When Descartes made his scientific work public, he ushered in a worldview based almost entirely on mechanical motion, which brought along a complete rejection of “occult” forces. Thus, the foundation of astrology was equally rejected by many prominent Cartesians. However, the popularity of Descartes’ system lead to its rapid adoption by many subjects, astrology included. Here, I will take a look at the curious case of Claude Gadroys, whose primary work, Discours sur les influences des astres, defends a (...) mechanical account of astrology that accords with Descartes’ principles. Gadroys’ Discours employs a sophisticated strategy to rehabilitate astrology of the 17th century against Pico della Mirandola, among other critics. Gadroys’ theory even incorporates Descartes’ discovery, contra the scholastics, that the sublunary and celestial spheres do not differ in kind. Surprisingly, Gadroys uses Descartes’ discovery to substantiate the stars influencing the Earth, whereas earlier astrologers required such a distinction. Gadroys’ adoption of Cartesian philosophy highlights two major theses. First, the advent of mechanical philosophy in no way necessitated the downfall of astrology; instead, it merely changed the direction of astrological explanation for those that followed current science. Second, it shows the selective nature of Cartesian explanation and hypotheses. (shrink)

This work takes into account three Cartesian manuals diffused in 17th century France ; Jacques Rohault, Traité de physique ; Pierre-Sylvain Régis, Cours entier de philosophie, ou système general selon les principes de M. Descartes contenant la logique, la metaphysique, la physique et la morale ) in order to question if the development of an empirical attitude in the scientific research influenced their approaches to the study of motion. The article intends to deepen the role that these authors give to (...) God in the physical structure of the universe with the purpose of investigating whether their analysis of motion is untainted by the metaphysical component or on what terms it remains linked to it. (shrink)

Descartes and his early followers were widely seen to be enemies of superstition and the occult. This was particularly visible in the Cartesian movement’s antagonism to astrology. However, why Descartes and his early followers were so pitted against astrology is less than clear given the flexibility afforded to them through their system of philosophy and various mechanical explanations. Claude Gadroys (1642-1678), for example, produced a short treatise that provided a mechanical explanation consistent with Cartesian physics to allow for (...) celestial influence on Earth. In doing so, he exposed a contradiction in Cartesian vortex theory that seemed to disallow any such influence. In this way, Gadroys brought against himself and then dispelled one of the strongest objections to a Cartesian astrology. Oddly, no other Cartesian relied on principles specific to Cartesianism to argue against astrology as a legitimate science. This paper’s goal is to give a survey of some of the most prominent anti-astrological influences on Descartes, as well as some of the most prominent anti-astrological Cartesians in the second half of the 17th century. In doing this, I hope to show two things. First, in mainstream Cartesianism of the period, the anti-astrological sentiment was in no way part of the debate surrounding Descartes’ philosophy. Instead, ‘Cartesian’ anti-astrological arguments were based on well-worn arguments with an emphasis on experimental difficulties in establishing an astrological science. Second, the explanation for the curious lack of distinctly Cartesian anti-astrological arguments reflects an inherent flaw in Cartesianism; namely, it lacked the theoretical tools to completely rule out ‘occult’ sciences such as astrology. (shrink)

The conception of René Descartes as the arch-rationalist has been sufficiently exploded in recent literature; however, there is still a large lacuna in our understanding of how empirical research and experimentation fits within his philosophy. My dissertation is directed at addressing just this problem. I contend that Descartes’ famed method is not a singular monolith but instead two interdependent methods: one directed at metaphysical and epistemological truth, while the other directed at empirical questions and contingent facts of the world. I (...) claim there is evidence for this position not only in his actual scientific practice, but also in the rhetorical structure of the Discourse on Method and the Principles of Philosophy. In exploring the empirical side of Descartes’ method, I show how his unusual system produces a system of experiment designed to serve both as a discovery and verification tool at the same time. As a further application of my interpretation, I argue that the Passions of the Soul and Descartes’ ethical theory expressed in his correspondence must also be seen as part of his two-fold methodology. Instead of attempting to cast Descartes as a virtue ethicist or deontologist, as is normally done, I emphasize that Descartes’ ethics is centered on the mind-body union, and therefore, includes an empirical element as well. The end result is an ethics that requires a detailed study of mechanics, anatomy, physics, as well as medicine. Lastly, I show how this methodology can help us understand the works of some of his early followers: Claude Gadroys and Jacques Rohault. Both of these philosophers not only serve to ground my interpretation, but also to highlight aspects of Cartesian that have often been passed over. I show how the experimentalism of Jacques Rohault goes beyond the epistemological boundaries set up by Descartes, as signifies a new direction that will ultimately eclipse the Cartesian school of thought. In the case of Claude Gadroys, I present a concrete example of the exploitation of the over generality of Cartesian principles. In so doing, I show that while Descartes’ experimentalism was intended to rule out the possibility of occult causes, he in fact created a system that allowed for them, only under a different guise. (shrink)

William of Ockham (c.1287-1347) is known to be one of the major figures of the late Middle Ages. The scope and significance of his doctrine of human thought, however, has been a controversial issue among scholars in the last decade, and this book presents a full discussion of recent developments. Claude Panaccio proposes a richly documented and entirely original reinterpretation of Ockham's theory of concepts as a coherent blend of representationalism, conceptual atomism, and non reductionist nominalism, stressing in the (...) process its special interest for current discussions in philosophy of mind and cognitive sciences. (shrink)

Les guerres d'Italie - qui débutent en 1494 - et les bouleversements qui s'ensuivent à Florence (où se met en place, après la chute des Médicis, la république du Grand Conseil), amènent Francesco Guicciardini (1483-1540) à réfléchir sur l'évidence« naturelle» du concept de libertàftorentina. Sa méthode - «ne pas se laisser à ce point tromper par les mots qu'on ne considère plus les choses» - lui fait abandonner la question du bon gouvernement pour lui substituer celle des effets qu'il produit (...) et le pousse à mettre en lumière, «sous la douceur du nom de liberté», les enjeux politiques. Dès lors, il n'y a plus d'évidence naturelle de l'aspiration à la libertà, mais la nécessaire analyse de la conjoncture politico-historique, de la « condition des temps ». (shrink)

Évoquant ce « véritable continent englouti » (Brigitte Louichon) qu’est le roman féminin, les maîtres d’œuvre de ce volume entendent moins réhabiliter que réévaluer cette littérature de bas-bleus. Une réévaluation bienvenue : pour ne prendre qu’un exemple, La Canne de M. de Balzac (Delphine de Girardin, 1836), auquel Andrea Del Lungo consacre d’éclairantes pages, relève pleinement de la « comédie humaine » propre à la France des notables dont l’auteure offre une remarquable représentation. So...

We discuss the finite-to-one Rudin-Keisler ordering of ultrafilters on the natural numbers, which we baptize the Rudin-Blass ordering in honour of Professor Andreas Blass who worked extensively in the area. We develop and summarize many of its properties in relation to its bounding and dominating numbers, directedness, and provide applications to continuum theory. In particular, we prove in ZFC alone that there exists an ultrafilter with no Q-point below in the Rudin-Blass ordering.

I argue that there are at least two kinds of tacit premises; describe a certain type of counterexample against the validity of arguments, and then use it to identify one kind of tacit premise. I distinguish two classes of tacit premises on the grounds that they are discovered or constructed differently, they have different roles in an argument or causal explanation, and have different logical relations to each other.

La méthode psychoprophylactique d’accouchement sans douleur se développe en URSS dans un contexte stalinien sur les principes de la médecine pavlovienne, définie officiellement lors de la « session pavlovienne » de 1950. En France, c’est la figure de Fernand Lamaze qui est associée à la promotion de l’accouchement sans douleur, après qu’il ait importé la MPP d’Union soviétique l’année suivante. D’abord soutenue par les organisations marxistes et le mouvement d’émancipation des femmes, elle sera ensuite contestée sous l’effet des transformations dans (...) la gestion médicale de l’accouchement et des rivalités politiques de la guerre froide. L’article interroge les origines historiques, épistémologiques et politiques de la médecine pavlovienne. Il compare la réception du pavlovisme à l’Ouest et à l’Est en suivant le fil de l’histoire de l’accouchement sans douleur et les enjeux en France et en URSS d’une controverse dans laquelle médecine et politique s’entremêlent. (shrink)

This book discusses the ethical dilemmas of migration in the era of globalization. Centered on the recent influx of large numbers of migrants and refugees to the United States and Europe and viewed through the lens of the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit and the United Nations Summit on Refugees and Migrants, this book focuses on the problems posed by globalized migration and analyzes proposed responses. Using prominent ethical theories and moral principles, such as Utilitarianism, duty, justice, and integrity, the book (...) proposes a framework for analyzing decision-making by migrants and policymakers and formulating equitable policies to address the migration crisis. Drawing attention to the ethical dilemmas that migrants and policymakers experience, this book fills a gap in the literature and enriches it, adding to the economic, political, and human rights issues that are traditionally part of the migration discussion. Appropriate for students and scholars of ethics, policy, and political science, this book is also meant to be of use to practitioners and decision-makers faced with similar decisions. (shrink)

Les politiques sociales en direction des ménages monoparentaux sont loin d’être homogènes en Europe. Cet article compare les différentes réformes adoptées par plusieurs pays européens ces dernières décennies, et montre la manière dont se dessine aujourd’hui une politique européenne de retour à l’emploi des mères qui élèvent seules leurs enfants – ce que les Anglo-Saxons qualifient de Workfare ou de Welfare to work.

Schelling fait remarquer que la théorie kantienne du mal radical repose fondamentalement sur un acte de liberté, ce qui n’est pas le cas chez Fichte. Dans cet article, nous voulons examiner le bien-fondé de la thèse de Schelling selon laquelle les conceptions kantienne et fichtéenne du mal moral présentent d’importantes divergences. Pour I’essentiel, en effet, la position de Fichte s’éloigne de celle de Kanten ce qu’elle réhabilite une certaine forme d’humanisme en réduisant le mal à l’inertie de l’être raisonnable fini (...) et à l’ignorance dans laquelle il a tendance à se maintenir. Contrairement à Kant donc, jamais Fichte ne pourra admettre que la pleine conscience de la loi morale laisse encore. ouverte la possibilité de choisir délibérément le mal.Shelling contends that Kant’s theory of radical evil, unlike Fichte’s, is fundamentally based on liberty. In this article, we wish to examine the relevance of Schelling’s thesis according to which the Kantian and Fichtean conceptions of moral evil bear important differences. Essentially, in deed, Fichte’s position differs from that of Kant in that it restores a certain form of humanism by reducing evil to the inertia of a finite rational being and to the ignorance in which it tends to persist. Thus, unlike Kant, Fichte could never admit that full consciousness of the moral law allows the possibility to choose evil deliberately. (shrink)

Maurice Blondel, Jacques Maritain, Gabriel Marcel, Etienne Gilson, Edith Stein et bien d'autres célébrités se réunirent à Juvisy en 1933 pour un colloque resté célèbre. La question posée était : "Y a-t-il une philosophie chrétienne?". Claude Brunier-Coulin s'attache à reprendre les divers arguments en présence pour en souligner toute l'actualité. Malgré des avis divergents, les participants admettaient qu'il n'y a pas formellement de philosophie chrétienne car la raison ne peut atteindre par ses propres forces les données de la Révélation. (...) La Révélation et son contenu est ce qui caractérise l'oeuvre de la théologie. A partir de là, les points de vue se partagent et divergent entre Maurice Blondel, Etienne Gilson ou Jacques Maritain en particulier. Pourtant, la philosophie peut-être chrétienne, non pas de façon formelle mais dans son exercice car elle est influencée par les valeurs chrétiennes à la fois sur le plan du savoir et de la pratique. (shrink)

Dans cet essai bref et étincelant, Jean-Claude Guillebaud s’insurge contre la désespérance qui habite nos sociétés. Il nous convainc que, décidément, l’avenir a besoin de nous. Ce texte de combat est l’un des plus personnels qu’il ait écrit. "J’aimerais trouver les mots pour dire à quel point m’afflige la désespérance contemporaine. Elle est un gaz toxique que nous respirons chaque jour, sans réfléchir. Or, la réalité n’est jamais aussi sombre. Ombres et lumières y sont toujours mêlées. L’espérance n’implique donc (...) ni aveuglement ni sotte crédulité. Elle est lucide, mais têtue. J’y repense chaque matin à l’aube, quand je vois rosir le ciel au-dessus des toits de Paris ou monter la lumière derrière la forêt, chez moi, en Charente... L’espérance a partie liée avec cet infatigable recommencement du matin. Elle vise l’avenir mais se vit aujourd’hui, les yeux ouverts. Avec passion." [Source : 4e de couv.]. (shrink)

In this interview, Claude Romano discusses his phenomenological project of the event in relation to hermeneutics, reason, realism, and some other fundamental problems of phenomenology. He explains common themes in his phenomenological project and elucidates why he considers it important to leave behind the transcendental perspective in phenomenology. He distinguishes his descriptive realism from other realist movements in contemporary French philosophy. The interview also questions the Eurocentric orientation of many phenomenological authors and considers the possibility of going beyond such (...) assumptions in phenomenology. (shrink)

Le bilan d'une vie marquée par la littérature, la peinture et la musique, et une introduction à l'oeuvre de l'anthropologue. Il évoque son itinéraire intellectuel, ses voyages et ses rencontres, ses goûts et ses aversions. Publié à l'occasion de son centenaire.

Après avoir rappelé les enjeux philosophiques de la problématique de l’idée d’un a priori affectif dans le parcours philosophique de Mikel Dufrenne, nous chercherons à mettre en valeur l’heuristique des a priori affectifs, conçue comme une herméneutique de la présence du sensible qui met en lumière l’affinité communicative entre les « a priori existentiels » et les « a priori cosmologiques ».

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Historiography of Philosophy by Michael FredeClaude PanaccioMichael Frede. The Historiography of Philosophy. Edited by Katerina Ierodiakonou, with a postface by Jonathan Barnes. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022. Pp. 256. Hardback, $80.00.From the 1970s until his tragic death in 2007, Michael Frede was one of the most prominent scholars in ancient Greek philosophy, with landmark contributions to the study of Aristotle and of Hellenistic thought in particular. This (...) volume contains his theoretical reflections on the work of historians of philosophy. The main part of the book reproduces with minor corrections the previously unpublished text of the Nellie Wallace Lectures that Frede gave in 1989–90 in Oxford (1–135). Then come three papers that he published on pretty much the same topic between 1987 and 1992 (137–88). Jonathan Barnes's postface, finally, launches an exciting discussion of Frede's proposals by raising a number of questions and critical remarks about them (189–230).Frede's main claim throughout the book is that there is, and should be, a distinctively historical approach to the history of philosophy that has not yet been sufficiently recognized as such in the academic world. This is not to say that he considers more philosophical approaches to be illegitimate. His point is that we have to be clear about the distinction and what it involves in terms of requirements and methods. What Frede calls the "historical history of philosophy" is thus contrasted by him with two varieties of philosophical approaches. One of them he identifies as the "philosophical history of philosophy." It consists in retrospectively studying the past of philosophy as a kind of maturation toward some more recent doctrinal stage, as Aristotle or Hegel saliently did with their respective predecessors. Frede takes this to be "a perfectly intelligible and legitimate, though perhaps not particularly interesting or fruitful, enterprise" (41). Most of the time, he thinks, it would be led by its own philosophical presuppositions to be too selective and to provide a badly distorted picture of past philosophy.Frede is much more sympathetic to the other philosophical approach to the history of philosophy he acknowledges, the one he calls "doxography." This is the study of past philosophers with the aim of finding something of interest in them for ongoing philosophical discussions—a familiar practice, indeed, in the philosophical discipline as we know it. There is an inevitable amount of anachronism in such endeavors, according to Frede, insofar as the commentators will have to reformulate the old views in contemporary terms to a certain extent and to look at them in connection with the questions that are currently debated in the field. But Frede deems this kind of anachronism acceptable as long as sufficient care is taken to correctly identify the views of the past we are interested in and to report them in the best available way. He strongly insists, however, that there are inherent risks of distortion in this approach. This might not be a problem if we are prepared to deal, as philosophers, with views that were not exactly those of the past; but we then run the risk of leaving out something of great philosophical interest, even to us, since "as a rule the philosopher subjected to doxographical treatment was a much better philosopher than the doxographer" (34). If we turn to the past for philosophical inspiration, we should also do it seriously, and this presupposes a historical study of past authors that is pursued for its own sake. [End Page 317]The latter is what Frede is really interested in, and he wants this historical approach to be "as independent as possible from philosophy and not just an ancilla to philosophy" (60). Its practitioners must have a strong philosophical training, of course, in order to understand the views they study and the arguments that were adduced in support of them, but Frede insists that they nevertheless are historians first and foremost: they strive to provide a correct account of "the actual, historical evolution of these views and positions" (14) and of how new doctrines actually grew out of previous ones given the historical context. Insofar as this is what they are doing, historians of... (shrink)

Cet article cherche à cerner la manière dont Charles Taylor approfondit sa distinction entre deux grands paradigmes, désignatif et expressif, pour l’approche du langage, dans son ouvrage récent, The language animal. En prenant position en faveur des conceptions expressivistes du langage, d’inspiration romantique, qui prennent pour modèle l’idéalisme transcendantal kantien et l’idée selon laquelle toute langue particulière donne forme à notre expérience du monde, Taylor peut-il encore défendre le réalisme épistémologique qu’il avance dans Retrieving realism? Comment peut-on penser chez lui (...) l’articulation entre ces deux affirmations? (shrink)

The Tindemans report on the European union and the decision to organize direct elections for the European Parliament have been two important events in European afjairs in 1976. This article analyses the origins, developments and bearing of these two events.Although his mandate was initiated and encouraged at the highest level - that of the European heads of state -, Mr. Tindemans' attempt to propose concrete steps in order to achieve a real political union in Europe did not get through. It (...) received a rather cold reception from several states who opposed some of his proposals on different grounds.At the Conference of The Hague, Mr. Tindemans was able to get a formal support to his ideas, but no decision was taken to implement any of them.The decision to organize direct elections for the European Parliament, which can be seen as a concrete step toward the implementation of the long awaited European union, is facing the same kind of resistance at the national level. Although the Nine have all agreed to do everything possible to organize these elections in the spring of 1978, there are still unsolved problems which are both technical and political. Moreover, even if they are taking place, it is not at all sure that they will bring about substantive changes in the role and functions of the European Parliament. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction The Master and the Disciple The Light and the Shadow Conclusion.

La confrontation de la philosophie et de la cuisine permet de découvrir la nature de chacune de ces pratiques et ce qui tend à les opposer. La philosophie par vocation se tient éloignée de la vie mortelle. Attachée à la vie mortelle, la cuisine fait de la nécessité de se nourrir un plaisir quotidiennement renouvelé et qui tient une place centrale dans la vie ordinaire de la plupart des hommes. Voilà pourquoi la philosophie ignore la cuisine et méprise le plaisir (...) de manger. (shrink)

In this article, I intend to show, first of all, that the metaphysical neutrality of the Logical Investigations leads to untenable consequences and even threatens the coherence of Husserl's project. In truth, Husserl's distinction between phenomenology and metaphysics and its corollary, the pure and simple exclusion of metaphysical problems - such as that of the reality of the so-called external world - from the field of nascent phenomenology, make it impossible to give a satisfactory form to a problem as central (...) to this new discipline as that of perception. However, my final word will not be on the indis-soluble link between the problems that phenomenology poses for itself and those that Husserl would like to be able to "purify" it from the outset. However permeable the boundaries between these two general directions of research may be, phenomenology and metaphysics are not equivalent. Phenomenology can even be said to contribute to formulating and solving certain metaphysical problems, starting with the idealism/realism antithesis. It is to this contribution that I will devote the second part of these reflections. (shrink)

This paper reports the text of the intervention pronounced by Claude Lévi-Strauss for the 60th anniversary of Unesco in 2006. Lévi-Strauss recalls the intersections between his activity in the field of anthropology and ethnology and Unesco since its foundation, and the role Unesco can play nowadays in the preservation of cultural diversity and biodiversity.

A major figure of Resistance in the French philosophical milieu, Gorges Canguilhem started his teaching at the university of Strasbourg in Clermont-Ferrand in April 1941, arriving from Toulouse, a city in which he had already carried out antifascist activities. In this paper, we present Canguilhem’s teachings related to war, freedom and values, and his activities of Resistance properly said, which, regarding Clermont-Ferrand, began as soon as April 1941 before he was able to join the underground military forces of the Maquis (...) in June 1944, to participate in the Mont Mouchet battle, on which he left an important testimony. A heavy human toll was paid by the university of Strasbourg during the war and especially at the time of the Libération, in order to keep German troops fighting in the Mont Mouchet and at other locations in the Central part of France. (shrink)

L'idéal universaliste, qui a traversé les siècles jusqu'à aujourd'hui en surplombant les traditions intellectuelles tant chinoise qu'européenne, a façonné un certain nombre de nos représentations et imposé l'idée d'une antinomie entre ce qui relève de l'universel et ce qui renvoie à l'existence du particulier. Outre ce que, à bien y regarder, cette incompatibilité supposée peut avoir de paradoxal, divers épisodes chinois ou européens montrent que, au cours de sa très longue histoire, l'universalisme a aussi entretenu des relations équivoques avec des (...) créations historiques instituant des communautés particulières, telle la nation. Et ce sont ses rapports, tantôt connivents, tantôt antagoniques avec un ensemble de constructions mentales ou historiques particularisantes que l'auteure envisage en première partie. A partir du XVIIe siècle, les deux universalismes évoluent dans une certaine interaction, au gré des rencontres de leurs divers représentants ou de moments de proximité intellectuelle : c'est cette histoire de leurs relations, longue de plus de quatre siècles, que retrace la seconde partie. Le dialogue né de cette interaction, marqué par des méprises et incompréhensions, aura été quelque peu tortueux, mais néanmoins fructueux, dans la mesure où il aura favorisé une prise de conscience par chacun des deux universalismes... d'eux-mêmes. (shrink)

v. 1. 1737-1756, lettres 1-249 -- v. 2. 1757-1760, lettres 250-464 -- v. 3.1761-1774, lettres 465-720 -- v. 4. 1774-1800, lettres 721-855 -- v. 5. Quatre nouvelles lettres, errata, additions et modifications, lettres exclues de l'édition proprement dite, généalogies, liste des lettres, index et table des matières.

Trois parties: la démocratie athénienne; les institutions oligarchiques; les fédérations de cités. [SDM].

This paper argues that the dominant mainstream neo‐classical economic theory propounds a world‐view which is based not simply on half‐truths, but on straight lies. This is particularly significant since the influence of the economic world‐view reaches into every realm of social thought. Although overtly grounded in utilitarianism, the basis of neo‐classical thought has undergone two shifts of meaning which have converted the original self‐evident utilitarian presuppositions into an ideology.The first of these alters the utilitarian proposition that ‘we seek satisfaction’ into (...) the statement that ‘we only seek satisfaction’. It follows that human action is motivated by nothing other than selfishness and greed, and that altruism therefore cannot exist: anything that looks like altruism is therefore nothing other than egoism in disguise, and there is no place for ethical reasoning in individual choice.The second shift alters the premise that our goal is ‘maximum satisfaction’ to the assertion that what we seek is ‘maximum monetary gain’. This shift is already present in the writings of Jeremy Bentham, and forms the basis of much subsequent work in economics. In particular, it has facilitated the emergence of what one might term ‘economic imperialism’, i.e. the use of economic theory to analyse social issues – family size, racial discrimination, marriage, education choices, among others. In all of these cases monetary gain is the paramount criterion. For business ethics the most obvious example here is the absolutisation of profit as the sole criterion of business achievements, and of salary as the sole criterion of work choice and worker satisfaction.Both of these premises are then used to demonstrate that it is free competition which will ensure maximum social welfare. This conclusion is both relativistic and reductionistic. In the first place, the necessary conditions for perfect competition can never exist. Nor can ‘optimum social welfare’ be translated into ‘optimum welfare for all’ in an economic world‐view which sees wealth and poverty as the ‘just deserts’ of hard work and laziness respectively.The dominant economic theory is thus explicitly immoral in that it enshrines the absolute sovereignity of the individual and the law of the jungle as social norms. The qualitative measure of human happiness is desire, the quantitative measure is money. From an ethical perspective we must reject the falsity of this world‐view. (shrink)

This article aims at answering the following problem: since for Heidegger the historicity of Being presupposes the withdrawal of the transcendental source of such a historicity, then does Heidegger’s perspective lead to a form of relativism of the kind of an epochal historicism? If on the contrary one judges that for Heidegger there is after all, beyond the ordered unfolding of epochs in the history of Being, an ultimate transcendental or at least trans-epochal dimension, does Heidegger’s thinking lead back to (...) an ahistorical Absolute beyond historicity? In order to answer these questions, I propose to divide Heidegger’s philosophy in three stages, rather than the two stages that have usually been retained by commentators ever since the works of Richardson, in conformity with Heidegger’s own indications regarding the Turning (Kehre) of his philosophy. Indeed, Heidegger in the 1930’s develops the notion of machination (Machenschaft) and thus gives historicity a hegemonic function in Being’s essential occurrence (Wesung), itself understood as the intensification of the program of machination starting in the Greek inceptual thinking and developing itself until today’s planetary technological era. However, after 1945 Heidegger does not think anymore that the truth of Being is entirely determined by historicity and that Being essentially abandons Dasein to machination and to its gradual historical unfolding, because there is now according to him, beyond the epochs that are destined to Dasein, a trans-epochal giving (and perhaps generous) origin of presence that constitutes the supreme cause for thinking (Sache des Denkens). (shrink)

Se presentan los resultados de una investigación multicéntrica de evaluación de los Comités de Ética de Investigación (CEI) en Panamá, la cual busca mecanismos que ayuden a fortalecer su capacidad para evaluar, desde un enfoque de bioética y derechos humanos, los protocolos de los ensayos clínicos financiados por la industria farmacéutica o por los centros extranjeros de investigación, así como monitorear la implementación de los protocolos aprobados. Se revisó documentación suficiente y se hicieron entrevistas a miembros de cuatro CEI. A (...) partir de ahí, se concluye que en Panamá los CEI respetan las normas internacionales de funcionamiento y de revisión de protocolos, y que los problemas encontrados guardan relación con su experiencia, el contexto social y la evolución de los intereses de las compañías farmacéuticas. (shrink)

Nous continuons la republication des beaux textes de J.-C. Schmitt disponibles en ligne. Cet article a déjà paru dans Annales HSS, juillet-août 2007, n°4, p. 793-835. Le rythme de la vie collective domine et embrasse les rythmes variés de toutes les vies élémentaires dont il résulte ; par suite, le temps qui l'exprime domine et embrasse toutes les durées particulières, écrivait Émile Durkheim en conclusion aux Formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse ; et il précisait : « c'est le rythme (...) de la - Histoire. (shrink)