When my book Reframing Women: A history of New Zealand cinema was published in 2000 New Zealand women’s film was flourishing. There had been an explosion of filmmaking following the upsurge of twentieth century feminism in the 1970s beginning with the international women’s year film Some of My Best Friends are Women and the subsequent production of nine feminist documentary films. The energy generated by these films and the international feminist history projects that uncovered the formerly invisible contribution of women (...) across every sphere of creative was contagious. There was a feeling of optimism that anything was possible. Women were using the camera to focus the lens on themselves and their issues. Between 1980 and 1990 dramas and features dealing with gender issues increased dramatically while the formerly marginalised were gaining access to the technology to explore sexuality and identity politics. There were powerful films about identity by Maori, Pacific, Asian, Yugoslavi... (shrink)

Numerous philosophical theories of joint agency and its intentional structure have been developed in the past few decades. These theories have offered accounts of joint agency that appeal to higher-level states that are?shared? in some way. These accounts have enhanced our understanding of joint agency, yet there are a number of lower-level cognitive phenomena involved in joint action that philosophers rarely acknowledge. In particular, empirical research in cognitive science has revealed that when individuals engage in a joint activity such as (...) conversation or joint problem solving, they become aligned at multiple levels. We argue that this phenomenon of alignment is crucial to understanding joint actions and should be integrated with philosophical approaches. In this paper, we sketch a possible integration, and draw out its implications for understanding of joint agency and collective intentionality. The result is a process-based, dynamic account of joint action that integrates both low-level and high-level states, and seeks to capture the separate processes of how a joint action is initiated and sustained. (shrink)

Is bioethics consultation a profession? Withfew exceptions, the arguments andcounterarguments about whether healthcareethics consultation is a profession haveignored the historical and cultural developmentof professions in the United States, the wayssocial changes have altered the work andboundaries of all professions, and theprofessionalization theories that explain howmodern societies institutionalize expertise inprofessions. This interdisciplinary analysisbegins to fill this gap by framing the debatewithin a larger theoretical context heretoforemissing from the bioethics literature. Specifically, the question of whether ethicsconsultation is a profession is examined fromthe (...) perspectives of trait theory, Wilensky''sfive-stage process of professionalization,Abbott''s interdependent system of professions,and Haug''s deprofessionalization thesis. Whilehealthcare ethics consultation does not meetthe criteria to claim professional status,neither could most professions pass these idealtheoretical standards. Instead of a yes or nodichotomous response to the question, it ismore helpful to envision a professionalizationcontinuum with sales clerks or carpenters atone end and medicine or law at the other. During the past decade healthcare ethicsconsultation has been moving along thiscontinuum toward greater professional status. (shrink)

This article argues that the fact that an action will compound a prior injustice counts as a reason against doing the action. I call this reason The Anti-Compounding Injustice principle or aci. Compounding injustice and the aci principle are likely to be relevant when analyzing the moral issues raised by “big data” and its combination with the computational power of machine learning and artificial intelligence. Past injustice can infect the data used in algorithmic decisions in two distinct ways. Sometimes prior (...) injustice undermines the accuracy of the data itself. In these contexts, improving accuracy will also help to avoid compounding injustice. Other times, past injustice produces real-world differences among people with regard to skills, health, wealth, and other traits that employers, lenders, and others seek to measure. When decisions are based on accurate data that itself results from prior injustice, these decisions can also compound injustice. This second dynamic has received less attention than the first but is especially important because improving the accuracy of data will not mitigate this unfairness. (shrink)

Philosophers such as Dan Brock believe that surrogates who make health care decisions on behalf of previously competent patients, in the absence of an advance directive, should make these decisions based upon a substituted judgment principle. Brock favours substituted judgment over a best interests standard. However, Edward Wierenga claims that the substituted judgment principle ought to be abandoned in favour of a best interests standard, because of an inherent problem with the substituted judgment principle. Wierenga's version of the substituted judgment (...) principle and his counterexample to the principle's successful interpretation of valid surrogate consent is presented. A new version of what is meant by the substituted judgment principle is advanced. The new version is not beset with the problems Wierenga initially ascribed to the substituted judgment principle. (shrink)

This paper offers an account of Margaret Cavendish's moral and political philosophy. In some respects Cavendish's theoury echoes Hobbes. However, although Cavendish agrees with Hobbes that morality is based on self-interest, she holds that morality derives from our natural desire for public recognition, not the desire for self-preservation. Via the desire for fame, self-love can motivate people to pursue virtue, which, for Cavendish, means establishing and maintaining a good government (in particular, absolute sovereignty). The paper explores how Cavendish thinks such (...) a government can be established and maintained. Cavendish's account of female virtue and its connection with honor and fame is also discussed. (shrink)

Clinical research employing the randomized clinical trial has, traditionally, been understood to pose an ethical dilemma. On the one hand, each patient ought to get the treatment that best meets her needs, as judged by the patient in consultation with her doctor. On the other hand, the method most helpful to advancing our understanding about what treatments are indeed best able to meet patient needs is the randomized trial, which necessitates that each patient's care is decided not by physician judgment (...) or patient choice but instead by random assignment. The tension can be described as a conflict between the interests of individual patients who are sick today, and the interests of the group of people who will become sick in the future and would benefit from advances in medical understanding. How one ought to balance these important and often competing interests is an important ethical question that resists easy resolution. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Most American engineers believe that they have a responsibility for the safety and well‐being of society, but whence does this responsibility arise? What does it entail? After describing engineering practice in America as compared with the practice of other professions, this paper examines two standard types of accounts of the social responsibilities of professionals. While neither provides a satisfactory account of the social responsibilities of American engineers, several lessons are learned by uncovering their weaknesses. Identifying the framework in which (...) professional rights and responsibilities are justified, I argue that an end or primary good is the starting place for conceptualizing a profession, and justifying its existence and shape. Too little attention has been paid to the end(s) of engineering. The social responsibilities of American engineers as defined in the present system of engineering are ambiguous and weak. I indicate how the case for assigning American engineers stronger social responsibilities must be made by starting with the end(s) of engineering. I argue that, at present, American engineers do not have social responsibilities as engineers, though they do have social responsibilities as persons. (shrink)

Abstract Inspired by Rawls?s admission that his twentieth?century contract theory builds in the parochial horizon of modern constitutional democracy, this essay critically examines two truisms about seventeenth?century contract theory. The first is the stock view that the English case is irrelevant to the logic of Leviathan and the Second Treatise. To the contrary, I argue that their political conclusions depend on introducing constitutional and legal ?facts?, in particular, facts about the constitution of the English monarchy. Second, I challenge the Whiggish (...) characterization of contract theory as an important step in the development of democratic sovereignty. I draw on Hume?s famous critique of the genre to make the case that seventeenth?century contract theory addressed a peculiarly ancien?regime issue ? namely, resistance to legitimate rulers. In both respects, Hobbes?s and Locke?s social contracts are properly regarded as ancien?regime theories of politics. They are, as Rawls would put it, ?political not metaphysical? theories. (shrink)

This essay focuses on the repeated rhetorical moves through which the third wave autobiographical subject seeks to be real and to speak as part of a collective voice from the next feminist generation. Given that postmodernist, postructuralist, and multiculturalist critiques have shaped the form and the content of third wave expressions of the personal, the study is ultimately concerned with the possibilities and limitations of such theoretical analysis for a third wave of feminist praxis.

Laspro et al. (2024) present an insightful survey of ethical issues emerging in first-in-human whole eye transplants (WET). Their discussion is applicable to a broad range of first-in-human surgica...

In one of his many metaphorical turns of phrase – a leitmotif in The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity — Jürgen Habermas speaks of the path not taken by modern philosophers, a path that might have led them towards his own intersubjective notion of communicative reason. Habermas is especially critical of his predecessors, Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer, because, he believes, they repudiated the rational potential in the culture of modernity. Whenever Adorno and Horkheimer heard the word ‘culture’, they apparently (...) reached for their revolvers. By the 1940s, their confidence in modern culture had allegedly succumbed to bitter disillusionment. Indeed, on Habermas's view, the confidence of these early critical theorists had been shaken so badly by the emergence of Nazism and Stalinism that their scepticism finally embraced reason itself, ‘whose standards ideology critique had found already given in bourgeois ideals’. Consequently, Adorno and Horkheimer were forced to call into question their own immanent critique of modernity: ideology critique itself came ‘under suspicion of not producing truths’. These philosophers supposedly had little choice but to render their now suspect critique ‘independent even in relation to its own foundations’. (shrink)

The role demographic, personality, and situational factors play in the ethical decision making process has received a significant amount of attention (Ford and Richardson, 1994). However, the empirical research on students' decisions to engage in collegiate cheating has not been included in this literature. This paper reviews the last 25 years of empirical research on collegiate cheating. The individual/situational factor typology from Ford and Richardson's review (1994) is used to compare the two literatures. In addition, issues pertaining to the quantification (...) of academic dishonesty, the perception that cheating is increasing, and methodological considerations are addressed in this review. (shrink)

In this paper, we explore the role of emotion in the interpretation and memory of sexual encounters. We consider situations likely to generate negative emotions during sex, and the mechanisms through which the experience of negative emotions can lead to false memories of coercion and mislabeling of an encounter as sexual assault. Specifically, we consider the role of emotion in directing attention during a sexual encounter and the effects of emotion as context for interpretation at the time of the encounter, (...) and for retrieval and interpretation when the encounter is later recalled and reported. Our intent is to provide a greater understanding of the processes of interpretation and memory through which false claims of sexual assault might arise, if and when they do arise. (shrink)

Being empathetic (or compassionate) is an important trait that allows for those working in health care professions to successfully analyze cases and provide patients with adequate care. One standard and enormously important way to try and teach empathy involves the use of case studies. The case-study approach, however, has some unique limitations in teaching empathy. This paper describes an activity where students are asked to imagine that they have contracted a specific disease (one that lasts the entire semester) through a (...) process of random (or lottery) assignment. Having contracted a disease, students are then tasked with taking on the persona of that patient. In writing and adopting the perspective of that patient, students are better able to learn the kind of empathy needed to be a successful health care professional. (shrink)

The product rule has been used to calculate the risk of a research study, in which the risk of harm is calculated as the product of the degree of harm multiplied by the likelihood that the harm will occur. This article challenges the product rule, especially when used to calculate "minimal risk" studies.

‘Supererogation’ is the notion of going beyond the call of duty. The concept of supererogation has received scrutiny in ethical theory, as well as clinical bioethics. Yet, there has been little attention paid to supererogation in research ethics. Supererogation is examined in this paper from three perspectives: (1) a summary of two analyses of ‘supererogation’ in moral theory, as well as an examination as to whether acts of supererogation exist; (2) a discussion of supererogation in clinical practice, including arguments that (...) both physicians and patients can practice acts of supererogation; (3) a discussion as to why researchers, qua researchers, are not routinely recognized to perform acts of supererogation, while at the same time the very nature of research subject participation involves supererogation. The article concludes by considering three examples of supererogation on the part of researchers, with a plea that researchers’ supererogatory actions be recognized as such. (shrink)

What makes "digital pets" pets? This article posits four necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for an individual to be a pet, concluding that digital pets fail to meet these sufficient criteria and thus are not pets.

POTTER'S PAPER RAISES several questions of great interest to the clinician. First, to what degree is it necessary to understand the patient's experience in order to treat a patient's disease? Second, to what degree is it possible to understand a patient's experience? And third, to what degree ought understanding be the goal of psychotherapy?

Heyes's claim that the only unequivocal evidence of motor imitation comes from rats and budgerigars is contested. It is suggested that the rats' behavior can be explained by emulation and the budgerigars' by response facilitation. Behavioral matching in chimpanzees (Custance et al. 1995; Whiten et al. 1996) is reconsidered and interpreted in terms of imitation.

O presente artigo analisa o uso abundante por Hume de ficções que relatam o que significaria para nós a ausência de experiência – ou porque esta ainda não existiria, ou porque, por algum motivo, ela não existira mais. Sugerimos que essas ficções, além de seu objetivo mais imediato de prestar o devido reconhecimento à experiência e ao hábito como únicos fundamentos possíveis de nossas inferências de causa e efeito, revelam a tensão permanente de nossa existência entre duas forças de atração: (...) uma força que nos puxa em direção à regularidade e uniformidade das leis da natureza e da natureza humana, afastando-nos da singularidade, da pura diferença entre percepções atômicas e da indiferença original da imaginação; e uma outra, que apenas entrevemos, mas que se mantém como uma ameaça constante por trás de todas as associações, inferências, crenças e mecanismos de paixões: o reino da pura singularidade, a recaída na indiferença, a ruína da natureza humana. (shrink)

Na Teodicéia, Leibniz apresenta três soluções para o sofisma de Buridan, em particular, e para o problema da liberdade de indiferença, em geral. A primeira refuta a idéia de que, mesmo em uma situação de perfeito equilíbrio e total ausência de uma razão determinante, os homens seriam capazes de agir. As outras duas refutam diretamente a possibilidade de haver no universo tal situação de equilíbrio e simetria perfeitos, de modo que o próprio sofisma perde seu sentido.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 41.2 (2003) 267-268 [Access article in PDF] Myles Burnyeat. A Map of "Metaphysics" Zeta. Pittsburgh, PA: Mathesis Publications, 2001. Pp. x + 176. Paper, $25.00. Burnyeat's map is an ambitious attempt to establish two claims about Zeta: that Aristotle employs an unusual, non-linear form of argument in Zeta, and that the discussion in Zeta is on two levels, one abstract and "logical" and (...) another specific and "metaphysical." In addition to looking at Zeta, chapter by chapter, Burnyeat examines the other works that provide the context for Zeta—the Organon for the logical level of explanation and the rest of the Metaphysics for the metaphysical level. Burnyeat argues that Aristotle's metaphysical project culminates in the theology of'Lambda, for which the metaphysics of Zeta has prepared us. The goal is to "map" or sketch the evidence for these claims rather than provide definitive arguments for them.A brief introductory chapter presents the main themes of the book. This is followed by an even briefer chapter that sets out the four routes (or independent sections of Zeta), viz. Z 3; Z 4-6, 10-11 with Z 7-9, 12; Z 13-6; and Z 17 with H 1. On all four routes, a logical discussion moves to a metaphysical discussion of form and matter.The third chapter on "signposts" is the lengthiest of all and takes the reader through the chapters of Zeta in order. It is also the most map-like of the chapters, as it requires that the reader have a copy of the Metaphysics ready to hand. Burnyeat follows other commentators in treating Zeta 7-9 and Zeta 12 as later insertions; he does, however, argue that the former and probably the latter were added by Aristotle. Chapters 7-9 are integral to the argument of Zeta, as they provide a diachronic view of artifacts and substantial beings (37). [End Page 267] Rejecting the prominence assigned Z 13 by several recent commentators, Burnyeat reads Z 13 in context with chapters 14-6. "The task of Z 13-6 is to show how the idea that substantial being is a universal such as human leads eventually, after suitable refinements and restrictions, to the conclusion that substantial being is form" (54). Wrapping up the discussion of Zeta, Burnyeat concludes that the goal of Zeta's two-level approach has been to show how logical concepts should be used to search for form.This leads directly to a chapter on the Organon. Burnyeat argues that none of the treatises making up the Organon are metaphysical; all employ an abstract (logical) mode of analysis. Even if written at different times, these treatises belong together because they are all methodological. Since form and matter belong to the metaphysical level, in the Analytics Aristotle "follows a deliberate policy of excluding form and matter" (97).In the final chapter, Burnyeat returns to the Metaphysics and considers Zeta in the context of the other books. Three "chunks," viz. books ABGE, ZHQ, and MN are briefly surveyed. The topics of Zeta are then considered in relation to Lambda. Several chapters, viz. D1 and Z1; D3 and Z 7-9, are found to have the same concerns. Burnyeat concludes with a fanciful muqo~ (story) about a dying Aristotle hastily writing a culminating metaphysical treatise.Burnyeat gives us a map—a map to prompt questions; he does not attempt to delve into many of the interpretative puzzles that have exercised other interpreters of Zeta. Thus, this book stands as a helpful counterbalance to a certain kind of scholarship on Zeta. The two interpretative claims, however, that are at the heart of Burnyeat's enterprise stand in need of further justification. One of these, the non-linearity of Zeta, seems to be too weak to support substantive claims. Burnyeat defines non-linearity as holding when "it is not the case that the successive chapters build continuously upon the results of their predecessors" (4). He then cites a few examples of linearity, e.g., Physics II. Yet the vast majority of Aristotelian... (shrink)

Before sailing past the sirens' “flowery meadow,” Ulysses instructed his sailors to lash him to the mast so that he would not succumb to the siren's singing. His advance directive demonstrated that he valued his dispositional or long-term autonomy over his unquestioned right to make decisions. He also indicated to his oarsmen that he understood the nature of temptation and his inability to resist it. Ideas of autonomy and sexual choice are central to this discussion of new AIDS treatments, especially (...) the trials of preventative vaccines. Questions arise over the rights of individuals and the extent that these should be limited by concerns of the gay community. Should the gay community intervene in the risky decisions of individuals if no explicit advance directive exists? If so, how do they justify their paternalism? Could their aims not be better served through strengthening the individual dispositional autonomy of trial participants rather than making specific claims about the common good? (shrink)

This article explores the meanings of nature, and examines how understandings of this term inform the field of psychology. In this period of high, late, or post-modernity, many of the "givens" become contested, and perhaps nothing has become more contested than nature itself. There is a threefold purpose to this paper. This first goal is to unravel two types of nature in psychology, to be distinguished as nature and Nature. The second aim is to discuss how these types of nature/Nature (...) have been distinguished epistemologically, ontologically and methodologically within the field. The final purpose is to suggest points of unity within nature and Nature in psychology. 2012 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

Völker Heins, Between Friend and Foe: The Politics of Critical Theory Content Type Journal Article Category Book Review Pages 266-268 Authors Deborah Cook, University of Windsor, 401 Sunset Avenue, Windsor, Ontario, N9B 3P4, Canada Journal Journal of Critical Realism Online ISSN 1572-5138 Print ISSN 1476-7430 Journal Volume Volume 11 Journal Issue Volume 11, Number 2 / 2012.

This chapter is reprinted from our lead essay in the Encyclopedia of Science, Technology, and Ethics, ed. C. Mitcham, Gale, 2005.

Around the world, there exist many organisations who claim a Christian motivation and whose work falls within the scope of the development sector. These organisations are distinctly different from local congregations, and whilst development as a field of theological study is becoming increasingly well-defined and established, there has been limited theological research and reflection on these organisations. Much about them remains unstudied and unclear, raising questions about their purpose, legitimacy and theological contribution. This in turn hampers a responsive and responsible (...) engagement with them within the academy. Contributing to this oversight is the absence of an appropriate, commonly shared name and definition around which research and discourse can occur. This article reviews names and definitions currently being used and then proposes the name ‘Christian developmental organisation’. It provides a rich definition, considering the CDO’s organisational, societal, purpose, activity and faith dimensions. In addition, the history dimension brings an understanding of the origins and formation of the CDO whilst the relationship dimension positions the CDO within a web of relational dynamics. It is hoped that the name and definition offered in this article will promote research and engagement with the CDO as well as aid their self-understanding. (shrink)

Sumit Sarkar, one of the leading Indian historians of his generation, participated in the Indian-British Subaltern Studies Collective that established new standards in the historiography of colonialism in the 1980’s. In this Interview, Déborah Cohen and Urs Lindner ask him about the achievements and oversights of the Subaltern Studies project, the prospects of global history, Marx’s eurocentrism and the problem of religion.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:REFLECTIONS ON GADAMER'S NOTION OF SPRACHLICHKEIT by Deborah Cook The works of Hans-Georg Gadamer recall the works of Martin Heidegger as those of Plato memorialize Socrates. The history of philosophy is constituted in such iterations. Indeed, die relationship between Gadamer and Heidegger offers us a paradigm for the understanding of die history of philosophy, manifesting as it does how this history is less marked by change than by (...) a ceaseless repetition of the same. Nevertheless, whUe Gadamer reappropriates the Heidegger of Being and Time, he does so with a different aim in mind; an aim very similar to that of Wilhelm Dilthey: to give to die human sciences (Geisteswissenschaften) a solid epistemological foundation for their judgments of cultural artifacts. This foundation would also unsetde the truth value of scientificjudgments about natural objects by reinterpreting them. Heidegger's goal, on die odier hand, was to understand why diere is somediing radier dian nodiing. This led him to propose a fundamental ontology in Being and Time which he later based on die word (verbum). From the beginning, Gadamer could see in the word die power and importance Heidegger had neglected in Being and Time. Thus, on die basis of a philosophy or phenomenology of language, Gadamer pursues his end with the aid of Heidegger's original and ontologically significant formulation of die hermeneutic circle. For Gadamer, the hermeneutic circle of understanding (Verstehen), interpretation (Auslegung), and application (Anwendung) is a movement inscribed primarily in language. Using the literary text as the prototype for any object understood in the circle, he accounts for our appropriation of 84 Deborah Cook85 objects by attributing it to the power diat dwells in language. Gadamer terms this characteristic ofunderstanding its Sprachlichkeit or linguisticality. In our dealings with die world, we understand everytiring in it linguistically. As Heidegger suggested in his Letter on Humanism, language is the house of Being. It is language and language alone which accounts for die fact that we understand die world. Gadamer takes up this view diat language is die house of Being and claims diat understanding, interpretation, and application must be interpreted as linguistic phenomena because diey embody a unified whole — die understanding must not be divorced from interpretation — and because our traffic with objects takes a form analogous to mat of dialogue. It is my aim in mis discussion to consider this Sprachlichkeit as described in Truth and Method first in relation to the Heidegger ofBeing and Time and the later Heidegger and then with respect to our understanding of texts in reading. The Heidegger of Being and Time portrays the much celebrated hermeneutic circle in an original and ontologically significant way. The circle is, for Heidegger, an existentiale characterizing Dasein's very mode of being in the world and its meaning structures. It is no longer primarily a mediod. What is originally meaningful is not language but die structures of significance (the Zeichen ofequipment and the Bedeutsamkeit ofdie world) which are prior to language and from which language is derived. The circle is first and foremost a prelinguistic understanding of tiiose structures of significance toward which Dasein always transcends itself in its projects. The world and equipment are meaningful because Dasein invests diem with meaning. It is thus Dasein diat is responsible for die meaning of the world and equipment. Nonedieless, this meaning is not, for all that, arbitrary ; what underlies it, or makes it possible, is Being. Being (Sein) is die ontological foundation of pre-linguistic significance. It is that upon which meaning is grounded. While objects, dien, do not have meaning, meaning is bestowed on them by the Dasein diat seeks to render diem intelligible to itselfon die basis ofits immediate and pre-ontological understanding of Being. The hermeneutic circle characterizes die way in which diis prelinguistic and pre-ontological relationship to the world and to objects is deployed. In Heidegger's words, "To every understanding of die world, existence is understood with it and vice versa. All interpretation, moreover, operates in the forestructure which we have already characterized. Any interpretation which is to contribute to understanding must already have understood what is to be interpreted." Heidegger then goes on to claim that even the "... derivative ways... (shrink)