Philosophers cannot agree on whether the rule of Countable Additivity should be an axiom of probability. Edwin T. Jaynes attacks the problem in a way which is original to him and passed over in the current debate about the principle: he says the debate only arises because of an erroneous use of mathematical infinity. I argue that this solution fails, but I construct a different argument which, I argue, salvages the spirit of the more general point Jaynes makes. I argue (...) that in Jaynes’s objective Bayesianism we might have good reasons to adopt Countable Additivity, and some of the major problems this adoption is known to entail need not worry us. In particular, I propose to adopt this new angle on Countable Additivity in Jon Williamson’s version of objective Bayesianism. (shrink)

Three kinds of things may be creative: persons, processes, and products. The standard definition of creativity, used nearly by consensus in psychological research, focuses specifically on products and says that a product is creative if and only if it is new and valuable. We argue that at least one further condition is necessary for a product to be creative: it must have been produced by the right kind of process. We argue furthermore that this point has an interesting epistemological implication: (...) when you judge a product to be creative--attributing creativity--you are not just judging it to be new and valuable. Even if you did not witness how it was produced, you are also making a judgement about how it was produced. (shrink)

This paper examines the famous doctrine that independent prediction garners more support than accommodation. The standard arguments for the doctrine are found to be invalid, and a more realistic position is put forward, that whether evidence supports or not a hypothesis depends on the prior probability of the hypothesis, and is independent of whether it was proposed before or after the evidence. This position is implicit in the subjective Bayesian theory of confirmation, and the paper ends with a brief account (...) of this theory, and answer to the principal objections to it. (shrink)

In the newly emerging debates about genetics and justice three distinct principles have begun to emerge concerning what the distributive aim of genetic interventions should be. These principles are: genetic equality, a genetic decent minimum, and the genetic difference principle. In this paper, I examine the rationale of each of these principles and argue that genetic equality and a genetic decent minimum are ill-equipped to tackle what I call the currency problem and the problem of weight. The genetic difference principle (...) is the most promising of the three principles and I develop this principle so that it takes seriously the concerns of just health care and distributive justice in general. Given the strains on public funds for other important social programmes, the costs of pursuing genetic interventions and the nature of genetic interventions, I conclude that a more lax interpretation of the genetic difference principle is appropriate. This interpretation stipulates that genetic inequalities should be arranged so that they are to the greatest reasonable benefit of the least advantaged. Such a proposal is consistent with prioritarianism and provides some practical guidance for non-ideal societies–that is, societies that do not have the endless amount of resources needed to satisfy every requirement of justice. (shrink)

Department of Political Studies, Queen's University, 99 University Avenue, Kingston, Ontario, Canada, K7L 3N6. Email: farrelly{at}queensu.ca ' + u + '@' + d + ' '//--> Abstract Should we invest more public funding in basic aging research that could lead to medical interventions that permit us to safely and effectively retard human aging? In this paper I make the case for answering in the affirmative. I examine, and critique, what I call the Fairness Objection to making aging research a greater (...) priority than it currently is. The Fairness Objection presumes that support for aging research is limited to a simplistic utilitarian justification. That is, a mode of justification that is aggregative and permits imposing high costs on a few so that small benefits could be enjoyed by numerous recipients. I develop two arguments to refute the Fairness Objection. The Fairness Objection mischaracterizes the utilitarian argument for retarding human aging. It does so by invoking the fallacious conceptual distinction between "saving lives" and "extending lives", as well as making a number of mistaken assumptions concerning the likely benefits of retarding human aging. Secondly, I argue that the case for tackling aging can be made on contractualist , in addition to utilitarian, grounds. Because the harms of senescence are "morally relevant" to the harms of disease, contractualists can permit aggregation within lives. And thus no one could reasonably reject, I contend, a principle that makes the aspiration to tackle human aging more of a priority than it currently is. CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

Since late antiquity, a connection was made between Jews and the psychological state of despondency based, in part, on the link between melancholy and Saturn, and the further association of the Hebrew name of that planet, Shabbetai, and the Sabbath. The melancholic predisposition has had important anthropological, cosmological, and theological repercussions. In this essay, I focus on various perspectives on melancholia in thinkers as diverse as Kafka, Levinas, Blanchot, Rosenzweig, Benjamin, Bloch, Scholem, and Derrida. A common thread that links these (...) thinkers is the hopelessness of hope imparted by the messianic belief in a future that must be perpetually deferred. (shrink)

Plato’s Theaetetus, Sophist, and Statesman exhibit several related dialectical methods relevant to Platonic education: maieutic in Theaetetus, bifurcatory division in Sophist and Statesman, and non-bifurcatory division in Statesman, related to the ‘god-given’ method in Philebus. I consider the nature of each method through the letter or element paradigm, used to reflect on each method. At issue are the element’s appearances in given contexts, its fitness for communing with other elements like it in kind, and its own nature defined through its (...) relations to others. These represent stages of inquiry for the Platonic student inquiring into the sources of knowledge. (shrink)

I find myself in agreement with almost all of Galen's paper (Strawson, 2006) -- except, that is, for his three main claims. These I take to be: that he has provided a substantive and useful definition of 'physicalism'; that physicalism entails panpsychism; and that panpsychism is a necessary and viable doctrine. But I find much to applaud in the incidentals Galen brings in to defend these three claims, particularly his eloquent and uncompromising rejection of the idea of brute emergence, as (...) well as his dissatisfaction with standard forms of physicalism. I certainly find his paper far more on target than most of the stuff I read on this topic. (shrink)

In recent years there has been a bold revival in the field of natural theology, where “natural theology” can be understood as the attempt to demonstrate that God exists by way of reason, evidence, and argument without the appeal to divine revelation. Today's practitioners of natural theology have not only revived and recast all of the traditional arguments in the field, but, by drawing upon the findings of contemporary cosmology, chemistry, and biology, have also developed a range of fascinating new (...) ones. -/- Contemporary Arguments in Natural Theology brings together twenty experts working in the field today. Together, they practice natural theology from a wide range of perspectives, and show how the field of natural theology is practiced today with a degree of diversity and confidence not seen since the Middle Ages. Aimed primarily at advanced undergraduates and graduate students, the volume will also be of interest to researchers in philosophy, theology, biblical studies, and religious studies, as an indispensable resource on contemporary theistic proofs. (shrink)

I offer a major reassessment of Foucault’s philosophico-historical account of the basic problems of modernity. I revise our understanding of Foucault by countering the influential misinterpretations proffered by his European interlocutors such as Habermas and Derrida. Central to Foucault’s account of modernity was his work on two crucial concept pairs: freedom/power and reason/madness. I argue against the view of Habermas and Derrida that Foucault understood modern power and reason as straightforwardly opposed to modern freedom and madness. I show that Foucault (...) held a much more complex view of these pairs, a view encapsulated in his term ‘reciprocal incompatibility’. By revising our interpretation of Foucault’s work on modernity in this way, we open the way to much more effective deployments of his critical apparatus. (shrink)

We study companies that do not produce a sustainability report in contexts where institutionalisation is assumed. Based on a careful analysis of interaction patterns between non-reporting companies, sustainability interest groups, and peer organisations, we find patterns of discursive and material isomorphism that suggest sustainability reporting is confined to an issues-based field, rather than spreading as an institutionalised practice across the business community. We argue that the issues-based field exerts only weak pressure for sustainability reporting, and that encouraging more firms to (...) report rests on understanding what influences companies to interact more widely to become part of this field. (shrink)

Where does the aspiration to retard human ageing fit in the ‘big picture’ of medical necessities and the requirements of just healthcare? Is there a duty to retard human ageing? And if so, how much should we invest in the basic science that studies the biology of ageing and could lead to interventions that modify the biological processes of human ageing? I consider two prominent accounts of equality and just healthcare – Norman Daniels's application of the principle of fair equality (...) of opportunity and Ronald Dworkin's account of equality of resources – and conclude that, once suitably amended and revised, both actually support the conclusion that anti-ageing research is important and could lead to interventions that ought to be considered ‘medical necessities’. (shrink)

An argument has been recently proposed by Watkins, whose objective is to show the impossibility of a statistical explanation of single events. This present paper is an attempt to show that Watkins's argument is unsuccessful, and goes on to argue for an account of statistical explanation which has much in common with Hempel's classic treatment.

Final Report on Phase 1 of the New Zealand Law Foundation’s Artificial Intelligence and Law in New Zealand Project.

Joyce and others have claimed that degrees of belief are estimates of truth-values and that the probability axioms are conditions of admissibility for these estimates with respect to a scoring rule penalizing inaccuracy. In this article, I argue that the claim that the rules of probability are truth-directed in this way depends on an assumption that is both implausible and lacks any supporting evidence, strongly suggesting that the probability axioms have nothing intrinsically to do with truth-directedness.

Compared to approach motivation, avoidance motivation evokes vigilance, attention to detail, systematic information processing, and the recruitment of cognitive resources. From a conservation of energy perspective it follows that people would be reluctant to engage in the kind of effortful cognitive processing evoked by avoidance motivation, unless the benefits of expending this energy outweigh the costs. We put forward three empirically testable propositions concerning approach and avoidance motivation, investment of energy, and the consequences of such investments. Specifically, we propose that (...) compared to approach-motivated people, avoidance-motivated people (a) carefully select situations in which they exert such cognitive effort, (b) only perform well in the absence of distracters that occupy cognitive resources, and (c) become depleted after exerting such cognitive effort. (shrink)

This article considers the relation between contemporary queer and transgender theory and the ‘second wave’ of feminism. Specifically, it explores the ways in which transgender theorist Paul B. Preciado's Testo Junkie: Sex, Drugs, and Biopolitics calls on feminist theorists, artists and activists of the second wave to explore transgender experience and embodiment, and to rethink gender in light of the new era of biocapitalism Preciado proposes. The article questions the way in which trajectories of feminism are conceived of, and finally (...) calls for a ‘scavenger methodology’ as a way to consider the formation of feminist and queer archives. (shrink)

This paper considers the prospects for objectivity in reasoning strategies in response to empirical studies that apparently show systematic culture‐based differences in patterns of reasoning. I argue that there is at least one modest class of exceptions to the claim that there are alternative, equally warranted standards of good reasoning: the class that entails the solution of certain well‐structured problems which, suitably chosen, are common, or touchstone, to the sorts of culturally different viewpoints discussed. There is evidence that some cognitive (...) tasks are seen in much the same way across cultures, not least by virtue of the common run of experiences with the world of material objects in early childhood by creatures with similar cognitive endowments. These tasks thus present as similarly structured sets of claims that have similar priority: what is framed, and what is bracketed, or held constant in the background, is shown to be naturally common across cultures. As a consequence, a normative view of reasoning and, by implication, critical thinking can be defended. While this might be a modest sense of objectivity, the high level of intercultural articulation that is able to occur among people of different backgrounds suggests that it provides cognitive scaffolding for a lot of other reasoning tasks as well. (shrink)

Hume's essay ‘Of Miracles’ has been a focus of controversy ever since its publication. The challenge to Christian orthodoxy was only too evident, but the balance-of-probabilities criterion advanced by Hume for determining when testimony justifies belief in miracles has also been a subject of contention among philosophers. The temptation for those familiar with Bayesian methodology to show that Hume's criterion determines a corresponding balance-of-posterior probabilities in favour of miracles is understandable, but I will argue that their attempts fail. However, I (...) show that his criterion generates a valid form of the so-called No-Miracles Argument appealed to by modern realist philosophers, whose own presentation of it, despite their possession of the probabilistic machinery Hume himself lacked, is invalid. (shrink)

The History of Madness (HM) is Michel Foucault's first major work, his longest single work, and the work that established his reputation in France. Foucault distinguishes four distinct components or forms of consciousness of madness: (1) the critical: the normative judgment which distinguishes and sanctions madness in its difference from reason or sanity; (2) the practical: an attitude of collective demarcation and exclusion of the deviant from a group; (3) the enunciative: the act of recognizing individuals as mad and identifying (...) them as such; (4) the analytic: reflection on the nature and forms of manifestation of madness. Foucault thinks that the experience of madness in the Classical Age is characterized by a dissociation between the first two elements, on the one hand, and the latter two on the other. (shrink)

Deliberative democrats conceive of the democratic process as a transformative process, one that requires citizens to participate in authentic deliberation with others rather than engaging in the strategic behaviour characteristic of existing democratic practices. Current practices often pit factions of society against one another in a struggle to win or retain political power. The moralized conception of democracy defended by deliberative democrats is one that emphasizes the importance of being open-minded, reasonable and accommodating. These civic virtues are necessary if we (...) are to treat others as equals when decisions are made concerning the use of political power, power that will influence the life prospects of everyone. Deliberative democrats are thus concerned with the normative legitimacy of a democratic decision; this legitimacy depends ‘on the degree to which those affected by it have been included in the decision-making processes and have had the opportunity to influence the outcomes’. (shrink)

I am grateful to Feeney and colleagues for their thoughtful engagement with, and application of, the normative analysis I developed concerning gene patents in Farrelly (2016). Their exploration of...

I get to choose the excerpts, so take all this with a grain of salt (though I've tried to be reasonably balanced). Reviews are arranged chronologically (until I stopped updating this page, in 1998). I've also included a few non review articles focusing on the book. I give some very brief replies here; I have a separate page for more detailed responses to some articles on my work.

Current models of insulin binding to the insulin receptor (IR) propose (i) that there are two binding sites on the surface of insulin which engage with two binding sites on the receptor and (ii) that ligand binding involves structural changes in both the ligand and the receptor. Many of the features of insulin binding to its receptor, namely B‐chain helix interactions with the leucine‐rich repeat domain and A‐chain residue interactions with peptide loops from another part of the receptor, are also (...) seen in models of relaxin and insulin‐like peptide 3 binding to their receptors. We show that these principles can likely be extended to the group of mimetic peptides described by Schäffer and coworkers, which are reported to have no sequence identity with insulin. This review summarizes our current understanding of ligand‐induced activation of the IR and highlights the key issues that remain to be addressed. (shrink)

In this essay I set out to problematize the concepts of intersubjectivity and interaction in the theories of Germany's two foremost social philosophers: Jiirgen Habermas and Niklas Luhmann. To do so, I shall briefly reconstruct Husserl's phenomenological concept of intersubjectivity and its relationship with rational horizons and lifeworlds. I shall then demonstrate the importance of Husserl's thought in the theory of (rational) communicative action in Habermas. The third section deals with the radical rethinking of the subject (and hence intersubjectivity) in (...) the theory of Niklas Luhmann. My principal question will then be: is it possible to reconcile critical theory with systems theory? Or, alternatively: is intersubjectivity a reality or a useful fiction? (shrink)

This short paper introduces institutional theory to some long-standing questions about business and society theory. Specifically, institutional theory would seem to offer some potential for understanding why business organisations may adopt CSR practices for non-instrumental reasons.

Fairclough’s (1992) model of critical discourse analysis can be used to show how corporate social responsibility, stakeholder identity and the social relations between organisations and stakeholders are socially constructed in the social and environmental reports prepared by companies. An example from doctoral work-in-progress is provided. Preliminary findings suggest the Royal Dutch/Shell Group of Companies construct corporate social responsibility as functionalist and economically-based. Stakeholders, rather than equal partners, are pacified and persuaded to Shell’s understandings about corporate social responsibility.

We question whether the postulated revenge and forgiveness systems constitute true adaptations. Revenge and forgiveness are the products of multiple motivational systems and capacities, many of which did not exclusively evolve to support deterrence. Anger is more aptly construed as an adaptation that organizes independent mechanisms to deter transgressors than as the mediator of a distinct revenge adaptation.

Kripke's theory of partial truth offers a natural solution of the Liar paradox and an appealing explanation of why the Liar sentence seems to lack definite content. It seems vulnerable, however, to...

Common sense assures me I am free and responsible for my actions, but on the other hand it is admitted that my way of acting is determined by temperament, heredity and environmental conditioning. Is man an autonomous centre of consciousness expressing himself in feeling-revealing behaviour, or is ‘man’ a short-hand expression for a bundle of heterogeneous phenomena? Ryle believes that the conceptual geography of ‘I’, ‘you’ and ‘he’ is not yet satisfactorily established. But in his view such mental perplexities are (...) growing pains that merely indicate one is in a healthy state. We are familiar with the concrete, but unsure about the abstract, and it is very rare that we are fully aware of all the logical powers of the expressions that we use. (shrink)