En este texto buscamos hacer inteligible el lugar y los derroteros que sigue el concepto de auto-afección en el pensamiento de Jacques Derrida. Dicho concepto se desarrolla a partir de una interpretación de Kant y el problema de la metafísica, de Heidegger. En la elaboración del concepto en Derrida se enfatiza el momento de distancia en el que el sí-mismo no puede reducir al otro, sino que tiene que hacer patente la demora en su propia formación. Esto implicaría considerar que (...) la mismidad que se constituye en la auto-afección no puede ser separada de una hetero-afección, mediante la cual el otro no puede ser objetivado y no es otra cosa que el sí-mismo en su alteración. La forma de dicho espaciamiento que produce la alteración se pone a prueba en la voz y en la estructura del “oírse-hablar”, la que se revela como un espacio polifónico irreductible a una unidad, donde la auto-afección se desune de sí para retornar como aquello que no espera y como aquello que no puede replegarse en un lugar de reunión. In this paper we try to understand the status and the path followed by the concept of self-affection in the thought of Jacques Derrida. This concept is developed based on an interpretation of Martin Heidegger’s Kant and the problem of Metaphysics. In the elaboration of the concept, Derrida emphasizes the moment of distance in which the self cannot be reduced to the other, but the self makes clear the delay in its own formation. This means that the sameness that constitutes self-affection cannot be separated from hetero-affection, in which the other cannot be objectified and is nothing more than the self in its own alteration. The shape of the spacing that produces such alteration is tested in the voice and its own structure of “s’entendre-parler”, which is revealed as a polyphonic space irreducible to a unity, where self-affection is detached from itself in order to return as something that it does not expect and as something that cannot not retreat into a meeting place. (shrink)

Cristóbal Balbontin Dans Totalité et infini, Emmanuel Levinas s’attaque surtout à critiquer la dimension anonyme que comporte l’État. Proche du geste de Franz Rosenzweig dans L’étoile de la rédemption qui relie la fin de la Phénoménologie de l’esprit avec les Principes de la philosophie du droit, la critique lévinassienne vise surtout la philosophie politique hégélienne. Pourtant, chez Levinas — par opposition à Rosenzweig —, il ne s’agit pas seulement de dénoncer le devenir de la Raison dans la pensée occidentale, (...) mais sinon plus fondamentalement l’ontologie à partir de laquelle cette raison est devenue possible. Ce faisant, il s’agit de déceler les points de rapprochement aussi bien que les différences entre les deux philosophes à l’égard du politique. À ce propos, il s’agit de relever le tournant dans la démarche lévinassienne qu’implique une revalorisation du politique. (shrink)

El presente artículo se propone el esclarecimiento existencial de la muerte y el suicidio, fundamentalmente al hilo del análisis que Jaspers realiza en la II parte de Filosofía. Para ello se afirma que los esquemas del yo, que constituyen objetivaciones de éste, no permiten una cabal comprensión del "yo-mismo". Lo cual permite distinguir entre una muerte "impropia" y una muerte "propia", a la cual se la encara con valentía. Finalmente, el suicidio queda como un acto radicalmente incomprensible y, no obstante, (...) cabe su autenticidad en la medida que no entrañe una mera huida. (shrink)

Resumen: El artículo reflexiona sobre la especificación del juicio “conforme al derecho” como juicio justo por criterios legales y morales. La evolución de la filosofía jurídica desde la tesis de que el juicio justo del juez debe fundarse solamente en fuentes legales hacia la constatación de que tal juicio no es posible exige que la teoría analítica del derecho, la filosofía jurídica hermenéutica y la teoría del derecho natural se complementen para evitar el irracionalismo nihilista.

According to John Rawls, the methods and conclusions of science—when these are non-controversial—constitute public reasons. However, several objections have been raised against this view. This paper focuses on two objections. On the one hand, the associational objection states that scientific reasons are the reasons of the scientific community, and thus paradigmatically non-public in the Rawlsian sense. On the other hand, the controversiality objection states that the non-controversiality requirement rules out their public character when scientific postulates are resisted by a significant (...) portion of the citizenry. The paper replies that both objections miss their mark. To the associational objection, it replies that the relevant test for a reason to be public is whether the reasons have been construed under the rules and constrains of a public frame of thought. Insofar as scientific methods and conclusions correspond to the principles of reasoning and rules of evidence that liberals understand as public, their associational origin is secondary. To the controversiality objection, it replies that the standard for a scientific argument to be regarded as non-controversial should refer to its degree of intra-scientific consensus, since ordinary citizens accept or reject scientific pronouncements conditioned to their particular comprehensive views. Nonetheless, a wide extra-scientific agreement on the epistemic virtues of the scientific method will be needed. The paper concludes that there is a good case to think about scientific reasons as public to the extent that scientific reasoning is a mode of inquiry that mirrors a central aspiration of Rawlsian political liberalism: having a public way of thought and an impersonal standpoint to adjudicate between competing claims. (shrink)

En el presente texto se intenta trazar posibles figuras en que viene a trabarse la relación deconstructiva con la soberanía en el pensamiento de Jacques Derrida. La fuerza y la violencia se asoman como huellas indelebles e inevitables de la soberanía. Pero a la vez la différance derrideana se puede pensar como un despliegue de fuerzas que viene a desorganizar las estructuras sociales, evidenciando que toda fundación política, como la de todo Estado-nación, implica una violencia originaria que es estructuralmente sometida (...) a operaciones de olvido. Deconstrucción y soberanía se trabarían en una relación de fuerza a fuerza, pero para Derrida esto no nos dispensa de atender a una economía de la violencia como primera configuración de esta relación, como una estrategia crítica que busca hacer visibles las violencias ocultas en las jerarquías conceptuales y políticas. Sin ser renunciable este acercamiento crítico, Derrida añadirá la figura de una fuerza débil como registro deconstructivo hacia la soberanía: una configuración de apertura que permite repensar la soberanía no como mero poder opresivo, sino como una posibilidad siempre frágil de justicia vinculada a la alteridad. La noción de una lengua de preestreno, de la espaciación de una lengua siempre por venir, se mostrará como un espacio dentro de la lengua que permitirá traducir estas operaciones deconstructivas hacia nuevas configuraciones políticas siempre por venir, lo que a la vez siempre implica el riesgo del despliegue de crueldades soberanas. Palabras clave: fuerza, soberanía, deconstrucción, Derrida. (shrink)

El artículo revisita la discusión entre Augusto Salazar Bondy y Leopoldo Zea hacia fines de la década de 1960 sobre la filosofía latinoamericana, con el objetivo de mostrar que la misma es el lugar de un diferendo: de pugna entre posiciones y representaciones disímiles, en algunos casos irreconciliables. Como se propone, lo que está en disputa en tal controversia, es el significado de la filosofía y de lo filosófico, en contextos de enunciación como América Latina. Para ello, se recorren diversos (...) núcleos conceptuales de la disputa, mostrándola como una discusión filosófica aún vigente. (shrink)

The article argues that the prohibition of abortion in Chile, other than when the mother's life is in danger, is a form of human rights violation targeting women specifically. The Pro-Birth Policy was established in Pinochet's Chile as a response to the previous government's attempts, under Allende, to encourage family planning and to educate and inform women about their choices. This had been done to put an end to the increase in back-street abortions with the inevitable toll on women's lives. (...) Pinochet's regime reversed these women-oriented family planning policies, and criminalized abortion, on the basis of costs to the state and, more importantly, the need to increase the birth rate for reasons of national security. Women's bodies were used by the Pinochet regime, both by sexual violence and torture, and by the denial of women's reproductive and sexual rights, as a means to impose discipline and order on society. The fact that this is still not acknowledged in the construction of a collective memory indicates that the issue has not yet been resolved in democratic Chile. (shrink)

Neil MacCormick says that his "version of institutional theory" about the law 'is "non positivist", or, if you wish, "post-positivist"'. He is aware, however, that his work could be perfectly labelled, from the point of view of the history of legal and moral thought, as a form of natural law theory, at least by those who adhere to some version of natural law. It is an important merit of MacCormick that, rising above the label walls and wars, his theory of (...) law has taken into account the main insights of the great authors belonging to both traditions, such as Hans Kelsen and Herbert Hart, on the so-called "positivist" side, and some authors in the Thomistic tradition, particularly John Finnis, as well as "the writings of seventeenth and eighteenth century jurists concerning natural jurisprudence and the law of nature", on the so-called "natural law" side. Writing with such openness to all sources and insights, Neil MacCormick, one of the most eminent legal philosophers of our time, does not surprise us when he chooses to end his lifetime's work with an attempt to dig into the ethical foundations of all that he has written on law and politics. Practical Reason in Law and Morality is, in a way, his most significant book. He tackles here the deeper issues that he himself realised were left open and uncertain in his salient works on legal theory. He considered this book as the last one in a quartet on "Law, State, and Practical Reason". The quartet itself has become the culmination of a life devoted to the common good, in academia and in politics, among many other endeavours. Notwithstanding its flaws, I am convinced that Neil MacCormick's last book can be illuminating for all those students, and even professors, who go about doing legal philosophy without ever reading anything antedating Hart's Concept of Law. They tend to be confused by sophisticated forms of scepticism, luxurious discussions on law and morality and metaethics, and all sorts of distrust of truth in practical matters. Hence they will surely benefit from reading how a great legal philosopher of our time, once equally confused but always honestly open to rational deliberation and fair discussion, freed himself of at least half of his misunderstandings, and learned a lot by reading some natural law theorists old and new. (shrink)

Este artículo propone una lectura interpretativa de la mutilación ocular como estrategia político-policial sistemática aplicada durante el llamado “estallido social” comenzado en Chile en octubre de 2019. A partir de una elaboración del concepto de “rostridad”, desarrollado por Deleuze y Guattari, sugerimos que dicha estrategia sugiere, por una parte, el reconocimiento anticipado de la potencia subversiva de la revuelta, difícil de desactivar por los poderes gobernantes. Por otra parte, que la mutilación no solo apunta a los ojos sino también a (...) las subjetividades que estos parecen organizar, las cuales aparecen ante el poder como clandestinas o nómades. Por ello, la mutilación ocular puede ser leída como una estrategia político-policial de re-subjetivación utilizada por el gobierno para desactivar una revuelta política que también se define por líneas de resistencia que se fugan de dicha estrategia. (shrink)

Levinas est traditionnellement perçu comme une voix critique à propos de la pensée de la totalité de Hegel et, ainsi, comme un philosophe qui cherche à dénoncer la négation de toute différence dans la pensée de l’identité, que ce soit dans l’unité de la vie, de l’esprit, du savoir ou du concept. Or, le paradoxe de Levinas est de critiquer Hegel tout en réinterprétant et en s’appropriant certains de ses concepts fondamentaux. Plus particulièrement, c'est le cas avec la radicalisation de (...) la puissance du négatif. Il s’agit donc de s’interroger sur l’effort de Levinas pour développer une forme intrinsèque à la dialectique hégélienne que Hegel aurait entrevue sans développer dans sa philosophie, encore trop enracinée dans une métaphysique que Levinas tente de quitter. Ce faisant, il s’agit d’éclaircir si l’on peut même parler d’une dialectique négative lévinassienne. (shrink)

The philosopher Akeel Bilgrami’s notion of identity is original and challenging to liberal political theory, but still largely unaddressed by it. In a nutshell, Bilgrami characterizes identity as holding certain values and commitments with a crucial addendum: as we want to continue living by those values and commitments in the future, we erect some social and legal barriers to prevent them from change. Liberals of a Millian and/or Rawlsian cast of mind, in turn, arrange political institutions to enable such change, (...) as they assume that we are the kind of creatures that change their minds. In this sense, the identitarian and the liberal mindset are, as the philosopher claims, “mirror opposites”. This article engages with Bilgrami’s view in two senses: on the one hand, it highlights some potentially problematic areas that may call for further clarification and reinterpretation of the liberal canon, as well as offering other set of tensions that arise with non-liberal philosophical traditions. On the other hand, it contends that Bilgrami’s ultimate claim is not merely that the identitarian mindset is more rational than the liberal mentality, as he does, but that it makes political demands that should be assessed against the liberal ideal of justification. While it may be the case that identitarianism is rationally superior to certain versions of comprehensive liberalism, the paper concludes that it loses out to political liberalism, to the extent that Bilgrami’s identitarianism is willing to display the state’s coercive muscle in oppressive ways, in a way that political liberalism does not. (shrink)

El modelo de desarrollo sustentable ha motivado la generación de una importante producción científica en distintos ámbitos. Tal ha sido el caso de la psicología que se ha propuesto comprender el papel de los factores conductuales y mentales implicados en la relación del hombre con la naturaleza. Si bien el emergente campo de la psicología ambiental se ha planteado objetivos pertinentes para el fomento de conductas sustentables, ésta ha operado desde modelos epistemológicos que tienden a mantener elementos de la cosmovisión (...) moderna relacionada con el deterioro ambiental. Se proponen las aproximaciones narrativas de la psicología como una alternativa capaz de subvertir el orden epistemológico. (shrink)

Resumen: La intención del presente artículo es reexaminar el concepto bergsoniano de Duración entendido como coexistencia de niveles de multiplicidad heterogéneos. Si bien dicho concepto ha sido pensado a partir de una comprensión que podría ser caracterizada como continuista, el mismo Bergson evitará confundir dicha continuidad con la idea de homogeneidad. Intentaremos mostrar que la determinación del concepto de Duración se alcanza al definirla como tensión o entrelazamiento entre sucesión y simultaneidad, y por consiguiente, como una multiplicidad que hace coexistir (...) diferentes flujos de duración. Para ello, Bergson propone la existencia de un Tiempo impersonal y único como base para la relación entre duraciones. Nuestra hipótesis es que esta misma situación puede entenderse mejor si se articula el concepto de ritmo en la obra de Deleuze, concepto ligado íntimamente a las nociones de duración y coexistencia. Mediante los movimientos de contracción, dilatación, reunión y división, el ritmo opera junto a las duraciones disponiéndose como un campo de relación, pudiendo ocupar el lugar que había sido asignado al Tiempo único.: The aim of this paper is to reevaluate the Bergsonian concept of durée, understood as a coexistence of heterogeneous levels of multiplicity. Although this concept has been thought of from a point of view that could be characterized as "continuist", Bergson himself avoids confusing this continuity with the idea of homogeneity. We will try to show that the determination of the concept of durée is reached by defining it as a tension or interlacement between succession and simultaneity, and therefore as a multiplicity based on the coexistence of different flows of duration. Bergson proposes the existence of an impersonal and unique time as the basis for the relationship between durations. Our proposal is that this same situation can be better understood through the concept of rhythm as articulated in Deleuze's work, a concept closely linked to the notions of Durée and coexistence. Through the movements of contraction, dilation, reunion, and division, rhythm operates along with the available durations as a field of relation, being able to occupy the place that had been assigned to unique time. (shrink)

Cristóbal Balbontin La phénoménologie française, et tout particulièrement la philosophie de Lévinas, cherche à critiquer la lutte pour la reconnaissance hégélienne en ce qu’elle est une philosophie qui cherche à réduire « l’Autre » au « Même ». Est-ce que cette critique vaut aussi pour la réactualisation honnethienne de la lutte pour la reconnaissance? Notre position est que, même si Honneth s’engage dans une réactualisation de la reconnaissance intersubjective qui met en valeur l’importance de l’altérité, cette démarche s’avère insuffisante (...) ; surtout par rapport à la place phénoménologique de la chair. (shrink)

Most debates surrounding the teaching of creationism in the science classroom have been addressed under a standard frame: whether creationism is science or religion. As creationism suggests supernatural causation, it has been understood as beyond the purview of science, and therefore as religion. This argument for methodological naturalism has been increasingly challenged by philosophers of science as a demarcation criterion. The disaggregation approach introduced by Cecile Laborde provides an alternative framework to address this debate. It suggests that the problem with (...) creationism lies in its epistemic inaccessibility, as it is a theory with weak explanatory capacity that has been superseded by Darwinian evolution. Thus, the exclusion of creationism from the science classroom is not grounded in its religious character, but rather in a set of epistemic shortcomings, which are shared by other fully secular pseudoscientific theories. In the same way that religion is not special as a legal-political category under Laborde’s analysis, creationism in the curriculum should not be treated as special either. (shrink)

In this paper we will reconstruct a hypothesis on love in Gilles Deleuze's philosophy. We notice that, at different moments of his philosophical itinerary, the topic of love is the object of a complex treatment, which moves from the discovery of the expression of worlds that the other involves, and which gradually detach themselves from that other, towards a progressive liberation of dehumanized elements that open up in a transformed sexuality. We will try to show that this experimental exercise reveals (...) a surface, defined by the decomposition of the self and where the passage through a world without others will allow us to discover a plane of liberated elements, open to connections that will allow us other ways of understanding the phenomenon of love. (shrink)

This paper presents a detailed contrastive frame semantic analysis of arriving events in English and Spanish, attested through a corpus study. The framework and methodology of our research follows the FrameNet II Research Project housed at ICSI. First, we present a formal description of the Arriving frame as a subframe of the Motion frame: arriving encodes a basic subpart of our conceptualization of motion, namely the transition from moving to arriving at a goal. Second, we carry out a cross-linguistic analysis (...) of this frame, based on a corpus study of English and Spanish arriving predicates. A first assumption would suggest that these two languages share a basic abstract frame description for arriving events. While acknowledging this, we yet show that at a lexical level the particular lexicalization patterns of each language influence the way speakers bring onto stage the different participants of the scene. We discuss this issue through a study of implicit frame elements, conflation and incorporation patterns, profiling, and deixis. Third, we briefly introduce the question of polysemy for those predicates that participate in the arriving frame. Arguably, the spatial meaning of arriving is the core sense from which a set of sense extensions derives, pointing to a wide range of independent frames (e.g. Cognition frame, Achievement frame, etc.) This fact can be attested in both languages in a parallel way. The different senses can be described synchronically in terms of frame semantics, while motivation for them is to be found in the cognitive processes of Metaphor (across frames), and Fictive Motion (within frame). (shrink)

Examinamos los alcances de la intuición en el pensamiento de Karl Jaspers, para lo cual nos apoyamos especialmente en su Psicologia de las concepciones de mundo, de 1919. Lo que le preocupa allí al pensador es cómo se conforma una concepción de mundo. Pues bien, ella se conforma, por el lado del sujeto, de actitud y, por el lado del objeto, de imagen de mundo. Lo decisivo, en todo caso, es la actitud, ya que es ella la que se da (...) a sí misma una imagen de mundo. Entre actitud del sujeto e imagen de mundo objetual hay las posibilidades de fisión-fusión-superación. A la actitud racional la caracteriza la fisión, ya que tiene una relación distante de oposición con el objeto, a la actitud mística la superación de la relación sujeto-objeto, y nuestra actitud intuitiva la fusión y una máxima cercanía con el objeto, en cierto modo, un hacerse uno con él. Al mismo tiempo, a la intuición la caracteriza la captación inmediata e instantánea de lo esencial de algo, y la acompaña el supuesto de la verdad que se devela con el descubrimiento, o más bien, la capacidad descubridora que también le sería propia. (shrink)

The article discusses the concept of truth in social sciences. Based upon Leibniz’s sufficient reason principle, it is proposed three stadiums of the principle of sufficient reasons: ontological, epistemological and existential, which in turn allow three versions of the concept of truth in the social sciences. El artículo discute el concepto de verdad en las ciencias sociales. Basado en el principio de razón suficiente de Leibniz, se proponen tres estadios del principio de razón suficiente: ontológico, epistemológico y existencial, los cuales (...) permiten entender tres versiones del concepto de verdad en las ciencias sociales. (shrink)

The status of scientific knowledge in political liberalism is controversial. Although Rawls argued that the noncontroversial methods and conclusions of science belong to the kind of reasons that citizens can legitimately call forth in public deliberation, critics have observed that the complexity and elaborateness of scientific arguments drive them away from the spirit of public reason, i.e., that which should reflect judgments that are the product of general beliefs and forms of reasoning found in common sense. In other words, scientific (...) claims remain as inaccessible as esoteric or religious reasons. This paper contends that this objection can be met by introducing a crucial assumption, drawn from W. V. O. Quine and the ‘naturalized epistemology’ tradition: that scientific reasoning and everyday reasoning are not two different epistemic categories but rather form a continuum. The former is just a filtered or refined version of the latter. Accordingly, evidence-based scientific reasoning is common to all citizens, regardless of their actual acceptance of specific scientific claims. Following the Quinean Assumption, political liberals may argue that, unlike religious or esoteric sources of knowledge, scientific reasoning is the expression of a cognitive operation that is fundamentally shared across comprehensive doctrines and politically reasonable individuals. (shrink)

As a comparative politics scholar, it is more than a challenge to read and comment on the work of political theorists. The reason for this lies in the fact that comparative politics and political t...

El artículo aborda el trabajo de un conjunto de filósofos chilenos, cuyo objetivo es mostrar que el pensamiento conservador ─y puntualmente la historiografía conservadora─ construye y transmite un imaginario nacional que, al sancionar la necesidad de una democracia tutelada, comparece como antecedente y justificación del golpe de Estado y la dictadura militar. Junto con exponer y discutir algunos de los supuestos del trabajo de estos autores, el artículo muestra que el mérito del mismo es poner de manifiesto que el relato (...) de la historia ─y la consiguiente construcción de memoria─ es el lugar de un diferendo, de un conflicto siempre abierto. (shrink)