation of intracellular second messengers. Thus, focal adhesion kinase may play a central role in signal transduction through integrins. (shrink)

It is often claimed that epistemological thought divides around the issue of the place of experience in knowledge: While empiricists argue that experience is the only legitimate source of knowledge, rationalists find other such sources. The trouble with such accounts is not that they are wrong, but that they are incomplete. On occasion, epistemological differences run deeper, raising the very notion of experience as an issue for epistemology. This paper looks at two epistemological debates which concerned not simply the place (...) of experience in knowledge but also the appropriate account of experience itself. The first episode is the rise of Marburg Neo-Kantianism in the 1870s – in particular the seminal work of Hermann Cohen in his Kants Theorie der Erfahrung (1871). Cohen's principal point was that Kant's significance as an epistemologist was in providing a new theory of experience, one that tied experience to exact science and led to a new stress on the formal conditions of exact knowledge. The second episode is Carnap's rejection of epistemology in the 1930s in favour of a program of the logic of science. My focus in each case will be the interplay between an epistemology focused on exact science as the locus of knowledge and a concomitant call for logical methods in epistemology. (shrink)

The formal framework of Kauffman (1991) depicts the constraints of self-organization on the evolution of complex systems and the relation of self-organization to selection. We discuss his treatment of 'generic constraints' as sources of order (section 2) and the relation between adaptation and organization (section 3). We then raise a number of issues, including the role of adaptation in explaining order (section 4) and the limitations of formal approaches in explaining the distinctively biological (section 5). The principal question we pose (...) is the relation of generic constraints on evolution to more specific local constraints, imposed, for example, by the characteristic materials out of which organisms are constructed, the accidental features characteristic of the Bauplan of a lineage, and the local vicissitudes of adaptation. We offer no answer to this large question. (shrink)

David Estlund’s Democratic Authority develops a novel doctrine of “normative consent,” according to which the nonconsent of those with a duty to consent is null. This article suggests that this doctrine can be defended by confining it to contexts involving consent to an authority, which raise distinctive normative challenges, but argues that Estlund’s attempt to deploy the doctrine fails, for it does not provide convincing reasons to think that citizens have any duty to consent. In closing, the article suggests that (...) the doctrine of normative consent might yet do some useful work in a quite different theoretical setting. (shrink)

In contrast to certain recent work, which supposes that the fetial priests were always responsible for the swearing of the oaths made upon the striking of a treaty and that the rituals they performed went unchanged for centuries, this paper argues that the treaty-making rituals of the Romans changed and developed, and that the ritual which the fetial priests performed may not have been devised until as late as the third century BC.

We commend the argument that perception and action are tightly coupled. We claim that the argument is not new, that uniting stimulus and response codes is not a problem for a cognitive system, only for psychologists who assume them, and that the Theory of Event Coding (TEC)'s event-codes are arbitrary and ungrounded. Affordances and information offer the common basis for perception-action (and even for event-codes).

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work.This work is in the public domain in (...) the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

Due process is the means by which ethical constraints are placed on administrative decision-making. I have developed a model of variation in due process and use this model to explore the implementation of “due process” norms by three standard-setting bodies that are created, funded, and overseen by the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants – the Accounting Standards Board, the Auditing and Assurance Standards Board, and the Public Sector Accounting Standards Board. I conducted two analyses: a comparative analysis of the implementation (...) of due process norms based on differences among the three cases; and, a critique of the due process norms followed by these boards based on their internal logic and a set of best practices identified in other contexts for due process by standard setters. I have presented evidence that due process norms are more fully developed, where standards are enforced by the state and the heterogeneity of users is greatest. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that the program of L. Laudan et al for empirically testing historiographical philosophies of science ("the VPI program") does not succeed in providing a consistent naturalist program in philosophy of science. In particular, the VPI program endorses a nonnaturalist metamethodology that insists on a hypothetico-deductive structure to scientific testing. But hypothetico-deductivism seems to be both inadequate as an account of scientific theory testing in general and fundamentally at odds with most of the historiographic philosophies under (...) test. I sketch an account of testing historiographic philosophies of science more consistent with the views about scientific testing of those philosophies and argue that such a program is neither viciously circular nor necessarily self-refuting. (shrink)

In spite of wars, the armament race, pollution, poverty, and other evils, a Christian view of progress is one of optimism, but qualified and realistic.

History of analytic philosophy has been an active, going concern within analytic philosophy for decades — one can scarcely imagine analytic philosophy being continued with some serious attention paid to the work of founders such as Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, and Ludwig Wittgenstein. History of philosophy of science has become an explicit part of the philosophical agenda in the past quarter century or so. These areas of research importantly overlap — logical empiricism, in particular, was an episode in both histories. (...) One might be forgiven for thinking, given all this, that the question of the relations of analytic philosophy to philosophy of science in the twentieth century would have been importantly thematized in both sorts of history and that the historical relations between analytic philosophy and philosophy of science would be, by now, a well-tilled field. (shrink)

In C.Q. xxiii. 2 Dr. C. M. Bowra examined the Ennian phrases in the Aeneid which Virgil adopted but transformed. Bowra, whose object was to investigate the reasons which led Virgil to make slight changes in these echoes, naturally had nothing to say about those borrowings which remained unaltered in Virgil. Of these, perhaps the most striking is the allusion to Q. Fabius Maximus Cunctator in v. 846 above. The following points can be noted about the line: 1. It is (...) not a subconscious, or apparently purposeless, reminiscence of familiar words, a habit of which the best-known example is Aen. vi. 460, invitus, regina, tuo de litore cessi, cf. Cat. lxvi. 39. (shrink)