There is strong reason to doubt that the intuitions Chalmers' meta-problem focuses on are widespread or independent of proto-theoretical prompting. So it's unlikely that they result from factors connected to the nature of consciousness. In any case, it's only the accuracy of the problem intuitions that matters for evaluating theories of consciousness or revealing the nature of consciousness, not an explanation of how they arise. Unless we determine that they're accurate about consciousness, we mustn't assume that realism about consciousness incorporates (...) them, or that denying them means denying that consciousness exists. And we must assess whether they're accurate independently of how they arise. (shrink)

Die indische Philosophin und Aktivistin Radha d’Souza begegnet dem Begriff Weltzivilgesellschaft mit größter Vorsicht und Skepsis. Selbst jahrelang in existenzielle Auseinandersetzungen um Grundrechte auf natürliche Ressourcen wie Wasser und Ackerland und höchstgerichtliche Entscheidungen verwickelt, sieht d’Souza im Begriff der Weltzivilgesellschaft in der Hauptsache den Versuch, einer neuerlichen Bemäntelung imperialistischer, westlicher Interessen, die sich nun nicht nur durch Entscheidungen von Regierungen legitimieren, sondern gar durch den Willen ihrer zivilen Bevölkerung.

My making choices and acting on those choices in a way that might count as my being free would seem to require that those choices are truly my choices. Furthermore, for my choices to be truly mine, it would seem that these choices must reflect my true self. So it seems that choosing and acting freely depends in a robust sense on such choosing and acting being authentic. Yet the concept of authenticity seems problematic. What or where is that true (...) self which would be the basis for authentic choosing, acting and living? Perhaps there is no such true self. This problem is central to the philosophies of both Sartre and Foucault. For the philosophers freedom authenticity or self-hood were central. The paper aims to show that, in spite of Foucault’s criticism, Sartre does not fall back on the idea of a true or deep self that is given to us. Sartre can appeal to the idea of authenticity without holding on such a dubious construct as a given, true self. Therefore the exploration of bad faith, good faith and authenticity in Sartre’s Being and Nothingness, where the problem is posed but left unresolved, is necessary. Sartre’s Anti-Semite and Jew, where a more concrete problem – the problem of authentically identifying oneself with a group of human beings − actually opens up a way how to overcome the problem of authenticity. (shrink)

INTRODUCTION If there is one underlying implication in the following essays it is the inadequacy of the information-processing model for cognitive ...