Ethical concepts are, or purport to be, normative. They make claims on us: they command, oblige, recommend, or guide. Or at least when we invoke them, we make claims on one another; but where does their authority over us - or ours over one another - come from? Christine Korsgaard identifies four accounts of the source of normativity that have been advocated by modern moral philosophers: voluntarism, realism, reflective endorsement, and the appeal to autonomy. She traces their history, showing (...) how each developed in response to the prior one and comparing their early versions with those on the contemporary philosophical scene. Kant's theory that normativity springs from our own autonomy emerges as a synthesis of the other three, and Korsgaard concludes with her own version of the Kantian account. Her discussion is followed by commentary from G. A. Cohen, Raymond Geuss, Thomas Nagel, and Bernard Williams, and a reply by Korsgaard. (shrink)

Essays discuss the division of household labor, anti-semitism, violence against women, reproductive freedom, parenting, friendship between women, and feminist theology.

It is not unusual now for Hume to be read as part of a virtue ethical tradition. However there are a number of obstacles in the way of such a reading: subjectivist, irrationalist, hedonistic, and consequentialist interpretations of Hume. In this paper I support a virtue ethical reading by arguing against all these interpretations. In the course of these arguments I show how Hume should be understood as part of a virtue ethical tradition which is sentimentalist in a response-dependent sense, (...) as opposed to Aristotelian. (shrink)

The reflection of global justice demands an innovative revision of traditional patterns of argument of political theory. How can moral responsibility be defined in connection with intergovernmental action? Ethical, institutional, and logical implications of a human legal foundation of intergovernmental justice are discussed in three theoretical chapters in this book. Further chapters deal with the structure of intergovernmental responsibility in connection with ethics of peace, humanitarian intervention, the fight against poverty, as well as migration. Moreover, the book analyzes governmental liability (...) and collective political duties towards individuals, who are citizens of other states. (shrink)

Journal of Social Philosophy, EarlyView.

abstractBackground: Evidence shows both a tendency for research participants to conflate research and clinical care and a limited public understanding of research. Conflation of research and care by participants is often referred to as the therapeutic misconception. Despite this evidence, few studies have explicitly asked participants, and especially minors, to explain what they think research is and how they think it differs from regular medical care. Methods: As part of a longer semistructured interview evaluating assent and parental permission for research, (...) adolescent research participants (n = 177), including adolescents with illnesses and healthy volunteers, and their parents (n = 177) were asked to describe medical research in their own words and say whether and how they thought being in medical research was different from seeing a regular doctor. Qualitative responses were coded and themes were identified through an iterative process. Results: When asked to describe medical research, the majority described research in terms of its goals of helping to advance science, develop treatments and medicines, and help others; fewer described research as having the goal of helping particular research participants, and fewer still in terms of the methods used in research. The majority of teen and parent respondents said being in research is different than seeing a regular doctor and explained this by describing different goals, different or more procedures, differences in the engagement of the doctors/researchers, and differences in logistics. Conclusions: Adolescents participating in clinical research and their parents generally describe medical research in terms of its goals of advancing science and finding new medicines and treatments, sometimes in combination with helping the enrolled individuals. The majority perceive a difference between research and regular medical care and described these differences in various ways. Further exploration is warranted about how such perceived differences matter to participants and how this understanding could be used to enhance informed consent and the overall research experience. (shrink)

The proposal that there are specific adaptations for the expression and detection of pain appears premature on both conceptual and empirical grounds. We discuss criteria for the validation of a pain facial expression. We also describe recent findings from our lab on coping styles and pain expression, which illustrate the importance of considering individual differences when proposing evolutionary explanations.

We address two main issues: the distinction between time-constrained and spatially constrained tasks, and the separable A and W effects on movement time (MT) in spatially-constrained tasks. We consider MT and 3-D kinematic data from human adults pointing to targets in human-computer interaction. These are better fit by Welford's (1968) two-part model, than Fitts' (1954; Fitts & Peterson 1964) ID model. We identify theoretical and practical implications.

On admet en général qu’il y a deux sortes de concepts normatifs : les concepts évaluatifs, comme bon, et les concepts déontiques, comme devoir. La question que soulève cette distinction est celle de savoir comment il est possible d’affirmer que les concepts évaluatifs sont normatifs. En effet, comme les concepts déontiques semblent constituer le coeur du domaine normatif, plus le fossé entre les deux sortes de concepts est grand, moins il paraîtra plausible d’affirmer que les concepts évaluatifs sont normatifs. Après (...) avoir présenté les différences principales entre les concepts évaluatifs et les concepts déontiques, et montré qu’il y a plus qu’une différence superficielle entre les deux sortes de concepts, j’examinerai la question de la normativité des concepts évaluatifs. Il deviendra apparent que même s’il s’agit de concepts ayant des fonctions différentes, il existe un grand nombre de relations entre les concepts évaluatifs, d’une part, et les concepts de devoir et de raison, d’autre part.It is generally accepted that there are two sorts of normative concepts : evaluative concepts, such as good, and deontic concepts, such as ought. The question that is raised by this distinction is how it is possible to claim that evaluative concepts are normative. As deontic concepts appear to be at the heart of normativity, the more there is a gap between evaluative and deontic concepts, the less it appears plausible to say that evaluative concepts are normative. After having presented the main differences between evaluative and deontic concepts, and shown that there is more than a superficial difference between the two sorts of concepts, the paper turns to the question of the normativitity of evaluative concepts. It will become clear that even if these concepts have different functions, there are a great many ties between evaluative concepts, on the one hand, and the concepts of ought and of reason, on the other hand. (shrink)

This paper consists in a critical review of Peter Goldie's book, The Emotion. A Philosophical Exploration (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). Goldie is right to distinguish between long-term emotions and emotional experiences. And he is also right to reject the view that emotions are reducible to 'feelingless' states plus some extra feelings. However, Goldie's own account in terms of "feeling towards" is problematic. Goldie would have been better advised to claim that emotional experiences are necessarily emotional representations of something as (...) being F (disgusting, attractive, admirable, etc.), that is, that emotional experiences are apprehensions or representations of evaluative features. (shrink)

Indigenous communities have always cultivated social studies learning that is interactive, dynamic, and integrated with traditional knowledges. To confront the assimilative and deculturalizing education that accompanied European settlement of the Americas, Montana has adopted Indian Education for All (IEFA). This case study evaluates the Digital Storywork Partnership (DSP), which strives to advance the goals of IEFA within and beyond the social studies classroom through community-centered research and filmmaking. Results demonstrate the potential for DSP projects to advance culturally revitalizing education, community (...) connectedness, and identity-development. The DSP offers a model for social studies education that is not only culturally affirming and revitalizing for Indigenous communities, but also holds potential for use in all communities. We conclude with recommendations for educators, scholars, and community members engaged in similar efforts. (shrink)

Les femmes mariées restent gouvernées par les hommes qui en attendent un travail domestique ménager, culturel, social, et sexuel. La famille reste oppressive pour les femmes. Patriarcat et capitalisme sont deux systèmes d’oppression distincts. Partout, et pas seulement dans le capitalisme, le travail ménager est fait par les femmes gratuitement et obligatoirement, parfois par des domestiques qu’il faut tout de même contrôler. La hiérarchie entre les hommes et les femmes reste admise, car elle est héritée du passé. Les femmes continuent (...) de s’autosacrifier quand il faut partager au sein de la famille. (shrink)

This dissertation explores the ethics of human subjects research with particular attention to how clinical research on vaccines differs from research on therapies. The major differences are rooted in the fact that the benefits of vaccines and vaccine research accrue to the community to which vaccines belong by inducing herd immunity and thereby protecting both vaccinated and unvaccinated individuals. Therapeutics have no corresponding benefit to the community, the primary beneficiary is the individual. The ethical justification for conducting vaccine research in (...) a given community therefore should include an evaluation of the risks and benefits to the community as well as to involved individuals. Respect for individuals extends to respect for communities and for individuals as members of communities. A three way partnership between investigators, the community, and the community members is suggested as an ethical foundation for vaccine research. ;This model is then applied to the particular and complex case of testing a preventive HIV vaccine. HIV is an unique virus which continues to cause extraordinary devastation worldwide. The characteristics of HIV, its transmission and epidemiology, along with unprecedented scientific possibilities present a formidable challenge to the development and testing of an HIV vaccine. Using the community model, specific suggestions are made for the ethical conduct of clinical efficacy trials of HIV preventive vaccines. (shrink)

In this essay, I offer some reflections on how the topics were identified and approached by the Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues, on which I had the honor to serve, in the hope that the reflections may be useful to future national bioethics commissions. In the executive order that established the bioethics commission, President Obama explicitly recognized the ethical imperative to responsibly pursue science, innovation, and advances in biomedical research and health care, and the importance of national (...) attention to these issues. The bioethics commission prioritized practicable, actionable, targeted recommendations. Like most earlier U.S. national bioethics commissions, President Obama's commission did not undertake projects on significant and troublesome issues related to health and health care that were not associated with new science or technology. Issues such as health care access, health care delivery, opioid addiction, end‐of‐life care, and physician‐aid‐in‐dying are topical and ethically complex areas of significance to bioethics, and they are also being discussed and debated by the public, the media, and policy‐makers. In my view, there are good reasons to select and prioritize projects as well as a justification for confining commission efforts to issues related to novel science and emerging technologies, when there is only one national‐level bioethics commission that has been established by the Office of the President. (shrink)

In this paper, I am concerned to show that a wide and interesting range of phenomena commonly described as ‘weakness of will’ should be understood as manifesting a defect of what I shall call ‘executive cowardice’ rather than a strong kind of irrationality. More specifically, I claim that such cases should not be understood as an irrational bypassing of an all-things-considered judgment about the thing to do—a view succinctly described by Peacocke thus: The akrates is irrational because although he intentionally (...) does something for which he has some reason, there is a wider set of reasons he has relative to which he does not judge what he does to be rational. (shrink)

This essay argues for a conception of law as a normative practice, a conception which departs from traditional, particularly positivist, conceptions. It is argued that Dyzenhaus's book (Dyzenhaus 1991), with its fascinating case study of unjust judicial decisions in South Africa, makes a compelling argument for such a conception. However, the essay takes issue with Dyzenhaus for romanticising the liberal tradition, and inflating the power of law and legal theory. Nonetheless, the essay agrees that positivist accounts tend to downplay the (...) emancipatory promise of law, and ends with some remarks about promise. (shrink)

_Feminism and ‘The Schooling Scandal’_ brings together feminist contributions from two generations of educational researchers, evaluating and celebrating the field of gender and education. The focus throughout is on the years of compulsory schooling, examining key concepts in gender and education identified and developed by international thinkers in educational feminism. Topics covered include: social class, ethnicity and sexuality in relation to experiences in school; theories and methodologies for understanding gender; pedagogy and practice in education; and the direction of educational policy (...) and the ‘problem of boys’. Providing a comprehensive overview of contemporary research and theory emerging from ‘second wave’ feminism and assessing their impact on pupils and teachers in today’s schools and classrooms, this book forms essential reading for anyone studying gender and education. (shrink)

We are, as of May 2019, witnessing yet another “caravan” of people fleeing violence in Latin America, bonding together to reach the territory of safer states in the North. Similarly, in the fall of 2015, Europe experienced the movement of many refugees fleeing war, persecution, and grave human rights violations in Syria. These new waves of people on the move have raised anew important questions about asylum and refuge: who should be able to claim asylum? Should the fear of persecution (...) be sufficient, or do asylum seekers need to show that they have actually suffered it? And maybe most controversially, how should asylum‐granting states respond to the plight of those asking for asylum on their territory?The moral principles guiding asylum and refuge are different from the rules usually regulating immigration, which are based on the principle of territorial sovereignty that allows nation‐states to discriminate and select among those who hope to immigrate. Asylum and refuge instead call upon nation‐states to provide refugees with a new home, protect human rights, and over time, provide access to the social, political and civic rights that characterize membership. Included in the list of human rights, I will argue, is the provision of the means for individual physical and psychological well‐being. (shrink)

The method of Wide Reflective Equilibrium has been defended by Kai Nielsen as an exciting new development in the search for a device for increasing our ability to choose between competing moral conceptions. Nonetheless, this confidence will be seen as misplaced unless serious issues are resolved. Lack of clarity surrounds the questions: What is the claimed epistemological role for WRE? What version of WRE is to be employed? In this paper I resolve these ambiguities in a way which supports Kai (...) Nielsen's claim. First, however, I should specify in broad terms the method of WRE. (shrink)

The idea that the state has a duty to protect minority cultures has become so influential that cultural rights might seem a logical extension of T. H. Marshall's idea of citizenship rights; that is, the most recent set of rights to enable the citizen to be a fully participating member of the political community. This article takes the view, however, that citizens do not have cultural rights in the sense of rights to the protection of their minority cultures per se. (...) Instead, we should consider how citizens have an entitlement to culture in the broadest sense, as a constituent of equal well-being. On this view, the state has a duty to enable its citizens to live well. Cultural enrichment may require the protection of endangered ways of life—such as those of minority cultures—but only if these cultures do not run afoul of citizens' equal well-being as autonomous individuals. (shrink)

Draws on Guo Xiang's commentary on the Zhuangzi to construct an account of freedom that is both metaphysical and political.

In his book Appearances of the Good, Sergio Tenenbaum has offered an impressive new defence of a classical account of practical reason, which marks him as heir to a philosophical tradition going back to Aristotle and Kant or, more recently, to Anscombe and Davidson. This account has come under heavy attack in the past twenty years, and it would be no exaggeration to say that it is now a minority view. This is at least so if one counts the number (...) of living philosophers who deny that strict akratic action is possible. Tenenbaum claims that, minimally, his aim is to show that what he calls after Kant “the scholastic view” still merits a place in the philosophical landscape, and in this respect, it is clear that his enterprise is a success. (shrink)

Introduction to the dossier on Imagination and Moral Reasoning.

Les émotions peuvent être pénibles, voire néfastes. Pensons par exemple à la peur, la colère, la haine, la jalousie ou au mépris. De telles émotions sont souvent qualifiées de négatives. Mais que sont les émotions négatives et comment se distinguent-elles des émotions positives ? Plus généralement, qu’impliquent-elles pour notre compréhension des émotions ? Et quels sont concrètement leurs effets sur nos pensées et nos vies ? De plus, comment analyser l’ambivalence affective, comme quand on ressent à la fois de l’amour (...) et de la haine ? Réunissant dix contributions rédigées pour l’occasion, Les ombres de l’âme propose des éléments de réponses originaux à ces questions. Ce faisant, cet ouvrage jette les bases d’une philosophie des émotions négatives. (shrink)

What’s the relation between values and reasons for action ? According to some all reasons are grounded in values. If one adds to this the thought that values themselves depend on non-evaluative or factual features of things, one gets what one can call after Jonathan Dancy the “layer-cake conception”. According to others, we should replace the layer-cake picture by what he calls the “buck-passing account of values” (Scanlon 1998). The main characteristic of this conception is that it denies that reasons (...) are grounded in values. This is not because some reasons would not be grounded in values. Rather, Scanlon’s claim is that values cannot ground reasons. I shall argue that Scanlon’s conception does not get things right: his account of values amounts in fact to a normative or deontic definition of the evaluative. (shrink)

Depuis la fin du Moyen Âge, périodiquement, le noir caractérise le vestiaire masculin. L'étude de John Harvey en cherche les raisons à travers un foisonnement de sources picturales et littéraires, sans négliger les contextes politiques et religieux qui ont pu établir le règne du noir. C'est au XIXe siècle que la conscience en apparaît, sous une forme problématique : pourquoi les hommes (et non les femmes, nous y reviendrons) optent-ils pour la couleur du deuil? « Symbole terrible », p...

La nouvelle biographie de Colette vient satisfaire une curiosité qui ne faiblit pas depuis sa mort en 1954. Contrairement à tant de ses contemporaines dans le monde des lettres, aujourd'hui oubliées, Colette a gagné la bataille de la postérité. Sa vie toute en audace puis en sagesse, son œuvre sensuelle et spirituelle, enfin sa place paradoxale dans le siècle lui donnent en effet une envergure exceptionnelle. Colette était moderne et l'est restée. Claude Francis et Fernande Gontier, qu..