The current paper synthesizes theory and data from the field of life history (LH) evolution to advance a new developmental theory of variation in human LH strategies. The theory posits that clusters of correlated LH traits (e.g., timing of puberty, age at sexual debut and first birth, parental investment strategies) lie on a slow-to-fast continuum; that harshness (externally caused levels of morbidity-mortality) and unpredictability (spatial-temporal variation in harshness) are the most fundamental environmental influences on the evolution and development of LH (...) strategies; and that these influences depend on population densities and related levels of intraspecific competition and resource scarcity, on age schedules of mortality, on the sensitivity of morbidity-mortality to the organism’s resource-allocation decisions, and on the extent to which environmental fluctuations affect individuals versus populations over short versus long timescales. These interrelated factors operate at evolutionary and developmental levels and should be distinguished because they exert distinctive effects on LH traits and are hierarchically operative in terms of primacy of influence. Although converging lines of evidence support core assumptions of the theory, many questions remain unanswered. This review demonstrates the value of applying a multilevel evolutionary-developmental approach to the analysis of a central feature of human phenotypic variation: LH strategy. (shrink)

The book examines what advocates of the law of karma mean by the doctrine, various ways they interpret it, and how they see it operating. The study investigates and critically evaluates the law of karma's connections to significant philosophical concepts like causation, freedom, God, persons, the moral law, liberation, and immortality. For example, it explores in depth the implications of the doctrine for whether we are free or fatalistically determined, whether human suffering can be reconciled with cosmic justice, the nature (...) of the self, and the character of moral experience. (shrink)

Newton certainly regarded his second law of motion in the Principia as a fundamental axiom of mechanics. Yet the works that came after the Principia, the major treatises on the foundations of mechanics in the eighteenth century—by Varignon, Hermann, Euler, Maclaurin, d’Alembert, Euler (again), Lagrange, and Laplace—do not record, cite, discuss, or even mention the Principia’s statement of the second law. Nevertheless, the present study shows that all of these scientists do in fact assume the principle that the Principia’s second (...) law asserts as a fundamental axiom in their mechanics. (For what that second law asserts, we rely on Newton’s own testimony.) Some, like Varignon and Hermann, assume the axiom implicitly, apparently unaware that any assumption is being made, while others, like Maclaurin and Euler, assume the axiom explicitly, apparently unaware that the assertion assumed is the second law as Newton himself understood it. But in every case these scientists employ the principle asserted by the Principia’s second law fundamentally, unaware that they should be citing Neutonus, Prin., Phil. Nat. Math., Lex II. (shrink)

This book is an important contribution to the philosophy of music. Whereas most books in this field focus on the creation and reproduction of music, Bruce Benson's concern is the phenomenology of music making as an activity. He offers the radical thesis that it is improvisation that is primary in the moment of music making. Succinct and lucid, the book brings together a wide range of musical examples from classical music, jazz, early music and other genres. It offers a (...) rich tapestry incorporating both analytic and continental philosophy, musicology and performance-practice issues. It will be a provocative read for philosophers of art and musicologists and, because it eschews technicality, should appeal to general readers, especially those who perform. (shrink)

Solidarity corresponds to virtuous social behavior, including personal freedom and responsibility, civic friendship, benevolence, reciprocity, and cooperation. These attributes are fundamentally good for individual persons and communities of work. Solidarity is therefore vitally important to the practice of humanistic management. This paper aims to provide management insights into the cultivation of solidarity. The paper begins by developing a theoretical framework to understand solidarity in business context, with attention to philosophical and theological connotations. An empirical research model is presented in the (...) form of a survey instrument to test for indications of solidarity in the workplace, and this measure is used to test several hypotheses regarding the positive associations of solidarity with validated measures of workplace engagement. Research results show that it is possible to identify and analyze workplace behaviors associated with solidarity. Data analysis confirms the validity of the model and demonstrates the positive associations of the hypotheses, based on empirical study of 40 workplaces and 399 employees. Moreover, the condition of whether the workplace was a public or private organization was found to affect the main relationship between solidarity and workplace engagement. The paper concludes with suggestions for practicable, tangible workplace behaviors based on the model, offering guidance in the pursuit of humanistic management. (shrink)

Abstract.As an undergraduate at Cambridge, Newton entered into his ‘Waste Book’ an assumption that we have named the Equivalence Assumption (The Younger): ‘‘ If a body move progressively in some crooked line [about a center of motion]..., [then this] crooked line may bee conceived to consist of an infinite number of streight lines. Or else in any point of the croked line the motion may bee conceived to be on in the tangent.’’ In this assumption, Newton somewhat imprecisely describes two (...) mathematical models, a ‘‘polygonal limit model’’ and a ‘‘tangent deflected model,’’ for ‘‘one-body motion,’’ that is, for the motion of a ‘‘body in orbit about a fixed center,’’ and then claims that these two models are equivalent. In the first part of this paper, we study the Principia to determine how the elder Newton would more carefully describe the polygonal limit and tangent deflected models. From these more careful descriptions, we then create Equivalence Assumption (The Elder), a precise interpretation of Equivalence Assumption (The Younger) as it might have been restated by Newton, after say 1687. We then review certain portions of the Waste Book and the Principia to make the case that, although Newton never restates nor even alludes to the Equivalence Assumption after his youthful Waste Book entry, still the polygonal limit and tangent deflected models, as well as an unspoken belief in their equivalence, infuse Newton’s work on orbital motion. In particular, we show that the persuasiveness of the argument for the Area Property in Proposition 1 of the Principia depends crucially on the validity of Equivalence Assumption (The Elder). After this case is made, we present the mathematical analysis required to establish the validity of the Equivalence Assumption (The Elder). Finally, to illustrate the fundamental nature of the resulting theorem, the Equivalence Theorem as we call it, we present three significant applications: we use the Equivalence Theorem first to clarify and resolve questions related to Leibniz’s ‘‘polygonal model’’ of one-body motion; then to repair Newton’s argument for the Area Property in Proposition 1; and finally to clarify and resolve questions related to the transition from impulsive to continuous forces in ‘‘De motu’’ and the Principia. (shrink)

How do the arts inform and cultivate our service to God? In this addition to an award-winning series, distinguished philosopher Bruce Ellis Benson rethinks what it means to be artistic. Rather than viewing art as practiced by the few, he recovers the ancient Christian idea of presenting ourselves to God as works of art, reenvisioning art as the very core of our being: God calls us to improvise as living works of art. Benson also examines the nature of liturgy (...) and connects art and liturgy in a new way. This book will appeal to philosophy, worship/liturgy, art, music, and theology students as well as readers interested in engaging issues of worship and aesthetics in a postmodern context, including Christian artists and worship leaders. (shrink)

Many philosophers believe that the traditional problem of our knowledge of the external world was dissolved by Wittgestein and others. They argue that it was not really a problem - just a linguistic `confusion' that did not actually require a solution. Bruce Aune argues that they are wrong. He casts doubt on the generally accepted reasons for putting the problem aside and proposes an entirely new approach. By considering the history of the problem from Descartes to Kant, Aune shows (...) that analogous arguments create difficulties for the contemporary philosophical consensus. He makes it clear that the problem remains acute, particualarly for our understanding of scientific evidence. The solution he proposes draws upon contemporary philosophy of science and probability theory. (shrink)

In this article I explore some statistical difficulties confronting going conceptions of ‘group’ as understood in accounts of group selection. Most such theories require real groups but define the reality of groups in ways that make it impossible to test for their reality. There are alternatives, but they either require or invite a nominalism about groups that many theorists abjure.

After preparing the way with comments on evanescent quantities and then Newton’s interpretation of his second law, this study of Proposition II (Book I)— Proposition II Every body that moves in some curved line described in a plane and, by a radius drawn to a point, either unmoving or moving uniformly forward with a rectilinear motion, describes areas around that point proportional to the times, is urged by a centripetal force tending toward that same point. —asks and answers the following (...) questions: When does a version of Proposition II first appear in Newton’s work? What revisions bring that initial version to the final form in the 1726 Principia? What, exactly, does this proposition assert? In particular, what does Newton mean by the motion of a body “urged by a centripetal force”? Does it assert a true mathematical claim? If not, what revision makes it true? Does the demonstration of Proposition II persuade? Is it as convincing, for example, as the most convincing arguments of the Principia? If not, what revisions would make the demonstration more persuasive? What is the importance of Proposition II, to the physics of Book III and the mathematics of Book I? (shrink)

Our understanding of emotional labor, while conceptually and empirically substantial, is normatively impoverished: very little has been said or written expressly about its ethical dimensions or ramifications. Emotional labor refers to efforts undertaken by employees to make their private feelings and/or public emotion displays consistent with job and organizational requirements. We formally define emotional labor, briefly summarize research in organizational behavior and social psychology on the causes and consequences of emotional labor, and present a normative analysis of its moral limits (...) focused on conditional rights and duties of employers and employees. Our focus is on three points of conflict involving rights and duties as they apply to the performance of emotional labor: when employees’ and organizations’ rights conflict, when employees’ rights conflict with their duties, and when organizations’ rights conflict with their duties. We discuss implications for future inquiry as well as managerial practice. (shrink)

This engaging book takes us on philosophical tour, following in the footsteps and thoughts of some great philosophers and thinkers. A fresh and imaginative reading of great philosophers, offering a new way of understanding some of their major works and ideas.

The paper investigates what is meant by "good science" and "bad science" and how these differ as between the natural (physical and biological) sciences on the one hand and social sciences on the other. We conclude on the basis of historical evidence that the natural science are much more heavily constrained by evidence and observation than by theory while the social sciences are constrained by prior theory and hardly at all by direct evidence. Current examples of the latter proposition are (...) taken from recent issues of leading social science journals. We argue that agent based social simulations can be used as a tool to constrain the development of a new social science by direct (what economists dismiss as anecdotal) evidence and that to do so would make social science relevant to the understanding and influencing of social processes. We argue that such a development is both possible and desirable. We do not argue that it is likely. (shrink)

Principia (Book 1, Sect. 6), Newton's Lemma 28 on the algebraic nonintegrability of ovals has had an unusually mixed reception. Beginning in 1691 with Jakob Bernoulli (who accepted the lemma) and Huygens and Leibniz (who rejected it and offered counterexamples), Lemma 28 has a history of eliciting seemingly contradictory reactions. In more recent times, D.T. Whiteside in 1974 gave an “unchallengeable counterexample,” while the mathematician V.I. Arnol'd in 1987 sided with Bernoulli and called Newton's argument an “astonishingly modern topological proof.” (...) This disagreement mostly stems, we argue, from Newton's vague statement of the lemma. Indeed, we identify several different interpretations of Lemma 28, any one of which Newton may have been intending to assert, and we then test a number of proposed counterexamples to see which, if any, are true counterexamples to one or more of these versions of the lemma. Following this, we study Newton's argument for the lemma to see whether and where it fails to be convincing. In the end, our study of Newton's Lemma 28 provides an answer to the question, Who is right: Huygens, Leibniz, Whiteside and the others who reject the lemma, or Bernoulli, Arnol'd, and the others who accept it? (shrink)

This article critically reviews Colin Wringe's Moral Education: Beyond the Teaching of Right and Wrong. The book has three broad aims. The first is to illustrate the philosophical deficiencies of the conceptualisation of moral education underlying two recently published UK government documents on values education. The second is to develop a pluralistic prescriptive account of mature moral judgement, putatively as a point of reference for the educational promotion of moral development. Finally, Wringe presents his views on how certain perennially contested (...) themes such as sexuality, the family and citizenship should be handled in moral education. In laying out its central claim about the rational contestability of moral judgements and, on the basis of this claim, in building its case against traditionalist conceptions of moral education and in favour of Wringe's own particular brand of discussion‐centred progressivist moral education, there is a problem in that the book fails to position itself clearly vis‐à‐vis the vigorous contemporary debates on the proper role of character, virtue and habituation in moral education. If this is its main weakness, however, the book's strength is its unfailing persistence in keeping social control and moral education conceptually distinct, as they should be. (shrink)

Sober (1984) presents an account of selection motivated by the view that one property can causally explain the occurrence of another only if the first plays a unique role in the causal production of the second. Sober holds that a causal property will play such a unique role if it is a population level cause of its effect, and on this basis argues that there is selection for a trait T only if T is a population level cause of survival (...) and reproductive success. Sterelny and Kitcher (1988) claim against Sober that some traits directly subject to selection will not satisfy the probabilistic condition on population level causation. In this paper I show that Sober has the resources to resist the Sterelny-Kitcher complaint, but I argue that not all traits that satisfy the probabilistic condition play the required unique role in the production of their effects. (shrink)

Background: Moral distress can be broadly described as the psychological distress that can develop in response to a morally challenging event. In the context of healthcare, its effects are well documented in the nursing profession, but there is a paucity of research exploring its relevance to healthcare assistants. Objective: This article aims to examine the existing research on moral distress in healthcare assistants, identity the important factors that are likely to contribute to moral distress, and propose preventative measures. Research Design: (...) This is a survey of the existing literature on moral distress in healthcare assistants. It uses insights from moral distress in nursing to argue that healthcare assistants are also likely to experience moral distress in certain contexts. Participants and Research Context: No research participants were part of this analysis. Ethical Considerations: This article offers a conceptual analysis and recommendations only. Findings: The analysis identifies certain factors that may be particularly applicable to healthcare assistants such as powerlessness and a lack of ethical knowledge. We demonstrate that these factors contribute to moral distress. Discussion: Recommendations include various preventative measures such as regular reflective debriefing sessions involving healthcare assistants, nurses and other clinicians, joint workplace ethical training, and modifications to the Care Certificate. Implementation of these measures should be monitored carefully and the results published to augment our existing knowledge of moral distress in healthcare assistants. Conclusion: This analysis establishes the need for more research and discussion on this topic. Future research should focus on evaluating the effectiveness of the proposed recommendations. (shrink)

This essay summarizes recent advances made in the analysis of mosaic patches in chimaeric epithelia of the mouse. The conclusions drawn from the observed patterns are relevant to the behaviour of expanding cell populations during tissue growth and homeostasis. References are made to clonal analysis of Drosophila.

After decades of deregulation and innovation, contemporary financial markets remain firmly anchored in law and legal institutions. The idea that private financial actors simply want to escape government oversight and regulation is simplistic as private interests find the coercive powers of the state too useful to forgo. Instead, such actors engage law selectively to create a more certain environment for themselves and their profit-seeking activities. Contract law adds certainty to financial transactions; law shapes how financial actors use information and exploit (...) information technology; law constitutes financial values; and law allows financial institutions to be turned into assets. Law’s application is shaped by changing conceptions of risk, as well as by new business models for financial institutions. (shrink)

Money undergirds market exchange, but the social significance of money goes well beyond the obvious importance of its highly uneven distribution in modern market economies. In addition, modern money imposes an ostensibly precise and unidimensional valuation on social products, processes and relations that often conflicts with other modes of social valuation. In this regard, monetarization is a particular instance of quantification. Money’s status as an official economic metric is the result of a long, contingent, and uneven historical process. Given alternative (...) forms of valuation, people manage and constrain the commensurability of money through a variety of individual, institutional and organizational practices. The social reception of money is active, not passive. A variety of examples are discussed to illustrate and develop these points. (shrink)

This paper elaborates three approaches to the issue of state autonomy, and uses two empirical cases (British and American treasury policy during the 1930s) to illustrate them. The three approaches are the group affiliations approach, which considers the social characteristics of the individuals who work in an organization; the structural dependance approach, which considers the structural position of the organization within a network of resource flows; and a cultural approach, which considers the role of ideology in the determination of organizational (...) autonomy. The application of these three approaches to the two cases gives some support to all three, but the cultural approach proves especially useful in conjunction with the other two. (shrink)

Defeasible rules are said to allow for the following two-staged sequence, viz., that p → q and yet p & r → not-q. This is puzzling because in the logic of conditionals the sufficiency of p for q cannot normally be undermined if one adds to the antecedent a further proposition r. Critics argue that the better approach to comprehending defeasibility is explicitly to represent the limiting factor r in a single-stage articulation of the rule, viz., as p & not-r (...) → q. This is a more complete statement of the rule; where the old rule announced, confidently and without qualification, that in circumstances or class of cases p consequence q follows, the new rule admits from the outset that q only follows if we add the qualifier that limits the antecedent circumstances to the smaller class of cases p & not-r. This is not only more complete, the critics argue, it is also a more accurate or truthful statement of the rule. The rule p → q, articulated at the first stage of the defeasible process, is only a pretender encountered along the way to this more complete truth. In this paper I show how, and why, contrary to the critics, the process of private law adjudication supports the multi-staged structure and representation of defeasible legal rules. What matters when one party makes a claim against another party is not so much that the claim is true (or even that it is advanced as a legitimate claim under the rule that is most likely to be true), but rather that the claim is of the sort that the party can justifiably say is true. The latter, at least, is what carries the plaintiff past the initial burden of proof, and what calls for the defendant to reply if the plaintiff is not to carry the day. I illustrate the argument by way of the court’s reluctance in a tort case to entertain a purely statistical basis for a plaintiff’s claim that the defendant has caused her injury. Rather, the court will insist on direct evidence that appears to arise out of the particular circumstances of the case as the plaintiff alleges them to be, and even if, as a purely statistical matter, the latter sort of claim is less likely to be true than the claim grounded in pure statistical likelihood. I relate this argument for defeasible rules (and against rules that are more truthful) to some important arguments offered by the philosopher Stephen Darwall in his recent book The Second Person Viewpoint. Private law’s defeasible rules, I argue, capture the special respect (and interpersonal accountability) that attaches only to rights arising out of “second personal” claiming (and counterclaiming) and which are not realizable merely as a matter of “third personal” (moral) truth. (shrink)

A frank and candid glimpse into the early life of the maturing poet.