A value space is a topological algebra equipped with a non-empty family of continuous quantifiers . We will describe first-order logic on the basis of . Operations of are used as connectives and its relations are used to define statements. We prove under some normality conditions on the value space that any theory in the new setting can be represented by a classical first-order theory.

In this book Bruno Latour brings together these different approaches to provide a lively and challenging analysis of science, demonstrating how social context..

The emergence of modern sciences in the seventeenth century profoundly renewed our understanding of Nature. For the last three centuries new ideas of Nature have been continuously developed by theology, politics, economics, and science, especially the sciences of the material world. The situation is even more unstable today, now that we have entered an ecological mutation of unprecedented scale. Some call it the Anthropocene, but it is best described as a new climatic regime. And a new regime it certainly is, (...) since the many unexpected connections between human activity and the natural world oblige every one of us to reopen the earlier notions of Nature and redistribute what had been packed inside. So the question now arises: what will replace the old ways of looking at Nature? This book explores a potential candidate proposed by James Lovelock when he chose the name "Gaia" for the fragile, complex system through which living phenomena modify the Earth. The fact that he was immediately misunderstood proves simply that his readers have tried to fit this new notion into an older frame, transforming Gaia into a single organism, a kind of giant thermostat, some sort of New Age goddess, or even divine Providence. In this series of lectures on "natural religion", Bruno Latour argues that the complex and ambiguous figure of Gaia offers, on the contrary, an ideal way to disentangle the ethical, political, theological, and scientific aspects of the now obsolete notion of Nature. He lays the groundwork for a future collaboration among scientists, theologians, activists, and artists as they, and we, begin to adjust to the new climatic regime. (shrink)

Fichte assigns ‘intellectual intuition’ a new meaning after Kant. But in 1799, his doctrine of intellectual intuition is publicly deemed indefensible by Kant and nihilistic by Jacobi. I propose to defend Fichte’s doctrine against these charges, leaving aside whether it captures what he calls the ‘spirit’ of transcendental idealism. I do so by articulating three problems that motivate Fichte’s redirection of intellectual intuition from being to acting: (1) the regress problem, which states that reflecting on empirical facts of consciousness leads (...) only to further facts and so cannot yield a first principle; (2) the rhapsody problem, which states that the categories form a haphazard set and so lack necessity unless they derive from a first principle; and (3) the nihilism problem, which states that a first principle cannot lie outside our cognition of it, lest it be the cause of our cognition and, being first, the cause of all our actions, reducing us to machines. Crucially, Fichte’s three motivating problems are in fact aspects of a single problem. Leaving any aspect unsolved spoils putative solutions to the other two. Consequently, Fichte requires a single unified solution to all three, which his doctrine of intellectual intuition provides. (shrink)

The combination of increased availability of large amounts of fine-grained human behavioral data and advances in machine learning is presiding over a growing reliance on algorithms to address complex societal problems. Algorithmic decision-making processes might lead to more objective and thus potentially fairer decisions than those made by humans who may be influenced by greed, prejudice, fatigue, or hunger. However, algorithmic decision-making has been criticized for its potential to enhance discrimination, information and power asymmetry, and opacity. In this paper, we (...) provide an overview of available technical solutions to enhance fairness, accountability, and transparency in algorithmic decision-making. We also highlight the criticality and urgency to engage multi-disciplinary teams of researchers, practitioners, policy-makers, and citizens to co-develop, deploy, and evaluate in the real-world algorithmic decision-making processes designed to maximize fairness and transparency. In doing so, we describe the Open Algortihms project as a step towards realizing the vision of a world where data and algorithms are used as lenses and levers in support of democracy and development. (shrink)

The book contains the transcription of a course on the foundations of probability given by the Italian mathematician Bruno de Finetti in 1979 at the a oeNational Institute of Advanced Mathematicsa in Rome.

Research teams have made considerable progress in treating absolute uterine factor infertility through uterus transplantation, though studies have differed on the choice of either deceased or living donors. While researchers continue to analyze the medical feasibility of both approaches, little attention has been paid to the ethics of using deceased versus living donors as well as the protections that must be in place for each. Both types of uterus donation also pose unique regulatory challenges, including how to allocate donated organs; (...) whether the donor / donor's family has any rights to the uterus and resulting child; how to manage contact between the donor / donor's family, recipient, and resulting child; and how to track outcomes moving forward. (shrink)

The concept of facticity denotes conditions of experience whose necessity is not logical yet whose contingency is not empirical. Although often associated with Heidegger, Fichte coins ‘facticity’ in his Berlin period to refer to the conclusion of Kant’s metaphysical deduction of the categories, which he argues leaves it a contingent matter that we have the conditions of experience that we do. Such rhapsodic or factical conditions, he argues, must follow necessarily, independent of empirical givenness, from the I through a process (...) of ‘genesis.’ I reconstruct Fichte’s argument by tracing the origin of his neologism, presenting his Jena critique of Kant’s rhapsodic appeal to the forms of judgment, and illustrating the Jena period’s continuity with the Berlin period’s genetic method, while noting a methodological shift whereby Fichte directs his critique against his own doctrine of intellectual intuition in order to eliminate its ‘factical terms.’. (shrink)

Kant’s critique/doctrine distinction tracks the difference between a canon for the understanding’s proper use and an organon for its dialectical misuse. The latter reflects the dogmatic use of reason to attain a doctrine of knowledge with no antecedent critique. In the 1790s, Fichte collapses Kant’s distinction and redefines dogmatism. He argues that deriving a canon is essentially dialectical and thus yields an organon: critical idealism is properly a doctrine of science or Wissenschaftslehre. Criticism is furthermore said to refute dogmatism, by (...) which Fichte means Spinozism. Schelling repudiates Fichte’s position in his Philosophical Letters by reviving Kant’s distinction. First, ‘critique’ for Schelling names a canon that is valid for all systems—including Spinozism—and thus favours none—not even the Wissenschaftslehre. Second, Schelling coins ‘dogmaticism’ to refer to what Kant calls ‘dogmatism’: reason’s uncritical claim to doctrine. Hence, he says all systems—even Fichte’s—are susceptible to the ‘enthusiasm’ of mistaking themselves for doctrines or ‘objects of knowledge’, instead of subjectively valid ‘objects of freedom’. I reconstruct Schelling’s argument for reviving Kant’s distinction, while noting two consequences for German idealism. First, if criticism favours no system, a system’s origin cannot be an act of knowledge, e.g., intellectual intuition, but only an act of endorsement. Second, if dogmaticism entails enthusiasm, a system’s goal cannot be absolute knowledge, but only infinite striving. Hence, by retrieving Schelling’s notion of dogmaticism, we can both gain a better understanding of the Letters and register the impact of a core Kantian distinction on the German idealist project. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to present a constructive solution to Frege's puzzle (largely limited to the mathematical context) based on type theory. Two ways in which an equality statement may be said to have cognitive significance are distinguished. One concerns the mode of presentation of the equality, the other its mode of proof. Frege's distinction between sense and reference, which emphasizes the former aspect, cannot adequately explain the cognitive significance of equality statements unless a clear identity criterion for (...) senses is provided. It is argued that providing a solution based on proofs is more satisfactory from the standpoint of constructive semantics. (shrink)

The Prince and the Wolf contains the transcript of a debate which took place on February 5, 2008 at the London School of Economics (LSE) between the prominent French sociologist, anthropologist, and philosopher Bruno Latour and the Cairo-based American philosopher Graham Harman.

Collecting, comparing, and computing molecular sequences are among the most prevalent practices in contemporary biological research. They represent a specific way of producing knowledge. This paper explores the historical development of these practices, focusing on the work of Margaret O. Dayhoff, Richard V. Eck, and Robert S. Ledley, who produced the first computer-based collection of protein sequences, published in book format in 1965 as the Atlas of Protein Sequence and Structure. While these practices are generally associated with the rise of (...) molecular evolution in the 1960s, this paper shows that they grew out of research agendas from the previous decade, including the biochemical investigation of the relations between the structures and function of proteins and the theoretical attempt to decipher the genetic code. It also shows how computers became essential for the handling and analysis of sequence data. Finally, this paper reflects on the relationships between experimenting and collecting as two distinct “ways of knowing” that were essential for the transformation of the life sciences in the twentieth century. (shrink)

While the idea that philosophy requires self-transformation is historically pervasive, it exerts considerable influence on the post-Kantians who first aim to systematize Kant’s idealism by grounding it on a first principle. In the 1790s, Fichte and Schelling offer competing accounts of the self-transformation that they regard as essential to positing a first principle. Their accounts raise two central questions. First, what makes this kind of self-transformation possible? Second, are there different possible expressions of philosophical self-transformation? In what follows, I will (...) articulate the Fichtean and Schellingian answers to these central questions. For Fichte, the one who summons me to posit a first principle makes possible my philosophical self-transformation, although the latter has an exclusively idealist expression in that I can only genuinely posit the I as first principle, which is to say that philosophical self-transformation depends on mutual recognition and vindicates precisely one philosophical system (Section 1). For Schelling, a brute act of will makes possible my philosophical self-transformation, although the latter has either an idealist or a realist expression in that I can genuinely posit either the I or the not-I as first principle, which is to say that philosophical self-transformation does not depend on mutual recognition and vindicates one of two possible philosophical systems (Section 2). Thus, whereas Fichtean self-transformation is recognitive and non-pluralistic, Schellingian self-transformation is pluralistic and non-recognitive. I conclude with a discussion of how Jacobi poses a challenge to Fichte’s and Schelling’s answers to the two central questions (Section 3). (shrink)

On the face of it, there is no connection between the social theory developed by Ulrich Beck under the name of `second modernization' and the post-ethnomethodological argument developed by Bruno Latour and his colleagues under the name of actor-network theory. Yet they are both concerned with empirical evidence of a major shift in modernity. Hence the idea of elaborating an empirical test to probe the extent to which `second modernization' is a real phenomenon, or rather, as is suggested here, (...) a shift in our interpretation of what modernity has always been about. (shrink)

Our understanding of Schelling’s internal critique of German idealism, including his late attack on Hegel, is incomplete unless we trace it to the early “Philosophical Letters on Dogmatism and Criticism,” which initiate his engagement with the problem of systematicity—that judgment makes deriving a system of a priori conditions from a first principle necessary, while this capacity’s finitude makes this impossible. Schelling aims to demonstrate this problem’s intractability. My conceptual aim is to reconstruct this from the “Letters,” which reject Fichte’s claim (...) that the Wissenschaftslehre is an unrivalled system. I read Schelling as charging Fichte with misrepresenting a system’s livability or commensurability with our finitude. My historical aim is to provide a framework for understanding Schelling’s Freiheitsschrift, which argues that a system’s liveability depends on its incompleteness or limitation by our finitude. On my reading, Schelling is early and continually committed to systematicity within the bounds of human finitude. (shrink)

Scholars agree that Schelling’s critique of Hegel consists in charging reason with an inability to account for its own possibility. This is not an attack on reason’s project of constructing a logical system, but rather on the pretense of doing so with complete justification and so without presuppositions, as if it were obvious why there is a logical system or why there is anything meaningful at all. Scholars accordingly cite the question ‘why is there something rather than nothing’ as emblematic (...) of Schelling’s critique and the source of his claim against Hegel that reason is bounded by something other than itself. But what sort of claim is this? For what sort of argument could it be the conclusion? On these questions, the literature is lacking. I propose that the question ‘why something’ motivates Schelling to give a transcendental argument to the effect that past and future are a priori conditions of the possibility of reason. As I reconstruct it from the Weltalter, this argument construes the past as the pre-rational decision to construct a logical system, while the future represents the purpose that guides the construction of the same. Schelling’s claim against Hegel that reason is bounded by something other is thus the discovery of inescapable presuppositions that condition the possibility of reason as such. (shrink)

The intellectual origins of molecular biology are usually traced back to the 1930s. By contrast, molecular biology acquired a social reality only around 1960. To understand how it came to designate a community of researchers and a professional identity, I examine the creation of the first institutes of molecular biology, which took place around 1960, in four European countries: Germany, the United Kingdom, France, and Switzerland. This paper shows how the creation of these institutes was linked to the results of (...) post-war economic reconstruction. Then, it compares how the promoters of these different institutional projects delimited the goals of their discipline, reflected on its history, and suggested how research should be organised. I show how they carefully positioned their new discipline within the emerging national science policy discourse of the 1950s, and aligned it with the current vision of scientific modernity. In particular, I discuss how they articulated the meaning of molecular biology with respect to five common themes: the role of physics in the atomic age, the relations between fundamental research and medical applications, the ‘Americanisation’ of scientific research, the value of science in the reconstruction of national identities, and the drive towards interdisciplinary research. This paper thus demonstrates that beyond the local and national accounts there is a European history of molecular biology. (shrink)

This article argues that using Joseph Raz’s service conception of authority to reject philosophical anarchism can be affected by political anarchism. Whereas philosophical anarchism only denies the authority of the state, political anarchism claims that anarchism is a better alternative to the state. Raz’s theory holds that an institution has authority if it enables people to better conform with reason. I argue that there are cases where anarchism is an existing alternative to the state and better fulfils this condition. Consequently, (...) in these cases, anarchist groups and societies and not the state have legitimate authority. When anarchism is not an existing alternative to the state, the state will, under Raz’s theory, have some legitimate authority, but that authority will be limited because anarchism remains a better possible alternative to the state. To support the political anarchist claim I discuss the anarchist collectives during the Spanish civil war, which I argue are an example of anarchism as an existing alternative to the state that better fulfils Raz’s service conception and also provide suggestive evidence that anarchism is in general a better possible alternative. I also discuss the relationship between political anarchism and authority and I argue that despite some tension they are not irreconcilable. I conclude that the interesting anarchist challenge for political theorists is political not philosophical. (shrink)

"Et toi, qui dis-tu que tu es? Je vais dire la poussée de ma foi... Je n'entends rien prouver, mais donner à constater". Ainsi s'exprime Bruno Ribes dans Cherchant qui adorer. Ce n'est pas à travers la philosophie que l'auteur demande quelque assise pour sa foi, mais à une logique quasi biologique. Comme l'évolution résulte de la rencontre charnelle de deux vivants, de même une "logique" toute d'ouverture à l'autre se déploie à travers l'intelligence et la liberté, en Dieu. (...) Sans mort à soi il ne peut y avoir procréation de l'autre. Toutes les modalités de la vie sont traversées par un même "logos" qui se révèle pleinement dans la mort de Jésus. Ce sont là "constats" élémentaires : mais dans cet éclairage la démarche religieuse change de sens : le christianisme apparaît dans sa singularité, différent de toute autre religion. (shrink)

This is an interview with Professor Patricia S. Churchland. It covers themes such as eliminative materialism, folk psychology, neurophilosophy, the relationship between philosophy and science, moral norms as well as the criticism of contemporary analytic philosophy.

Les sciences sociales, depuis le structuralisme, se sont développées en France sur fond d'ignorance ou de rejet déclaré de la philosophie de type phénoménologique. De son côté, celle-ci a pris un tour qui l'a de plus en plus éloignée des sciences positives en général et des sciences humaines en particulier. Pourtant, lorsque la sociologie, comme c'est le cas aujourd'hui, cherche à cerner la figure de l'acteur social et à interroger les conditions de sa subjectivation - de sa constitution comme sujet (...) social - une confrontation avec cette philosophie pourrait s'avérer fructueuse. Et pour une phénoménologie qui n'a que trop tendance à se confondre avec la forme actuelle de la métaphysique, un retour sur l'inscription sociale de ce qu'elle décrit, et une mise à l'épreuve de la critique sociologique, pourrait en retour être salutaire. C'est dans cet esprit que les auteurs de ce collectif ont tenté de construire des liens, dans une réflexion croisée sur le caractère immédiatement social de la subjectivité et sur la nécessité de penser les conditions d'appropriation de l'espace social par des sujets. (shrink)

The Ikhwan al-Safa (Brethren of Purity), the anonymous adepts of a tenth-century esoteric fraternity based in Basra and Baghdad, hold an eminent position in the history of science and philosophy in Islam due to the wide reception and assimilation of their monumental encyclopaedia, the Rasa'il Ikhwan al-Safa (Epistles of the Brethren of Purity). This compendium contains fifty-two epistles offering synoptic accounts of the classical sciences and philosophies of the age; divided into four classificatory parts, it treats themes in mathematics, logic, (...) natural philosophy, psychology, metaphysics, and theology, in addition to didactic fables. The Rasa'il constitutes a paradigmatic legacy in the canonization of philosophy and the sciences in mediaeval Islamic civilization, as well as having shown a permeating influence in Western culture. This is the fifth volume in a series presenting the very first critical edition of the Rasa'il in its original Arabic, complete with the first fully annotated English translation. Epistle 52: On Magic is the last in the corpus, and presents the short version of the 'Epistle on Magic, Incantations, and the Evil Eye'. Within its pages the authors of the epistle argue for the legitimacy of magic and the other occult sciences, and seek confirmation of their views in authorities as diverse as Plato, the Qur'ân, the Torah, the astrologer Abû Ma'shâr, and the mysterious sect of pagan star-worshippers known as the Sabians of Harrân. As in all other volumes of the series, this volume provides the first critical edition of the Arabic text, together with an English translation and a substantial range of notes. An extensive introduction highlights the unique relevance of this treatise within the framework of the Brethren's encyclopaedia itself, and to the history of science in general. (shrink)

This paper addresses debates in German idealism that arise in response to the modal shift in logic, proposed by Kant, from a logic of thinking to a logic of experience. With the Kantian logic of experience arises a problem of radical contingency or 'rhapsodic determination' for logic. While Fichte and Hegel attempt to resolve the problem of contingency by constructing rational systems aimed at established the grounds for logic, I show how Schelling brings into view, in a proto-existentialist movement, the (...) way in which the indeterminacy of the will undergirds rational system construction and, thereby, presents a limiting problem for the question of the value of system-building itself. (shrink)

A puzzle arises when we consider that, for Kant, the categories are 'original acquisitions' of our understanding to which we must nevertheless prove our entitlement via 'deduction', on pain of dogmatism. I resolve this puzzle by articulating skepticism’s role in the transcendental deduction, drawing on Kant’s construal of the skeptical 'question quid juris' in the juridical terms of entitlement to property. I then situate skepticism’s transformative potential within what Kant regards as reason’s 'maturation' from dogmatism toward self-knowledge. Finally, I contrast (...) Hegel’s account of spirit’s progress toward 'absolute knowledge', which shifts both the mode of skepticism and the prospect of maturation. (shrink)

This paper analyses explanations provided by current philosophical models of time consciousness. These models attempt to explain temporal experience by describing the mechanisms of time consciousness in experiential terms. I criticize this practice on two grounds; firstly, it relies upon folk notions that have no clear individuation conditions and secondly because it often merely names, but does not explain the phenomena.

Meillassoux defines “correlationism” as the view that we can only access the mutual dependence of thought and being—specifically, subjectivity and objectivity—which he attributes to Heidegger. This attribution is inapt. It is only by accessing being—via existential analysis—that we can properly distinguish beings like subjects and objects. I propose that Meillassoux’s misattribution ignores the ontological difference that drives Heidegger’s project. First, I demonstrate the inadequacy of Meillassoux’s account of correlationism as a criticism of Heidegger and dispense with an objection. Second, I (...) argue that Meillassoux’s neglect of the ontological difference stems from a question-begging appeal to transcendental realism, which is at odds with Heidegger’s twin claims for a variety of transcendental idealism in Being and Time. Third, I offer a reflection on three general marks of transcendental idealism. (shrink)

Which entities should be accepted as part of the furniture of the world, and which not? What are pseudo-objects, if they are not properly objects? This collection explores the answers given to these questions by some key philosophers throughout the 20th century. It brings together essays by leading scholars on a subject of central importance to both metaphysics and the history of philosophy.".

Keine ausführliche Beschreibung für "Immanuel Kant" verfügbar.

This paper endeavors to carry out a philosophical analysis of the current state of civic education in Western democracies, in order to deal with the problematic dualism between extreme individualism and endogamic communitarianism, which alters the relational modalities and specific lifestyles that characterize human plurality. As such, the intention of this article is to understand how the formation of citizens supported by the practice of philosophy can cultivate a dialogical, open, and pluralistic community capable of facing this duality. For this (...) purpose, we carried out a systematic and critical analysis of books and articles that, in dealing with the relationship between the individual and the community, aim to overcome the above-mentioned problematic dualism. Among the results of this study, we found that Matthew Lipman and Ann Sharp’s Philosophy for Children (P4C) program contributes significantly to the empowerment of citizens, and supports the development of their ability to engage in dialogue in search of creative and ethical solutions in the diverse circumstances of daily life. Moreover, P4C contributes to the achievement of communities characterised by solidarity, plurality, openness, and self-correction, and which are oriented toward the rigorous search for the common good. Therefore, we conclude that community-based philosophical practices such as P4C can contribute to civic education and the formation of responsible citizens, offering a possible paradigm to develop the humanistic axis of the individual and promote openness to diversity. (shrink)

We study two notions of definability for classes of relational structures based on modal extensions of Łukasiewicz finitely-valued logics. The main results of the paper are the equivalent of the Goldblatt-Thomason theorem for these notions of definability.

Several countries maintain universal health coverage, which implies responsibility to organize delivery formats of healthcare services and products for citizens. In Brazil, the health system has a principle of universal access for more than 30 years, but many deficiencies remain and the country observes a day practice for those seeking judicial decisions to determine provision of healthcare.

This article tackles the political implications of Reinhart Koselleck’s first work, Kritik und Krise, re-questioning its relationship to the ‘Enlightenment’ and the ‘Counter-Enlightenment’. Rather than establishing the semantic contents of this pair of antonymic concepts in an abstract way, I believe that we must study the concrete uses to which they are put, that is, the discursive strategies of the actors themselves showing, in each case, the specific adversaries against whom they are mobilized and the specific ends to which they (...) are used. The goal of the present essay is to understand whether the early Koselleck belonged to the tradition of the Enlightenment or the Counter-Enlightenment in the specific context of post-War West Germany intellectual debates. By locating Kritik und Krise in the controversies relating to the political identity of the new German Federal Republic, I show that he was not, in the 1950s, a representative of Cold War Liberalism or anti-totalitarianism but, rather, oscillated between different conservative positions (‘Traditional’ conservatism and ‘Conservative Revolution’) that were typical of the post-War period and, in large measure, hostile to the Enlightenment legacy. (shrink)

Depuis l'entrée dans l'âge moderne de l'émancipation, c'est-à-dire depuis l'époque des Lumières et de la Révolution française, on admet en général que les juifs ont brisé un carcan qui les confinait dans des communautés fermées pour participer à la modernité européenne sans se renier et tout en restant juifs. Comment ce cheminement a-t-il eu lieu? Qu'a-t-il réellement impliqué, à la fois pour les juifs et pour les sociétés auxquelles ils s'intégraient? Bruno Karsenti reprend le fil de ce récit. Sous (...) l'angle philosophique, il examine les opérations intellectuelles par lesquelles certaines figures d'exception écrivain (Heine), sociologue (Durkheim), historiens (Salvador, Bloch), philosophe (Strauss) et linguiste (Benveniste) sont entrées dans cette modernité, au prix de quelles tensions et de quels efforts : comment ces hommes ont-ils pensé les liens entre judaïsme et modernité, et comment par là ont-ils éclairé les principes des sociétés démocratiques qui sont aujourd'hui les nôtres? À l'heure où les juifs d'Europe sont inquiets de leur avenir jusqu'à être parfois poussés au départ, à l'heure aussi où théologie et politique, loin de régler leurs rapports, se conjuguent en menace pour les démocraties elles-mêmes, ce livre cherche à redonner tout son sens à l'émancipation sociale et politique qui est notre héritage."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

Today's physics has led to incredible advances in the technology we use in daily life - from cell phones and GPS systems to PET scans and more. Current theories in physics have been amazingly effective in practical terms. Yet all is far from well: the two foundational concepts in physics - Quantum Theory and General Relativity - are incompatible with each other, and observations of the universe show that our theories are incomplete - at best. While physicists have tried to (...) paper over this impasse by inventing dark matter and dark energy, they remain unobserved mysteries. Adding fuel to the fire of current crises, artificial intelligence threatens to replace our most cherished theories and procedures with arcane algorithms. Worse yet perhaps, the public understands physics poorly, either taking it for granted or fearing and rejecting it completely. Physicists dream of a new universal theory that will completely change how we see our world, much as Einstein did with relativity and Newton with gravity. Likewise, society loves the romantic notion of a single genius heroically creating a massive paradigm shift. Still, is this scenario likely today? Perhaps the next steps in physics will be incremental rather than gigantic. In Physics in Crisis, Bruno Mansoulié uses simple language, insightful examples, and his personal experience as a working physicist to address these fundamental questions and reflect on how today's crises in physics might be solved. (shrink)

In recent work, William Blattner claims that Heidegger is an empirical realist, but not a transcendental idealist. Blattner argues that, unlike Kant, Heidegger holds that thinking beyond human life warrants no judgment about nature's existence. This poses two problems. One is interpretive: Blattner misreads Kant's conception of the beyond-life as yielding the judgment that nature does not exist, for Kant shares Heidegger's view that such a judgment must lack sense. Another is programmatic: Blattner overstates the gap between Kant's and Heidegger's (...) positions, for both are ontological, not ontic. I solve these problems by showing that Heidegger's analysis of Dasein contains the core of Kant's argument for transcendental idealism: the apriority of space and time. I conclude that Heidegger exemplifies Kant's view that empirical realism just is transcendental idealism. (shrink)