It can often seem as though existence is split in two: body and mind, flesh and spirit, moving and thinking. In the office or at study we are 'mind workers,' with seemingly superfluous bodies. Conversely, in the gym we stretch, run and lift, but our minds are idle. In How to Think About Exercise, author and philosopher Damon Young challenges this idea of separation, revealing how fitness can develop our bodies and minds as one. Exploring exercises and sports with (...) the help of ancient and modern philosophy, he uncovers the pleasures, virtues and big ideas of fitness. By learning how to exercise intelligently, we are contributing to our overall enjoyment of life and enhancing our full humanity. Find out how bestselling author Haruki Murakami quit smoking and took up running, and why the simple act radically changed his whole outlook on life; why Schopenhauer thought that swimming was a sublime act; how Charles Darwin came up with some of his best ideas while exercising; and much more. (shrink)

Retributivism is often explicitly or implicitly assumed to be compatible with the harm principle, since the harm principle (in some guises) concerns the content of the criminal law, while retributivism concerns the punishment of those that break the law. In this essay I show that retributivism should not be endorsed alongside any version of the harm principle. In fact, retributivists should reject all attempts to see the criminal law only through (other) person-affecting concepts or “grievance” morality, since they should endorse (...) the criminalization of conduct that is either purely self-harming or good for somebody and bad for nobody (i.e., Pareto improvements). (shrink)

Children are expensive to raise. Ensuring that they are raised in such a way that they are able to lead a minimally decent life costs time and money, and lots of both. Who is responsible for bearing the costs of the things that children are undoubtedly owed? This is a question that has received comparatively little scrutiny from political philosophers,despite children being such a drain on public and private finances alike. To the extent that there is a debate, two main (...) views can be identified. The Parents Pay view says that parents, responsible for the existence of the costs, must foot the bill. The Society Pays view says that a next generation is a benefit to all, and so to allow parents to foot the bill alone is the worst kind of free-riding. In this article, I introduce a third potentially liable party currently missing from the debate: children themselves. On my backward-looking view, we are entitled to ask people to contribute to the raising of children on the basis that they have benefited from being raised themselves. (shrink)

I examine communitarian social theory with an eye to suggesting that the form it most often takes contains resources insufficient to satisfy the aims of those who propose it. This is shown to be the case through an analysis of the writings of Johann Gottfried Herder , the first philosophically rigorous communitarian in the West. Herder's communitarianism, like that of so many of our contemporaries, combines a description of what he believes to be man's ineradicably communal nature with a normative (...) longing for an experience of community we have supposedly lost. But unlike today's communitarians, who usually propose ways for modern man to reattain primordial happiness in communal particularism, Herder became convinced that he could only satisfy his normative longing for community by supplementing his descriptive communitarianism with a radically universalistic theology that took the form of a providential philosophy of history. I conclude that Herder's attempt to fashion a new, humanistic religion as a means to making it possible for him to "live" his communitarianism has much to teach contemporary communitarians as well as their critics. (shrink)

Well-Structured Mathematical Logic does for logic what Structured Programming did for computation: make large-scale work possible. From the work of George Boole onward, traditional logic was made to look like a form of symbolic algebra. In this work, the logic undergirding conventional mathematics resembles well-structured computer programs. A very important feature of the new system is that it structures the expression of mathematics in much the same way that people already do informally. In this way, the new system is simultaneously (...) machine-parsable and user-friendly, just as Structured Programming is for algorithms. Unlike traditional logic, the new system works with you, not against you, as you use it to structure--and understand--the mathematics you work with on a daily basis. The book provides a complete guide to its subject matter. It presents the major results and theorems one needs to know in order to use the new system effectively. Two chapters provide tutorials for the reader in the new way that symbols move when logical calculations are performed in the well-structured system. Numerous examples and discussions are provided to illustrate the system's many results and features. Well-Structured Mathematical Logic is accessible to anyone who has at least some knowledge of traditional logic to serve as a foundation, and is of interest to all who need a system of pliant, user-friendly mathematical logic to use in their work in mathematics and computer science. (shrink)

The subject matter of this essay is a certain understanding of the value of equality which I will call ‘relational egalitarianism’ – a view which locates the value of equality not in distributions but in social and political relationships. This is a suitable topic for a contribution to a volume based on themes from the work of G.A. Cohen for two, somewhat contradictory, reasons.

Is childhood valuable? And is childhood as, less, or more, valuable than adulthood? In this article I first delineate several different questions that we might be asking when we think about the ‘value of childhood’, and I explore some difficulties of doing so. I then focus on the question of whether childhood is good for the person who experiences it. I argue for two key claims. First, if childhood wellbeing is measured by the same standards as adulthood, then children are (...) worse off than adults. Second, if childhood and adulthood wellbeing are measured by different standards, then we cannot compare them, and children are neither better off nor worse off than adults. This has some counter-intuitive implications, such as that we do not harm persons by depriving them of a childhood, nor by keeping them as children for elongated periods. (shrink)

The Power of Ideals examines the lives and work of six 20th century moral leaders who pursued moral causes ranging from world peace to social justice and human rights, and uses these six cases to show how people can make choices guided by their moral ideals rather than by base emotion or social pressures.

Philosophers writing about proportionality in self-defense and war will often assume that defensive agents have full knowledge about the threat that they face and the defensive options available to them. But no actual defensive agents possess this kind of knowledge. How, then, should we make proportionality decisions under uncertainty? The natural answer is that we should move from comparing the harm we will do with the good we will achieve to comparing expected harm with expected good. I argue that this (...) simple calculation is flawed, and I begin to develop a more sophisticated account of “subjective proportionality.”. (shrink)

This classic work by one of the most important philosophers and critics of our time charts the genesis and trajectory of the desiring subject from Hegel's formulation in _Phenomenology of Spirit_ to its appropriation by Kojève, Hyppolite, Sartre, Lacan, Deleuze, and Foucault. Judith Butler plots the French reception of Hegel and the successive challenges waged against his metaphysics and view of the subject, all while revealing ambiguities within his position. The result is a sophisticated reconsideration of the post-Hegelian tradition that (...) has predominated in modern French thought, and her study remains a provocative and timely intervention in contemporary debates over the unconscious, the powers of subjection, and the subject. (shrink)

Business ethics educators strive to produce graduates who not only grasp the principles of ethical decision-making, but who can apply that business ethics education when faced with real-world challenges. However, this has proven especially difficult, as good intentions do not always translate into ethical awareness and action. Complementing a behavioral ethics approach with insights from social psychology, we developed an interventional class module with both online and in-class elements aimed at increasing students’ awareness of their own susceptibility to unconscious biases (...) and, consequently, unethical behaviors. We deployed this intervention within a problem-based learning course, in which students completed real-world projects for actual business clients. Our results suggest that although students appeared universally aware of the importance of ethical issues in business and generally espoused intentions to act ethically, those who received the intervention were significantly more likely to recognize their own susceptibility to perpetuating unethical business behavior and to identify ethical issues specific to their real-world projects. These results have important implications for behavioral ethics pedagogy and provide a de-biasing interventional approach for bridging classroom knowledge with real-world skills. (shrink)

Most of us struggle with distraction every day: the familiar feeling that our attention is not quite where it should be. We feel it at work and at home and it can be frustrating and uncomfortable. But what is distraction? In his lucid, timely book, Damon Young shows that distraction is more than too many stimuli, or too little attention. It is actually a matter of value - to be distracted is to be torn away from what is worthwhile (...) in life. And for Young, what is most worthwhile is freedom: not simply rights or legal liberties, but the capacity to patiently, creatively craft one's own life. Exploring the lives of such luminaries as Henri Matisse, Karl Marx, Seneca and Henry James, Young exposes distraction in work, technology, art, politics and intimacy. With warmth and wit, he reveals what is most valuable, and what is best avoided, in the pursuit of a life of one's own. (shrink)

A common anti-egalitarian argument is that equality is motivated by envy, or the desire to placate envy. In order to avoid this charge, John Rawls explicitly banishes envy from his original position. This article argues that this is an inconsistent and untenable position for Rawls, as he treats envy as if it were a fact of human psychology and believes that principles of justice should be based on such facts. Therefore envy should be known about in the original position. The (...) consequences for Rawlsian theory—both substantive and methodological—are discussed. (shrink)

Constrained instrumentalist theories of punishment – those that seek to justify punishment by its good effects, but limit its scope – are an attractive alternative to pure retributivism or utilitarianism. One way in which we may be able to limit the scope of instrumental punishment is by justifying punishment through the concept of duty. This strategy is most clearly pursued in Victor Tadros’ influential ‘Duty View’ of punishment. In this paper, I show that the Duty View as it stands cannot (...) find any moral distinction between the permissible punishment of the guilty and the permissible punishment of the innocent in extreme circumstances, therefore undermining one the key pillars of its intuitive appeal. I canvass several ways to respond to this problem, arguing that a rights forfeiture theory which employs the distinction between rights forfeiture and rights infringement is the best solution. (shrink)

Many philosophers believe that intentions are relevant to the justification of harm—they believe that intentional harms, or harms that result from intentionally affecting or using another person, are harder to justify than harms that are merely foreseen. How does this idea work in cases in which we are uncertain about what will happen—for example, about who will be harmed, in what way they will be harmed, or how much they will be harmed? All potential harms count against an action in (...) evidence-relative justification, but which potential harms should count as intended, and which as merely foreseen? Must all potential harms be one or the other? In investigating these questions, I try to show two things. First, it is plausible that not one intention, but rather several distinct intentions, matter to the justification of harm. This only becomes clear under uncertainty. Second, several of the things that matter are best understood as scalar, and so no account of the moral relevance of intentions can escape appealing to some version of the controversial notion of ‘closeness.’ Even if closeness can be avoided under conditions of certainty, it reappears once we consider more realistic uncertainty cases. (shrink)

Perhaps the best-known theory of fairness is John Broome’s: that fairness is the proportional satisfaction of claims. In this article, I question whether claims are the appropriate focus for a theory of fairness, at least as Broome understands them in his current theory. If fairness is the proportionate satisfaction of claims, I argue, then the following would be true: fairness could not help determine the correct distribution of claims; fairness could not be used to evaluate the distribution of claims; fairness (...) could not guide us in distributing claims (or unowed goods); we could not have a claim to be treated fairly; and we would not be wronged when treated unfairly. These entailments mean that it is questionable that fairness is concerned with claims in the way Broome suggests. At the very least, the relationship between fairness and claims appears to be more complex than the picture painted by Broome. (shrink)

There are many places that we must save from destruction. Sadly, they are mostly distant from us. If we accept Heidegger's notion of Being-in-the-World, this distance means that we cannot authentically speak of their Being. Even if we 'dwell' in our own lands, we are not 'at home' in these beautiful places. However, if we cannot speak of their Being, of what 'is', how can we ask logging and mining multinationals to stop destroying them? This speechlessness may be overcome with (...) a Whiteheadian process metaphysics, and 'late' Heideggerian poetics. These may then be developed in a concrete community life. (shrink)

Courtesy seems to be an essential part of budō , the Japanese martial ways. Yet there is no prima facie relationship between fighting and courtesy. Indeed, we might think that violence and aggression are antithetical to etiquette and care. By situating budō within the three great Japanese traditions of Shintō, Confucianism, and Zen Buddhism, this article reveals the intimate relationship between courtesy and the martial arts. It suggests that courtesy cultivates, and is cultivated by, purity of work and deed, mutually (...) beneficial cooperation, and loving brutality. These individual and social virtues are not only complementary but also essential to budō. (shrink)

Modern philosophical biology has been dominated by the idea of mechanism. Even the attempts to escape from mechanism, such as the theories of vitalism and holism, covertly assume the mechanistic hypothesis while surrounding it with an aura of mysticism. The mechanistic approach is the result of applying the methods of physics to the realm of biology. The immense prestige of physics has tended to disguise the fact that biology is a science in its own right, with autonomous principles. The purpose (...) of the article is to develop the philosophy of organism, first systematically elaborated by Whitehead, and to seek to demonstrate that organic being is unintelligible without the concept of purposiveness and hence of value. This necessarily leads to the return of metaphysics in the form of metabiology.RésuméLa biologie philosophique moderne est dominée par l'idée de mécanisme. Il n'est pas jusqu'aux tentatives d'échapper au mécanisme, telle par exemple la théorie du vitalisme et celle du holisme, qui n'assument implicitement l'hypothése mécaniste tout en l'entourant d'une aura de mysticisme. La conception mécaniste résulte de l'applicatio n des méthodes de la physique au domaine de la biologie. L'immense prestige de la physique a tendu à déguiser le fait pourtant reel que la biologie est une science qui jouit de sa propre souveraineté et de principes autonomes. Le but de cet article est d'exposer une philosophie de l'organisme élaborée systématiquement par Whitehead pour la premiére fois et de chercher ensuite à démontrer que tout être organique est inintelligible en dehors du concept de finalité et, par conséquent, de valeur. Ceci conduit nécessairement à un renouveau de la métaphysique sous forme de métabiologie. (shrink)

The individualist nature of much contemporary just war theory means that we often discuss cases with single attackers. But even if war is best understood in this individualist way, in war combatants often have to make decisions about how to distribute harms among a plurality of aggressors: they must decide whom and how many to harm, and how much to harm them. In this paper, I look at simultaneous multiple aggressor cases in which more than one distribution of harm among (...) aggressors is available. I show how such cases pose deep questions concerning the nature, role, and scope of the necessity principle, and its relationship to both liability and narrow proportionality. I argue that a hitherto unrecognised measure – ‘narrow proportionality shortfall’ – and its distribution is relevant in choosing how to distribute harms across aggressors. I then extend this analysis to show how this may help us with a puzzle concerning sequential attacks. (shrink)

Rawls’s difference principle and the position dubbed ‘luck egalitarianism’ are often viewed as competing theories of distributive justice. However, recent work has emphasised that Rawlsians and luck egalitarians are working with different understandings of the concept of justice, and thus not only propose different theories, but different theories of different things. Once they are no longer seen in direct competition, there are some questions to be asked about whether these two theories can be consistently endorsed alongside one another. In this (...) essay, I (begin to) investigate whether Rawls’s theory (or elements of it) and (some form of) luck egalitarianism can be consistently endorsed. -/- I begin by outlining the main aspects of Rawls’s theory and luck egalitarianism, showing them to be different kinds of theory and therefore not in direct competition. I then propose an understanding of how these ideas came to be seen to be in direct competition. Finally, I outline five different ways in which one might consistently be (some kind of) a luck egalitarian and (some kind of) a Rawlsian, and try to say something about what is to be said for and against each of these ways of combining the theories. (shrink)

The family of theories dubbed ‘luck egalitarianism’ represent an attempt to infuse egalitarian thinking with a concern for personal responsibility, arguing that inequalities are just when they result from, or the extent to which they result from, choice, but are unjust when they result from, or the extent to which they result from, luck. In this essay I argue that luck egalitarians should sometimes seek to limit inequalities, even when they have a fully choice-based pedigree (i.e., result only from the (...) choices of agents). I grant that the broad approach is correct but argue that the temporal standpoint from which we judge whether the person can be held responsible, or the extent to which they can be held responsible, should be radically altered. Instead of asking, as Standard (or Static) Luck Egalitarianism seems to, whether or not, or to what extent, a person was responsible for the choice at the time of choosing, and asking the question of responsibility only once, we should ask whether, or to what extent, they are responsible for the choice at the point at which we are seeking to discover whether, or to what extent, the inequality is just, and so the question of responsibility is not settled but constantly under review. Such an approach will differ from Standard Luck Egalitarianism only if responsibility for a choice is not set in stone—if responsibility can weaken then we should not see the boundary between luck and responsibility within a particular action as static. Drawing on Derek Parfit’s illuminating discussions of personal identity, and contemporary literature on moral responsibility, I suggest there are good reasons to think that responsibility can weaken—that we are not necessarily fully responsible for a choice for ever, even if we were fully responsible at the time of choosing. I call the variant of luck egalitarianism that recognises this shift in temporal standpoint and that responsibility can weaken Dynamic Luck Egalitarianism (DLE). In conclusion I offer a preliminary discussion of what kind of policies DLE would support. (shrink)

Un des enjeux actuels du traitement sémantique des corpus textuels concerne la nécessaire tentative de contrôle et d’objectivation de l’intertexte. Les corpus réflexifs, que nous définissons dans cet article, poursuivent cette exigence d’objectivation et de mise en forme des ressources sémantiques et interprétatives, en se proposant d’être, dans la mesure du possible, des tout-textuels sémantiquement auto-suffisants – c’est-à-dire des univers interprétatifs clos, définis parmi d’autres – pour une exploitation certes pas exhaustive, mais raisonnable et raisonnée du texte.

Construal-level theory emphasizes that representing events at greater spatial, temporal, social, or hypothetical distance results in processing information at high construal levels (more conceptual, abstract). We posit that psychological distance and construal level are somewhat separable constructs, and can have different effects on emotion, and therefore, emotion regulation. We argue that psychological distance influences emotional appraisal, such that increasing distance results in lower emotion intensity, which can be leveraged to down-regulate emotions. However, we consider construal level a mindset, which can (...) occur with either high or low psychological distance. Furthermore, we argue that compared with psychological distance, construal level has a more nuanced relationship with emotion, and changing construal level for the purpose of changing emotion also requires considering the construal level of one's emotion-regulation goals. (shrink)

In this article I argue that revisionists in just war theory must further revise their proportionality principles. I show that on the revisionist view it is possible for a war to be proportionate,...

In his book Democratic Authority, David Estlund puts forward a case for democracy, which he labels epistemic proceduralism, that relies on democracy's ability to produce good – that is, substantively just – results. Alongside this case for democracy Estlund attacks what he labels ‘utopophobia’, an aversion to idealistic political theory. In this article I make two points. The first is a general point about what the correct level of ‘idealisation’ is in political theory. Various debates are emerging on this question (...) and, to the extent that they are focused on ‘political theory’ as a whole, I argue, they are flawed. This is because there are different kinds of political concept, and they require different kinds of ideal. My second point is about democracy in particular. If we understand democracy as Estlund does, then we should see it as a problem-solving concept – the problem being that we need coercive institutions and rules, but we do not know what justice requires. As democracy is a response to a problem, we should not allow our theories of it, even at the ideal level, to be too idealised – they must be embedded in the nature of the problem they are to solve, and the beings that have it. (shrink)

As seen in his enthusiastic praise of John Dos Passos's 1919 , Sartre evaluated literary works by how effectively they aim to play a role in fundamental social change. This essay has two goals. One is to show that Sartre's endorsement of committed literature is not undercut if literature fails to play a role in fundamental social change and the other is to show at least some of the ways in which committed literature is successful. Both goals are pursued through (...) a consideration of the literary works of Kurt Vonnegut and Don DeLillo. The former was mentioned briefly but favorably by Sartre in 1971 and the latter, while lacking such direct ties to Sartre, was accused of “sandbox existentialism.” I read both writers as arguments in favor of Sartre's instrumentalist take on literature. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:IntroductionCynthia Damo and Sarolta TakácsThe present special issue of the American Journal of Philology is devoted to the Senatus Consultum de Cn. Pisone Patre ( SCPP). 1 It grew up around the APA/AIA Joint Seminar on that subject which was part of the program at the annual meeting in Chicago in 1997. In addition to the three papers presented at that seminar and the formal response to them, this (...) collection contains a critical text of the document, an English translation, photographic plates of the most complete version of the text (Copy A), a bibliography of editions, reviews, and discussions of the document, a new review of the inscription’s initial publication, an essay on a closely related text, and an essay on a literary account of the events that generated the document.The SCPP is a substantial document, running to 176 lines in Copy A, a bronze tablet of approximately 118 3 45 cm. Six or seven copies have been found in Spain alone. The inscription reports the Senate’s decisions in the trial of Cn. Calpurnius Piso and his associates in Rome in the year a.d. 20. A lengthy text on a crucial event from a central period of the Principate will naturally offer information for and reveal problems in our understanding of many areas of Roman history. The SCPP thus joins the Tabula Siarensis to give us a glimpse, unseen before the 1980s, of the Senate’s corporate self-presentation in this period: the Senate addresses in turn the immortal gods, the emperor, members of the imperial family in descending importance, the equestrian ordo, the populace, and the soldiers, positioning itself carefully (and differently) vis-à- vis each. The Senate ensures that the decree will be seen throughout the empire by ordering publication in the most frequented spot of the most populous city of each province and in the winter quarters of every legion (lines 165–72). Furthermore, because the decree responds to events to which Tacitus devoted an important section of his first three Tiberian books, it provides an external (though far from unproblematic) check on Tacitus’ account of the trial and the events that led up to it. [End Page 1]Copies A and B were found in the modern province of Sevilla. Copy A’s provenance seems to point to the ancient Irni. Copy B’s place of origin was initially believed to be ancient Olaurum, but a location in the vicinity of El Tejar has now surfaced as another possibility. Like the remaining fragments (Copies C, D, E, and F, containing only a few letters each), all pieces of A and B came to light during illegal “excavations.” This circumstance will most likely render more precise localization impossible, but all the available information about the various copies points at present to the Roman province of Baetica as their original source. All the pieces are now housed together in the Archaeological Museum of Seville.Copy A begins with the heading “Decree of the Senate Concerning the Elder Cn. Piso, put up for view when N. Vibius Serenus was proconsul” ( senatus consultum de Cn. Pisone patre propositum N. Vibio Sereno procos.). This is inscribed across the top of the tablet’s four columns in letters much larger than those used for the text of the decree (see Plates I–VIII). This heading is not found in Copy B, where the first three lines of the text itself are simply written in letters larger than those of the remaining lines, with the first line displaying letters somewhat larger than the second and third. Copy A’s heading offers us a glimpse at the procedure involved in displaying a decree composed in Rome for an empire-wide audience; it was the governor of the province who initiated the process of public display at the provincial level. Yet the fact that Copy B lacks this heading suggests that the process that resulted in the creation of these two (and presumably other) copies was not entirely uniform.Further discrepancies between the two copies include their physical layout—Copy A consists of four columns with 176 lines of text, Copy B of two columns with 127 lines—and... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Art of Forgetting: Disgrace and Oblivion in Roman Political CultureCynthia DamonHarriet I. Flower. The Art of Forgetting: Disgrace and Oblivion in Roman Political Culture. Studies in the History of Greece and Rome. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006. xxiv + 400 pp. 75 black-and-white ills. 1 map. Cloth. $59.95.Despite its title, this book is not really about forgetting. Forgetting, as Tacitus knew to his cost, (...) cannot be done to order, whether the order be one's own or another's. Erasure, rather. Indeed erasures of a wide variety, from official memory sanctions mandating the removal of names from inscriptions and imagines from funerals, to spontaneous erasures on or of monuments associated with the disgraced, to literary attacks targeting posthumous reputations. The emphasis is on the first category; the book is structured around a chronological survey of official memory sanctions and the physical traces thereof from the early Republic [End Page 599] up to the first year of the principate of Antoninus Pius, but the other types are well integrated into the discussion. The Art of Forgetting is a fascinating study of the battle between the living and the dead or disgraced for prime turf in the memory space of the Roman elite.As with so much of Roman history as we can know it, the "memory wars" and "memory games" treated in this book are an elite phenomenon. The erasures discussed (and, happily, often pictured) here are most accessible to us when they are accomplished in the same enduring media to which the Roman elite entrusted its public record and reputation. The title of Flower's first chapter, "Clementis' Hat," alluding to the chance survival of a photographic testimonial for Czech politician Vladimir Clementis, captures Flower's early assertion that we can only know the incompletely successful erasures (12), but this seems to me to collapse an essential distinction, preserved elsewhere in the book, including its subtitle, between memory and reputation. The senate-mandated erasure of the man accused of Germanicus' murder is accomplished both by chiseling his name out of the dedication of a statue of Germanicus and by chiseling it into the empire-wide inscriptions on which the senate's verdict in his trial was recorded. The former deprives him of prime memory space; the latter assigns him space on the wrong side of the tracks, so to speak. Both oblivion and disgrace are weapons in the memory wars, and their relative salience varies.The chronological survey of the Roman evidence is preceded by a contextualizing chapter on memory sanctions in the Greek world, particularly in the Hellenistic world, in which Rome's elite saw first hand the battles over what went into the monumental record that followed (or even preceded) battles for territory. Early-attested sanctions such as the razing of a disgraced person's house seem to combine practical and symbolic ends: displacement of the individual and his immediate family and erasure of an avatar. The record of sanctions in democratic Athens, which adds to house-razing the expulsion of remains and the erection of stelai publicizing the names and crimes of offenders against the demos, already shows the complementary effects of oblivion and disgrace later exploited at Rome. A helpful distinction is drawn between amnesties such as that of 403 B.C.E. Athens, in which "a new start was made by promising not to use the past as a political weapon" (23), and the kind of memory politics manifested in sanctions. The discussion of the Hellenistic world establishes the connection, later relevant to the treatment of Rome's imperial women, between extravagant honors and harsh penalties in the symbolic realm: in the rhetoric of relations between cities and kings, for example, a ruler in favor is honored as a god, while a ruler out of favor may find his cult appropriated, his record erased, and his memory cursed.Rome had its own long-standing traditions of memory sanctions. Or at least by the Augustan age it felt it had. Chapter 3 tries to get back beyond the triumviral phase of Roman memory sanctions, citing fifth- and fourth-century house-razings for "citizen traitors" (45... (shrink)

The paper examines the emphasis on knowing the inner life of Jesus by a prominent 19th century Liberal Protestant, and Albert Schweitzer's decisive blow to the Life of Jesus movement at the beginning of the 20th century. It gives critiques to both the former and the latter, and identifies the approach of the Liberal Protestants as ‘subjective’ in two senses. While the subjectivity of an interpreter can pose problems in the interpretation of Jesus, it is maintained that the possibility of (...) knowing some aspects of the subjectivity of Jesus cannot be ruled out a priori. A method of correlation is suggested to give a more objective and connected interpretation of Jesus' outer words/actions and his mind. (shrink)

Hoc tempore velut per universum orbem Romanum, bellicum canentibus bucinis, excitae gentes saevissimae, limites sibi proximos persultabant. Gallias Raetiasque simul Alamanni poputabantur; Sarmatae Pannonias et Quadi; Picti Saxonesque et Scotci, et Attacotti Brittanos aerumnis vexavere continuis; Austoriani Mauricaeque aliae gentes, Africam solito acrius incursabant; Thracias et diripiebant praedatorii globi Gothorum. Persarum rex manus Armeniis iniectabat, eos in suam dicionem ex integro vocare vi nimia properans, sed iniuste, causando, quod post Ioviani excessum, cum quo foedera firmarat et pacem, nihil obstare debebit, (...) quo minus ea recuperaret, quae antea ad maiores suos pertinuisse monstrabat. (shrink)

Atheists are rarely associated with holiness, yet they can have deeply spiritual experiences. Once such experience of the author exemplified ‘the holy’ as defined by Otto. However, the subjectivism of Otto’s Kantianism undermines Otto’s otherwise fruitful approach. While the work of Hegel overcomes this, it is too rationalistic to account for mortal life. Seeking to avoid these shortcomings, this paper places ‘holiness’ within a self-differentiating ontological unity, the Heideggerian ‘fourfold’. This unity can only be experienced by confronting groundless finite mortality, (...) and the resulting existential disposition is characterized as ‘reverence’. Reverence is gratitude for mortal existence, and existence itself. Moreover, it is as much political as it is ontological, atheistic as it is theistic. (shrink)

Often institutions or individuals are faced with decisions where not all claims can be satisfied. Sometimes, these claims will be of differing strength. In such cases, it must be decided whether or not weaker claims can be aggregated in order to collectively defeat stronger claims. Many are attracted to a view, which this chapter calls Limited Aggregation, where this is sometimes acceptable and sometimes not. A new version of this view, Local Relevance, has recently emerged. This chapter seeks to explore (...) and evaluate this view. In order to do so, the chapter offers a more precise interpretation of this basic approach, calling it ‘Sequential Claims-Matching’. The chapter shows how Sequential Claims-Matching avoids problems that dog other Limited Aggregation views but suffers from difficulties and ambiguities of its own. In particular, the chapter shows that it is hard to accommodate some core Limited Aggregation intuitions around tie-break cases within the Local Relevance view. (shrink)

In this paper, I consider a view that explains colour experience by the independent representation of surface and illumination. This view implies that surface colour is a phenomenal perceptual content. I argue from facts of colour phenomenology to the conclusion that surface colour is not a phenomenal perceptual content. I then argue from results of surface-matching experiments to the conclusion that surface colour is neither a perceptual content of any kind nor any sort of computational output of the perceptual system. (...) These conclusions contradict widely accepted views in both the philosophy of perception and colour science. I finish by considering and rejecting a competing account of the surface-matching results, according to which surface colour is represented indeterminately in perception. (shrink)

At criminal trial, we demand that those accused of criminal wrongdoing be presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond any reasonable doubt. What are the moral and/or political grounds of this demand? One popular and natural answer to this question focuses on the moral badness or wrongness of convicting and punishing innocent persons, which I call the direct moral grounding. In this essay, I suggest that this direct moral grounding, if accepted, may well have important ramifications for other areas of the (...) criminal justice process, and in particular those parts in which we (through our legislatures and judges) decide how much punishment to distribute to guilty persons. If, as the direct moral grounding suggests, we should prefer under-punishment to over-punishment under conditions of uncertainty, due to the moral seriousness of errors which inappropriately punish persons, then we should also prefer erring on the side of under-punishment when considering how much to punish those who may justly be punished. Some objections to this line of thinking are considered. (shrink)

It is at this juncture that post-modernism in the science field lacks that remaining piece of discipline, accepting the existence of an absolute, inner fabric of creative intelligence that is responsible for the vibratory formation of all physical world phenomena. It is for this reason that science alone will not find a viable answer of how the universe was created. Thus far, the science hierarchy has supplied us with theories that are totally incompatible with the belief that the universe had (...) an origin connected to a creative force. Their contradictions come as a result of their atheistic/agnostic beliefs. It is the time in our evolution to make a changing of the guard. We need a new paradigm, a practical application that people can make sense of and find valuable in their daily lives. (shrink)

This article attempts a full appreciation of interdependence in Sartre's thinking about practical freedom. The result is an account that opens Sartre's thinking on practical freedom to more than just the empowerment of individuals and groups. Ultimately, this means privileging, perhaps paradoxically, a vision of practical freedom that is greater by being more limited. The trajectory for this attempt is Sartre's 1971 diagnosis of America as “full of myths,” which provokes a critical examination of a vision of freedom in independence. (...) The attempt is then fleshed out through encounters with notions that linger at the fringes of Sartre's thought, namely, happiness, progress, equality and the possibility of everything. (shrink)