From the 1910s through the 1930s, the American naturalist and photographer Arthur C. Pillsbury made time-lapse and microscopic films documenting what he, in common parlance, called the “miracles of plant life”. While these films are now mostly lost, they were part of Pillsbury’s prolific work as a conservationist and traveling film lecturer who used his cameras everywhere from Yosemite National Park to Samoa to promote both public understanding of plants and a desire to protect the natural world. Guiding this work (...) was Pillsbury’s belief that the nonhuman optics of the film camera, which revealed the animacy of plants, could also incite viewers to sympathize with them. In the context of the early American conservation movement, that sympathy stemmed in complicated ways from longstanding transcendental and pastoral ideas of nature that were entangled with imperialist visions of controlling nature. With an eye to that context, I show that Pillsbury’s filmmaking was not simply about using motion picture technologies to shape attitudes toward plants and nature more broadly; it was also about using nature to think through the techno-scientific possibilities of the cinema in the early part of the twentieth century. (shrink)

In a well-known paper, Timothy Williamson claimed to prove with a coin-flipping example that infinitesimal-valued probabilities cannot save the principle of Regularity, because on pain of inconsistency the event ‘all tosses land heads’ must be assigned probability 0, whether the probability function is hyperreal-valued or not. A premise of Williamson’s argument is that two infinitary events in that example must be assigned the same probability because they are isomorphic. It was argued by Howson that the claim of isomorphism (...) fails, but a more radical objection to Williamson’s argument is that it had been, in effect, refuted long before it was published. (shrink)

Timothy Williamson claimed to prove with a coin-tossing example that hyperreal probabilities cannot save the principle of regularity. A premise of his argument is that two specified infinitary events must be assigned the same probability because, he claims, they are isomorphic. But as has been pointed out, they are not isomorphic. A way of framing Williamson’s argument that does not make it depend on the isomorphism claim is in terms of shifts in Bernoulli processes, the usual mathematical model (...) of sequential coin tossing. But even so framed, the argument still fails. (shrink)

Timothy Williamson has claimed to prove that regularity must fail even in a nonstandard setting, with a counterexample based on tossing a fair coin infinitely many times. I argue that Williamson’s argument is mistaken, and that a corrected version shows that it is not regularity which fails in the non-standard setting but a fundamental property of shifts in Bernoulli processes.

Philosophers cannot agree on whether the rule of Countable Additivity should be an axiom of probability. Edwin T. Jaynes attacks the problem in a way which is original to him and passed over in the current debate about the principle: he says the debate only arises because of an erroneous use of mathematical infinity. I argue that this solution fails, but I construct a different argument which, I argue, salvages the spirit of the more general point Jaynes makes. I argue (...) that in Jaynes’s objective Bayesianism we might have good reasons to adopt Countable Additivity, and some of the major problems this adoption is known to entail need not worry us. In particular, I propose to adopt this new angle on Countable Additivity in Jon Williamson’s version of objective Bayesianism. (shrink)

In this chapter we explore the process of extrapolating causal claims from model organisms to humans in pharmacology. We describe and compare four strategies of extrapolation: enumerative induction, comparative process tracing, phylogenetic reasoning, and robustness reasoning. We argue that evidence of mechanisms plays a crucial role in several strategies for extrapolation and in the underlying logic of extrapolation: the more directly a strategy establishes mechanistic similarities between a model and humans, the more reliable the extrapolation. We present case studies from (...) the research on atherosclerosis and the development of statins, that illustrate these strategies and the role of mechanistic evidence in extrapolation. (shrink)

Understandably absorbed in technical details, discussion of the semantic paradoxes risks losing sight of broad methodological principles. This chapter sketches a general approach to the comparison of rival logics, and applies it to argue that revision of classical propositional logic has much higher costs than its proponents typically recognize.

Philosophers have spent a great deal of time debating whether intransitive preferences can be rational. I present a risky decision that poses a challenge for the defender of intransitivity. The defender of intransitivity faces a trilemma and must either: (i) reject the rationality of intransitive preferences, (ii) deny State-wise Dominance, or (iii) accept the bizarre verdict that you can be required to pay to relabel the tickets of a fair lottery. If we take the first horn, then we have a (...) synchronic refutation of intransitivity, an improvement on widely criticized diachronic arguments. I sketch possible responses that may rescue intransitivity and argue that each response is possible but generates an explanatory debt. I conclude by showing how the challenge here clarifies the foundations of decision theory without transitivity, conditional on some explanatory debt being payable. (shrink)

Data increasingly drive our lives. Often presented as a new trajectory, the deep immersion of our lives in data has a history that is well over a century old. By revisiting the work of early pioneers of what would today be called data science, we can bring into view both assumptions that fund our data-driven moment as well as alternative relations to data. I here excavate insights by contrasting a seemingly unlikely pair of early data technologists, Francis Galton and W.E.B. (...) Du Bois. Galton, well known for his contributions to eugenics, was first and foremost a tinkering technician of measure. There are numerous domains of science over which Galtonian conceptions retain considerable influence, presumably without his pride in racial inequality. A more viable, because more egalitarian, alternative for the present can be found in the early data work of Du Bois. (shrink)

This paper addresses the problem of finding a Bayesian net representation of the probability function that agrees with the distributions of multiple consistent datasets and otherwise has maximum entropy. We give a general algorithm which is significantly more efficient than the standard brute-force approach. Furthermore, we show that in a wide range of cases such a Bayesian net can be obtained without solving any optimisation problem.

Frege puzzles exploit cognitive differences between co-referential terms. Traditionally, they were handled by some version of Frege’s distinction between sense and reference, which avoided disruptive consequences for epistemology. However, the Fregean programme did not live up to its original promise, and was undermined by the development of theories of direct reference; for semantic purposes, its prospects now look dim. In particular, well-known analogues of Frege puzzles concern pairs of uncontentious synonyms; attempts to deal with them by distinguishing idiolects or postulating (...) ‘narrow contents’ or elaborate forms of context-sensitivity are inadequate or semantically implausible. Although ascriptions of knowledge, belief, and other attitudes are ubiquitous in epistemology, epistemologists have not properly come to terms with the surprising consequences of anti-Fregean semantic accounts of attitude ascriptions. In ‘A Puzzle about Belief ’, Saul Kripke shows that natural-seeming disquotational principles for ascribing belief lead to apparently unacceptable consequences, including outright contradictions, in problem cases. Such disquotation principles, I argue, are best regarded not as conceptual connections but just as heuristics in the psychological sense, quick and easy ways of assessing belief ascriptions, usually accurate under normal conditions but far from 100% reliable. I discuss similar heuristics for ascribing knowledge and other attitudes. That the principles have a merely heuristic status need not be pre-theoretically manifest to their users. This view vindicates Kripke’s conclusion that it would be wrong-headed to draw semantic conclusions from Frege puzzles. I discuss the epistemological consequences of an anti-Fregean approach to Frege puzzles, including for Kripke’s cases of the contingent a priori and the necessary a posteriori, but also for evidence, for epistemic modalities, and for epistemic and subjective conceptions of probability. Anna Mahtani’s recent identification of Frege puzzles for the ex ante Pareto Principle as used in welfare economics provides an interesting example. I suggest a model-building methodology as the most promising way of handling at least some of the difficulties. A final issue is the choice between different anti-Fregean approaches to semantics, from very coarse-grained intensional approaches on which sentences express functions from possible worlds to truth-values to more fine-grained hyperintensional approaches on which sentences express functions from possible or impossible worlds to truth-values or else Russellian structured propositions. Some of the hyperintensional theories violate semantic compositionality. More generally, since our attitude ascriptions rely on heuristics, they should be expected to exhibit some level of error; although hyperintensional approaches may be able slightly to reduce the level of postulated error, they do so at the cost of vastly increased theoretical complexity, and so have weak explanatory power. Methodologically, a simple intensional approach does better. (shrink)

The paper explains how to integrate the knowledge-first approach to epistemology with the intellectualist thesis that knowing-how is a kind of knowing-that, with emphasis on their role in practical reasoning. One component of this integration is a belief-based account of desire.

In recent years there has been a resurgence of interest in the work of Emmanuel Levinas, widely recognized as one of the most important yet difficult philosophers of the 20th century. In this much-needed introduction, Davis unpacks the concepts at the centre of Levinas's thought - alterity, the Other, the Face, infinity - concepts which have previously presented readers with major problems of interpretation. Davis traces the development of Levinas's thought over six decades, describing the context in which he worked, (...) and the impact of his writings. He argues that Levinas's work remains tied to the ontological tradition with which he wants to break, and demonstrates how his later writing tries to overcome this dependency by its increasingly disruptive, sometimes opaque, textual practice. He discusses Levinas's theological writings and his relationship to Judaism, as well as the reception of his work by contemporary thinkers, arguing that the influence of his work has led to a growing interest in ethical issues among poststructuralist and postmodernist thinkers in recent years. Comprehensive and clearly written, this book will be essential reading for students and researchers in continental philosophy, French studies, literary theory and theology. (shrink)

The main aim of this book is to encourage philosophers to take a more sophisticated and scientific attitude to their handling of evidence, both in theory and in practice, by introducing two categories neglected in current metaphilosophy. The first category is that of heuristics. These are typically efficient ways of solving problems of some kind, quick and easy to use, and mostly but not always reliable. Those most probably central to philosophical methodology are more or less humanly universal general cognitive (...) heuristics which we employ without conscious reflection. In many plausible cases, they can be shown to be implicitly inconsistent, and so cannot be perfectly valid, though for evolutionary reasons they are likely to be fairly reliable in normal cases. Such heuristics may well generate false but convincing data as applied to some actual or hypothetical. Arguably, the heuristics also generate philosophical paradoxes, just as heuristics embedded in our perceptual systems generate perceptual illusions. The second category is that of overfitting. This is a recognized pathology in science, when models are allowed to become very complicated to achieve a close fit with data, and further complications typically keep having to be made as new data comes in. When the data contains errors, such theorizing provides little insight. Scientists guard against overfitting by strongly preferring comparatively simple models. Philosophers should learn to do the same. This approach is applied to debates between coarse-grained (intensionalist) and fine-grained (hyperintensionalist) theories of metaphysics, ascriptions of propositional attitudes, and other topics, in favour of intensionalism. (shrink)

Agroecology has been proposed as a key building block for food sovereignty. This article examines the meaning, practices and potentials of ‘transformative agroecology learning’ as a collective strategy for food system transformation. Our study is based on our qualitative and action research with the European Coordination of Via Campesina to develop the European Agroecology Knowledge Exchange Network. This network is linked to the global network of La Via Campesina and builds on the strong experiences and traditions of popular education in (...) Latin American peasant movements. Rather than focusing on agroecology education as a process of individual learning, we analyse how a transformative agroecology education can be strengthened as a critical repertoire of action used by social movements to advance food sovereignty. Our analysis contributes a new theory of transformative agroecology learning based on four key characteristics or qualities: horizontalism; diálogo de saberes ; combining practical and political knowledge; and building social movement networks. While these different elements of transformative agroecology learning were present across EAKEN, they were unevenly developed and, in many cases, not systematized. The framework can help to strategically and reflexively systematize and strengthen a transformative agroecology learning approach as a key building block for food sovereignty. (shrink)

How does Descartes characterize the peculiar way in which each of us is aware of our bodies? I argue that Descartes recognizes a sense of bodily ownership, such that the body sensorily appears to be one's own in bodily awareness. This sensory appearance of ownership is ubiquitous, for Descartes, in that bodily awareness always confers a sense of ownership. This appearance is confused, in so far as bodily awareness simultaneously represents the subject as identical to, partially composed by, and united (...) to her body, without distinguishing these relations. Finally, the appearance of ownership is grounded in multiple other ways in which the body sensorily appears: namely, in the fact that the body appears to be inescapable, modified by bodily sensations, and an object of special concern. (shrink)

The article defends moral realism against epistemological objections by arguing that if there are moral truths, some of them are known. The claim that moral properties are unknowable because causally inert is shown to be ineffective: none of the main current theories of knowledge requires a causal connection, and anyway moral properties have not been shown to be causally inert. It is explained why a posteriori moral knowledge need not derive from combining a priori moral knowledge with a posteriori non-moral (...) knowledge. The possibility of moral knowledge by perception and by testimony is briefly defended. The role of recognitional capacities for instances of moral properties is emphasized. (shrink)

So-called family values and their part in education are considered. ‘Traditional’‘modern’ and ‘deviant’ patterns of family relationships are discussed and the moral superiority of the first is questioned. The single life without family involvement is also proposed as a possibly fulfilling mode of existence in its own right.

This paper argues that young people are unlikely to integrate themselves positively into adult life - to adopt its values, responsibilities and opportunities - unless that life is made more morally acceptable in their terms. Central to this process of community building and reconciliation with the young is the condition of solidarity which both results from and results in common values and a shared conception of the good life.

A notion of Education for Active Citizenship is identified in the pronouncements of certain politically influential individuals. Key elements in this are seen to include action, the citizen, appreciating the benefits of democracy and freedom, respect for the rule of law, a due balance between rights and duties, participation and service to the community. These are shown to be systematically ambiguous, simultaneously capable of evoking critical, independent-minded, socially effective citizens and docile conforming subjects. Clarification is held to be a necessary (...) precondition of translating the ideal of citizenship into specific curricular goals. (shrink)

ABSTRACTOscar Larsson’s sympathetic critique of constructivist institutionalism calls for a clarification of my understanding of subjectivity, inter-subjectivity, and their mutual interdependence. That interdependence lies at the heart of any genuinely constructivist approach, just as the interdependence of structure and agency lies at the heart of any genuinely institutionalist approach. As such, I reject the charge of subjectivism just as I would that of voluntarism. Building on the social ontology of Berger and Luckmann, we can distinguish between subjectivity and intra-subjectivity and (...) proceed to show how the latter implies a notion of inter-subjectivity. An example of the social construction of a political crisis shows that social facts are made and remade through a fusion of inter- and intra-subjectivities. (shrink)

Glaucon in Plato's _Republic_ fails to grasp intermediates. He confuses pursuing a goal with achieving it, and so he adopts ‘mathematical platonism’. He says mathematical objects are eternal. Socrates urges a seriously debatable, and seriously defensible, alternative centered on the destruction of hypotheses. He offers his version of geometry and astronomy as refuting the charge that he impiously ‘ponders things up in the sky and investigates things under the earth and makes the weaker argument the stronger’. We relate his account (...) briefly to mathematical developments by Plato's associates Theaetetus and Eudoxus, and then to the past 200 years' developments in geometry. (shrink)

Much attention is focussed on recent debates in contemporary political philosophy concerning the relative merits of ideal theory and non-ideal theory. In one of their many forms, these debates take shape as a realist challenge to idealistic or utopian approaches to normative political theory. This article shows that the philosophical tradition of pragmatism both instructively anticipates and also, more importantly, can today contribute to contemporary realism. It is shown how a political pragmatism, particularly one centred in William James’ work, helps (...) frame two key contributions that would be resources for the realist challenge to ideal theory. First is an orientation towards unruly pluralism as a feasibility condition that should constrain political theorising. Second is a procedural norm of inclusive tolerance that can help enact the motion of a liberal political vision under the constraints of unruly pluralism. (shrink)

The dichotomy between virtue and self‐interest or pleasure is held to face modern moral educators with a conflict between the interest of society and that of their pupils, as well as presenting obvious motivational difficulties. Three possibilities for mitigating this conflict are offered. First, it is argued that virtue is an essential constituent of our well‐being insofar as even undetected wickedness isolates us from others. Second, young people, alienated by the negative nature of conventional morality, may respond positively to certain (...) moral appeals in a way that is fulfilling and life‐enhancing. Third, it is argued that moral education which emphasises the rights of young people themselves alongside those of others would be both more reputable and more effective than that based on the opposition between virtue and self‐interest or pleasure. (shrink)

While not underestimating the value of useful knowledge and skills, it is suggested that education should also develop the subjective self of the learner. A distinction is drawn between an ‘additive’ view of education which simply furnishes the individual with knowledge and skills and a ‘transformative’ concept which concerns itself with changes to more central parts of the learner's self. In developing a concept of the subjective self, reference is made to the Enlightenment notion of the autonomous rational self and (...) the interpersonal or cultural self of the Symbolic Interactionists and Communitarians. Particular attention, however, is given to Heidegger's three categories of entities experienced by the phenomenological self: the ‘present at hand’, the ‘ready to hand’ and those entities with whom we share the experience of ‘being with’. An attempt is made to interpret important aspects of education in terms of the development of learners' growing knowledge and deepening understanding of these three kinds of entity and the relation in which they stand to them. (shrink)

George Berkeley's two major works, A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge and Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous, are presented here, together with perhaps the most searching examination his ideas received during his lifetime, that of the American Samuel Johnson, who corresponded with Berkeley during his stay in the country.

In this article I critically examine Adam Moore’s claim that the threshold for overriding intangible property rights and privacy rights is higher, in relation to genetic enhancement techniques and sensitive personal information, than is commonly suggested. I argue that Moore fails to see how important advances in genetic research are to social justice. Once this point is emphasised one sees that the issue of how formidable overriding these rights are is open to much debate. There are strong reasons, on grounds (...) of social justice, for thinking the importance of such rights is likely to be diminished in the interests of ensuring a more just distribution of genes essential to pursuing what John Rawls calls a person’s ”rational plan of life’. (shrink)

Codes of ethics and conduct have become common in UK organisations. This paper explores how such codes are understood and responded to by those whom the codes seek to influence. The study is an interpretative one, based on interview material, in which a dialectical pattern is seen in employees’ reactions to codes. Initial contradictions are found in codes of ethics and in codes of conduct . These tensions create perceptions of a two‐tier system in organisations in which core employees are (...) subject to codes of ethics that are loosely applied, but non‐core staff are subject to codes of conduct that are strictly applied. However, even core staff are aware of a dialectical contradiction in their position. They believe that loyalty to the organisation is the price they pay for being allowed freedom of integrity by their organisations, but that the price they have to pay for showing integrity may be breaking faith with their organisations. This chiasmus of integrity and loyalty represents a difficulty for the project of improving standards of corporate citizenship. The use of this trope and other rhetorical figures to exemplify processes of understanding and interpretation in organisations is discussed. (shrink)

By far the most common term in Professor Jeffner's paper is ‘understanding’, and it is clearly with understanding that he is primarily concerned. However, at the beginning of his paper he talks of understanding and explanation, and at least in the case of his third kind of reality he clearly sees understanding and explanation as intimately related. In this he is surely right. I myself would say that understanding is cognizing a manifold as a single whole in all its internal (...) relationships, and this ties up with what Jeffner has to say about Gestalts on pp. 220–221. And explanation, as I hope to show, depends upon or presupposes the understanding that flows from the possession of a Gestalt . However, Jeffner adopts Hempel and Oppenheim's deductivist account of scientific explanation, and I believe this account to be fundamentally mistaken, and to have serious consequences for his argument. One does not achieve explanation merely by finding a set of empirically true premises from which a proposition expressing the explanandum can be deduced – if that were so one would explain Socrates' mortality by pointing out that everything snub-nosed is mortal, and that Socrates was snub-nosed. It is interesting, in this respect, to compare Hempel's account of explanation with that of Aristotle. There are substantial similarities between the two accounts, but there is one fundamental difference. Hempel insists that there can be no explanation unless events are connected in some way, and so rejects, for example, a mere sequential narrative as constituting an explanation. (shrink)

The earlier much discussed issue of a society's right to educate the young is the starting point for various observations regarding education itself. A distinction is drawn between additive and transformative conceptions of education, the latter seeking to bring about changes to the learner's subjective self as reflected in a tripartite division of entities intended by the phenomenological self. Despite liberal or progressive educators' intuitive preference for the transformative conception, it may be asked whether this may not infringe the learner's (...) rights, however worthy the educator's motives or benign the intended outcomes. This possibility is rejected, however, on grounds of the learner's residual freedom to criticise the educator's values, the necessity of value assumptions as the essential basis of moral freedom and the unpredictability of human perceptions and responses, given the potential gap between the intentions and perceptions of the emitter of language and the understandings of the receiver. (shrink)

The prima facie linguistic evidence of everyday experience suggests that human beings are bewilderingly different from each other: adults frequently complain that it is impossible to master a foreign language; indeed, many communities despise languages or dialects other than their own; serious translation is often a painful struggle, producing results that are felt to be inadequate, even by the translators themselves; and even within our own communities, most of us have had the despairing experience of not understanding a single word (...) of what someone else is saying. (shrink)

In this piece the author takes issue with Mario Bunge’s claims that conceptual and semiotic systems have "compositions, environments and structures, but no mechanisms." Structures, according to Bunge, can never be mechanisms in conceptual and semiotic systems. Contra this the author argues that in social systems, social structures (which are concept-dependent and reproduced and/or transformed, at least in part, semiotically), can be mechanisms in the sense that such structures are one of the processes in a concrete system that makes itwhat (...) it is. As such, not only may conceptual and semiotic systems have mechanisms, but they may also themselves be considered some of the mechanisms that make the social what it is. As such, they can be said to possess powers and liabilities that neither reside at lower levels nor are explainable in terms of the lower level. To hold out the prospect of social explanation by conceptual and/or semiotic mechanisms does not represent an attempt to decouple these systems from material factors. What it does mean is that conceptual and/or semiotic systems can, potentially at least, play a role in social explanation; and themselves be subject to explanation. Key Words: mechanisms • social • structures • cause • explanation • realism • emergence • reductionism. (shrink)

We can learn from questions as well as from their answers. This paper urges some things to learn from questions about categorical foundations for mathematics raised by Geoffrey Hellman and from ones he invokes from Solomon Feferman.