Burnout has important ramifications for employees and organizations and preventing burnout forms an ethical issue for managers. However, the role of the leader and especially the role of ethical aspects of leadership have received relatively little attention in relation to burnout to date. We conducted a survey among employees (N = 386) of a Dutch retail organization, nested in 122 teams with a leader. Our first contribution is that we empirically show the hypothesized opposing relationships of ethical and passive leadership (...) behavior with follower burnout. Furthermore, we examined two job characteristics as mechanisms that link these forms of leadership and burnout. Lastly, we show that the positive relationship of ethical leadership with burnout via role clarity (but not overload) is dependent on the degree of passive leadership the leader is perceived to display. Our results suggest that organizations should promote ethical leadership behaviors and limit passive leadership behaviors by stimulating leaders to be active in their role and use their social influence to promote ethical conduct. (shrink)

It is highly now intuitive that the future is open and the past is closed now—whereas it is unsettled whether there will be a fourth world war, it is settled that there was a first. Recently, it has become increasingly popular to claim that the intuitive openness of the future implies that contingent statements about the future, such as ‘There will be a sea battle tomorrow,’ are non-bivalent (neither true nor false). In this paper, we argue that the non-bivalence of (...) future contingents is at odds with our pre-theoretic intuitions about the openness of the future. These intuitions are revealed by our pragmatic judgments concerning the correctness and incorrectness of assertions of future contingents. We argue that the pragmatic data together with a plausible account of assertion shows that in many cases we take future contingents to be true (or to be false), though we take the future to be open in relevant respects. It follows that appeals to intuition to support the non-bivalence of future contingents are untenable. Intuition favours bivalence. (shrink)

We outline a framework of multilevel neurocognitive mechanisms that incorporates representation and computation. We argue that paradigmatic explanations in cognitive neuroscience fit this framework and thus that cognitive neuroscience constitutes a revolutionary break from traditional cognitive science. Whereas traditional cognitive scientific explanations were supposed to be distinct and autonomous from mechanistic explanations, neurocognitive explanations aim to be mechanistic through and through. Neurocognitive explanations aim to integrate computational and representational functions and structures across multiple levels of organization in order to explain (...) cognition. To a large extent, practicing cognitive neuroscientists have already accepted this shift, but philosophical theory has not fully acknowledged and appreciated its significance. As a result, the explanatory framework underlying cognitive neuroscience has remained largely implicit. We explicate this framework and demonstrate its contrast with previous approaches. (shrink)

There is a growing interest in aggregating more biomedical and patient data into large health data sets for research and public benefits. However, collecting and processing patient data raises new ethical issues regarding patient’s rights, social justice and trust in public institutions. The aim of this empirical study is to gain an in-depth understanding of the awareness of possible ethical risks and corresponding obligations among those who are involved in projects using patient data, i.e. healthcare professionals, regulators and policy makers. (...) We used a qualitative design to examine Swiss healthcare stakeholders’ experiences and perceptions of ethical challenges with regard to patient data in real-life settings where clinical registries are sponsored, created and/or used. A semi-structured interview was carried out with 22 participants between July 2014 and January 2015. The interviews were audio-recorded, transcribed, coded and analysed using a thematic method derived from Grounded Theory. All interviewees were concerned as a matter of priority with the needs of legal and operating norms for the collection and use of data, whereas less interest was shown in issues regarding patient agency, the need for reciprocity, and shared governance in the management and use of clinical registries’ patient data. This observed asymmetry highlights a possible tension between public and research interests on the one hand, and the recognition of patients’ rights and citizens’ involvement on the other. The advocation of further health-related data sharing on the grounds of research and public interest, without due regard for the perspective of patients and donors, could run the risk of fostering distrust towards healthcare data collections. Ultimately, this could diminish the expected social benefits. However, rather than setting patient rights against public interest, new ethical approaches could strengthen both concurrently. On a normative level, this study thus provides material from which to develop further ethical reflection towards a more cooperative approach involving patients and citizens in the governance of their health-related big data. (shrink)

Knowledge of the basic rules of logic is often thought to be distinctive, for it seems to be a case of non-inferential a priori knowledge. Many philosophers take its source to be different from those of other types of knowledge, such as knowledge of empirical facts. The most prominent account of knowledge of the basic rules of logic takes this source to be the understanding of logical expressions or concepts. On this account, what explains why such knowledge is distinctive is (...) that it is grounded in semantic or conceptual understanding. However, I show that this cannot be the correct account of knowledge of the basic rules of logic, because it is open to Gettier-style counter-examples. (shrink)

This paper concerns connection between knowing or accepting a logical principle such as Modus Ponens and actions of reasoning involving it. Discussions of this connection typically mention the so-called ‘Lewis Carroll Regress’ and there is near consensus that the regress shows something important about it. Also, although the regress explicitly concerns logic, many philosophers think that it establishes a more general truth, about the structurally similar connection between epistemic or practical principles and actions involving them. This paper’s first aim is (...) to address key interpretations Carroll’s regress as clearly as possible so as to show precisely how it might be relevant to questions concerning the connection between logical knowledge and reasoning, and, more broadly, to discussions of how epistemic or practical principles may be action-guiding. Its second aim is to show that the regress fails to establish anything of substance about the connection between logical knowledge and reasoning, or any other structurally similar relation, unless substantive, contentious and typically undefended assumptions are made. The consensus is thus on shaky ground. (shrink)

L’idée selon laquelle le temps, son organisation, sa discipline est un facteur discriminant permettant de séparer nettement la période industrielle de celle qui la précède a longtemps prévalu chez les historiens. Cet article s’inscrit en faux contre cette thèse : les conflits autour du temps de travail doivent être inscrits dans la longue durée des rapports sociaux de production. Nous dressons ici une esquisse large des conflits où le temps est un élément de la mobilisation des travailleurs, du XIVe au (...) premier XIXe siècle. Alors qu’au Moyen-Âge, certains conflits portent clairement sur la remise en cause de la définition du temps de travail, à partir du XVIIe siècle, le thème semble s’estomper. Mais apparaissent alors des conflits qui portent sur le contenu du travail effectué dans un temps donné. La première industrialisation ne change pas véritablement la nature des revendications. Elles proviennent encore majoritairement d’ouvriers engagés dans des activités traditionnelles. Les ouvriers d’usine, quant à eux, ne sortent globalement pas de leur mutisme avant les décennies 1860/1870. (shrink)

John MacFarlane has recently argued that his brand of truth relativism provides the best solution to the puzzle of future contingents: assertions about the future that express propositions that are metaphysically neither necessary nor impossible. In this paper, we show that even if we grant all of the metaphysical, semantic and pragmatic assumptions in terms of which MacFarlane sets and aims to solve the puzzle, his truth relativism is not apt to solve the problem of future contingents. We argue that (...) the theory fails to vindicate the intuition that future contingent propositions are neither true nor false, leaving the theory open to a charge of Reductio. We show that these problems cannot be answered while preserving the core tenets of truth relativism. (shrink)

This paper argues that the prominent accounts of logical knowledge have the consequence that they conflict with ordinary reasoning. On these accounts knowing a logical principle, for instance, is having a disposition to infer according to it. These accounts in particular conflict with so-called ‘reasoned change in view’, where someone does not infer according to a logical principle but revise their views instead. The paper also outlines a propositional account of logical knowledge which does not conflict with ordinary reasoning.

Normal 0 false false false MicrosoftInternetExplorer4 /* Style Definitions */ table.MsoNormalTable {mso-style-name:"Table Normal"; mso-tstyle-rowband-size:0; mso-tstyle-colband-size:0; mso-style-noshow:yes; mso-style-parent:""; mso-padding-alt:0in 5.4pt 0in 5.4pt; mso-para-margin:0in; mso-para-margin-bottom:.0001pt; mso-pagination:widow-orphan; font-size:10.0pt; font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-ansi-language:#0400; mso-fareast-language:#0400; mso-bidi-language:#0400;} Carlos Castaneda’s books and his New Age shamanistic religion raise, beyond the controversy regarding the counterfeit character of his ethnographic narrative and charlatanism, several methodological problems. Educated within the emerging paradigm of emic studies and ethnomethodoly of the 1960s, Castaneda used it in order to set a very clever methodological (...) trap: Can an ethnologist and historian of religions discard a religious movement on account that its initiator is a charlatan or, at best, an enlightened or self-deluded individual? In order to tackle this dilemma, in this article I successively rally several methods and hermeneutics: reader-response theory, phenomenological anthropology, ethnomethodology and emic studies, psychoanalysis, fictional worlds theory, and “make believe / make belief” theatrical theory. (shrink)

In his recent political writings, Habermas has opposed his cosmopolitan project to that of the Bushite neoconservatives. However, this article argues that in some respects Habermas's works come closer to the neoconservative agenda than he realizes and that this poses a potential danger of its being appropriated by precisely the camp he opposes. These problems particularly come to the fore in his analysis of Islamic fundamentalism, democracy and the Middle East, but also in his recommendations concerning UN-based internationalism and his (...) appeals to Woodrow Wilson. By tracking these problematic areas in Habermas's work, this article argues that Habermas needs to engage in a more carefully articulated, concrete and empirical analysis if he is to avoid these problems. (shrink)

In Paul’s argument against dissensions, Paul is said to have tried to regain his authority before the Corinthians. The first rhetorical unit is thus seen as an apologia. In his argument, he seemingly uses the concept of paterfamilias known to have evoked power and control. However, such a proposal neglects the fact that Paul’s argument is against exactly such type of discourse in which one seeks to elevate one teacher against another. Rather, in the use of the concept of paterfamilias (...) we should see Paul redefining the concept and filling it with affection. (shrink)

This paper considers the problem of assigning meanings to empty natural kind terms. It does so in the context of the Twin-Earth externalist-internalist debate about whether the meanings of natural kind terms are individuated by the external physical environment of the speakers using these terms. The paper clarifies and outlines the different ways in which meanings could be assigned to empty natural kind terms. And it argues that externalists do not have the semantic resources to assign them meanings. The paper (...) ends on a sceptical note concerning the fruitfulness of using the Twin-Earth setting in debates about the semantics of empty natural kind terms. (shrink)

This paper considers the question of what knowing a logical rule consists in. I defend the view that knowing a logical rule is having propositional knowledge. Many philosophers reject this view and argue for the alternative view that knowing a logical rule is, at least at the fundamental level, having a disposition to infer according to it. To motivate this dispositionalist view, its defenders often appeal to Carroll’s regress argument in ‘What the Tortoise Said to Achilles’. I show that this (...) dispositionalist view, and the regress that supposedly motivates it, operate with the wrong picture of what is involved in knowing a logical rule. In particular I show that it gives us the wrong picture of the relation between knowing a logical rule and actions of inferring according to it, as well as of the way in which knowing a logical rule might be a priori. (shrink)

Classical logic counts sentences such as ‘Alice is identical with Alice’ as logically true. A standard objection to classical logic is that Alice’s self-identity, for instance, is not a matter of logic because the identity of particular objects is not a matter of logic. For this reason, many philosophers argue that classical logic is not the right logic, and that it should be abandoned in favour of free logic — logic free of existential commitments with respect to singular terms. In (...) most standard free logics, sentences such as ‘Alice is identical with Alice’ are not logically true. This paper argues that this objection from existential commitments is some- what superficial and that there is a deeper reason why ‘Alice is identical with Alice’ should not be considered a logical truth. Indeed, a key fundamental thought about the nature of logic is that a logical truth is true in virtue of its logical form. The fundamental problem I raise is that a sentence such as ‘Alice is identical with Alice’ appears to not even be true in virtue of its logical form. Thus this paper argues that given that such a sentence is not true in virtue of its logical form, it should not be counted as logically true. It moreover argues, on the same grounds, that even the sentences which free logicians regard as logically true shouldn’t be regarded as logically true. So in this sense free logic is no repair to classical logic. (shrink)

L’anorexie fait partie des troubles du comportement ou de la conduite alimentaire qui sont répertoriés dans le Manuel diagnostique et statistique des troubles mentaux, publié par la Société américaine de psychiatrie. Elle figure parmi les troubles majeurs cliniques, à côté de la dépression, du trouble bipolaire, de la schizophrénie, et de la boulimie à laquelle elle est associée comme s’il s’agissait de l’autre face d’une même pathologie addictive. Au-delà des critiques que ce rapprochement peut susciter, parce qu’il ne permet pas (...) d’analyser la spécificité du mode d’expression des personnes qui s’imposent ces.. (shrink)

We provide an explicit taxonomy of legitimate kinds of abstraction within constitutive explanation. We argue that abstraction is an inherent aspect of adequate mechanistic explanation. Mechanistic explanations—even ideally complete ones—typically involve many kinds of abstraction and therefore do not require maximal detail. Some kinds of abstraction play the ontic role of identifying the specific complex components, subsets of causal powers, and organizational relations that produce a suitably general phenomenon. Therefore, abstract constitutive explanations are both legitimate and mechanistic.

The aim of this paper is to show what sorts of logics are required by externalist and internalist accounts of the meanings of natural kind nouns. These logics give us a new perspective from which to evaluate the respective positions in the externalist-internalist debate about the meanings of such nouns. The two main claims of the paper are the following: first, that adequate logics for internalism and externalism about natural kind nouns are second-order logics; second, that an internalist second-order logic (...) is a free logic—a second order logic free of existential commitments for natural kind nouns, while an externalist second-order logic is not free of existential commitments for natural kind nouns—it is existentially committed. (shrink)

I address a type of circularity threat that arises for the view that we employ general basic logical principles in deductive reasoning. This type of threat has been used to argue that whatever knowing such principles is, it cannot be a fully cognitive or propositional state, otherwise deductive reasoning would not be possible. I look at two versions of the circularity threat and answer them in a way that both challenges the view that we need to apply general logical principles (...) in deductive reasoning and defuses the threat to a cognitivist account of knowing basic logical principles. (shrink)

Why do we continue to adopt lifestyles that are destructive to both the ecological and social levels? The relative failure of environmental ethics is, above all, due to the fact that it has neither been able to link ecology with a philosophy of existence that could enable people to respect nature and its beauty, nor to indicate the way to a possible renewal of democracy. One has to face this double task. By considering everything we live on and depend upon (...) as nourishment, and not as resources, we understand our inhabiting the earth as living together with other living beings. The political consequences of this phenomenology of corporeality, which emphasizes the aesthetic dimension of our relationship to nature, are highlighted. The question of which moral dispositions are required of subjects to achieve the ecological transition are highlighted, as well as the question of what kind of role aesthetics play in ethics and politics. (shrink)

Metaphysics, Psychology and Philosophy have defined the notion of archetype. We will argue that there is another concept, the “anarchetype” which could escape to the centralization and to any pre‑defined structure building on archetypes. Anarchetype belongs to anarchic and unpredictable structures denying center and logos. It could be used to study marginal or non coherent works far beyond occidental pattern. Eschatype is finally analysed. Some structures without any archetype have to draw an internal evolution before building any model or order. (...) If eschatype is not initially known, it finally shows up and exposes explanations, meanings and even a structure. Eschatype may then give birth to a new theme. It finally may be found in other supports or works, structure and archetype. (shrink)

A paradigmatic case of rigidity for singular terms is that of proper names. And it would seem that a paradigmatic case of rigidity for general terms is that of natural kind terms. However, many philosophers think that rigidity cannot be extended from singular terms to general terms. The reason for this is that rigidity appears to become trivial when such terms are considered: natural kind terms come out as rigid, but so do all other general terms, and in particular all (...) descriptive general terms. This paper offers an account of rigidity for natural kind terms which does not trivialise in this way. On this account, natural kind terms are de jure obstinately rigid designators and other general terms, such as descriptive general terms, are not. (shrink)

Dans ses romans « historiques », Umberto Eco revisite, de manière postmoderne, le grand bassin sémantique des « merveilles » de la littérature médiévale et de la Renaissance. Plus spécifiquement, dans L’Île du jour d’avant, il travaille sur la toile de fond de l’imaginaire cosmographique de l’âge des grandes « reconnaissances ». Les aventures du protagoniste suivent un trajet initiatique vers un « centre sacré » de la mappemonde, le méridien zéro. En même temps, les péripéties extérieures sont le corrélatif (...) d’une évolution intérieure, que nous analysons avec les instruments de la psychologie analytique jungienne. La colombe orange qui jaillit de l’île au moment culminant du roman, ayant les caractéristiques d’un Phénix — oiseau de la rédemption et la renaissance — est un symbole de l’accomplissement du personnage, de l’atteinte de son soi mystique. In his “historical” novels, Umberto Eco revisits, in a postmodern manner, the great “semantic basin” of the marvels from medieval and Renaissance literature. In his Island of the Day Before, he makes use of the cosmographic representations of the world from the “Age of Reconnaissance”. The adventures of the character are organized as an initiation journey towards a sacred center of the mappaemundi of the epoch, the Meridian 0. These objective events are the correlative of an internal evolution, which we analyze using concepts from Jungian psychology. The orange dove that springs from the island at the climax of the novel, resembling a classical Phoenix, is a symbol for the character’s realization of the mystique Self. (shrink)

On Fred Dretske’s account of knowledge, the Epistemic Closure Principle for knowledge is not valid. Dretske takes this to be a virtue since the account is thus able to saves ordinary knowledge from skepticism. On it, you may know that you have hands, although you do not know that you are not a handless brain in a vat. As a correlate, the account also has to countenance the existence of what has come to be known as ‘abominable conjunctions’ – conjunctions (...) of the form ‘I know I have hands but I do not know that I am not a handless brain in a vat’. These conjunctions are abominable in that they look false or in some way incoherent. Dretske suggests that the abomination is merely pragmatic and can be explain in terms of conversational features, more precisely, in terms of the Gricean Conversation Principles and its associated Maxims of Conversation. I argue that no such Gricean explanation is forthcoming, and that the abomination cannot be thought of as a merely pragmatic or conversational phenomenon. As I show, the abomination goes deeper, into the semantics. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Ideas 61.4 (2000) 561-575 [Access article in PDF] Claude de Seyssel's Translations of Ancient Historians Rebecca Boone Through his seven translations of ancient history Claude de Seyssel played a major role in transmitting knowledge about antiquity to the French. Despite this fact he has received little attention from scholars of the French Renaissance. Perhaps the problem is that Seyssel does not seem to fit (...) neatly into any category. He was neither French nor Italian but a Savoyard, not truly noble but the illegitimate son of a noble family, not truly a historian but a writer of history-based propaganda and a translator of histories. He began his career as a jurist, became a royal councillor, then a bishop, and in the end died as the Archbishop of Turin. Before his death Seyssel left numerous works, his most famous being a political treatise entitled La Monarchie de France, a work contemporaneous with The Prince by Machiavelli, with whom he shared a similar view of the political world. 1Much like Seyssel himself the genre of history translation has been rather neglected by scholars. A notable exception is a recent article by A.C. Dionisotti, which also examines the translations of Seyssel. The article's intention is to continue a project proposed by Arnaldo Momigliano, to collect evidence that "would help us to understand where and on what occasions and by what people books of history were written and read." 2 This essay attempts to continue this project by asking the following questions: Why did Seyssel undertake the translations? For whom were they intended? How did Seyssel conceive his task as translator? Finally, what can be inferred from his technique of translation? [End Page 561]First, the translations must be put in the context of Seyssel's life. The translations were a sideline in his busy career as royal councillor. One of many itinerant scholar-diplomats hired by the states of Europe at that time, Seyssel had been teaching law at the University of Turin when he was called into the service of France by the newly crowned Louis XII in 1498. Seyssel was of value to the court because of his reputation as a jurist as well as his connections with the court of Savoy, the state which held the mountain passes leading to Italy. This was especially important because the conquest of Milan was the main goal of Louis XII throughout his reign. Seyssel played an active role in the French occupational government in several Italian cities. Although Seyssel spent much of his time in Italy, he often followed the king around France or was in transit on diplomatic missions to England, to Flanders, and to the Swiss cantons.It is amazing that Seyssel even found the time to write, but by the end of his life, he had left an astounding variety of written works: legal commentaries, translations, works of propaganda for the French monarchy, a political treatise, and at the end of his life several religious tracts. Despite the copiousness of his written works, however, Seyssel remained outside the circle of writers at the French court. He had no connections either with Budé or with the Grands Rhetoriqueurs, such as Jean Lemaire de Belges, nor did he leave any friendly and eloquent correspondence to other humanists. If Seyssel lived during the budding years of the French renaissance, he showed few signs of appreciating it. As a Savoyard educated in Italy he probably thought of the French in the same way as did many Italians of his age: they were militarily powerful but culturally backward. 3Undoubtedly, Seyssel believed the translations would serve his own interests at court. They were a way to cultivate patronage and to enhance his prestige by building up a reputation as an important scholar. But evidence suggests that their main purpose was to prove to the king, to whom all but one of his translations were dedicated, his utility as a councillor. This was the argument of Paul [End Page 562] Chavy in his study of Seyssel's... (shrink)

This article outlines a philosophy of science in practice that focuses on the engineering sciences. A methodological issue is that these practices seem to be divided by two different styles of scientific reasoning, namely, causal-mechanistic and mathematical reasoning. These styles are philosophically characterized by what Kuhn called ?disciplinary matrices?. Due to distinct metaphysical background pictures and/or distinct ideas of what counts as intelligible, they entail distinct ideas of the character of phenomena and what counts as a scientific explanation. It is (...) argued that the two styles cannot be reduced to each other. At the same time, although they are incompatible, they must not be regarded as competing. Instead, they produce different kinds of epistemic results, which serve different kinds of epistemic functions. Moreover, some scientific breakthroughs essentially result from relating them. This view of complementary styles of scientific reasoning is supported by pluralism about metaphysical background pictures. (shrink)

It is disputed what norm, if any, governs assertion. We address this question by looking at assertions of future contingents: statements about the future that are neither metaphysically necessary nor metaphysically impossible. Many philosophers think that future contingents are not truth apt, which together with a Truth Norm or a Knowledge Norm of assertion implies that assertions of these future contingents are systematically infelicitous. In this article, we argue that our practice of asserting future contingents is incompatible with the view (...) that they are not truth apt. We consider a range of norms of assertion and argue that the best explanation of the data is provided by the view that assertion is governed by the Knowledge Norm. (shrink)

Each of the degenerating constitutions in Book VIII of Plato's Republic is the result of the disappearance of one of the four cardinal virtues. The failure of wisdom creates a timocracy; the failure of courage, an oligarchy; the failure of moderation, a democracy; the failure of justice, a tyranny. The degeneration shows that the disunited virtues are imperfect, though they have some power to stave off vice. Thus Book VIII implies a unity of the virtues thesis according to which perfect (...) virtues can only exist in a united state, but imperfect simulacra of virtue can exist in a disunited state. -/- Published 2011 in Apeiron: A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science. (Please note that the pagination in the uploaded document is not the same as the pagination in the published edition.). (shrink)

We start from the idea that Utopia is a Renaissance alternative to the Medieval Garden of Eden and, consequently, that dystopia, as a failed utopia, continues the theme of Paradise Lost. Inheriting such a rich tradition, the word “utopia” designates a semantic hybrid that encompasses several fields and disciplines. In this paper, we propose a reorganisation of the species of the utopian genre by reusing, with a minimum of violence, the already existing, albeit rather lax terms of utopia, eutopia, dystopia (...) and antiutopia. The main criteria for distinguishing these species are the moral value, the degree of verisimilitude, the constructing procedures. (shrink)

Early medieval Irish literature presents several types of voyages into the afterworld: echtrai (various adventures into Mag Mell), immrama (sea travels to the enchanted islands of the Ocean), fisi (ecstatic revelations of Christian eschatology), journeys into Saint Patrick’s Purgatory. In this paper, we seek to contrast the fisi and the descents into the cave of Saint Patrick. From a morphological point of view, both have a great deal of topoï in common, which describe the structure of the Christian other world: (...) the waste land of pains, the infernal pit, the ordeal bridge, the land of the blessed, the celestial Kingdom of God, etc. However, between the two genres appear some major differences, such as the order in which these places are visited. The main distinction lies in the fact that the fisi are mainly ecstatic voyages (i.e. psychanodias ), implying a “ raptus animae ”, while the voyages into Saint Patrick’s Purgatory are physical expeditions (i.e. somanodias ), during the actual life of the adventurers. Although many of the common themes of the two genres derive from the medieval Christian tradition (especially the apocryphal apocalypses and visiones ), we argue that the differences may be due to the input of local Irish Celtic heritage. (shrink)

This paper comparatively presents three notions related to the concept of creative fantasy. These three terms (”imagination”, ”imaginaire”, ”imaginal”) have been developed by the French school of research on the imagination (“recherches sur l’imaginaire”), which is little known in the Anglo-Saxon academic field. As such, the terms don’t even have convenient translations and linguistic equivalents. Briefly, imagination is fantasy conceived as a combinatory faculty of the psyche. French rationalistic “philosophes” saw it as a misleading and rather weakly creative ability. ”L’imaginaire” (...) is the resourceful and inventive aspect of fantasy, as conceived by the Romantics and then theorized by psychoanalysis and contemporary French philosophers. ”L’imaginal”, or ”mundus imaginalis” is a concept defined by Henry Corbin in order to designate fantasies as self-sustained, ontological beings. (shrink)

Avec l’essor et le succès croissant de la littérature de voyages, nourrie par les grandes explorations et découvertes, les utopistes de l’Âge classique ont commencé à s’intéresser plus au sujet épique qu’à l’encadrement rhétorique de la relation utopique. Avec comme résultat des utopies réalistes dans lesquelles les narrateurs, en imitant le schéma de la littérature de voyages et d’exploration, prétendent avoir découvert des civilisations exotiques idéales, crédibles et applicables, qu’ils offrent en modèle à leurs contemporains. Les principaux procédés de construction (...) des « utopies réalistes » sont la sélection et l’extrapolation utopique. Travaillant sur l’image de son monde historique, l’utopiste fait un choix des traits négatifs et positifs et les regroupe dans deux espaces complémentaires. Les caractéristiques jugées mauvaises sont rassemblées et isolées dans la description de « notre » civilisation, celles bénéfiques sont regroupées et extrapolées dans la configuration de la civilisation exotique. L’exclusion des éléments désagréables, nuisibles et funestes soumet la fiction utopique à une « réduction au positif », ce qui fait d’elle un univers fictionnel eudémonique, capable de susciter l’adhésion rationnelle, morale et affective des personnages, ainsi que des lecteurs. Nurtured by the great explorations of the period, the emergence of voyage literature in early modern Europe led classical utopian writers to shift from the dialogical form of Renaissance utopias to voyage narratives. A great many of the classical utopias worked in a realistic code, mimicking the voyage epic, in which fictional voyagers discovered exotic ideal civilizations that were offered as a contrastive example to the European countries. The main construction procedures of these “realistic utopias” were utopian selection and extrapolation. The utopian writer started from the “neutral” image of his contemporary world and operated a separation between its positive and negative features. He regrouped the negative features into the image of “our” civilization and the positive features into the image of the antipodal civilization. By excluding the bad and harmful elements, the utopian writer submitted his ideal society to a “reduction to the positive” and transformed it into a eudemonic fictional world, meant to prompt a rational, moral and emotional adhesion response in the characters, as well as in the readers. (shrink)

Many philosophers claim that understanding a logical constant (e.g. ‘if, then’) fundamentally consists in having dispositions to infer according to the logical rules (e.g. Modus Ponens) that fix its meaning. This paper argues that such dispositionalist accounts give us the wrong picture of what understanding a logical constant consists in. The objection here is that they give an account of understanding a logical constant which is inconsistent with what seem to be adequate manifestations of such understanding. I then outline an (...) alternative account according to which understanding a logical constant is not to be understood dispositionally, but propositionally. I argue that this account is not inconsistent with intuitively correct manifestations of understanding the logical constants. (shrink)

Si nous ne voulons pas que l'écologie se réduise à des déclarations d'intention, des changements dans nos styles de vie sont nécessaires. La question est de savoir quelle éthique et quelles transformations de la démocratie peuvent rendre possible la prise en compte de l'écologie dans notre vie. Reliant des champs de l'éthique appliquée qui d'ordinaire sont étudiés séparément - la culture et l'agriculture, le rapport aux animaux, l'organisation du travail et l'intégration des personnes en situation de handicap -, cette enquête (...) élabore un concept rigoureux de responsabilité susceptible de promouvoir une autre manière de penser le sujet et une autre organisation politique. Loin de fonder la politique sur l'écologie, il s'agit de montrer que celle-ci ne peut être prise au sérieux qu'au sein d'un humanisme rénové. Ainsi, le sujet de l'éthique de la vulnérabilité s'inquiète du devoir être de son droit et intègre, dans son vouloir vivre, le souci de préserver la santé de la terre et de ne pas imposer aux autres hommes et aux autres espèces une vie diminuée. (shrink)

"Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908-1961) et Emmanuel Levinas (1906-1995) reprennent l'héritage de Husserl et de Heidegger en opérant une réhabilitation du corps et du monde sensible dont les conséquences en philosophie et en éthique sont considérables. Il y a des différences notables entre la phénoménologie de la perception de Merleau-Ponty ou sa description de la structure ontologique du monde et la pensée de Levinas qui fait de la rencontre d'autrui le point de départ de l'éthique. Toutefois, en insistant sur la corporéité du (...) sujet et en l'inscrivant dans un tissu social, ils renouvellent l'un et l'autre la conception de la condition humaine, qui n'est plus pensée seulement à la lumière de la liberté. Cet ouvrage est issu d'un colloque franco-japonais qui s'est tenu à Cerisy du 6 au 12 juillet 2022. Accueillant plusieurs traducteurs japonais de l'œuvre de Levinas et de Merleau-Ponty ainsi que des chercheurs venus de différents pays, il souligne l'actualité de ces phénoménologues ainsi que l'originalité des approches qu'ils ont pu inspirer. Une attention particulière est accordée à la manière dont ils contribuent à renouveler la réflexion sur le soin, l'habitation de la Terre et l'écophénoménologie, la philosophie de l'animalité et l'esthétique."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

L'interdiction du meurtre a un sens même en l'absence de toute référence à un Dieu transcendant et à l'idée selon laquelle la vie humaine serait sacrée. Bien plus, la justification de cette norme par des valeurs morales et l'effort pour la fonder rationnellement l'affaiblissent. Malgré l'apport majeur de Kant à la morale, son analyse consistant à rapprocher les devoirs envers soi-même des devoirs envers autrui passe à côté de la violence propre au meurtre et criminalise le suicide. Au contraire, en (...) faisant de l'expérience de mon rapport à l'autre la source de l'éthique, la description du meurtre, qui renvoie à la volonté d'anéantir l'autre comme tel, permet de dégager l'essence de la violence qui est un faire taire. Il y a donc dans le "tu ne tueras point" plus qu'une prohibition de l'homicide volontaire. Affirmer l'actualité de cet interdit, c'est rappeler le sens des crimes imprescriptibles tout en invitant à prendre la mesure de ce qu'impliquent les guerres qui ne sont pas des génocides. C'est aussi préconiser des solutions adaptées aux problèmes qui se posent au début et à la fin de la vie, comme on le voit avec l'avortement, le suicide assisté et l'euthanasie. Enfin, c'est reconnaître que le droit absolu que nous nous octroyons sur les animaux relève d'une transgression. (shrink)

This article presents an overview of discussions in the philosophy of technology on epistemological relations between science and technology, illustrating that often several mutually entangled issues are at stake. The focus is on conceptual and ideological issues concerning the relationship between scientific and technological knowledge. It argues that a widely accepted hierarchy between science and technology, which echoes classic conceptions of epistêmê and technê, engendered the need of emancipating technology from science, thus shifting focus to epistemic aspects of engineering design (...) and design methodology at the cost of in-depth philosophical analysis of the role of scientific research in the engineering sciences. Consequently, the majority of current literature on this topic in the philosophy of technology presents technology as almost completely divided from and independent of science, thereby losing sight of the epistemic relations between contemporary scientific practices and technology. (shrink)

Theories of diagrams and diagrammatic reasoning typically seek to account for either the formal semantics of diagrams, or for the advantages which diagrammatic representations hold for the reasoner over other forms of representation. Regrettably, almost no theory exists which accounts for both of these issues together, nor how they affect one another. We do not attempt to provide such an account here. We do, however, seek to lay out larger context than is generally used for examining the processes of using (...) diagrams in reasoning or communication. A context in which detailed studies of sub-problems, such as the formal semantics or cognitive impact of specific diagrammatic systems, may be embedded.Accounts of the embedding of sentential logics in the computational processes of reasoners and communicators are relatively well developed from several decades of research in AI. Analogies between the sentential and the graphical cases are quite revealing about both similarities and differences. To provide a structure for the 'grand context' of diagrammatic representation and reasoning, and to clarify the relations between its component problems, we examine carefully these analogies and the decomposition they provide of subproblems for analysing diagrammatic reasoning. (shrink)

Augustine′s conversion to Christianity in A.D. 386 is a pivotal moment not only in his own life, but in Christian and world history, for the theology of Augustine set the course of theological and cultural development in the western Christian church. But to what exactly was Augustine converted? Scholars have long debated whether he really converted to Christianity in 386, whether he was a Platonist, and, if he adhered to both Platonism and Christianity, which dominated his thought. The debate of (...) the last thirteen decades spans an immense body of literature in multiple languages. In this literature, four major views on Augustine′s conversion may be discerned. The first view is associated with Gaston Boissier and Adolph von Harnack, and was famously championed by Prosper Alfaric: that Augustine in 386 converted to neo-Platonism but not to Christianity. Second, there is the view recently promoted by Catherine Conybeare: that Augustine in 386 converted to Christianity and rejected neo-Platonism. Third, there is the view that he converted to Christianity and was also a neo-Platonist; the most famous adherents of this view are Robert J. O′Connell and Pierre Courcelle. Finally, there is the view recently promoted by Carol Harrison: that Augustine committed to Christianity in 386, yet did not utterly reject neo-Platonism; rather, he aimed to develop a Christian faith that was informed by neo-Platonic insight. In this article, I first explain and distinguish these four general views, and then I explain why I prefer the fourth view. -/- More Info: This is the pre-peer reviewed version of Boone, Mark, "The Role of Platonism in Augustine's 386 Conversion to Christianity," Religion Compass 9.5 (May 2015), 151-61. This article has been published in final form at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/rec3.12149/abstract. (shrink)

There are two distinct but related threads in this article. The first is methodological and is aimed at exploring the relative merits and faults of different operational definitions of consciousness. The second is conceptual and is aimed at understanding the prior commitments regarding the nature of conscious content that motivate these positions. I consider two distinct operationalizations: one defines consciousness in terms of dichotomous subjective reports, the other in terms of graded subjective reports. I ultimately argue that both approaches are (...) inadequate and that a third alternative that involves integration of subjective report and task performance should be adopted. (shrink)