Claims about the transformations enabled by modern science and medicine have been accompanied by an unsettling question in recent years: might the knowledge being produced undermine--rather than further--human and animal well being? On the Dual Uses of Science and Ethics examines the potential for the skills, know-how, information, and techniques associated with modern biology to serve contrasting ends. In recognition of the moral ambiguity of science and technology, each chapter considers steps that might be undertaken to prevent the deliberate spread (...) of disease. Central to achieving this aim is the consideration of what role ethics might serve. To date, the ethical analysis of the themes of this volume has been limited. This book remedies this situation by bringing together contributors from a broad range of backgrounds to address a highly important ethical issue confronting humanity during the 21st century. (shrink)

The popularity of direct-to-consumer genetic ancestry services has exploded over the past five years, with as many as 250 direct-to-consumer genetic ancestry testing companies currently operating and estimates that 1 in 5 Americans are customers of one or more of those companies. Marketing of genetic ancestry testing has consistently linked the results of DNA testing to a consumer’s racial and ethnic identity, and, because of that, can help consumers find out “who they really are.” We argue that the “biologization” of (...) race and ethnicity promoted in such marketing violates norms of marketing ethics. In particular, we show that this marketing technique violates a number of the core commitments and values of the American Marketing Association Statement of Ethics. (shrink)

Among the objections to the Christian doctrine of the Incarnation which Anselm takes up in ’Cur Deus Nomo’ is an argument that a wise God would not act so, because it is inefficient. I explicate Anselm’s reply to this. It is (I argue) that the Incarnation is an elegant way to achieve a large set of goods including human salvation, and that God might well be wise to treat a sort of beauty the Incarnation involves as a value more important (...) than efficiency. (shrink)

« L’instinct est sympathie. Si cette sympathie pouvait étendre son objet et aussi réfléchir sur elle-même, elle nous donnerait la clef des opérations vitales. » Bergson On s’étonne de la précision athlétique du bond du félin sur sa proie ; on contemple avec admiration la prouesse architecturale du palais de termites ; la délicatesse complexe de la toile d’araignée nous transporte. La merveille réside...

Descartes argues that the mind and body are really distinct substances. He also insists that minds and bodies compose human beings. But how are mind and body united to compose a human? This question is crucial to understanding the place of human beings in Descartes’s ontology. Many scholars argue that Descartes has no solution to the unity problem, and they call into question the ontological status of mind- body composites. On some views, Cartesian humans are mere aggregates, like stacks of (...) pancakes; on other views, Descartes is not entitled to the view that humans exist at all. I argue that Descartes has a solution to the unity problem, and that he appropriates this solution from contemporaneous Jesuit discussions of soul- body unity—discussions that remain mostly unknown to contemporary scholars. The upshot is that Descartes has the metaphysical machinery to account for mind-body unity, and doesn’t have to say that a human being is like a stack of pancakes. (shrink)

Volume 25, Issue 2, February 2025, Page 31-33.

The paper has two main parts. First, I introduce the eudaimonistic setting of the epistemological discussions in book one and – very briefly – and make a few points about book two. Second, in an analysis of book three, I show how Augustine relieves a tension which was present between the conclusions of books one and two and how the relief of that tension culminates in a critique of the skeptic’s eudaimonistic claims more so than their epistemological ones.

One in the series New Dialogues in Philosophy, Brian Orend has written an engaging dialogue from the perspectives of a critically injured soldier and his spouse on all questions related to the ethics of going to war and the ethics of fighting in war. Readers learn of the major traditions of thinking about war, including realism, pacifism, just war theory, and international law. Orend draws on a variety of references from the Civil War to the current war in Iraq (...) to illustrate the moral dimension and ambiguity of war. (shrink)

Ever since Chomsky, language has been considered primarily as an individual cognitive capacity. Even linguists who reject Chomsky's hypotheses accept this assumption. Daniel Dor proposes instead that language is a socially invented communication technology. It differs from all other animal communication systems, including human nonverbal communication, in that it can instruct the imaginations of others about things not shared with the speaker in the here and now. Dor's proposal solves the problem of the evolution of language, assigns a key role (...) to individual differences in language evolution, change, diversity, acquisition, and use, unifies the many divided branches of linguistics, and solves or points toward solutions in many central areas of the subject, from semantics and syntax to pragmatics and the relation between language and thought. It promises not only to change the face of the language sciences, but also to have profound implications for anthropology, biology, cultural studies, literary studies, philosophy, politics, and religion, and for our understanding of human experience. (shrink)

Davidson argues that mental properties are causally relevant properties. I argue that Davidson cannot appeal to ceteris paribus causal laws to ensure that these properties are causally relevant, if he wishes to retain his argument for anomalous monism. Second, I argue that the appeal to supervenience cannot, by itself, give us an account of the causal relevancy of mental properties. I argue that, while mental properties may indeed 'make a difference' to the causally efficacious properties of events, this is not (...) sufficient to show that mental properties are causally relevant. (shrink)