Arab and English cultures are incongruent, where the former is greatly influenced by religion when compared to the latter. This study focuses on court interpreting from Arabic into English and questions the interpreters’ objectivity when rendering religious and cultural expressions, bearing in mind that certain cultures, like the Arab and Muslim ones, have significant religious ties. To this end, fifteen transcripts were randomly collected from Canadian court hearings. The analysis showed that interpreting religious and cultural expressions can (...) be complex, especially when the original speaker attempts to transmit a notion that may have negative implications in the target language. The results also showed that court interpreters either added explanations to religious and cultural expressions or omitted them. Such additions and omissions may be used to avoid negative stereotypes other cultures have about Muslims and Arabs. The study recommends that future researchers interested in legal interpreting consider the non-verbal factors that can be observed during court hearings. The study suggests allocating extensive training sessions to interpreters on how to impartially render culture-bound expressions, mainly in the legal context. (shrink)

Why does an argument end up in the final court decision? Was it deliberated or questioned during the oral hearings? Was there something in the hearings that triggered a particular judge to write a dissenting opinion? Despite the availability of the final judgments of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), none of these legal research questions can currently be answered as the ECHR’s multilingual oral hearings are not transcribed, structured, or speaker-attributed. We address this (...) fundamental gap by presenting LaCour!, the first corpus of textual oral arguments of the ECHR, consisting of 154 full hearings (2.1 million tokens from over 267 h of video footage) in English, French, and other court languages, each linked to the corresponding final judgment documents. In addition to the transcribed and partially manually corrected text from the video, we provide sentence-level timestamps and manually annotated role and language labels. We also showcase LaCour! in a set of experiments that explore the interplay between questions and dissenting opinions. Apart from the use cases in legal NLP, we hope that law students or other interested parties will also use LaCour! as a learning resource, as it is freely available in various formats at https://huggingface.co/datasets/TrustHLT/LaCour. (shrink)

The article explores court forms as an interactive genre essential for legal-lay communication in civil and family proceedings: court forms elicit key information from predominantly lay users for the purposes of court administration and the judiciary. The information presented in court forms defines the agenda and communicative focus of the subsequent hearings and settlement negotiations, and in some instances even the path the proceedings would take. It is thus important to consider court forms in (...) terms of their comprehensibility as well as functionality for eliciting legally coherent narratives and facilitating efficient engagement of lay participants with the proceedings. The case study presented in the article draws on the combination of corpus linguistics and discourse analysis to explore two versions of the court form most frequently used by self-represented parties in England and Wales, ‘Form C100: Apply for a court order to make arrangements for a child or resolve a dispute about their upbringing’. The comparison of the paper form and its redesigned online version identifies the improvements made as part of the digitisation process but also indicates communicative challenges which can prevent the lay person from presenting the relevant information. The discussion provides an opportunity to reflect on the role of language in online courts. (shrink)

This article suggests a discourse analysis suitable for multi-dimensional processes. The exemplar in focus is a single narrative that travelled a long way through an English criminal pre-trial to the finalising Crown Court-hearing. The following case study asks how this story was mobilised by the defence to challenge the prosecution's case. The resulting sequential analysis of the story's career profits a good deal from Laboratory Studies. Like ethnographies in Science and Technology Studies, the analysis involves an extended production process—and (...) the productivities of the artefacts produced. It shows, furthermore, how the mobilisation of the alibi is at some points threatened by emerging potentialities to undermine it. All in all, the resulting micro-history on the story's career hinges on as well as exceeds common preferences in social constructivism: for collaborative and local accomplishments, for structural and antagonistic oppositions, and for success stories. (shrink)

A fourteen year old is diagnosed with aplastic anemia. The teen and his parents are Jehovah’s Witnesses. An ethics consult is called on the day of admission by an ethically sophisticated social worker and attending. The patient and his parents see this diagnosis as “a test of their faith.” The ethical analysis focuses on the mature minor doctrine, i.e. whether the teen has the capacity to make this decision. The hospital chooses to take the case to court, with a (...) result that is at odds with the ethics consultation recommendations. Ethics was never deposed or otherwise invited to be involved with the hearing. Thus the larger question of the relation of ethics and law was brought into stark relief. (shrink)

The case of Charlie Gard sparked an ongoing public and academic debate whether in court decisions about medical treatment for children in England & Wales the best interests test should be replaced by a harm threshold. However, the literature has scantly considered (1) what the impact of such a replacement would be on future litigation and (2) how a harm threshold should be introduced: for triage or as standard for decision-making. This article directly addresses these gaps, by first analysing (...) reported cases in England & Wales about medical treatment in the context of a S31 order, thus using a harm threshold for triage and second comparing court decisions about medical treatment for children in England & Wales based on the best interest test with Dutch and German case law using a harm threshold. The investigation found that whilst no substantial increase of parental discretion can be expected an introduction of a harm threshold for triage would change litigation. In particular, cases in which harm is limited, currently only heard when there are concerns about parental decision-making, may be denied a court hearing as might cases in which the child has lost their capacity to suffer. Applying a harm threshold for triage in decisions about withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining treatment might lead to a continuation of medical treatment that could be considered futile. (shrink)

In In re Christopher I., the California Court of Appeal upheld a juvenile court's decision to withdraw life-sustaining medical treatment for a then-1-year-old dependent of the court. Christopher I. had come under juvenile court custody after his biological father, Moises I., physically abused him and rendered him comatose. Christopher's biological mother, Tamara S., was either unwilling or unable to protect him. After the disposition hearing, Tamara petitioned for a “Do Not Resuscitate” order for Christopher and/or removal (...) of his life-sustaining medical treatment. Moises opposed, asserting that the juvenile court did not have authority to make medical decisions for a dependent child, for whom counsel had been assigned, without appointing a guardian. The juvenile court rejected Moises's argument and proceeded with an evidentiary hearing. All six physicians who testified supported the withdrawal of treatment or at least a DNR order. (shrink)

Accused persons who are subjected to a saturation level of negative media coverage may be denied an impartial hearing, which is perhaps the most important aspect of the right to a fair hearing. Despite this, the courts have generally held that the social imperative of prosecuting accused trumps the interests of the accused. The justification for an impartial hearing stems from the repugnance of convicting the innocent. Viewed dispassionately, this imperative is not absolute, given that every legal system condones procedures (...) which result in the conviction of some innocent people. While the importance of guarding against wrongful convictions has been overstated, the imperative to bring to trial all accused has been even more exaggerated. The legal system has displayed a capacity to deal with cases where the guilty walk free. The institutional integrity of the criminal justice system would be significantly compromised by convictions that are tarnished by pre-judgment. Confidence in the criminal justice system is more important than individual criminal accountability. The inability to receive an impartial hearing should result in a permanent stay. The only exception is where the alleged crime has the capacity to cause widespread fear or social unrest. This only applies in relation to serious acts of terrorism. This article focuses on recent legal fair trial developments in Australia, however, the analysis, reasoning and conclusion applies in relation to all jurisdictions where juries determine guilt and innocence. (shrink)

As courts become increasingly technologically sophisticated, it can be expected that the use of the latest visualisation techniques will also increase to make the most of this technology. In particular, the use of computer-generated animations can be expected to become more dominant. There is, however, very little research into the effects of animated evidence on jurors and other members of the judicial process. This paper investigates whether there is a difference in the quality and robustness of memories formed by either (...) hearing an oral testimony or seeing an animated version of it. Also, the paper investigates whether different opinions and attitudes are produced when testimony is presented as an animation as opposed to being verbally presented. Preliminary results reported here indicate that there is indeed a difference in attitude (and therefore potential bias) when animations are used instead of verbal testimony, but that this difference is only apparent in the long term (four weeks or more after the presentation of the animated evidence). The results point to the need for improved knowledge structures for mapping verbal testimony into animations, where issues of implicit knowledge and potential bias are explicitly referenced in the knowledge structure. The paper argues that, until and unless such issues are addressed, it is not safe to use animations in court except to present purely factual information. (shrink)

The paper analyses the problem of workload quotas for district court judges in relation to the standard statutory work time duration. The problem is set against the general tendency of increase in the number of cases brought before courts each year. District courts as the courts of first instance are faced with an ever growing flow of cases. With regard to civil cases, the numbers are increasing especially in the field of the law of obligations (disputes in relation to (...) sale, loan, credit, consumer credit, lease contracts, as well as contracts for the provision of services, etc.). As far as criminal cases are concerned, the numbers are increasing especially in the fields of robbery, theft, in particular car theft, disturbance of public order and other crimes. In these circumstances, it is extremely important to conduct the analysis of the activity of courts in order to obtain a picture of the current situation with regard to the workload of courts and judges. District courts deserve special attention. Uneven distribution of workload among courts and judges is often the reason for the increase of the number of cases where a final decision (judgement) is reached later than 6 months after the start of proceedings. This was pointed out in the Overview of Activities of the Lithuanian Courts and their Self-Governance Institutions (2009–2010), as well as in the report of the National Courts Administration (2010). Those documents underline the importance to analyse the workload of district court judges for the purposes of optimising work organisation, setting the number of judges, distribution of resources, evaluation of judges’ activity, etc. The said analysis is crucial in order to avoid exceeding working time quotas and excessive workload of judges. At present, the workload of district court judges is calculated in accordance with the regulation adopted by the Courts Council in 2004 (as amended in 2005) and it reflects the number of standard cases (civil, criminal cases and cases of administrative offences) as well as other types of procedural documents dealt with by a judge within a period of one month. However, there are no quotas set for judge’s workload with regard to the duration of the statutory work time. The quotas for separate procedural stages (preparation for hearings, hearings, adoption of decision (judgement), other procedural actions that a judge performs while administering justice) are inexistent. The calculation does not take into account whether those standard cases are heard by a single judge or by a panel of judges, the complexity of a particular case is neither reflected. Establishing quotas for district court judges and other court clerks (judge assistants, secretaries, etc.) should consist of legal, organisational-procedural and technical-economical activity. The Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Lithuania, the National Courts Administration, the Courts Council as well as chairmen and experienced judges of district courts should play an active part in the process of establishing quotas. A special role should be assumed by the General Assembly of Judges. (shrink)

This paper’s aim is to promote greater interest in courtroom practices of minute-taking—the preparation of written documents that constitute a record of what was said and done in the courtroom during a case hearing, very often based on a judge’s dictation of rephrased questioned person’s statements to a clerk who records them. This aim is achieved through discussion ultimately focused on the distinguishable aspects of minute-taking, its possible underlying mechanisms, and further consequences, followed by some remarks concerning the judge–clerk relationship (...) outside the scope of minute-taking and more direct discussion of clerks themselves. The discussions and analyses presented here are empirically-grounded, forming a side result of a larger research project conducted in a Polish lower court that combined observations of case hearings with witness interviews. Despite their inadvertent origin, the investigations presented here demonstrate the complexity and multifaceted nature of minute-taking to a greater extent than previous relevant studies have revealed. While minute-taking has not been neglected entirely in legal research, there remain many questions to be addressed. This paper suggests some of these questions as well as potential directions for future research on minute-taking through discussion of how the identified aspects of minute-taking can be utilized and which theoretical frameworks may be applicable. Although the paper is a result of empirical research conducted in Poland, its aims are relevant outside the Polish context, particularly in other continental European countries where minutes are also taken from case hearings. (shrink)

Should machines be judges? Some say no, arguing that citizens would see robot-led legal proceedings as procedurally unfair because “having your day in court” is having another human adjudicate your claims. Prior research established that people obey the law in part because they see it as procedurally just. The introduction of artificially intelligent (AI) judges could therefore undermine sentiments of justice and legal compliance if citizens intuitively take machine-adjudicated proceedings to be less fair than the human-adjudicated status quo. Two (...) original experiments show that ordinary people share this intuition. There is a perceived “human-AI fairness gap.” -/- However, it is also possible to reduce — and perhaps even eliminate — the fairness gap through “algorithmic offsetting.” Affording a hearing before AI judges and enhancing the interpretability of AI-rendered decisions reduce the human-AI fairness gap. Moreover, the procedural justice advantage of a human over AI appears to be driven more by beliefs about the accuracy of the outcome and thoroughness of consideration, rather than doubts about whether a party felt it had a good opportunity to voice its opinions or whether the judge understood the perspective of the litigant. -/- The results support a common and fundamental objection to robot judges: There is a concerning human-AI fairness gap. Yet, the results also indicate that the strongest version of this challenge — human judges have irreducible procedural fairness advantages — is not reflected in public views. In some circumstances, people see a day in robot court as no less fair than a day in human court. (shrink)

Through a ‘micro’ and ‘macro’ level analysis, this study focuses on elements of questioning and question design in the Senate Judiciary hearing conducted for Supreme Court nominee Brett Kavanaugh. Specifically, two lines of questioning are analyzed: that of Kamala Harris, D. California, and that of Ted Cruz, R. Texas. Through an analysis that builds heavily on prior research that uses Conversation Analysis to understand the news interview, this study attempts to expand such research to institutional talk done by politicians (...) in Congress. The analysis portion of the paper investigates, on a ‘micro’ level, the linguistic elements at play in each line of questioning. In the discussion section, a ‘macro’ level analysis situates the findings of this paper within the broader US political climate among the public and in terms of the growing conservatism of the Supreme Court. (shrink)

The Supreme Court frequently uses two tools to gather information about which cases to hear following a petition for writ of certiorari: the call for response and the call for the views of the Solicitor General. To date, there has been no empirical analysis of how the Supreme Court deploys these tools and little qualitative study. This Article fills in basic gaps in the literature by providing concrete answers to common questions regarding these two tools and offers detailed (...) analysis of how and why states, private parties, and the United States (through the Solicitor General) respond to petitions. In addition, the Article provides much-needed data for litigators and litigants to be able to estimate the probability of their case being heard by the Court, and provides insight on how to react when the Court calls for a response or calls for the views of the Solicitor General. To reach these conclusions, the Article relies on detailed, quantitative analysis of a novel, 30,000-petition dataset, as well as interviews with top Supreme Court litigators, former Supreme Court clerks, and former staff of the Clerk’s office. (shrink)

Effective methods for evaluating the reliability of statements issued by witnesses and defendants in hearings would be an extremely valuable support to decision-making in court and other legal settings. In recent years, methods relying on stylometric techniques have proven most successful for this task; but few such methods have been tested with language collected in real-life situations of high-stakes deception, and therefore their usefulness outside lab conditions still has to be properly assessed. In this study we report the (...) results obtained by using stylometric techniques to identify deceptive statements in a corpus of hearings collected in Italian courts. The defendants at these hearings were condemned for calumny or false testimony, so the falsity of (some of) their statements is fairly certain. In our experiments we replicated the methods used in previous studies but never before applied to high-stakes data, and tested new methods. We also considered the effect of a number of variables including in particular the homogeneity of the dataset. Our results suggest that accuracy at deception detection clearly above chance level can be obtained with real-life data as well. (shrink)

This article argues that the courts, not the Home Secretary, should be empowered to issue Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures. It explains that at the heart of the debate are three questions: whether measures like TPIMs should be viewed primarily from the perspective of security or liberty; how we should conceive the executive and the courts; and the empirical question of how these two arms of government answer these questions. The non-mechanistic nature of legal reasoning means that legal reasons may (...) be constructed to fit one’s normative viewpoint on each of the first two questions. Importantly, however, the case law on judicial scrutiny of control orders consistently demonstrates that the courts themselves regard TPIMs as being primarily a restriction on liberty, which require a fair hearing before an independent court. Whilst this does provide some protection of individual rights, the nature of law as an unfinished practice means that for stable protection of individual rights judicial independence must be promoted and nurtured in both the legal and political realms. The failure of the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 to vest the power to issue TPIMs in the courts thus represents a missed opportunity to secure political endorsement of enhanced legal protection of individual liberty in cases involving national security. (shrink)

Much of recent medical, legal, and ethical focus has been directed toward the unborn or newly born. Guidelines and frameworks for decision making are in the early stages of evolution and are likely to shift as the politics, ethics, and economics of caregiving move beyond technologic accomplishments and debates into a more compassionate construct that may include input from an institutional bioethics committee. Beyond that, the courts may continue to be the place where unresolved issues are settled, and with each (...) passing year new and often divergent legal decisions are being generated that further complicate the physician's role as care giver and healer. (shrink)

The war in the DRC has resulted in one of the world’s worst humanitarian crisis with over 3.4 million displaced persons scattered throughout the country. An estimated 4 million people have died as a result of the war. The most pressing need to be addressed is the question of justice and accountability for these human rights atrocities in order to achieve a durable peace in the country and also in the Great Lakes region. It is particularly true in post-conflict situations (...) where justice systems have been either partially or completely destroyed, that national courts are not capable of arriving at a uniform stance, or willing to provide justice for atrocities in the immediate future. As a result, international justice seems to be a crucial and last resort that must continue to be fortified against efforts to undermine it. However, even if the ICC achieves its full potential, it faces a number of challenges. Firstly, it is realistically not able to address all situations in which national courts are unwilling or unable to prosecute perpetrators. Secondly, there are temporal and other jurisdictional limitations on what cases the ICC can hear. Accordingly, the ICC will only have the power to try people accused of the gravest human rights violations committed after 1 July 2002; the date the Rome Statute which established the ICC took effect. As a result, only a small number of individuals responsible for the atrocities committed will be tried by this Court. Thirdly, is the establishment, of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), one of the civilian institutions that emerged from the peace talks, meant to end impunity or to cover up gross violations of human rights committed in the DRC? It remains to be seen how it will function and interact with the courts. (shrink)

Endeavours of politicians, representatives of law enforcement institutions and courts to create simplified, accelerated and less human and time resources requiring legal procedures in criminal cases prompted the authors of this article to assess the possibilities to develop the written form of procedure in Lithuania. The goal of the authors of this article is to assess the origin and goals of the written form of procedure, as well as to define the main rules and points for discussions on the possibilities (...) to develop the written form of procedure in the Lithuanian criminal procedural law. The conclusion is drawn in this article to the effect that written form of procedure is seen as a condition for simplifying and accelerating the legal process, and choosing this form of procedure is not considered as denying or restraining the expectations of participants of criminal procedure towards a fair trial. The analysis provides the basis for the authors to make a conclusion on the appropriate limits of applying written or oral procedures for hearing criminal cases: Oral procedure must be guaranteed in cases where questions of criminal liability and personal guilt are solved at the first instance court hearings; Oral procedure usually has to be guaranteed in cases where during the procedure at the first instance court hearing the questions of criminal liability and personal guilt are solved, although oral procedure may be limited and the procedure may be conducted in written form if new evidence are not investigated and there is no doubt for deciding whether oral procedure is better for understanding the case; Oral procedure need not be guaranteed only in cases where questions of application of the law are solved and if oral procedure was guaranteed during the procedure at the court of first instance; Written procedure may guarantee the right to a fair trial, where the participants of the procedure are allowed to provide various explanations and written documents or a person is allowed to ask for an oral court hearing. (shrink)

Controversial cases in medical ethics are, by their very nature, divisive. There are disagreements that revolve around questions of fact or of value. Ethical debate may help in resolving those disagreements. However, sometimes in such cases, there are opposing reasonable views arising from deep-seated differences in ethical values. It is unclear that agreement and consensus will ever be possible. In this paper, we discuss the recent controversial case of Vincent Lambert, a French man, diagnosed with a vegetative state, for whom (...) there were multiple court hearings over a number of years. Both family and health professionals were divided about whether artificial nutrition and hydration should be withdrawn and Lambert allowed to die. We apply a ‘dissensus’ approach to his case and argue that the ethical issue most in need of scrutiny is different from the one that was the focus of attention. (shrink)

Reform of child justice system has started with enactment of the Children Act 2013 in Bangladesh. The Act adopted a number of institutional setup for child friendly justice i.e. child help desks in the police station, separate children’s court, child development centres, national child welfare board etc. These all are inter-linked and the responsibilities of concerned authorities have been focused in the law. In practice, most of the children are deprived from their fair justice in different phases i.e. police (...) arrest, prosecution, court hearing and correctional treatment as there are lack of professional ethics of concerned personnel. Ethical approach, skill and knowledge of personnel are major challenges for treatment of offender children. Thus code of ethics are important for professionals to provide value-based justice for the best interest of the children. The study focuses on the legal and ethical responsibility towards child justice system in the country to protect child rights and their childhood. (shrink)

Abstract:Untranslatability and resistance are terms that have a longstanding place in psychoanalytic theory and philosophies of law. But how might these terms labor differently whence their conditions rest on the founding conditions of antiblackness that position blackness as a type of permanent errancy? Pursuing the question on the untranslatability of blackness, antiblackness, and the resistances therein and thereof, the article adumbrates on the strange and estranged forty-year gap between the anti-lynching legislation’s enactment and its first court hearing (1969) as (...) well as its second court hearing (1999)—cases which have translated the statute’s original legislative intent from anti-lynching to “self-lynching.” As the article considers the untranslatability of blackness in the various registers of “resistance” in law, representation, and the psychic economies of antiblackness, it also reflects on how the transience of such translation casts an impossible “self” via a mode of lynching in the juridical imaginary—a type of foreclosure that precedes and operates beyond the orders of de jure and de facto law. (shrink)

One of the ways in which film was used by the communist authorities for propaganda purposes was to present show trials. The aim of the article is an attempt to explain how film was used in Poland to discredit defendants in trials before courts during the Stalinist period. How were the roles of the participants in the court proceedings presented in the film? How were the films from court hearings to be used to depreciate the defendants in (...) the eyes of society, and to legitimise and strengthen the authority of the new government? The article is based on examples of films from show political trials of “enemies of the people” in Poland in the 1940s and 1950s. (shrink)

Legal wiretapping has gained importance in law enforcement along with the development of information and communication technology. Understanding the language of intercepted persons is essential for the success of a police investigation. Hence, intercept interpreters, as we suggest calling them in this article, are hired. Little is known about this specific work at the interface between language and law. With this article, we desire to contribute to closing this gap by focussing particularly on the translational activity. Our study identifies a (...) fragmented field of research due to the difficulty in accessing workers in this specific field who interpret in a highly confidential phase of criminal investigations. The findings, which are drawn from scarce studies and our empirical data derived from an online questionnaire for a pilot study in Switzerland, demonstrate the wide range of the performed activity intercept interpreting. This article is the first to present translational activity from the perspective of intercept interpreters. The activity differs in many ways from interpretation in court hearings or police interviews. Hence, we suggest categorising interlingual intercept interpretation as a translational activity sui generis and—since previous research has not done justice to the ethical and deontological questions that intercept interpretation raises—advocate for further transdisciplinary research in this field of translation. (shrink)

Inside the Constitutional Court of South Africa hangs Judith Mason’s artwork, entitled The Man Who Sang and the Woman Who Kept Silent, more commonly known as The Blue Dress. Mason created the artwork to commemorate Phila Ndwandwe and Harold Sefola after hearing testimony from the perpetrators of their deaths at the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). In this article I explore how The Blue Dress contributes to the reimagining of human rights culture in South Africa in three (...) key ways. First, the artwork is a symbolic reparation that recognizes the harm suffered under apartheid. Second, the artwork is an alternative record of women’s experiences of sexual violence; experiences which are largely absent from the official TRC record. Third, the artwork is a form of judicial consciousness which keeps the past alive so that a different future can be imagined. I argue that The Blue Dress instantiates an “ethics of responsibility” in post-apartheid human rights discourse. That is, the responsibility to remember past violations of human rights in order to prevent future ones and the responsibility to recognize past triumphs of human rights in order to support future ones. The article draws on seven months of participant observation fieldwork at the Court, which included fifty-four interviews with judges, clerks, staff members, advocates, artists, curators, and visitors, as well as visual and archival research. (shrink)

How do you decide what is ethically wrong and right? Few people make moral judgments by taking the theory first. Specifically written with the interests, needs, and experience of students in mind, this textbook approaches thinking ethically as you do in real life – by first encountering practical moral problems and then introducing theory to understand and integrate the issues. Built around engaging case studies from news media, court hearings, famous speeches and philosophical writings, each of the 15 (...) chapters: - explains and defines the moral problem dealt with - provides excerpts of readings on all sides of the issue - analyses the problem, using the relevant theory The examples are recognizable ethical problems, including judgments about racism and sexism, controversial debates such as assisted suicide and the death penalty, and contemporary concerns like privacy and technology, corporate responsibility, and the environment. The mission of the book is to assist you to engage in informed, independent, critical thinking and to enable you to enter into ethical discussions in the classroom and beyond. Supported by learning features, including study questions, key quotes, handy definitions and a companion website, this book is essential for any student of moral philosophy. (shrink)

I explore both the potential and the perils of Twitter as a space for constituting a Deweyan public aimed at transforming how "we" (here, I mean not only citizens of the United States but global citizens) affectively receive and thereby respond to and resist sexual violation. In the course of this brief exploration, I operate with a pragmatic notion of "truth," namely, as democratically formulating a hypothesis concerning the nature of a social problem that enables fruitful amelioration of the problem. (...) I specifically focus on the viral #WhyIDidntReport Twitter campaign provoked by Brett Kavanaugh's Supreme Court hearing. (shrink)

_The Case of the Speluncean Explorers, _written in 1949 by Lon Fuller, is the most famous fictitious legal case of all time. Describing a case of trapped travellers who are forcd to cannibalize one of their team, it is used on courses in philosophy of law and Jurisprudence to show how their trial upon rescue touches on key concepts in philosophy and legal theory such as utilitarianism and naturalism. _The Case of the Speluncean Explorers: Nine New opinions_ includes a reprint (...) of Fuller's classic article and a much-needed revision of and addition to the five openings originally expressed in the case by the five Supreme Court Judges. Peter Suber carefully and clearly introduces students to the main themes of Fuller's article before introducing nine new opinions. These opinions include perspectives from communitarian, feminist, multicultural, postmodern and economic theories of law, updating Fuller's original case and bringing contemporary theories of law to bear on the five original opinions. Why read this book? One reason is to get beyond sloganeering about "judicial activism" and "activist judges". The book is an enjoyable and even-handed way to understand what the debate is about. It doesn't tell you what to think, but illustrates the contending positions and lets you think for yourself. It will show you how judges with different moral and political beliefs interpret written law, how they use precedents, how they conceive the proper role of judges, how they conceive the relationship between law and morality, and how they defend their judicial practices against criticism. It anchors all of this in a Supreme Court hearing of a gripping, concrete case on which real people disagree. The book uses no jargon and assumes no prior knowledge of law or legal philosophy. (shrink)

To study Judicial determinants of the ordered obstetrical and fertility interventions. Nature, corresponding laws, decisions upon the 37 expounded holdings at the Probate, Trial, District, Appellate, and Supreme Courts are studied in 92 published materials identified through the ACOG, RCOG, SOCG portals, and Legal Scholarship Repository. Hearings are held in the US (83.8 %), Canada (10.8 %) and U.K (5.4 %). Of all the hearings reviewed, 27 % concern mentally impaired, 37.8 %-maternal incompetence, and 21.6 % cases are (...) of criminal nature. The Judicial determinants vary from country to country. In Canada, the ordered medical interventions are effected by the child protection legislation, whereas in the US, by court orders. In majority of cases, orders are obtained by dismissing the patriae petitions for involuntary sterilizations of mentally impaired sui juris adults (57 %); coerced obstetrical interventions (33.3 %), fetal custody (50 %); enforcement of surrogacy contracts (62.5 %) in favor of the Common Humanity Benefit clause; and recognizing the rights to inherit in posthumously conceived children (80 %) pursuant to the Social Security Act, Law of obviousness, Law of inherent anticipation, and Intestacy statute. Current study prioritizes two questions: (1) whether it is justified to override the wishes of a competent patient purportedly in her best interests; and (2) whether the patient’s autonomy and competence is an absolute concept. With the law unsettled as to a woman’s right to assent a treatment and contradict her fetus, parties concerned with fetal rights should consider exercising of screening tools on maternal judgmental fitness jointly developed by medical and legal practitioners. Further, given the advances in gamete conservations, states consider enacting legislation in order to safeguard the orderly administration of estates disrupted by claims from posthumously conceived children. A balance must be struck between the child’s right to inherit, the state’s interest, as well as the interests of prior born children. (shrink)

As I write, I hear that Dr. Jack Kevorluan has delivered another victim to the emergency room of his local Michigan hospital. Why do physicians and terminally ill patients feel we need to change the law with respect to assisted suicide when a rogue pathologist, who has been stripped of his medical license, is allowed to pursue his appetite for providing his clients with inhalation treatments of carbon monoxide gas? If no court will convict this outlaw, what makes the (...) physicians and patients who brought Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington and Quill v. Vacco fear that any court would ever convict a licensed physician of assisting in a suicide when he/she writes one of her established patients a prescription for a short-acting barbiturate? Moreover, it is not even clear that laws against assisted suicide in most jurisdictions were ever intended to apply to the actions of licensed physicians. Nonetheless, the plaintiffs in the Second and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals were clearly seeking some kind of redress, some kind of protection from potential legal claims they feared might be made against them. (shrink)

This book addresses the European Court of Human Rights’ fairness standards in criminal appeal, filling a gap in this less researched area of studies. Based on a fair trial immediacy requirement, the Court has found several violations of Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights at the appellate level by at least eighteen States of the Council of Europe in a vast array of cases, particularly in contexts of first instance acquittals overturning and of sentences increasing (...) on appeal. -/- On the one hand, the book critically engages this case-law with the law revisions it has recently inspired in European countries, as well as with the critiques and difficulties that it continues to raise. On the other hand, it interweaves insight from criminal procedure theory with new discoveries in the field of cognitive sciences (neuroscience of memory, philosophy of knowledge, AI), shedding an interdisciplinary light on the (in)adequacy and limits of the Strasbourg Court’s jurisprudence. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Landmark Legal Cases in BioethicsSusan Cartier Poland (bio)Only a few decades old, the interdisciplinary field of bioethics has developed surrounded by centuries of legal tradition and moral philosophy. Bioethics and the law have weaved back and forth over time influencing each field. Sometimes ethics leads the debate on problematical issues; for example, the Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee at the National Institutes of Health established regulations prior to initiating human (...) gene therapy. At other times, law takes over; Roe v. Wade, for example, has polarized and closed public discussion on abortion. Most frequently, however, scientific developments initiate discussion in both fields, as when the announcement of the birth of Dolly—the first cloned mammal—sparked President Clinton to ask the National Bioethics Advisory Commission for a report on cloning.A back-and-forth pattern also exists within the law itself, this time between legislator and judge. Legislators enact statutes, which apply universally to regulate conduct in society. Judges, on the other hand, interpret statutes and apply them to particular cases to resolve disputes between parties. Case law, as judge-made law is called, that grows in the absence of legislation becomes the common law. Legislatures can change the course of common law development by enacting more law, usually as amendments, but sometimes as repeals. A judge who sees the facts of a case or the law differently may also change the common law. And so the counterpoint between legislator and judge goes.A legal case becomes a landmark in bioethics because of its historical or precedential value to the field. Historical cases reflect judicial reasoning or rationalization that lays the conceptual foundation for a bioethical principle. Perhaps the best known example of this is the focus on the right to self-determination in Schloendorff that led to the development of informed consent. The principle of autonomy in bioethics derives its legal impetus from this line of cases.A case that acquires landmark status because of its precedential value does so for one of two reasons based on legal precedents. First, the case may be one of “first impression.” In the legal sense, that means that the particular case with its [End Page 191] facts or issues is the first one that a particular court has confronted within that court’s jurisdiction or area of decision-making authority. To be a landmark in bioethics, however, the ordinary sense of “first impression” applies. The first time that a particular bioethical topic has appeared in court for legal resolution makes a case one of “first impression” for bioethics. The case of Baby M on surrogacy contracts illustrates this.The second way in which a case can achieve landmark status based on precedents involves legal precedent and the jurisdictional basis of the court system. Under the common law system, a preceding case that involves the same or similar facts or issues as a current case must be followed by lower—i.e., less authoritative—courts in the same jurisdiction. That judicial rule of decision making is called stare decisis. It creates an institution of continuity, yet allows for change due to differences in judicial interpretation of facts and issues, which is called distinguishing the case.All courts under United States jurisdiction must follow the U.S. Supreme Court. By its sheer power of authority, the Court issues opinions that, if they concern bioethical topics, make cases landmarks in bioethics. For example, Roe v. Wade made abortion legal and set off the debate between maternal and fetal rights. Casey later refined, or to some redefined with a discussion of stare decisis, the bioethical underpinnings of Roe by framing the debate as one between maternal rights and state interests.In law, precedents concern only appellate cases. Trial courts, like that in McFall v. Shimp, handle questions of both fact and law. Appellate courts, like that in Brotherton, hear appeals from the lower trial courts and address legal issues only. Trial judges apply the law to facts, and appellate judges reason about the trial judge’s legal interpretation.Appellate court decisions are the ones most frequently published, either in print or electronically online, for citation. Consequently they are the easiest to locate and retrieve. “Reporters” as... (shrink)

When we hear about a transgression, we may consider whether the perpetrator’s individual circumstances make their transgression more understandable or excusable. Mitigating circumstances may reduce the severity of punishment that is deemed appropriate, both intuitively and legally. But importantly, in courts of public opinion and of law, mitigating information is typically presented only after information about a perpetrator’s transgression. We explore whether this sequence influences the force of mitigating evidence. Specifically, in two studies, we examined whether presenting evidence about a (...) perpetrator’s background before or after evidence of their violation influenced how severely U.S. participants punished perpetrators. In Study 1 (N = 132), evidence about the perpetrator’s mitigating circumstances reduced punishment only when it was presented before evidence about the perpetrator’s violation. Study 2 (N = 316) additionally revealed this moderating effect of presentation order across a variety of premeditated and impulsive violations. These findings are consistent with person-centered theories of punishment and with the Story Model of adjudication. (shrink)

In February 2020, the British Medical Association will be surveying members for their views on what the BMA’s position on physician-assisted dying should be. The BMA is currently opposed to physician-assisted dying in all its forms, a position that was agreed in 2006 at the annual representative meeting, the Association’s policy-making conference.1 As previously reported in Ethics briefing,2 the decision to survey members follows a motion passed at last year’s ARM which called on the BMA to “carry out a poll (...) of members to ascertain their views on whether the BMA should adopt a neutral position with respect to a change in the law on assisted dying”. The results from the survey will not determine BMA policy. Rather, the results be published ahead of this year’s ARM and provided to those attending to inform a debate and discussion on the BMA’s policy position. More information about the survey, including a briefing pack of useful information, and information for BMA members on how to participate can be found online at www.bma.org.uk/PAD. ### High Court rejects Judicial reviews on assisted suicide The High Court has refused permission for two separate challenges to the law on assisted suicide in the UK to proceed to a full hearing. In the first case, Phil Newby, who has motor neuron disease, applied for judicial review of the law on assisted suicide and asked for the court to carry out a detailed examination of what he termed “legislative facts” – that is, an examination of the existing evidence on the “costs, risks and benefits” of regulating assisted suicide – including a cross-examination of relevant expert witnesses.1 Handing down the judgement, Lord Justice Irwin and Mrs Justice May, held that assisted dying …. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 11.4 (2001) 391-400 [Access article in PDF] Bioethics Inside the Beltway A Shooting on Capitol Hill: "The Ruby Satellite System," Mental Illness, and Failure of the American Legal System Peter J. Cohen On 24 July 1998, Russell Eugene Weston, Jr., stormed the United States Capitol, forced his way through a security checkpoint, bypassed a metal detector, and entered the office complex of Representative Tom (...) DeLay (R-TX), the House Majority Whip (Weil 1998). During this period of terror, he shot and killed two officers of the Capitol Police and seriously wounded another as they attempted to end his foray. 1 Weston was severely wounded by several Capital police officers and taken into custody. After being treated for his injuries, he was incarcerated in the District of Columbia. 2On 5 May 1999, Weston was transferred to the Federal Correctional Institute in Butner, North Carolina (United States v. Weston, 69 F. Supp. 2d 99 (D.D.C. 1999), 103), where he remains to this day. He has neither been brought to trial nor received appropriate psychiatric therapy, but continues to be warehoused "in solitary confinement under constant observation... in a psychotic state (United States v. Weston, 255 F.3d 873; LEXIS 16851 (U.S. App. 2001b), 3-4 [LEXIS]). I will briefly detail the legal events responsible for this mad situation and suggest alternative actions that should have been taken at the very onset of the case. Early Chronology Although overtly the crime appeared to be senseless and without any conceivable motivation, Weston believed that his acts were justified and necessary. The story he told to the court-appointed forensic psychiatrist, Sally C. Johnson, M.D., 3 was that while working for NASA in the early 1980s, he had developed a "Ruby Satellite System," a powerful machine that could reverse time. With access to this system, nothing was permanent--the user could simply reverse time and exit from the current scene. However, the "System" was now controlled by cannibals who were developing and spreading "Black Heva," the deadliest disease known to [End Page 391] humankind, similar to HIV or the plague. It resulted from human corpses rotting and turning black. Time was running out, and Weston believed he had to return to override the "Ruby Satellite System" in the Capitol so that he could stem the spread of "Black Heva" and prevent world calamity. He believed that if he were tried, convicted, and even executed, he could simply time reverse himself, place himself in a safe within the Capitol, and subsequently resume his life at whatever point he chose (United States v. Weston, 206 F.3d 9 (D.C. Cir. 2000), 19-20).On 22 April 1999, the district court accepted Dr. Johnson's diagnosis that Weston suffered from paranoid schizophrenia, the symptoms of which were so severe that he would be incapable of understanding the proceedings against him and of assisting in his own defense. On this basis, the court had no difficulty in finding him incompetent to stand trial (U.S. v. Weston 1999, 102).At Weston's initial hearing, Dr. Johnson had testified that medication would be efficacious in treating Weston's delusions: [T]he standard of care in someone suffering from this type of symptom picture would be to treat them with medication.... [T]here is a good likelihood that he'll have a positive response, positive in the sense that his symptoms will diminish in response to treatment.... The potential benefits to treating the defendant far outweigh the risks.... (U.S. v. Weston 1999, 108) The defense presented no expert testimony refuting Dr. Johnson's presentation. The district court then ordered that Weston begin receiving medication in order to render him nondangerous and competent for trial (U.S. v. Weston 1999, 108-9). The Problem Weston refused to be medicated! 4 He has continued to claim that the administration of antipsychotic drugs against his will would violate his Fifth Amendment due process liberty interest in avoiding unwanted bodily intrusion and implicated... (shrink)

Over the last decade, attention has crawled from out of the shadows into the philosophical limelight with several important books and widely read articles. Carolyn Dicey Jennings has been a key player in the attention revolution, actively publishing in the area and promoting awareness. This book was much anticipated by insiders and does not disappoint. It is in no way redundant with respect to other recent monographs, covering both a different range of material and developing novel positions throughout. The book (...) might have been called The Attending Self, since Jennings defines attention as mental prioritization controlled by the self. This invocation of the self is among her central innovations, and may prove to be the main source of controversy. I will highlight points of contention here, but want to emphasize at the outset that the book is essential reading for anyone interested in attention. Jennings also contributes to a range of other debates, which will help a broader audience appreciate the importance this topic.After a brief introduction, Jennings provides “a philosophical landscape” of attention (chap. 2), tracing the concept through history. This is an invaluable achievement that will be welcomed by both newcomers and veterans. Jennings exhibits enormous breadth, covering areas that contemporary philosophers of mind tend to neglect: medieval philosophy, Buddhist thought, and phenomenology, to name a few. We also get perspectives on attention from core figures in the Western canon, such as Descartes, Locke, and Kant, as well as thinkers who gave the topic a more political inflection: Mary Wollstonecraft and W. E. B. DuBois. Jennings surveys contemporary literature as well, locating recent work in these older lineages. Some authors get more treatment later in the book (e.g., William James and Wayne Wu). Overall, Jennings provides the best overview of this history I have seen. She proves that attention is not a new topic, but one with deep roots and one that can inform current debates; Jennings draws on these roots throughout. I would love to see a companion piece surveying scientific theories, including “gain control” and “biased competition,” which get little airtime in the book. Some recent philosophical theories are under-explored as well, including Chris Mole’s concept of cognitive unison (Jennings discusses other aspects of his view), Carlos Montemayor and Harry Haladjian’s exploration of attention’s diversity (we get a touch of this), and my own proposal that attention is a gateway to working memory (not mentioned here). That said, no extant survey is more complete.Chapter 3 begins with the empirical claim that attention is regulated by slow brainwaves, and then takes up two issues. The first is mental causation. Endorsing moderate emergentism, Jennings argues that slow brain waves are causally efficacious even though they are not reducible to lower-level processes. (The metaphysics and neuroscience are presented accessibly, aided by three appendixes.) Second, Jennings argues that these slow brain waves indicate that attention is controlled by the self. As someone who was never moved by the mental causation problem—I don’t think overdetermination threatens efficacy—I would have welcomed more development of this second issue. For one thing, in linking attention to subjective control, Jennings eschews the idea that there can be purely “bottom-up” attention driven by stimulus features alone. This goes against the orthodoxy in attention science, and makes it hard for her to accommodate phenomena such as “pop-out,” or the commonsense idea that attention can be “captured” by a sudden flash or loud sound. For another thing, I wanted to hear more on why Jennings relates slow brain waves to the self. Does this include the slow waves that occur during deep sleep? Is there even such a thing as the self? Is there one self or many? How do slow brain waves reflect our interests, projects, values, self-conceptions, autobiographical narratives, or social identities? Does the social self invoked by Wollstonecraft and DuBois gain a foothold here? The whole chapter campaigns against metaphysical reductionism, but arrives at a perspective on the self that will strike some readers as highly reductive.In the fourth chapter, Jennings sheds further light on her conjecture that attention involves the self by advancing the thesis that attention endows sensory information with meaning. On the face of it, this may sound implausible. Object recognition, reading, and many other meaning-involving processes can take place outside of attention and outside of consciousness. But Jennings has a richer notion of “meaning” in mind. She develops the idea of “subject unity,” which is imposition of structure on perception that reflects the interests of the perceiving subject. This, she claims, is what brings perception into the space of reasons. Along the way, she has interesting observations about binding, feature integration, and demonstrative reference. The material is highly original, and Jennings’s postulation of interest-based perceptual organization is compelling. At the same time, one might wonder whether interests are really relegated to the ambit of attentional control. Consider the cocktail party effect, wherein one’s own name captures attention. This implies a preattentive filter that reflects our interests. Emotionally charged words, facial expressions, and dangerous objects also work this way, and social biases can operate preattentively as well. If these reflect our interests, then meaning may arise outside attention.Jennings’s fifth chapter explores the relationship between attention and consciousness. Some authors have argued that attention is necessary and sufficient for consciousness. Jennings focuses primarily on the necessity claim. She does not systematically review the empirical literature here, but she addresses some of the key findings, and effectively rebuts studies that allege to find consciousness outside attention. She does not rest her case there, however. Instead, she identifies a new class of examples that purport to establish the possibility of consciousness without attention. Her central example she calls “conscious entrainment,” which is what we experience when engaged in habitual or skilled activities. Other possible examples touched on in the chapter include hypervigilance in individuals with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), passive movie watching, dreaming, and “attentional neglect.” These states all involve intense focus, Jennings admits, but not attention. To some readers this may sound contradictory. Isn’t focus a kind of attention? Don’t these states of absorption involve stimulus selection and enhancement of relevant features, suppression of distractors, and other hallmarks of attention? Jennings says none of this is tantamount to attention. Recall that she thinks attention is controlled by the self. In these cases, we are invited to imagine that the self takes a passive role: control is either ceded to the world (movie watching) or to previously mastered routines (skills and habits). Thus, Jennings’s claim that there is no attention in these cases hangs on her contentious thesis that attention requires a controlling self. One might also push back by arguing that, in some of Jennings’s allegedly selfless examples, the self remains involved. Skilled activities and hypervigilance, for example, can reflect personal interests.Skills and hypervigilance get more airtime in chapter 6. There, Jennings turns to questions of responsibility—a neglected topic in attention research. The chapter begins with a manslaughter trial in which the teenage plaintiff was given a light sentence because the judge evidently believed that the teen’s ADHD compromised his ability to control his actions. The example may be a bit triggering for people who have a personal relationship with this diagnosis, but, putting that aside, Jennings uses it to introduce the important concept of attention-based control. With reduced control, Jennings argues, comes reduced responsibility. I am inclined to see ADHD as involving dysregulation of attention (difficulty disengaging and dividing attention, for example) rather than diminished attention, but that can still be characterized as an issue with control of attention; therefore ADHD still illustrates Jennings’s point that there is a link between responsibility and control of attention. This, it turns out, is only half of her story. Having argued for this link, one might expect Jennings to follow Wayne Wu, who contends that attention is necessary for action, and hence for responsibility. She does not. Instead, she says argues that responsibility can also arise in cases of “strategic automaticity.” This brings us back to skills. When skills are deployed, action is governed by learned pairings between stimuli and responses. The choice to exercise a skill requires attention, so attention is needed for being a responsible agent, but once a skill kicks in, attention is no longer required, and one can be held responsible for actions performed skillfully—thus attention is not required for responsibility tout court. Jennings addresses an opposing view (defended by Wu, Ellen Fridland, and Barbara Montero), according to which skills involve “automatic attention” rather than no attention. Jennings worries that this move will collapse the distinction between attention and other kinds of selection and filtering that occur throughout the nervous system, including the retina. She says that the attentional interpretation of skilled action is at odds with the lack of top-down reweighing of sensory inputs, regulated by lateral frontal cortex. These objections to automatic attention warrant response. My own view is that attention involves broadcasting to working memory, so retinal filtering is ruled out. Jennings’s insistence on top-down reweighing will not move those who believe attention can be purely bottom-up. For all that, I side with Jennings in wanting to allow for responsibility without attentional control. I think we can be responsible for implicit biases, for example. I also think attentional control is insufficient for responsibility, as when we act under duress.Jennings offers fresh perspective on the nature of attention, and its role in meaningful perception, consciousness, action, and responsibility. Each chapter can be read separately, but they hang together well, and each reflects her thesis that attention is essentially linked to the self. Though I am skeptical of that strong claim, we would do well to follow Jennings in regarding attention as interest-laden interface between mind and world. I look forward to a sequel in which attention is related to richer conceptions of identity, and where the political consequences of this link are actively explored. Meanwhile, one can hardly fault Jennings for covering too little. She tackles a remarkable range of topics, from metaphysics to ethics. Her arguments throughout demand response, repay careful study, and propel the field forward. (shrink)

On the grounds of a former Ottoman palace overlooking the Bosphorus, member nations of the European Union and the Organization of the Islamic Conference met in the first-ever O.I.C.-E.U. Joint Forum, initiated by Turkey in the aftermath of Sept. 11 "to promote understanding and harmony among civilizations." Some 70 nations took part, including Iran and Iraq, two points on Washington's "axis of evil." As Turkish officials led their guests in discussing tolerance, appreciation of cultural diversity and the understanding of different (...) perceptions and values, the nearby State Security Court was hearing the latest freedom-of-expression cases on its docket. (shrink)

Over the past few years, universities in Lithuania have make changes to the legal study programs—obligatory subject Criminology moved to list of alternative optional subjects. Therefore, is increasing the number of new lawyers, who have not studied criminology, which thinking about criminals, crime victims, crime, its causes and successful impact on crime, is based on stereotype understanding of a few centuries ago. However, the new lawyers, being professionals, pre-trial investigators, advocates, prosecutors, judges play a crucial role in criminal proceedings, to (...) decide the fate of people, how to use public resources for crime control and prevention. They will make speeches during the hearing in courts savour of their complete incomprehension of processes speaking about. Purpose of the article is to assess what criminological competencies are important to lawyers today, what are the possible consequences for the Lithuanian society if lawyers do not acquire these competencies. There are used the methods of analysis, aggregation, comparison and others. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Towards Language Justice:A Call to Identify and Overcome Structural BarriersFelicity RatwayThe patient I am interpreting for praises my interpretation. I've done nothing particularly noteworthy to merit her praise; I followed basic ethical tenets, nothing more. Hearing everything the provider says rather than a brief synopsis exceeds her expectations after many experiences working with untrained interpreters, or being refused interpreting services altogether. The bar shouldn't be this low.I am exhausted. (...) Like most interpreters, I am an independent contractor. I must work 5 am–9 pm to get paid for 8 hours of work. With some language companies, I earn less than minimum wage. To many new interpreters, $35 per hour sounds great—then they realize that driving to and from a one-hour appointment involves two hours of unpaid drive time. In rural areas, this really takes a toll. I spend hours checking pay stubs; I find errors nearly every pay period, but I wouldn't have a court case for the repeated underpayments because when I reach out to ask for the errors to be fixed, they are eventually corrected. Despite my state and national certifications and Master's degree in Interpreting and Translation Studies, medical interpreting doesn't pay the bills. I supplement my income through multiple other jobs.Laws intended to protect the patients we work with as interpreters are seldom enforced. Title VI Guidance defines a competent interpreter as one who has been trained, demonstrated proficiency, demonstrated interpreting skills, and agrees to abide by ethical standards. Patients fare better when competent interpreters are available, but when most patient and provider experiences are with interpreters who haven't met competency standards, patients and providers (understandably) lose trust in the profession. The profession has few opportunities for advancement and struggles to attract interpreters to go through rigorous training or build a long-term career. Skilled interpreters soon leave for greener pastures: the Oregon Health Authority (OHA) houses a registry of interpreters who meet minimum state training and proficiency requirements, and a 2019–2021 study found that roughly 92% of interpreters due to renew dropped off of the registry instead.When I began interpreting, I was shocked by how infrequently laws protecting patients' rights to interpreting services were followed in practice. At primary care appointments, patients often cannot answer questions about specialist visits because interpretation was not provided at the specialist's office. I knew recipients of federal funds couldn't [End Page 164] legally bill patients for interpreting services, yet I was asked to sight-translate paperwork that stated patients would be billed for interpreting services if they were late to an appointment. I reported the issue; years later, the same paperwork would still appear on their public-facing website. I discovered that though state law required credentialed interpreters to be made available, no agency had been tasked with enforcing that law; all that could be done with my complaint was to refer it to the patient's insurance company.In Oregon, Coordinated Care Organizations (CCOs) manage Medicaid plans, and are required to pay for interpreting services for their members. Instead of hiring interpreters directly, many contract with language companies that, in turn, hire us. Providers must book interpreters through the specific language companies contracted with the patient's CCO to avoid paying for the interpreter themselves. I am often called to interpret for speakers of indigenous languages even though I am not able to meet their needs as a Spanish interpreter. I offer contact information for organizations that could provide interpretation in the appropriate language, but the receptionist tells me that she can only go through specific vendors because the clinic doesn't want to have to pay out-of-pocket. Indigenous-led organizations that pay indigenous interpreters a living wage are not contracted with the CCOs in my region. In some cases, when interpreters are not available for a particular language through the CCO's preferred vendor, providers instead ask that an appointment be rescheduled, hoping that an interpreter will be available later. I have seen speakers of rare languages seeking primary care end up in the hospital after being rescheduled several times.Providers I work with often don't know... (shrink)

A 78-year-old Chinese woman joined a clinical trial sponsored by a Pharmaceutical companies. Unfortunately a serious Serious Adverse Event occurred. The sponsor paid for the cost of the medical care arising from the SAE, but refused the family’s request for compensation. The family then sued the company and the hospital in Beijing. Although the SAE was related to a complication of lower extremity angiography and not the drug itself, it was a direct consequence of participating in the trial. According Good (...) Clinical Practice, a set of regulations promulgated under Chinese law, “the sponsor should provide Insurance to those human subjects who participate in clinical trials, cover the cost of Treatment and the corresponding economic compensation for the occurrence of the harm or death associated with the trial”. The court ordered the trial sponsor to provide a translation of the company’s insurance policy, so that the court could understand the amount of compensation available to the Patient under the policy, but the sponsor never surrendered either the documentation or a translation. Consensus was never reached about the amount of compensation due to the patient through negotiation with the hospital, the company and the family. The Litigation ended after nine hearings and five long years. This chapter provides an ethical analysis of the case relative to at least three areas of Risks of Exploitation when a major, international Pharmaceutical companies sponsors clinical research in a country with an immature legal system and where Research participants have limited resources. (shrink)

An important but unstudied event in US legal institutions is when judges question plaintiff and defense attorneys about the issue that brings them to an appeals hearing before a state supreme court. In this article I analyze judges' questioning during the oral argument phase of the New York Court of Appeals' hearing of Hernandez v. Robles, a case concerning whether the state was violating same-sex couples' constitutional rights by denying them access to marriage. The article's purpose is to (...) show how the content, format, and language style of judges' questioning turns constructs the judges as persons possessing particular attitudes, judicial philosophies, political leanings, and personalities. The article provides a quantitative overview of the 186 questioning turns and analyzes the discourse in selected episodes to evidence how features of questioning generate identity inferences. The conclusion considers how the oral argument phase of Appeals Court proceedings contributes to larger discourses of the law. (shrink)

This paper explores how scientific knowledge is used in a criminal case. I examine materials from an admissibility hearing in a murder trial and discuss the dynamics of contesting expert scientific opinion and evidence. The research finds that a purported form of “science” in the relevant scientific community is filtered through, tested by, and subjected to legal standards, conceptions, and procedures for determining admissibility. The paper details how the opposing lawyers, the expert witness, and the judge vie to contingently work (...) out what will count in court as appropriate scientific authority, methods and evidence, and as a scientifically valid and legally admissible account of “reasonable fear.” When science becomes enmeshed in legal controversies, science does not trump law. Rather, it is the court’s canons of proper procedure and measures of substantive adequacy that take precedence. (shrink)

For hundreds of years, Muslim Spain was the most tolerant place in Europe. Christians, Muslims, and Jews were able to live together there more or less peacefully. The three religious groups maintained a tolerant convivencia, or coexistence, thanks partly to a twofold distinction among kinds of people that was essential to the particularist doctrine of Islam influential in Spain. Islamic doctrine distinguishes first between Muslim and non-Muslim peoples and second between those non-Muslims who are, like Muslims themselves, “Peoples of the (...) Book” and those non-Muslims who are “pagan.” These two distinctions, taken together, could amount to the difference between life and death. For example, Muslim courts ruled on the basis of the Koran that those “others” who were Peoples of the Book could not legally be put to the sword for refusing to convert to Islam while those “others” who were pagan could be. Christians and Jews had to be put up with, and usually were.2 1. Henry Kamen, Inquisition and Society in Spain in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries , p. 264; my emphasis; hereafter abbreviated I.2. The Koran grounds the series of divisions outlined and is consistent with the well-known Pact of Umar I, which established special regulations for Christians and Jews living in Muslim lands: “’There is to be no compulsion in religion. Rectitude has been clearly distinguished from error. So whoever disbelieves in idols and believes in Allah has taken hold of the firmest handle. It cannot split. Allah is All-hearing and All-knowing’” . See also Sura 109:6: “To you your religion, to me my religion.” Marc Shell, a John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Fellow for 1990-95, is head of the department of comparative literature at the University of Massachusetts in Amherst. His books include The Economy of Literature , Money, Language, and Thought: Literary and Philosophical Economies from the Medieval to the Modern Era , and The End of Kinship: “Measure for Measure,” Incest, and the Ideal of Universal Siblinghood . Children of the Earth is forthcoming. (shrink)

Around 990, somewhere in Catalonia, a certain Julius was staying in the house of a certain Ramió. Unbeknownst to Ramió, Julius was stealing from him: mostly bread and wine, and perhaps other things as well. Eventually Ramió figured out what was going on, but instead of dragging Julius to the comital court, Ramió made a deal with him. As part of this deal, Ramió promised Julius not to involve the lawyers: neither he nor his descendants would get any count, (...) viscount, or advocate to prosecute the matter of the theft, under the heavy penalty of a pound of gold. How do we know about all this? Because Julius got Ramió to write up a document recording it: a scriptura securitate, which is currently preserved in the episcopal archive of Vic. This is the only such document that I have come across in Catalan sources, and it is absent from an influential tenth-century formula book from Catalonia. The scribe himself did not quite know how to handle the situation, as he began the document with the formula for a simple gift, as if Ramió were granting something tangible to Julius: “In nomine Domini. Ego Ramio donator …” Historians who do not work on Catalonia are no doubt tired of hearing those who do refer to the apparent mania for the written word in this society, but it is documents like this that lie behind such claims. If we may judge by the rarity of their names in contemporary documents from this region, Ramió and Julius are nobodies—a small-time landowner and a petty thief—but for some reason, in working out their dispute they decided that it was necessary to round up three witnesses and hire a scribe to put something down on parchment. (shrink)

The right to a fair trial is implemented in our criminal procedure and is one of the core values of our criminal justice system. This right is absolute and can’t be limited on any legal base. Its essence is fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial court with guaranteeing of all the minimum rights of the defendant. One of those minimum rights is the right of equity of arms between the parties, the prosecutor and the defense. In (...) our Law on Criminal Procedure, it is provided that the defense has the same rights and duties as the prosecutor except those rights that belong to the prosecutor as a state authority. Therefore, the purpose of this article is elaborating the right of ‘equity of arms’ and its misunderstanding in practice. Hence, we intend to show some case studies in which some evidence are not considered by the court just because they are not proposed by the prosecutor and they are crucial for the verdict. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Weight of Rhetoric: Studies in Cultural DeliriumThomas B. FarrellThere is something of this anachronistic doggedness in all importance, and to use it as a criterion of thought is to impose on thought a spellbound fixity, and a loss of self-reflection. The great themes are nothing other than primeval rumblings which cause the animal to pause and try to bring them forth once again. This does not mean that (...) the hierarchy of importance should be ignored. Just as its narrow- mindedness reflects that of the system, so it is saturated with all the latter’s force and stringency. Thought ought not, however, to repeat this hierarchy, but by completing, end it. The division of the world into important and unimportant matters, which has always served to neutralize the key phenomena of social injustice as mere exceptions, should be followed up to the point where it is convicted of its own untruth. The division which makes everything objects must itself become an object of thought, instead of guiding it. The large themes will then make their appearance, though hardly in the traditional “thematic” sense, but refractedly and eccentrically.—Theodor Adorno, Minima MoraliaBoy, you’re going to carry that weight, carry that weight a long time.—The Beatles [End Page 467]Preface: on Attachments—Flowers and the InfinitesimalThe number of adjustments it takes to make a square into a circle, the number of times any real number may be subdivided before reaching zero, the grainy inflections differentiating snowflakes, the differences among petals in a tulip—these are the sort of qualitative distinctions some of us might call minute and other cynical souls might consider trivial. But if the attachment of real human interest to objects of longing is any measure of worth, then they are far from insignificant.Imagine the following sequence of events. A young kid, fourteen or so, is out with some friends one summer evening and decides—on a whimsical adolescent impulse—to pick some tulips from a neighbor’s garden to leave at a girlfriend’s front porch. What follows?The neighbors, one of whom turns out to be a self-professed horticulturist and gardening aficionado, call the police and file a criminal complaint. The girlfriend’s parents give the alleged offender’s name to the same authorities. When the kid comes to the door of the neighbors to apologize, he is verbally threatened. When he writes a letter of contrition and remorse to the neighbors, they turn the letter over to the police as evidence. One day later, the neighbors angrily phone local school officials to complain of his behavior. Two days later, when two of the kid’s accomplices are summarily removed from eighth grade, taken to the police station, fingerprinted, and booked (without being informed of their rights), the parents reluctantly secure the services of an attorney (two attorneys, actually). When an outof- court settlement is finally agreed to, it is discovered that the city police have already passed the case on to the State’s Attorney’s Office. A criminal hearing will now need to be held in juvenile court. When the hearing is held, the charges are summarily dismissed. The cost? Several hundred dollars a tulip (with side effects including migraines, despondency, two trips to the emergency room, not to mention rather hefty attorneys’ fees).As the reader has probably surmised by now, this thinly disguised episode did not occur to Gregor Samsa but to someone near and dear to your author. It did not occur in Singapore but in Evanston, Illinois. All of us can probably recall occasions when things seemed to careen wildly out of control and apparently minor matters took on disproportionately inflated significance. We struggle to “make sense” of these episodes, for ourselves and others. In the above example, two allegories about magnitude surfaced. One, relayed to me by our grizzled Chicago attorney, addressed the question [End Page 468] of how to explain these events to our son. “Tell him,” he said, “that there are a lot of jerks in the world” (except he didn’t use the word “jerks”). A second allegory emerged rather belatedly. There was more than one nonrational attachment in... (shrink)

La judicialización de la política argentina abre un hiato entre el creciente activismo en materia política desarrollado por los tribunales de justicia y la tradicional legitimidad atribuida al judicial en tanto que poder conservador de la constitución. Este déficit de legitimidad del poder judicial ha intentado subsanarse mediante el recurso a instancias participativas, inspiradas en el modelo de la democracia deliberativa. Esto ha dado lugar a una serie de innovaciones institucionales en la corte suprema argentina, como la admisión de amigos (...) del tribunal y la celebración de audiencias públicas. La evaluación de estas experiencias permite, sin embargo, identificar una concepción de la participación ciudadana que apunta a la intervención de especialistas y que privilegia la intermediación de abogados y juristas. The judicialization of Argentine politics opens a gap between the activism in political matters developed by the judges and the legitimacy traditionally attributed to the judiciary, as the power in charge of the conservation of the constitution. Recent efforts to supersede this deficit in terms of legitimacy pointed to participatory processes, inspired by the model of deliberative democracy. In this sense, the Argentine supreme court has developed a series of institutional innovations, such as the admission of amici curiae and the holding of public hearings. The evaluation of these experiences allows nonetheless to identify an underlying conception of citizen participation focused on the intervention of specialists and the intermediation of lawyers and legal scholars. (shrink)

In Patel v. Midland Memorial Hospital & Medical Center, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the defendant hospital did not violate the plaintiff's due process rights by suspending his clinical privileges without a pre-suspension hearing, where there were reasonable grounds for assuming that patient safety was at risk. Dr. P.V. Patel, a board-certified cardiologist, brought an action against Midland Memorial Hospital and several of its doctors, alleging that the suspension of his clinical privileges violated (...) his right to a pre-suspension hearing; was the result of racial discrimination; and resulted in anticompetitive behavior in violation of antitrust laws. The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas granted Midland's motion for summary judgment. The parties filed cross appeals, Dr. Patel on the ground that there were genuine issues of fact for all of his claims, and Midland on the ground that, with the exception of the civil rights claim, it was immune from all of Dr. Patel's claims under the Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986. (shrink)