The way in which one understands information and concepts, and the way a student works to develop this, is an individual aspect of learning that cannot be universally defined as (at least manifested) the same for everyone. ‘Understanding’ is a broad term, and the way one achieves understanding is dependent on the way that material is presented. In this article, we argue that the philosophy of science can be important to nursing education—in particular, by showing that the way we imbue (...) understanding might depend on the meaning of ‘understanding’. Diagrams and concept maps are meant to guide newly formed knowledge and connections to develop proper thinking (e.g., the order in which nursing students must prioritize data) that a student requires in the field. We argue that whether or not an image/diagram/concept map confers understanding will depend on both what the object is and what we mean by ‘understanding’. (shrink)

The generally agreed upon principle that legality and ethics can come apart is frequently overlooked in our professional ethics education and decision-making procedures. The crux of the issue is that we teach in our philosophy classes that the law can sometimes be unethical, but then clearly state in nursing codes of ethics that students should always follow the law. The law could no doubt give us some reason to choose action A over action B, but in professional contexts we frequently (...) treat the law as a side-constraint that limits the logical space of choices to exclude even consideration of action B. If B is the mandatory action, this in effect forces professionals to do something unethical by preventing them from ever seeing the ethical action as an option. This is a problem. Ultimately we concede that there might be an irresolvable tension in competing normative interests in ethics and the law, though we suggest that a more nuanced approach to ethical code formation could help alleviate the issue somewhat. (shrink)

To understand the human capacity for psychological altruism, one requires a proper understanding of how people actually think and feel. This paper addresses the possible relevance of recent findings in experimental economics and neuroeconomics to the philosophical controversy over altruism and egoism. After briefly sketching and contextualizing the controversy, we survey and discuss the results of various studies on behaviourally altruistic helping and punishing behaviour, which provide stimulating clues for the debate over psychological altruism. On closer analysis, these studies prove (...) less relevant than originally expected because the data obtained admit competing interpretations – such as people seeking fairness versus people seeking revenge. However, this mitigated conclusion does not preclude the possibility of more fruitful research in the area in the future. Throughout our analysis, we provide hints for the direction of future research on the question. (shrink)

RésuméJ'ai soutenu dans un article de 1985 que s'il y avait des miracles, cela parlerait contre l'existence du Dieu judéo-chrétien. Dans son livre de 1988 sur le concept de miracle, Robert Larmer propose une critique de mes arguments. J'évalue ici la force de cette critique. Je montre que la redéfinition de «miracle» que propose Larmer est circulaire; que sa distinction est spécieuse entre violer une hi naturelle et la surmonter grâce à la création ou la destruction d'énergie par Dieu; et (...) que sa tentative de montrer que les miracles sont le produit d'un être rationnel, bienfaisant et tout-puissant est inadéquate. (shrink)

Recent research has begun to explore individual differences in statistical learning, and how those differences may be related to other cognitive abilities, particularly their effects on language learning. In this research, we explored a different type of relationship between language learning and statistical learning: the possibility that learning a new language may also influence statistical learning by changing the regularities to which learners are sensitive. We tested two groups of participants, Mandarin Learners and Naïve Controls, at two time points, 6 (...) months apart. At each time point, participants performed two different statistical learning tasks: an artificial tonal language statistical learning task and a visual statistical learning task. Only the Mandarin-learning group showed significant improvement on the linguistic task, whereas both groups improved equally on the visual task. These results support the view that there are multiple influences on statistical learning. Domain-relevant experiences may affect the regularities that learners can discover when presented with novel stimuli. (shrink)

How should we approach the daunting task of renewing the ideal of equality? In this book, Christine Sypnowich proposes a theory of equality centred on human flourishing or wellbeing. She argues that egalitarianism should be understood as seeking to make people more equal in the constituents of a good life. Inequality is a social ill because of the damage it does to human flourishing: unequal distribution of wealth can have the effect that some people are poorly housed, badly nourished, (...) ill-educated, unhappy or uncultured, among other things. When we seek to make people more equal our concern is not just resources or property, but how people fare under one distribution or another. Ultimately, the best answer to the question, equality of what?, is some conception of flourishing, since whatever policies or principles we adopt, it is flourishing that we hope will be more equal as a result of our endeavours. Sypnowich calls for both retrieval and innovation. What is to be retrieved is the ideal of equality itself, which is often assumed as a background condition of theories of justice, yet at the same time, dismissed as too homogenising, abstract and rigid a criterion for political argument. We must retrieve the ideal of equality as a central political principle. In doing so, she casts doubt on the value of focussing on cultural difference, and rejects the idea of neutrality that dominates contemporary political philosophy in favour of a view of the state as enabling the betterment of its citizens. ". (shrink)

This paper examines key aspects of Allan Gibbard's psychological account of moral activity. Inspired by evolutionary theory, Gibbard paints a naturalistic picture of morality mainly based on two specific types of emotion: guilt and anger. His sentimentalist and expressivist analysis is also based on a particular conception of rationality. I begin by introducing Gibbard's theory before testing some key assumptions underlying his system against recent empirical data and theories. The results cast doubt on some crucial aspects of Gibbard's philosophical theory, (...) namely his reduction of morality to anger and guilt, and his theory of “normative governance.” Gibbard's particular version of expressivism may be undermined by these doubts. (shrink)

At a time when neoliberalism and financial austerity are together encouraging academic scientists to seek market alternatives to state funding, this essay investigates why, a century ago, their predecessors explicitly rejected private enterprise and the private ownership of ideas and inventions available to them through the patent system. The early twentieth century witnessed the success of a long campaign by British scientists to persuade the state to assume responsibility for the funding of basic research : their findings would enter the (...) intellectual commons; their rewards would be primarily reputational . The essay summarizes recent research in three separate fields of British technoscience—electricity, aviation, and agricultural botany—all of which were laying claim, at this time, to a heightened commercial or military importance that raised new questions about the ownership of scientific ideas. It suggests that each of the three established an idiosyncratic relationship with the patent system or with other forms of “intellectual property,” which would both influence their emergent disciplines and affect the extent to which commercial enterprise could remain a viable funding strategy. (shrink)

To discover David Hume's views on women it is necessary to bring together remarks scattered somewhat sparsely throughout his philosophical and historical writings. Although the titles of Hume's major works might suggest that he was describing the understanding and nature of all human beings, both male and female, in none of the works do we find a specific section devoted to an analysis of sexual differences in these two respects. There is a tidy chapter on female morality in A Treatise (...) of Human Nature , but nothing comparable for female nature as such . This omission does not, however, imply that Hume thought that biological differences had no concomitants in character and understanding. Neither, despite Hume's bantering remark that an essay on a ‘Subject so little to be understood as Women’ would be ‘unintelligible’, does this neglect imply that Hume was uncertain about these attendant differences . Hume's exclusion of such a section seems to stem only from his desire to stress human uniformity, not from any lack of recognition of human variety. Because of the absence of any systematic treatment of the subject by Hume, it is necessary to proceed cautiously in interpreting his remarks on women. There is a further reason for caution in that Hume offers ‘jests and pleasantries’ as well as more serious comments on this subject; Hume, on occasions, gallantly woos his so-called ‘favourites’, his female readers, and when he does so sincerity is gallantly put aside. (shrink)

In this paper we have two related aims. First, we aim to present an account of what it is to treat women as sex-objects.1 Like other philosophical writers in the field, we hold that the central idea in an account of such treatment is the failure to treat women with proper respect in sexual behavior. This idea has been cashed out in terms of using,2 and in terms of dehumanization or failure to accord equal rights to freedom and welfare.3 However, (...) we believe that there is a central deficiency in most such philosophical accounts of treating women as sex-objects, namely, a failure to outline in any detail a theory of interpersonal norms so that one can grasp in more concrete terms what it is to avoid treating a woman as a sex-object. We aim to rectify this deficiency by presenting a model of interpersonal norms based on the work of the social psychologist Chris Argyris. (shrink)

The two main goals of this paper are to question the possibility of the existence of moral emotions and to decipher the notion of moral emotion. I start with a brief critical analysis of various philosophical understandings of moral emotions before setting out an evolutionary line of approach that seems promising at first glance: according to the functional evolutionary approach, moral emotions have the evolutionary function of sustaining cooperation. It turns out ultimately that this approach has its own drawbacks. I (...) finally propose to give up the idea of moral property intrinsic to some emotions; “moral” seems instead merely to label emotions when they occur in morally relevant contexts. (shrink)

This volume includes essays presented at the conference on Emotions and Rationality in Moral Philosophy held at the Universities of Neuchâtel and Bern in October 2005. The authors of this volume share the Humean insight that the ‘sentiments’ have a crucial role to play in elucidating the practice of morality. In a Humean fashion, they warn us against taking an intellectualist view of emotions and reject the rationalist account of morality.

This volume includes essays presented at the conference on Emotions and Rationality in Moral Philosophy held at the Universities of Neuchâtel and Bern in October 2005. The authors of this volume share the Humean insight that the ‘sentiments’ have a crucial role to play in elucidating the practice of morality. In a Humean fashion, they warn us against taking an intellectualist view of emotions and reject the rationalist account of morality.

This paper contains an ‘affective picture’: a story, extensively supported by empirical data, about the way I take people to judge and behave morally; a picture in which the respective roles of reflective and affective processes are explained. According to this picture, different sorts of judgements have to be distinguished, some being cognitively more complex than others. ‘Sophisticated judgements’ are displayed at the level of rational considerations and allow for moral thinking, whereas ‘basic value judgements’ are a primitive and nonreflective (...) way of assessing the world and are motivating. As we shall see, this affective picture has some consequences for the traditional internalismexternalism debate in philosophy; it highlights the fact that motivation is primarily linked to ‘basic value judgements’ and that the norms and judgements we openly defend do not have a particular effect on our actions, unless we are inclined to have an emotional attitude that conforms to them. Key words: affect, emotion, emotional reaction, externalism, internalism, justification, moral judgement, motivation, norm, value. (shrink)

This book gives a concise history of biophysics in contemporary China, from about 1949 to 1976. It outlines how a science specialty evolved from an ambiguous and amorphous field into a fully-fledged academic discipline in the socio-institutional contexts of contemporary China. The book relates how, while initially consisting of cell biologists, the Chinese biophysics community redirected their disciplinary priorities toward rocket science in the late 1950s to accommodate the national interests of the time. Biophysicists who had worked on biological sounding (...) rockets were drawn to the military sector and continued to contribute to human spaceflight in post-Mao China. Besides the rocket-and-space missions which provided the material context for biophysics to expand in the late 1950s and early 1960s, Chinese biophysicists also created research and educational programs surrounding biophysics by exploiting the institutional opportunities afforded by the policy emphasis on science's role to drive modernization. The book explores and demonstrates the collective achievements and struggles of Chinese biophysicists in building their scientific discipline. (shrink)

This article aims to offer a general view of the work and the progress the Partnership and promotions team, placed at the core of the Globethics.net Foundation activities, has reached so far. Starting with a general view on its tasks and duties, Christine Housel opens the floor for the regional officers of the department to offer a personalized view and opinion on the relevant and pressing matters Globethics.net has to focus, or has focused on, locally. During this exposition, we (...) will hear about the Partnership and promotion team’s commitment with students at all levels, its work to foster and nurture ethics in higher education on institutions worldwide, and the diversity and plurality held in itself, a clear embodiment of the pluralistic vocation of Globethics.net. (shrink)

IntroductionIntelligent Virtue is a great book on virtue: an eminently sensible book, and I agree with virtually all of it. For me describing a philosophy book as sensible and indeed commonsensical is real praise, for much philosophy exemplifies a vice to which Martha Nussbaum has drawn our attention in ‘Saving Aristotle’s Appearances.’See Language and Logos Studies in Ancient Greek Philosophy, ed. Malcolm Schofield and Nussbaum , pp. 267–293, 277. This is the intellectual vice of philosophers who got ‘fascinated with the (...) internal progress of their argument, even though it ended in a place incredibly remote from and at odds with, human belief.’ Annas’s work is well grounded in the endoxa .I could list all the important theses with which I agree, ranging from the central claim that virtue is analogous to a practical skill, to the very important claim that happiness is not reached by attaining “stuff” such as money, power, prope .. (shrink)

This chapter provides a background for a virtue ethical map of Hume and Nietzsche. A map offers an interpretation of a terrain or subject matter that is “stylized,” “abstract,” and “simplified. A complete map of Nietzsche and Hume, whether or not it involves a virtue ethical map of their ethics, ideally requires a thoroughly explicated conception of their metaphysical perspective. The chapter offers instead a very abstract map of the main issues and the author's general position. Of great importance for (...) a virtue ethical map of Hume and Nietzsche is their emphasis on psychology. Psychological interpretation must not be confused with an “individualistic” interpretation, according to which persons are viewed as if they were not shaped by their cultures. Indeed Nietzsche frequently draws the attention to the virtues of different ages which may be embryonic in earlier ages. (shrink)

Practical Shape: A Theory of Practical Reasoning. By Jonathan Dancy.

The idea that the state has a duty to protect minority cultures has become so influential that cultural rights might seem a logical extension of T. H. Marshall's idea of citizenship rights; that is, the most recent set of rights to enable the citizen to be a fully participating member of the political community. This article takes the view, however, that citizens do not have cultural rights in the sense of rights to the protection of their minority cultures per se. (...) Instead, we should consider how citizens have an entitlement to culture in the broadest sense, as a constituent of equal well-being. On this view, the state has a duty to enable its citizens to live well. Cultural enrichment may require the protection of endangered ways of life—such as those of minority cultures—but only if these cultures do not run afoul of citizens' equal well-being as autonomous individuals. (shrink)