We propose a revised definition of “argument scheme” that focuses on describing argumentative performances and normative assessments that occur within an argumentative context, the social context in which the scheme arises. Our premise-and-conclusion structure identifies the typical instantiation of an argument in the argumentative context, and our critical framework describes a set of normative assessments available to participants in the context, what we call _practically normative_ assessments. We distinguish this practical normativity from the _rationally or universally normative_ assessment that might (...) be imposed from outside the argumentative context. Thus, the practical norms represented in an argument scheme may still be subject to rational critique, and the scheme avoids the is/ought fallacy. We ground our theoretical discussion and observations in an empirical study of US district court opinions resolving legal questions about copyright fair use and the lawyers’ briefs that led to them, instantiating our definition of argument scheme in the “argument for classification by precedent.” Our definition addresses some criticisms the argument-scheme construct has received. For example, using our data, we show that a minimally well formed instance of this type of argument does not shift any conventional burden from the proponent of the argument to its skeptics. We also argue that these argument schemes need not be seen as dialogical. (shrink)

The ideas of John McDowell concerning the relations between mind, world and language are brought into contact with those of Julius Kovesi, with a view to seeing whether the latter can illuminate and flesh out the former. McDowell’s dialectic in Mind and World is expounded and reviewed, hinging on the notion of ‘conceptual second nature’ as his suggested way of showing that there is nothing mysteriously non–natural in human animals learning to find their way about both in a world characterised (...) by lawlike connections and in one characterised by rational connections. Kovesi’s redrawing, in Moral Notions, of the Aristotelian material/formal metaphysical distinction as one between the logical elements of concepts, is adduced to show how the world is ‘shot through’ with concepts and reasons: the formal elements of concepts are nothing other than the reasons we have for collecting varied features of the material world under a concept, to meet our bodily and social needs. The mind can then be treated as a set of acquired capacities and dispositions to become conversant with these features and with the corresponding needs. Some possible objections to this bringing together of the two sets of ideas are briefly examined, and overall conclusions drawn. (shrink)

In the present scenario, Superman’s problem is not just a problem of physical effort but one of practical reasoning. A well‐adjusted and fairly moral person will respond to the world in certain kinds of ways that go beyond making calculations of reasons. First, there is the issue of what they will count as a reason at all. Second, there is the matter of when serious deliberation is required at all. Just as we act out of habit in our usual daily (...) routines, so too we can act out of habit in less routine matters. And these habits can be emotional too. Injustice causes us to feel anger on our own or on others’ behalf, exemplified by Grant Morrison’s Superman‐as‐social‐crusader in the new Action Comics. When the circumstances make things clear, a virtuous person just acts. In this sense, Superman is virtuous in his exercise of practical reason. (shrink)

This article expands upon the notion of ideology as a material phenomenon, usually in the form of institutionalized, taken-for-granted practices. It draws on Herbert Marcuse and related thinkers to conceptualize technological solutions to environmental problems as materialized ideological responses to social-ecological contradictions, which, by concealing these contradictions, reproduce existing social conditions. This article outlines a method of technology assessment as ideology critique that draws attention to: (1) the social determinants of the given technology; (2) whether the technology conceals or masks (...) social-ecological contradictions; (3) whether the technology reproduces existing social conditions; and (4) whether the technology may be used for more rational or emancipatory ends in different social conditions. The examples of solar geoengineering and agricultural biotechnology are examined and it is found that, in each case, these technological solutions conceal social-ecological contradictions and support the current economic system and those benefiting from it, while precluding other alternatives. (shrink)

In 2012, a new and promising gene manipulation technique, CRISPR-Cas9, was announced that seems likely to be a foundational technique in health care and agriculture. However, patents have been granted. As with other technological developments, there are concerns of social justice regarding inequalities in access. Given the technologies’ “foundational” nature and societal impact, it is vital for such concerns to be translated into workable recommendations for policymakers and legislators. Colin Farrelly has proposed a moral justification for the use of patents (...) to speed up the arrival of technology by encouraging innovation and investment. While sympathetic to his argument, this article highlights a number of problems. By examining the role of patents in CRISPR and in two previous foundational technologies, we make some recommendations for realistic and workable guidelines for patenting and licensing. (shrink)

Medical Humanities the journal started life in 2000 as a special edition of the JME. However, the intellectual taproots of the medical humanities as a field of enquiry can be traced to two developments: calls made in the 1920s for the development of multidisciplinary perspectives on the sciences that shed historical light on their assumptions, methods and practices; refusals to assimilate all medical phenomena to a biomedical worldview. Medical humanities the term stems from a desire to situate the significance of (...) medicine as a product of culture. But despite growing usage over half a century the term defies a unifying encapsulation and continues to conjure up a multitude of discourse communities, including scholars working at the interfaces of health and humanities, arts and health, and medical education and bioethics. The field is intellectually capacious and polymorphous, forming and reforming around critical new research questions and teaching tasks spanning disciplines. (shrink)

This Paper suggests that the answer to the question “what is domestic labor law for?”—commonly regarded as securing “justice against markets” or a justified tax on market activity—has informed the search for the answer for the question “what is international labor law for.” This is reflected in what this Paper refers to as P2, which provides that “the failure of any country to adopt humane conditions of labor is an obstacle in the way of other nations which desire to improve (...) the conditions in their own countries.” P2 envisions a “race to the bottom” by rational states trapped in a Prisoner’s Dilemma game. The author maintains that this cannot be the objective of ILO which cannot stop “the race” given its deficient enforcement mechanisms to ensure compliance. This Paper suggests an alternative raison d’etre for the ILO, which is called P1, namely social justice: “universal peace can only be established if it is based upon social justice.” P1 reflects what states actually seek to achieve. Following Sen, this Paper suggests that there is no tradeoff between social justice and economic efficiency. Therefore the promotion of labor rights by the ILO will contribute both to social justice and to economic success. Thus the ILO should promote international labor law so as to lead member states to pursue their self-interest which is consistent with the collective goal of humanity. (shrink)

In this article, I suggest that post‐modernism is in essence a return, under radically different circumstances and with a cultural inheritance from the modernist era , to a kind of medievalism. The view that the ‘trend of our times’ is towards a ‘post‐modern medievalism’ is based mainly upon a consideration of the decline of the nation‐state, the replacement of ‘absolute’ with a kind of ‘moderated’ national sovereignty and the fact that the nations and regional assemblies of Europe are beginning to (...) look increasingly like the duchies and baronies of feudal Europe. (shrink)

The article describes the nature of a faceted classification, and its application in document retrieval. The kinds of facet used are illustrated. Procedures are then discussed for identifying facets in a subject field, populating the facets with individual subject terms, arranging these in helpful sequences, using the scheme to classify documents, and searching the resultant classified index, with particular reference to Internet search.

This thesis is about toleration as a modality of citizenship for pluralistic societies. Its central argument is that the current dissatisfaction with "mere" toleration which we find so broadly represented in our public and scholarly cultures is based on an underestimation of the capacities and attitudes that toleration entails. The liberal recasting of toleration, sophisticated and indeed invaluable though it is abets this devaluation by focusing too exclusively on public justification and on the Lockean stream of the tradition from which (...) we draw. ;The present thesis begins by tracing some of the difficulties facing the Rawlsian and Habermasian projects if we accept a vivid picture of the pluralisms amidst which we live. It then sketches the central features of a complementary tradition of toleration as it flows to us through the works of Montaigne, William James, Mikhail Bakhtin and others. An attempt is made to show where the resources drawn from this tradition might fit in to a theory of citizenship given reasonable Rawlsian qualms about "thick" public conceptions and given the fissiparous nature of a civil society like ours. The thesis ends with a pair of empirically oriented chapters which show ways in which we could conceive a praxis of toleration which might respond to the issues raised in the earlier sections of the work. (shrink)

Introduction: the fingerprint of spirit -- The subject/object of cinema: The Maltese falcon -- "A deeper breath": from body to spirit in Kiss me deadly -- Negative dioretix: Repo man -- "Jackie Treehorn treats objects like women!": two types of fetishism in The big Lebowski.

Man kann die Vielfalt und Dynamik der gegenwärtigen Analytischen Philosophie kaum besser unter Beweis stellen als durch sachorientierte Streitgespräche zwischen ihren herausragenden Vertretern. Die Kolloquien der GAP.5-Konferenz waren solche Streitgespräche. In ihnen haben international renommierte Philosophinnen und Philosophen über aktuelle Fragen aus dem Spektrum der Analytischen Philosophie debattiert - von Willensfreiheit bis Wohlfahrt und Armut, von Bedeutung und Normativität bis Feministische Wissenschaftstheorie, von Philosophie als Wissenschaft? bis Physikalismus. Mit Beiträgen von: Daniela Bailer-Jones, Paul A. Boghossian, Ansgar Beckermann, Jonathan Dancy, Hans-Johann (...) Glock, Jane Heal, Frank Jackson, Pierre Jacob, Janet A. Kourany, Brian P. McLaughlin, Margaret Morrison, Jan Narveson, Julian Nida-Rümelin, Cassandra L. Pinnick, Wolfgang Prinz, Michael Ruse, Ludwig Siep, Wolfgang Spohn, Larry Temkin und Holm Tetens. (shrink)

This reply considers how my article’s approach might be extended by attention to individual, contextual, and ecological processes. I agree that individual learning and agency play important roles in ontogeny; that sociologists have conducted informative work about the interpersonal and institutional contexts shaping on-line emotion construction; and that consideration of the relational niches in which discrete emotions consolidate can help to clarify their abstract structure. Emotion construction works with nonsocial as well as social materials.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Myrmidon vs. the AbbessHow Contrasting Mechanisms to Resolve Mimetic Contagion in Shakespeare's Troilus and Cressida and Comedy of Errors Stand as a Warning Against the Rejection of Christianity in Favor of Resurgent Homeric EthosBrian P. Quaranta (bio)This investigation started with a question: Why does Shakespeare hate the Iliad?The question arose after first reading Troilus and Cressida (T&C), Shakespeare's play set during the Trojan War. In his retelling, all (...) claims to glory for Homer's heroes are undermined; a world that is presented by Homer as brutal but honorable is replaced, by Shakespeare, with one that is rife with social and physical disease. As I continued to consider why Shakespeare displayed such hostility toward the Iliad, I found myself recognizing multiple, much more subtle, allusions to the Trojan War in another of his plays set in ancient Greece, The Comedy of Errors (COE). In time, it became apparent that the connection of these two plays with each other, and with the Iliad, was deliberate; through this comparison, Shakespeare rejects the Homeric ethos in favor of a Christian one. A consideration of René Girard's work on Shakespeare helps to bring home the connection between the plays and the concern that they illuminate.In his Theatre of Envy, Girard famously claimed that Shakespeare was consciously familiar with the concepts of mimetic desire and its relationship [End Page 183] to collective violence.1 He drew upon T&C and COE for examples: T&C for its explication of the importance of degree, its employment of collective murder, and the association of mimetic contagion with disease,2 and COE primarily for its emphasis on the special role of twins in mimetic theory as exemplars of identical rivals.3 Girard, I believe, is correct that Shakespeare understood the mechanisms and implications of mimetic theory, and he demonstrates how in these plays its consequences play out in a purely pagan world, and then in another in which there is a saving Christian intervention.The intellectual current of Shakespeare's time has been characterized by two primary themes: Reformation and Renaissance. The use of the word reformation, when taken on its own terms, suggests a benign and necessary process. But for an Englishman in the late 16th century, reformation also would have meant violence, displacement, fracture, war, and the disintegration of a once-unified Christendom. This crumbling of the ancient universal catholic church was accompanied by the Renaissance, a term used to refer to the rebirth of interest in, and progressive obsession with, the culture and literature of the ancient Greeks and Romans.4 My argument is that the two plays discussed here can be read as Shakespeare's response to these developments, demonstrating an anxiety over the threat of resurgent pagan values to a troubled Christianity, with T&C's ending standing as a warning of the danger of a return to the scapegoat mechanism, and COE reminding the reader of the power of the Christian alternative.The essay begins with a brief reminder of the depth of the enthusiasm for the classical era that emerged in Europe in the century leading up to, and including, the life of Shakespeare. I then detail the surprising ways in which Shakespeare thoroughly upends expectations in his retelling of the Trojan War story, discrediting the original tale. Next, the similarities of the Comedy of Errors to Troilus and Cressida, and to the Iliad, are documented. Because this area has received little previous scholarly attention, and because it is crucial to the argument, the inversions of the Trojan War in COE are meticulously detailed. Once it has been established that the two plays both respond to the Iliad, Girard's mimetic theory is brought to bear to explain the very different endings of the plays and to reveal Shakespeare's underlying concern about the Homeric ethos.THE RENAISSANCE AND SHAKESPEARE'S RESPONSE TO THE CLASSICSThe emerging triumph of the Greco-Roman pagan world over the renaissance mind, and its intrusion into the Christian realm, are evident in the development [End Page 184] of visual art in the decades preceding Shakespeare's work. Works by Michelangelo, Raphael, and Giulio Romano, depicting... (shrink)

Nietzsche's perspectivism can be seen as a two-leveled cure for dogmatism. On the one hand, perspectivism amounts to the dismissal of the metaphysical world and the acknowledgement of the esential incompleteness of all knowledge insofar as knowledge is only and always perspectival. On the other hand, perspectivism is an affirmation of the central role the affects play in all interpretations of the world; consequently, it presents itself as a summary rejection of the notion of disinterested contemplation or knowledge. Nietzsche's theory (...) of interpretation results in a transcendental-experimental philosophy able to liberate humankind from the stagnating, destructive effects of dogmatism. A perspectival account of knowledge implies not only an aesthetic aspect, but also a therapeutic one. (shrink)

In this paper I look at Dominique Janicaud’s proposal for a minimalist phenomenology. He develops this proposal in Phenomenology wide open, a sequel of sorts to his essay on the ‘Theological turn.’ Eschewing his polemics, I try to determine (a) the problem that he hopes minimalist phenomenology will solve; (b) the nature of this minimalism and how it differs from other approaches to phenomenology; and (c) critically evaluate some aspects of this minimalism, wondering if the gains of minimalist phenomenology are (...) worth what is given up in minimizing it. (shrink)

The goal of this dissertation is to show that cognitive science, while dealing with the special subject of the mind, can nonetheless fit into the same general model that Bas van Fraassen provides for the natural sciences. The dissertation focuses specifically on the nature of explanation in the cognitive sciences. ;Chapter One makes clear what I take cognitive science to be in the work. The two central cases here are Noam Chomsky's theory of generative syntax, and David Marr's computational theory (...) of vision. The bulk of this chapter is devoted to setting out the structure of the two theories, in order to provide concrete case studies in the sorts of explanations they give. ;Chapter Two sets out the model of explanation employed by considering the relative virtues of several recent approaches--Hempel's classic D-N model, Salmon's statistical relevance model, and Stalnaker and Lewis' counterfactual approach--and concluding with van Fraassen's pragmatics-oriented model. Like many accounts, van Fraassen's takes explanations to be answers to "Why?" questions, and emphasizes the pragmatic machinery at work in question-asking. ;Chapter Three considers two influential views of explanation in cognitive science. Such explanations are often said to be functional or dispositional. I look at proposals of each sort and argue that none of the explanatory strategies singled out can count as the central one in cognitive scientific explanation, because cognitive science has no central explanatory strategy. ;In Chapter Four I hold instead that cognitive science uses all the relevance relations found in natural science. The odd features of cognitive scientific explanation turn instead around the sorts of objects and processes that get posited in its theories--abstract, multiply-instantiable objects that can act as representations, and abstract processes of transformation on these objects. I do not, then, deny that we get new sorts of explanation in cognitive science--only that the source of this novelty has been properly located. (shrink)