Philosophical discussions of Molyneux's problem within contemporary philosophy of mind tend to characterize the problem as primarily concerned with the role innately known principles, amodal spatial concepts, and rational cognitive faculties play in our perceptual lives. Indeed, for broadly similar reasons, rationalists have generally advocated an affirmative answer, while empiricists have generally advocated a negative one, to the question Molyneux posed after presenting his famous thought experiment. This historical characterization of the dialectic, however, somewhat obscures the role Molyneux's problem has (...) played in spawning debates within the empiricist tradition. Fortunately, the differences between various empiricist accounts have been widely recognized and discussed among historians of philosophy working on the topic. The focus of the present essay is to develop an interpretation of John Locke's views on Molyneux's problem that best coheres with his other views on human understanding as well as with the predominant scientific opinion about the nature of perception during the period in which he lived. (shrink)

Abstract: The standard picture of rationality requires that the agent acts so as to realize her most preferred alternative in the light of her own desires and beliefs. However, there are circumstances where such an agent can predict that she will act against her preferences. The story of Ulysses and the Sirens is the paradigmatic example of such cases. In those circumstances the orthodoxy requires the agent to be ‘sophisticated’. That is to say, she should take into account her expected (...) future choices and prevent her future self to act in certain ways. She should ‘bind’ herself to a certain course of action. This is a form of causal commitment. It is generally recognized that this form of self-commitment is the only one that is available to a rational agent. Rational commitment, where the agent gives herself a reason to act in a certain way rather than making herself act in that way, is considered not feasible. In this paper, I question this verdict. I sketch the broad outlines of a model of rational commitment, which takes as its starting point Michael Bratman’s ‘planning theory’ of intention. There are two important objections against this theory (one by John Broome and one by the Dutch philosopher Govert den Hartogh.) Both criticisms claim that such a theory is a form of ‘bootstrapping’ reasons for action into existence. In the remainder of the paper, I will defend the theory against these objections. This way, I hope to establish that defending the feasibility of rational commitment is not an obvious mistake. (shrink)

In recent years researchers have begun to investigate how the perceptual, motor and cognitive activities of two or more individuals become organized into coordinated action. In the first part of this introduction we identify three common threads among the ten papers of this special issue that exemplify this new line of research. First, all of the papers are grounded in the experimental study of online interactions between two or more individuals. Second, albeit at different levels of analysis, the contributions focus (...) on the mechanisms supporting joint action. Third, many of the papers investigate empirically the pre‐requisites for the highly sophisticated forms of joint action that are typical of humans. In the second part of the introduction, we summarize each of the papers, highlighting more specific connections among them. (shrink)

Brain imaging studies suggest that truth telling constitutes the default of the human brain and that lying involves intentional suppression of the predominant truth response. By manipulating the truth proportion in the Sheffield lie test, we investigated whether the dominance of the truth response is malleable. Results showed that frequent truth telling made lying more difficult, and that frequent lying made lying easier. These results implicate that the accuracy of lie detection tests may be improved by increasing the dominance of (...) the truth response and that habitual lying makes the lie response more dominant. (shrink)

Bohmian mechanics represents the universe as a set of paths with a probability measure defined on it. The way in which a mathematical model of this kind can explain the observed phenomena of the universe is examined in general. It is shown that the explanation does not make use of the full probability measure, but rather of a suitable set function deriving from it, which defines relative typicality between single-time cylinder sets. Such a set function can also be derived directly (...) from the standard quantum formalism, without the need of an underlying probability measure. The key concept for this derivation is the quantum typicality rule, which can be considered as a generalization of the Born rule. The result is a new formulation of quantum mechanics, in which particles follow definite trajectories, but which is based only on the standard formalism of quantum mechanics. (shrink)

Common‐sense intuition suggests that, when people are engaged in informational exchanges, they communicate so as to be reasonably sure that they perform the exchanges faithfully. Over the years, we have found evidence suggesting that this intuition, which is woven into several influential theories of human communication, may be misleading. We first summarize this evidence and discuss its potential limitations. Then, we present a new study that addresses the potential limitations. A confederate instructed participants to “pick up the skask” from a (...) tray containing six objects and move it to a specific location. Since skask is a non‐word invented by us, participants had to ask for clarification to perform the instruction faithfully. In contradiction with the intuition that people pursue faithfulness when engaged in informational exchanges, 29 of the 48 participants we tested performed the instruction without asking for clarification. We identified a possible cause for this behavior, which occurred more frequently when avoiding the clarification was unlikely to result in an overt consequence (an error in the execution of the instruction that could be noticed by the confederate or the experimenter). Other factors such as individual differences and the specific interpersonal dynamics of the experimental settings, if they played a role at all, did it to an extent that is unlikely to be comparable to that of the role played by overt consequences. Considered together, our various assessments of the extent to which people engage in faithful informational exchanges converge on a simple conclusion: Communicating faithfully is a substantially demanding task, and people often fail at it. We discuss the implications of this conclusion and speculate on its relevance for understanding the evolutionary past of human communication. (shrink)

Here are two plausible ideas about belief. First: beliefs are our means of storing information. Second: if we believe something, then we are willing to use it in reasoning. But in this paper I introduce a puzzle that seems to show that these cannot both be right. The solution, I argue, is a new picture, on which there is a kind of belief for each idea. An account of these two kinds of belief is offered in terms of two components: (...) a relatively stable one, which represents our information; and a more variable one, which represents what we are taking seriously. I also consider the possibility of solving the puzzle by less radical means; and an alternative argument for the proposed account of belief in terms of considerations from desire. (shrink)

In the Critique of the Power of Judgment, Kant diagnoses an antinomy of taste: either determinate concepts exhaust judgments of taste or they do not. That is to say, judgments of taste are either objective and public or subjective and private. On the objectivity thesis, aesthetic value is predicable of objects. But determining the concepts that would make a judgment of taste objective is a vexing matter. Who can say which concepts these would be? To what authority does one appeal? (...) On the subjectivity thesis, aesthetic value is not predicable of objects. But this threatens judgments of taste with a sort of relativism. Can we not firmly assert the aesthetic value of any object? Have we no authority to make criticisms of taste? Following John McDowell’s “Aesthetic Value, Objectivity and the Fabric of the World”, I will hold that aesthetic value is neither objective nor subjective, but rather intersubjective. But, contra McDowell, I will argue that the validity that intersubjective aesthetic value bestows on judgments of taste must assume an indeterminate absolute conception of reality, of the world as it is in itself. Only such a conceptual resource can in turn make intelligible the notion of a shared or common sense according to which a judgment of taste can be universally valid, that is, valid for all subjects. Finally, I will consider an objection to common sense in matters of taste. (shrink)

One of the most debated questions in psychology and cognitive science is the nature and the functioning of the mental processes involved in deductive reasoning. However, all existing theories refer to a specific deductive domain, like syllogistic, propositional or relational reasoning.Our goal is to unify the main types of deductive reasoning into a single set of basic procedures. In particular, we bring together the microtheories developed from a mental models perspective in a single theory, for which we provide a formal (...) foundation. We validate the theory through a computational model (UNICORE) which allows fine‐grained predictions of subjects' performance in different reasoning domains.The performance of the model is tested against the performance of experimental subjects—as reported in the relevant literature—in the three areas of syllogistic, relational and propositional reasoning. The computational model proves to be a satisfactory artificial subject, reproducing both correct and erroneous performance of the human subjects. Moreover, we introduce a developmental trend in the program, in order to simulate the performance of subjects of different ages, ranging from children (3–6) to adolescents (8–12) to adults (>21). The simulation model performs similarly to the subjects of different ages.Our conclusion is that the validity of the mental model approach is confirmed for the deductive reasoning domain, and that it is possible to devise a unique mechanism able to deal with the specific subareas. The proposed computational model (UNICORE) represents such a unifying structure. (shrink)

If we accept the Socratic edict that the examined life is the only worth living, we find no examination can exclude that mortal fate of human life. If we define a philosophical problem as, in Hans Jonas’ words, “the collision between a comprehensive view (be it hypothesis or belief) and a particular fact which will not fit into it”, we see there can be no greater problem for materialism or organicism than the corpse. That living things die is a problem (...) for a view on which only a figment of the imagination differentiates organic from inorganic matter, as for a view on which life is rational and eternal. For any systematic view, the body is a constant reminder of an acceptable answer to the question 'what is being'. This is because the body that can die is the ultimate explanatory task for any principled answer to this question. (shrink)

The introduction of the long-term history of the Earth into the preoccupations of historians has triggered a crisis because it has become impossible to keep the “planet” as one single entity outside of history properly understood. As soon as the planetary intruded into history, it became impossible to keep it as one naturalized background. By problematizing the planetary, Dipesh Chakrabarty has forced philosophers, historians and anthropologists to extend pluralism to the very ground on which history was supposed to unfold. Hence (...) Bruno Latour’s attempt at counting the number of “planets” whose attractions are simultaneously being felt today on any political question. Each of his eight planets are defined by the disconnect between where they are situated and where they are imagined to be moving, which means that each planet is led by a different and incommensurable philosophy of history. Such a “fictional planetology” is then discussed by Chakrabarty, who reviews the difficulties historians have had in taking the nonhuman as a historical agent and then adds to Latour’s count a new planetary body which further complicates the geopolitical situation. The result of their joint effort is to shift questions of philosophy of history to philosophy of geography. (shrink)

Suppose you intend now to φ at some future time t. However, when t has come you do not φ. Something has gone wrong. This failing is not just a causal but also a normative failing. This raises the question how to characterize this failing. I discuss three alternative views. On the first view, the fact that you do not execute your intention to φ is blameworthy only if the balance of reasons pointed to φ-ing. The fact that you intended (...) to φ does not add to the reasons for φ-ing at t. On the second view, the fact that you do not execute your intention to φ is blameworthy because you violate a requirement of rationality. Both these views have in common that they deny that intending to φ at t creates a reason to φ at t. The third alternative, the one I defend, claims that you often create reasons to φ by intending to φ. (shrink)

In this paper, I summarize Hume's moral theory as it is developed in the Treatise on Human Nature and pay particular attention to the question how evil is possible in Hume's theory.

Idee und Sein.--Idee und Geltung.--Die Idee in Wirklichkeit und Geltung.

This journal issue opens with Bruno Langlet’s French translation of the first section of Bertrand Russell’s article “Meinong’s theory of complexes and assumptions” (1904). Russell, a defender of logical realism, provides an analysis of Meinong’s thoughts at the turn of the century - thoughts which ultimately lead to Object Theory. Russell aknowledges the deep agreement between himself and Meinong, at this period in time, concerning several principles, arguments and theses. In this first section of his article, Russell discusses Meinong’s (...) higher-order objects theory. (shrink)

This journal issue opens with Bruno Langlet and Jean-François Rosecchi’s French translation of the second and third sections of Bertrand Russell’s article “Meinong’s theory of complexes and assumptions (1904).” Russell, a defender of logical realism, provides an analysis of Meinong’s thoughts at the turn of the century - thoughts that ultimately lead to Object Theory. Russell aknowledges the deep agreement between himself and Meinong, at this period in time, concerning several principles, arguments and theses. In these sections of his (...) article, Russell exposes and analyses Meinong’s theory of assumptions (1902), then proceeds to an analysis of the object of mental acts. (shrink)

Après avoir identifié quelques-uns des multiples biais intellectuels qui obèrent trop souvent l’analyse de la réalité économique africaine, cette introduction précise la perspective de ce numéro. Il tente de définir l’esprit d’une économie politique lucide appliquée aux pays d’Afrique, avant de présenter brièvement les articles du dossier.

A correction to this paper has been published: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10701-021-00451-y.

¿El agua recuerda? ¿Cómo es posible visualizar y sanar su memoria? En el año 2013 el artista Eduardo Navarro presentó su obra Tratamiento homeopático del Río de la Plata en el Parque de la Memoria - Monumento a las Víctimas del Terrorismo de Estado, como parte de la exhibición Aquella mañana fue como si recuperara, si no la felicidad, sí la energía, una energía que se parecía mucho al humor, un humor que se parecía mucho a la memoria, bajo la (...) curaduría de Inés Katzenstein y Javier Villa. En palabras del artista, el proyecto se inspiró en la teoría del científico japonés Masaru Emoto, quien sostiene que las diversas formas de cristalización del agua se deben a las energías y afectos a las que ésta se expone. (shrink)

Economics and psychology are both sciences of human behaviour. This paper gives a survey of their interaction. First, the changing relationship between the two sciences is discussed: while economics was once imperialistic, it has become a science inspired by psychological insights. In order to illustrate this, recent developments and evidence for three major areas are presented: bounded rationality, non-selfish behaviour, and the economics of happiness.

This article calls for a rethinking of critical sociology. Representing classical critical sociology, the Bourdieusian paradigm illustrated domination, but its negative foundation removed actors’ power, privileging sociological knowledge as capable of identifying (social) transcendental categories of thought. Latour’s constructivism challenged this privilege, giving actors the political power of aggregating collectives around their common concerns at the cost of emphasizing domination and critique. We propose a critical approach that evades a transcendental perspective reliant on pure negation, producing a more positive critical (...) sociology founded on processualist phenomenological and pragmatic perspectives, principally Merleau-Ponty and Dewey. Actors and researchers can collectively ruminate on their perspectives and concerns to challenge power structures and transform their worlds. At the center of this is the social-mien, a creative reimagination of habitus. A brief discussion of the protests and scholarship surrounding the Notre-Dame-des-Landes activists’ practice of democracy highlights the utility of the approach and serves as a model for future application. (shrink)

Cet article part d’un constat : certains objets produits par des IA génératives ressemblent à des œuvres d’art qui existent déjà et renversent de ce fait les problématiques liées à l’indiscernabilité entre l’art et le non-art. La facilité avec laquelle ces objets sont acceptés comme œuvre d’art semble reposer sur cette ressemblance qu’il s’agit dès lors d’interroger. Elle semble en effet subrepticement redonner de l’importance à l’objet et son apparence. Les productions issues d’IA permettent ainsi de réfléchir sur le rapport (...) que l’art contemporain entretient à ses objets. Une question symptomatique des pistes discutées est de savoir s’il est plus pertinent de considérer The Next Rembrandt comme une nouvelle peinture d’un Rembrandt virtuel ou comme une nouvelle œuvre appropriationniste d’une Elaine Sturtevant virtuelle. Une manière de répondre à cette question est d’insister sur la dimension immatérielle des œuvres et la différence à faire avec les objets qui les instancient, et ce afin d’éviter tout fétichisme. (shrink)

Dans Risking together, Bryan et Rafferty pensent à la manière de la finance comportementale, mais ils pensent contre elle et inventent la Marxian behavioural finance. Ils montrent en quoi les ménages, amenés à penser à la manière de la finance dans leur vie quotidienne, sont devenus malgré eux un acteur clé du processus de production des produits dérivés. Les ménages sont désormais intégrés à la finance du côté offre, par la titrisation de leur dette mais aussi de leurs paiements, et (...) du côté demande par leur épargne. Il convient alors de préciser les enjeux systémiques de la boucle financière dans laquelle s’insèrent désormais les ménages, devenus collectivement absorbeurs nets de risque. Face à la toute-puissance d’une finance qui transfère les risques aux ménages, s’impose désormais l’institutionnalisation sociale du risque de défaut. (shrink)

Le premier tractatus du commentaire d'Albert le Grand à l'Isagoge de Porphyre consiste en une manière de proème ou d'introduction à l'ensemble de la logique. Comme la plupart des textes d'Albert le Grand, ce traité est d'une très grande richesse, qu'atténuent toutefois son manque d'ordre et son obscurité d'expression. Étant donné que les aspects fondamentaux de la logique y sont touchés—son statut scientifique et philosophique, son utilité, son sujet, sa division, sa relation aux sciences du langage, etc.—, ce petit ouvrage (...) est du plus haut intérêt pour quiconque cherche à mieux comprendre la logique et la philosophie de la logique du XIIIe siècle. L'auteur présente ici une traduction annotée et expliquée de ce texte difficile, faite d'après la version provisoire de la nouvelle édition de Cologne. Le relevé des sources principales de l'ouvrage révèle, sur un fond aristotélicien permanent, une forte influence des traités logiques arabes nouvellement arrivés en Occident. Pour des exemples de ces auteurs contemporains, voir Lafleur ( 1988, p. 182, l.37–44, p. 321, l.284–294). The first tractatus of Albert the Great's commentary on Porphyry's Isagoge consists of a kind of proem or introduction to the whole of logic. As most of Albert the Great's texts, this tract is of great richness, though it lacks order and is sometimes obscure. Since the fundamental themes of logic are addressed therein—its scientific and philosophical status, its utility, its subject, its division, its relation to the linguistic arts, etc.—, this small work is of high interest for anyone trying to better understand thirteenth-century logic and philosophy of logic. The author presents a translation of this difficult text, made after a preliminary version of the new critical edition and enriched with an introduction and explanatory notes. The survey of the main sources of the tract reveals, apart from a permanent artistotelian background, the strong influence of the Arabic logical treatises which were then coming in the Western world. (shrink)

This paper deals with the autonomy of art and more specifically with the autonomy of socially engaged art once it is institutionalized. The originality of the article is its use of Goodman's terminology to theorize socially engaged art. By comparing two works of art from the same collective, the main issue is to defend the hypothesis that artistic consecration prevents an emancipatory action from functioning as art or prevents an action from functioning as socially engaged art. Thus, in the context (...) of engaged art, the question is no longer "when is art?" but "where is art?". (shrink)

A ficção corresponde a um estilo de escrita que sustenta a construção de narrativas capazes de arrancar o escritor de si mesmo em um sentido de, por meio do experimento da própria linguagem, constituir-se esteticamente. Quando observamos as obras de Nietzsche, percebemos que há uma pluralidade de estilos literários, compostos, frequentemente, por aforismos que demandam outro performático: a escrita hiperbólica. Por meio da escrita artística, Nietzsche cria um mundo compreendido como vontade de poder em que dá a si mesmo como (...) personagem dentre outros tipos psicológicos. Já na filosofia de Foucault o traço marcante de suas obras é o tom histórico com o qual aborda seus temas. Porém, como o próprio afirma em algumas entrevistas, não escreve outra coisa que não sejam ficções, seleciona e organiza enunciados históricos criando diversos cenários, sujeitos e objetos de seu discurso. Este estilo presente em ambos entra em contato com o exterior provocando um reposicionamento do leitor, que é afetado promovendo, como efeito de subjetivação, um reposicionamento político de insubmissão de não querer mais ser governado dessa forma. (shrink)

Individuals are sometimes unable to realize their callings in their formal careers. The literature has highlighted that such unanswered callings produce negative outcomes in the individual’s career and personal life and that coping strategies, such as job and leisure crafting, can help them buffer such consequences. We developed a grounded theory regarding how people cope with their unanswered callings through a previously unexplored strategy in the calling literature: workplace personalization. Our study revealed that through this strategy, individuals retain the aspects (...) of an unanswered calling in their self-concept and then reduce the consequences of not realizing the calling. Some participants enjoy some of the benefits of perceiving a calling, even without performing it in a formal work role. This phenomenon occurs because workplace personalization can be used to represent unanswered callings performed in the past and present, or that are intended to be performed in the future. This form of enactment produces interpersonal and intrapersonal processes that help buffer the negative consequences of not realizing a calling. (shrink)