새로운 제국의 질서 속에서 한대의 지식인들은 선진시대 이래로 인성론에 대하여 다양한 학파의 관점을 발전적으로 수용하는 한편 그것에 절충과 조화를 더하기도 했다. 각 학파의 인성론과 관련한 관점을 조화하려고 하는 주요한 의도는 바로 정치적 교화를 위하는 것과 사회의 윤리적 가치질서를 재건하여 견실한 이론적 기초와 숭고한 가치 관념을 제시하는데 있었던 것이라고 할 수 있다. 한대에 비교적 유행했던 인성론 관점은 바로 인성을 세 등분으로 나누는 이른바 성삼품설이 주류를 이루고 있었다고 할 수 있다. 예를 들자면 동중서가 제기한 ‘성인의 본성’ㆍ‘중인의 본성’ㆍ‘필부의 본성’이라고 하는 것이다. 또한 동중서는 (...) ‘중인의 본성’을 지닌 사람만이 정부가 시행하는 교육과 교화의 대상이 된다고 했다. 기본적으로 왕충의 인성론 역시 이와 같이 인성을 등급별로 분류한다고 하는 견해를 계승하여 인성을 ‘중인이상’ㆍ‘중인’ㆍ‘중인이하’의 세 종류로 구분한다. 또한 그는 이러한 분류 관념에 의거하여 선진시기 이래로 전해져 오는 각종의 인성론을 비판했다. 중국 인성론사에 있어서 선진시기와 송명시기의 연결고리였던 양한시기의 인성론은 학술사적으로 매우 중요한 위치를 점하고 있으며, 사상적 측면에서 볼 때도 선진시대와 양한시대의 인성론을 총체적으로 비판 정리했다는 점에서 충분히 그 가치가 있다고 생각한다. 이러한 왕충의 인성론에 관하여 본문에서는 선대 학자들의 이론 비판과 인성의 선악문제와 사회적 윤리교화 문제를 중심으로 논의를 진행해 보았다. (shrink)

While interdisciplinary work on morality has largely been confined to a dialogue between psychologists and philosophers on the one hand, and economists and philosophers on the other, this volume brings together papers from a wider field ...

Blinded by heaven -- The pre-established heart-mind -- The transformation of things -- Zhen, some normative concerns -- The facts of human construction -- Metaphor in the Zhuangzi and theories of metaphor -- Self, virtue (de) and values in the Zhuangzi.

While it is well known that Zhuangzi uses metaphor extensively, there is much less appreciation of the role that it plays in his thought-a topic that is investigated in this essay. At the same time, this investigation is closely concerned with questions about the nature of metaphor. Comparisons are made between a central metaphorical structure in the Zhuangzi on the one hand and contemporary views of the nature of metaphor by Donald Davidson and by Lakoff and Johnson on the other. (...) It is hoped that these comparisons will help to illuminate the central metaphorical structure and its role in the philosophy of the Zhuangzi. (shrink)

The term zhen 真 in the Zhuangzi 莊子 is commonly associated with the zhen ren 真人 or "true person." We find metaphorical descriptions such as that he can go through fire and water unharmed. On the other hand, some scholars would claim that there is a more mystical element to the Zhuangzi that is missed if we think that such descriptions are "merely" metaphorical. However, the term zhen is not only applied to the zhen ren, and this essay has the (...) broader aim of investigating its various meanings and uses in the Zhuangzi. We shall situate our understanding of the zhen ren within the context of this broader investigation.Zhen has several applications throughout the text. To begin with, it may be used to affirm that .. (shrink)

The issue of human nature or xing 性 was a major philosophical topic of the mid- and late-Warring States period of ancient China. It was famously discussed, for example, in the Mencius. Zhuangzi 莊子 lived around the same time as Mencius and one might expect that he, too, would have discussed it. Surprisingly, the term xing is absent from the Inner Chapters of the Zhuangzi. There have been different responses to this, namely, that Zhuangzi: used different terms equivalent to xing; (...) believed that human nature is bad (despite not mentioning xing); was deliberately silent on xing as an oblique way of criticizing others such as Mencius. I review these claims and provide an analysis of how xing was mainly conceptualized during the Warring States period in essentialist terms. I shall read Zhuangzi’s philosophy as transcending this conceptual framework. Instead of a theory of human nature, Zhuangzi provides stories and descriptions of the different facets of human behavior and their psychological and other complexities. These often have an epistemic focus that stand independently of any theory of human nature. (shrink)

: While it is well known that Zhuangzi uses metaphor extensively, there is much less appreciation of the role that it plays in his thought—a topic that is investigated in this essay. At the same time, this investigation is closely concerned with questions about the nature of metaphor. Comparisons are made between a central metaphorical structure in the Zhuangzi on the one hand and contemporary views of the nature of metaphor by Donald Davidson and by Lakoff and Johnson on the (...) other. It is hoped that these comparisons will help to illuminate the central metaphorical structure and its role in the philosophy of the Zhuangzi. (shrink)

Some commentators hold that Xunzi's criticism of Mencius' thesis that human nature is good depends more on Xunzi's definition of xing or nature than on substantive argument. Some also claim that Xunzi is committed to accepting Mencius' thesis. A more precise account of Xunzi's critique is offered here, based on an elaboration of his distinction in the "Xing e pian" between ke yi (capacity) and neng (ability). Others have noted this distinction, but no one has sufficiently appreciated its role in (...) making Xunzi's critique more systematic and substantive than it is usually thought to be. (shrink)

Under Mencius' influence jen has been regarded as part of a theory of nature. As such, commentators have had difficulty resolving the apparent paradox in "Analects" 9.1 that Confucius rarely talked about jen. No paradox arises if jen is seen as a practice involving self-cultivation as a never-ending task and the immediacy of ethical commitment where a cluster of emotions, attitudes, and values are expressed. Jen is an ethical orientation from which one speaks and acts--not particular qualities that one might (...) enumerate and claim to possess. As such, the internal relation between jen and li does not amount to their being the same thing, as implied by some recent writers. (shrink)

Mengzi 孟子 and Zhuangzi 莊子 lived around the same time in the mid–Warring States period of ancient China. The historical relation between them is unclear. There is no mention of each other in the texts named after them. But some authors have claimed that characterizations of deformed bodies, the heart-mind, and qi 氣 in the Inner Chapters of the Zhuangzi are directly critical of Mengzi. I argue that there is no good reason for this claim. Although their philosophies are conceptually (...) opposed, this does not mean that there is a directly critical relation between them. (shrink)

In his essay “Philosophy of Human Nature,” Antonio Cua argues that the term “bad” in Xunzi’s statement that “Human nature is bad” is to be taken in a consequential sense. This goes against a common tendency to read the Xunzi in what I refer to as the essentialist mode of thinking. In this paper, I show how it is that the consequential reading of “bad” and other features that Professor Cua describes offer a significant understanding of Xunzi’s position as a (...) non-essentialist one. (shrink)

This question is the theme uniting all these essays by lead Chinese and Western philosophers.

This essay examines Zhuangzi's idea, in his dialogue with Hui Shi in the De Chong Fu, of being without human qing. This idea is situated within the contrast that Zhuangzi constantly makes between heaven and human beings. Some contexts for this contrast are described. The essay concludes that qing should be read as basically referring to “facts" in the Zhuangzi, including certain factual beliefs about (false or mistaken) emotions.

: Some commentators hold that Xunzi's criticism of Mencius' thesis that human nature is good depends more on Xunzi's definition of xing or nature than on substantive argument. Some also claim that Xunzi is committed to accepting Mencius' thesis. A more precise account of Xunzi's critique is offered here, based on an elaboration of his distinction in the "Xing e pian" between ke yi (capacity) and neng (ability). Others have noted this distinction, but no one has sufficiently appreciated its role (...) in making Xunzi's critique more systematic and substantive than it is usually thought to be. (shrink)

This book is about the philosophical, historical, and interpretative aspects of Mencius. It explores his influence, reception, and relevance in China from the third century BCE to the present, as well as offers comparative studies of Mencius and major figures in the history of Chinese and Western philosophy. With 34 accessible articles written by leading philosophers and scholars, the Dao Companion to the Philosophy of Mencius provides both broad pictures and in-depth discussions regarding the work of one of the most (...) important and influential Chinese philosophers. It covers his normative ethics, meta-ethics, political philosophy, epistemology and moral psychology. The last section of the volume, “Mencius and Western Philosophers: Comparative Perspectives,” explicitly puts him in dialogue with major Western philosophers. The Dao Companion to the Philosophy of Mencius serves as an essential volume for college students, graduate students, and scholars who study and teach Mencius as well as Chinese philosophy and comparative philosophy in general.​. (shrink)

Mengzi 孟子 and Zhuangzi 莊子 lived around the same time in the mid–Warring States period of ancient China. The historical relation between them is unclear. There is no mention of each other in the texts named after them. But some authors have claimed that characterizations of deformed bodies, the heart-mind, and _qi_ 氣 in the Inner Chapters of the _Zhuangzi_ are directly critical of Mengzi. I argue that there is no good reason for this claim. Although their philosophies are conceptually (...) opposed, this does not mean that there is a directly critical relation between them. (shrink)

This is an introduction to the Dao Companion to the Philosophy of Mencius. It provides a brief account of the life of Mencius, discusses the issue of the authorship of the Mencius, and describes the salient features of Mencius’s philosophy and its influence in the history of Chinese philosophy. Historically, Mencius’s influence spans the classical Pre-Qin period to the present. Philosophically, the Mencius has inspired the examination of issues in social and political thought, ethics and epistemology, moral development and moral (...) psychology. (shrink)

This chapter discusses the relation between Mencius and “Daoism” by taking Zhuangzi (and other authors of the Zhuangzi) as representative of the latter and seeing where each of them stood in response to the cross-current of ideas of the Warring States period. The ideas of some figures mentioned in the Mencius, such as Gaozi, Yang Zhu, and Xu Xing, are extended in the Zhuangzi. Some ideas gathered in the Zhuangzi can be seen to contrast with Mencius’s and these are referred (...) to as “Daoist tendencies” of thought. For instance: self-preservation and nourishment of one’s own life, morality as an artificial construct, moral skepticism, tian (“heaven”) as non-normative, an ideal primitive life free from hierarchy, and that there is no essential (moral) human nature. (shrink)

It is well known that Mozi criticizes the ritual practices of the Ru for being wasteful. However, another criticism has been less appreciated: These practices are merely conventional habituations and violate the Ru’s own moral ideals of ren 仁 , yi 義 and xiao 孝 . Xunzi responds to both criticisms in the Li Lun Pian 禮論篇 . Based on an account of Mozi’s arguments and Xunzi’s replies, this essay discusses the significance of ritual transformation in Xunzi’s moral philosophy.

本书是一本关于陈冲体验人生感悟人生的书法集子。内容包括:悟道篇;明理篇;做人篇;处世篇等。.

We study whether robots can satisfy the conditions of an agent fit to be held morally responsible, with a focus on autonomy and self-control. An analogy between robots and human groups enables us to modify arguments concerning collective responsibility for studying questions of robot responsibility. We employ Mele’s history-sensitive account of autonomy and responsibility to argue that even if robots were to have all the capacities required of moral agency, their history would deprive them from autonomy in a responsibility-undermining way. (...) We will also study whether humans and technological artifacts like robots can form hybrid collective agents that could be morally responsible for their actions and give an argument against such a possibility. (shrink)

What should we do about “tainted” public commemorations? Recent events have highlighted the urgency of reaching a consensus on this question. However, existing discussions appear to be dominated by two naïve opposing views – to remove or preserve them. My aims in this essay are two-fold. First, I argue that the two views are not naïve, but undergirded by concerns with securing self-respect and with the character of our engagement with the past. Second, I offer a qualified defence of vandalising (...) tainted commemorations. The defence comprises two parts. I consider two prominent suggestions – to install counter-commemorations and to add contextualising plaques – and argue that they are typically beset with difficulties. I then argue that in some circumstances, constrained vandalism is a response to tainted commemorations which effectively adjudicates the demands of the two opposing views. (shrink)

This paper presents a case study of a psychiatric intervention as an example of an institutional ethnography of psychiatric work. Institutional ethnography, a mode of inquiry outlined by Dorothy Smith (1987), is conceived here as an approach to the analysis of work in institutions as the contingent, local and context-bound insertion of a particular "case" - a patron, a pupil, a client, a patient - into both institutional and other social (e. g. gender, class) relations. The case presented in this (...) paper, shows how a psychiatric factual account is the outcome of a process of the recognition, and/or the production, of "mentionables," followed by the documentary interpretation of mentionables as symptoms. Subsequently it is demonstrated that, and how, the recognition of mentionables depends on non-professional interpretations which by their nature express other social (such as gender, class, etc.) relations. This description of psychiatric diagnostic work is produced by means of a method of discourse analysis that consists of the juxtaposition of the various institutional texts (the two reports) with the transcript of the interview. An analysis of only the interview data would undoubtedly have resulted in some insights about psychiatric interviewing but would have shown neither how the interview functioned as a stage in the institutional process of (re)writing reports nor how ideological evaluations entered the diagnostic process. On the other hand, an analysis of only the two reports would have resulted in some insights about psychiatric reporting but would not have shown how these reports were produced. (shrink)