It is good to spot young German philosophers working unapologetically in the tradition of Hegel, when it is done as well as this; such spottings are rarer on this side of the Atlantic. In this monograph, based on his dissertation written under Béla Weissmahr at the Jesuit Hochschule für Philosophie in München, Burkhardt examines Hegel’s critique of Kant’s theoretical philosophy, focussing on the three themes of traditional metaphysica specialis: the world, the self, and God; or, in Kant’s critique, (...) the antinomies, the paralogisms, and the transcendental ideal. But the book is not just a treatment of specific passages in Hegel, nor even a summary of Hegel’s critique as a whole; it is an attempt to rethink the fundamental moves of the Transcendental Dialectic in light of the sorts of concerns that Hegel has raised, to speculate first with Kant and then beyond him. If one accepts, as I do, that the Kantian critique of reason remains the most fundamental opponent to speculative philosophy, then the urgency of assessing the strength of Hegel’s answer to Kant is clear. (shrink)

RésuméCet article examine diverses façons d'exploiter l'éthique aristotélicienne pour rendre compte philosophiquement de l'hypocrisie. Aristote lui-même n'apas dit grand chose d'explicite à ce sujet, mais nous nous employons à identifier et à scruter les passages qui sont les plus pertinents pour un traitement distinctif de l'hypocrisie, élucidant en cours de route un certain nombre de confusions à propos d'Aristote. Nous envisageons divers domaines d'émotion et d'action qui pourraient fournir un lieu propre au vice de l'hypocrisie, ceux en particulier de l'engagement (...) personnel, du souci à l'égard des opinions d'autrui, et de la sincérité. Nous concluons de cet examen que la doctrine du juste milieu ne fournit pas une explication satisfaisante de l'hypocrisie. Nous proposons alors que si un système moral comme celui d' Aristote doit rendre compte de la moralité dans son entièreté, il lui faut trouver place pour des phénomènes qui excèdent les limites de la doctrine du juste milieu. L'hypocrisie, selon nous, appartient précisément à cette famille de phénomènes. Finalement, nous esquissons une approche de l'hypocrisie qui fait usage d'éléments aristotéliciens, mais sans pour autant s'y confiner. (shrink)

People do, quite naturally and not uncommonly, speak of other people as deceiving themselves, as being their own dupes. A man's child is ill and growing constantly worse. The father keeps talking optimistically about the future, keeps explaining away the evidence, and keeps pointing to what he insists are signs of improvement. We can easily imagine ourselves deciding that he has deceived himself about his son's condition. Nor is it the case that talk of self-deception is appropriate only in connection (...) with other people. We can easily imagine the father admitting, say, after the son's death, that he has deceived himself about the child's condition. Thus the notion of self-deception obviously has application. Furthermore, ordinarily talk of self-deception is not thought to be puzzling. (shrink)

Words can mean different things to different people. This can be problematic, mainly for those working together in a bureaucratic institution, such as the secret service. Shared, certified, explicit and codified definitions offer a counter to subjective, solitary and/or culturally dominant definitions. It’s true that codified secrecy terms for secret services can be seen to involve a number of political, cultural, subcultural “languages”, but if words come from unclassified or declassified files, memorandums and/or records, one needs a deep understanding of (...) the secret services. A remarkable feature of this bureaucratic language is the evolving nature of, certain “keywords” as important signifiers of historical transformation. Thus, the changes in the language of the secret services depends at least as much on the internal changes of the secret services as on the transformation in the external political-social environment. In spite of the confusion of Hungarian secret services in the revolutions of 1918–1919 and the disintegration of the Austrian-Hungarian Monarchy, in the early 1920’s became a stable system. Between the two World Wars, the Hungarian State Police directed by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Military Intelligence and Counter-Espionage directed by the Ministry of Defence, and the Hungarian Royal Gendarmerie directed by both of the Ministries had their own operational service. This structure existed unchanged until 1945. Simultaneously with the forward advance of the soviet troops, government began to re-establish the former system of the secret services in the eastern part of the country. After WWII, in 1946, the “State-protection Department” as political police became independent from the police. However, from the beginning, they remained under the control of the Communist Party. After 1950, the State Security Authority provided special services for the MIA and the Military Political Directorate of the MoD. After quashing the revolution in 1956, in the spring of 1957, the MIA Political Investigation Department was established which—with slight modifications—kept the structure created during the “state protection era”. The MIA III. The State-Protection General Directorate was established in 1962. The reorganization was finalized in the middle of the 1960’s, which resulted in the new system, which—with the structure of Directorates—became the ultimate structure of the state secret police until the abolishment of the MIA General Directorate III in January 1990. These organizational transformations were largely the result of exogenous historical-political changes. Moreover, each new period had a major impact on the organizational communication, language use and vocabulary of the secret services. This study seeks to interpret these historical transformations. (shrink)

Es wird die Entwicklung von Positivismus und Empirismus, beginnend vom Anfang des vorigen Jahrhunderts, untersucht. Als das "Gegebene" wollte der ältere Positivismus allein die Erlebnisdaten gelten lassen. Die kritische Auseinandersetzung mit der kantischen Einteilung der Satzformen führte nicht nur zur Gegenüberstellung der empirischen Daten und der analytischen Strukturen als "gegebenen" Bereichen, sondern ließ auch die sprachlogisch-hypothetische Form der Ausdrücke und Sätze über die objektive Realität erkennen. Die erkenntnislogische Analyse gelangte so zur Unterscheidung dreier gegebener Bereiche: der Erlebnisdaten , der logisch-mathematischen (...) Formen und der objektiven Realität. Bezogen auf diese drei Bereiche gewinnen wissenschaftliche Grundbegriffe wie "Raum", "Zeit", "Wahrheit", "Wahrscheinlichkeit" u.a.m. unterschiedliche Bedeutungen, wodurch die Grundlagenfragen in ganz neuem Sinne gestellt werden müssen. Der logisch fundierte Positivismus und Empirismus erweisen sich so als eine erkenntnisanalytische Methode, die von den Satzarten der Wissenschaften und des Alltags, den Methoden ihrer Gewinnung und Nachprüfung und den zu ihrer Darstellung benutzten sprachlogischen Elementen als dem "Gegebenen" ausgeht. (shrink)

What are the differences between hypocrisy, change of mind, and weakness of will? Each typically involves a gap between word and deed, yet they do not seem morally equivalent. Moreover, they are intuitively different concepts, even though the conceptual boundaries between them are fuzzy. This paper explores diverse examples, attempting to identify elements which may be distinctive of each concept, with special attention to hypocrisy. It also provides a discussion of the appropriateness of such use of examples in moral philosophy.

Not so long ago it was fashionable to claim that it is not the moral philosopher's business to say what things are good or what actions we should perform. This view is succinctly stated by A. J. Ayer:There is a distinction, which is not always sufficiently marked, between the activity of a moralist, who sets out to elaborate a moral code, or to encourage its observance, and that of a moral philosopher, whose concern is not primarily to make moral judgments (...) but to analyse their nature.On the other hand, in direct opposition to this, recently many philosophers actively moralize, in the sense that they argue for substantive normative ethical positions. In doing this they tend to assume but not to explore seriously two views: that the notion of moral expertise is unproblematic, and that moral philosophers in particular are moral experts. My aim in this paper is to promote the exploration of these questions. is logically prior to. Nevertheless I begin with discussing ; for puzzles about expertise in morals naturally emerge when one examines the credentials of candidates for the job. (shrink)

The authors’ aim is to bring to the attention of readers the inadequacies of care for people in Hungary who are terminally ill. They believe that both objective and subjective factors cause these inadequacies. Most of these factors arise from moral dilemmas that could be eased or even solved if ethics education had a much more prominent place in the nursing curriculum. Even if nurses would not become automatically better persons morally, a much wider knowledge of medical/nursing ethics could significantly (...) improve nursing care both before and at the end of life. Although the article is also critical of the nursing care provided, it is not its purpose to make any generalizations. The study utilized selected passages from essays written by 76 practicing nurses on their personal experience of ethical dilemmas in their work environment, and a questionnaire administered to 250 students (registered nurses and health care students) studying for a college degree. This article is written by two authors who have formed an unusal alliance: a registered nurse with 29 years’ experience of bedside nursing, but who is currently a teacher of nursing ethics at a local health college, and a lawyer turned bioethicist. (shrink)

Važna zadaća srednjoeuropskog povjesničara ili povjesničarke filozofije posljednjih desetljeća bila je interpretacija iznenada ponovno pojavljujućih elemenata njene ili njegove nacionalne kulture, uključujući i zajedničku ključnu riječ ovih tradicija – nacionalnu filozofiju. Moj rad nudi povijesnu rekonstrukciju pojma nacionalne filozofije na temelju mađarskih primjera. U prvome dijelu opisat ću nekoliko suvremenih dilema o upotrebi toga pojma. Glavni dio rada povezuje ovaj pojam s transformacijom javne sfere znanstvenika u kantijanskom razdoblju, uključujući Kantova osobna razmišljanja, kao i narativ mađarske »Rasprave o Kantu«. Analizom (...) ove rasprave nastojat ću pokazati da se taj pojam ne može u plauzibilnom obliku interpretirati niti u europskom niti u nacionalnom okviru, nego samo kao dio jedne moguće srednjoeuropske komparativne povijesti filozofije.An important task of a Central-European historian of philosophy was in the last decades to interpret the suddenly reappeared elements of her or his own national culture, including the common key word of these traditions – national philosophy. My paper offers a historical reconstruction of the concept of national philosophy, based on Hungarian examples. In the first part I will outline several contemporary dilemmas about the use of this term. The main part of my paper links this concept with the transformation of the public sphere of the scholars in the age of Kantianism, including Kant’s personal reflections, and the narrative of the Hungarian “Debate on Kant”. I will try to demonstrate, by the analysis of this debate, that it cannot be interpreted in a plausible form in a European, nor in a national framework, but just as a part of a would-be Central-European comparative history of philosophy.Une tâche importante pour un historien ou une historienne de la philosophie d’Europe centrale a été, ces dernières décennies, d’interpréter les éléments de sa propre culture nationale soudainement réapparus, y compris le mot-clé commun de ces traditions : la philosophie nationale. Mon article propose une reconstruction historique du concept de philosophie nationale, fondée sur des exemples hongrois. Dans la première partie, je ferai un aperçu de plusieurs dilemmes contemporains quant à l’emploi de ce terme. La partie principale de mon article relie ce concept à la transformation de la sphère publique des chercheurs à l’époque kantienne, y compris les réflexions personnelles de Kant, ainsi que le récit hongrois du « Débat sur Kant ». En analysant ce débat, j’essaierai de démontrer que ce concept ne peut être interprété sous une forme plausible dans un cadre européen ni dans un cadre national, mais seulement comme partie d’une éventuelle histoire comparative de la philosophie d’Europe centrale.Die bedeutungsvolle Mission des zentraleuropäischen Philosophiehistorikers oder der – historikerin in den vergangenen Dezennien hieß, die jählings wiederkehrenden Elemente seiner bzw. ihrer eigenen Nationalkultur zu explizieren, unter Einschluss des gemeinsamen Schlüsselwortes dieser Traditionen – der nationalen Philosophie. Meine Arbeit bietet eine historische Rekonstruktion der Notion der nationalen Philosophie auf der Grundlage der ungarischen Beispiele. Im Anfangsteil umreiße ich etliche gegenwärtige Dilemmas über den Gebrauch des angeschnittenen Begriffs. Der Hauptteil meines Papers verknüpft diesen Begriff mit der Umwandlung der öffentlichen Sphäre der Gelehrten zu Zeiten des Kantianismus, samt Kants persönlichen Überlegungen, wie auch dem Narrativ der ungarischen „Debatte über Kant“. Anhand der Analyse dieser Debatte versuche ich auszumalen, der Begriff lasse sich weder im europäischen noch im nationalen Milieu plausibel interpretieren, sondern ausschließlich als Baustein einer denkbaren zentraleuropäischen vergleichenden Philosophiegeschichte. (shrink)

In this note I argue that although Rorty's programme (Inquiry, Vol. 15, No. 4) to bring into focus the role that belief plays in self?deception is a salutary one, her actual claims obscure that role. It is also contended that Rorty fails to de?mythologize self?deception, since her account is either paradox?ridden or else describes a concept recognizably distinct from the concept of self?deception.

There are three major themes in the dialogue thought to be Plato’s Statesman: the nature of statesmanship, the difference between perfect and less than perfect regimes and the method of division. In this paper I focus on the first two themes. I argue, first, that the dialogue makes a plausible case for what it takes to be a wise statesman. In doing so, I play down the importance of the second theme: the difference between regimes. In fact, I consider this (...) discussion to be deeply flawed and even irrelevant to the argument of the first. My main purpose is to provide a critical analysis of the political theory articulated in the dialogue. My analysis is made plausible by abandoning the traditional view that the Statesman was written Plato in its entirety as a unified whole. In my view, a close reading of the text supports the hypothesis that it is, at best, semi-authentic; namely, that it is most likely a collage of fragments written at different times by Plato and other members of the Academy. (shrink)