Many metaphysicians accept the view that, necessarily, any collection of things composes some further thing. Necessarily, my arms, legs, head, and torso compose my body; necessarily, my arms, my heart, and the table compose something y; necessarily, my heart and the sun compose something z; and so on. 1 Though there have been a few recent attempts to argue against the necessity of this principle of unrestricted composition the consensus is that if it is true, it is necessarily true. 2In (...) what follows I will join the few dissenters and argue that this principle of unrestricted composition is not necessarily true. If I am right, it follows that either some principle of restricted composition is necessarily true or the existence of composite objects is a contingent matter. I will end by indicating why the latter option seems the most plausible. 3I proceed by reductio. Assume the following: Unrestricted composition is necessarily true.That is, assume that necessarily, any collection of things composes something. Then, necessarily, the collection of everything composes something. That is, necessarily, there exists a universal object U having all things as parts, not itself being a proper part of anything. Hence, by our assumption, we get: There must be a universal object U.It is important to note that this is so whether the world is finite or infinite. Holding that in worlds of finite cardinality there is a universal object U while in worlds of infinite cardinality there is no universal object U amounts to accepting a restricted form of composition. 4Now consider the following scenario. Everything in this world is spatially extended and just one half of something else that is also spatially extended. That is, for any thing in this world, there is something else of which …. (shrink)

In this paper I argue against grounding being necessarily well-founded, and provide some reasons to think it's actually not well-founded.

In this paper, I provide an argument for pannormism, the view according to which there are normative properties all the way down. In particular, I argue for what I call the trickling down principle, which says that if there is a metaphysically basic normative property, then, if whatever instantiates it has a ground, that ground instantiates it as well.

I first explore the notion of the world's being such that everything in it is a proper part. I then explore the notion of the world's being such that everything in it both is and has a proper part. Given two well recognized assumptions, I argue that both notions represent genuine metaphysical possibilities. Finally I consider, but dismiss, some possible objections.

In this paper I argue that composition as identity entails unrestricted composition. I also briefly consider a new take on the special composition question.

I develop and defend a version of panpsychism that avoids the combination problem by appealing to plural collective properties.

Despite significant efforts to support those bereaved by intrauterine death, they remain susceptible to avoidable psychological harm such as disenfranchised grief, misplaced guilt, and emotional shock. This is in part because the words available to describe intrauterine death—“miscarriage,” “spontaneous abortion,” and “pregnancy loss”—are referentially ambiguous. Despite appearing to refer to one event, they can refer to two distinct events: the baby’s death and his preterm delivery. Disenfranchised grief increases when people understand “miscarriage” as the physical process of preterm delivery alone, (...) for this obscures the baby’s death and excludes non-gestational parents, such as the father. Additionally, focusing on the delivery reinforces the mistaken idea that a gestational mother bears responsibility for her baby’s death, increasing misplaced guilt. When these terms instead shift the focus to the baby’s intrauterine death rather than the preterm delivery, they can obscure the physically difficult and often traumatic experience women have when they deliver their dead children, leaving women shocked by preterm delivery’s physical reality. Given their outsized role in framing the bereaved’s experiences, and their duty to avoid harming their patients, healthcare practitioners in particular should take special care to discuss intrauterine death and preterm delivery appropriately with patients and their families. Changing language to describe intrauterine death and preterm delivery clearly and precisely helps mitigate disenfranchised grief, misplaced guilt, and shock, while also helping to reframe the social response to intrauterine death, making it more obvious why certain steps, such as allowing bereavement leave following an intrauterine death, promote healing. (shrink)

In this paper, I present the thesis of Composition as Identity as I think it should be understood, and reply to some objections to it. My aim is not to argue that CAI is true, but to show how CAI can be true, and push the debate forward in the direction I think it must and should go in light of some new objections.

In this paper I argue that we need to take irreducibly plural logic more seriously in metaphysical debates due to the fact that the verdict of many metaphysical debates hangs on it. I give two examples. The main example I focus on is the debate recently revived by Jonathan Schaffer over the fundamental cardinality of the world. I show how the three main arguments provided by Schaffer are unsound in virtue of an employment of plural logic. The second example I (...) give is a more general issue about the possibility of emergent properties of mereological wholes. Employing plural logic there is a new way to understand such cases. The upshot is that plural logic greatly matters to metaphysics and hence can no longer be ignored the way it has in this area. (shrink)

I argue that Composition as Identity blocks the plural version of Cantor's Theorem, and that therefore the plural version of Cantor's Theorem can no longer be uncritically appealed to. As an example, I show how this result blocks a recent argument by Hawthorne and Uzquiano.

In this paper, I raise the question whether an artificial intelligence can act morally. I first sketch and defend a general picture of what is at stake in this question. I then sketch and defend a behavioral test, known as the Moral Turing Test, as a good sufficiency test for an artificial intelligence acting morally. I end by discussing some general anticipated objections.

I show that a particular version of Hume's Dictum together with the falsity of Composition as Identity entails an incoherency, so either that version of Hume's Dictum is false or Composition as Identity is true. I conditionally defend the particular version of Hume's Dictum in play, and hence conditionally conclude that Composition as Identity is true. I end by suggesting an alternative way out for a persistent foe of Composition as Identity, namely mereological nihilism.

In this short piece I provide an interpretation of David Lewis' thesis of Composition as Identity.

Divine necessity is the thesis that God must exist. In this paper, I give a brief survey of what the thesis is more exactly, the main arguments for it, and the main arguments against it.

Der Protestantismus hat ein Problem mit der Welt: Die reformatorische Behauptung eines dreifachen SOLA - Gnade, Glaube, Schrift - bricht die Kirche aus der Welt heraus, eröffnet aber neben dem schlichten Glaubensbekenntnis keine überzeugenden Kommunikationsmöglichkeiten. Wie kann nun das bürgerliche Verhältnis dieser Kirche zu der sie umgebenden Welt gedacht werden? Kann sie überhaupt in rechtlicher Gemeinschaft mit der Welt leben? Verfügt sie über geeignete Mittel, an der Gestaltung dieser Gemeinschaft mitzuwirken?Ausgehend von dem Blick auf die »Kehrseite« des SOLA - die (...) radikale Vergottlosung der Welt - und der daran notwendig sich anschließenden Zuordnung von Reformation und Neuzeit weist Jochen Bohn nach, daß der bei Luther und Calvin angelegte Bruch zwischen Kirche und Welt den Anschluß an die vermittelnde Naturrechtstradition verhindert. Des Naturrechtes als einer Brücke zur Welt entledigt, steht der Protestantismus vor dem Dilemma, sich in bürgerlichen Dingen entweder einer weltflüchtigen, oder aber einer christlich-despotischen Orientierung hingeben zu müssen. Am Beispiel Helmut Thielickes und Karl Barths zeigt Bohn, daß diese Not sich selbst in den Sozialtheorien des modernen Protestantismus äußert. Die evangelische Theologie, so die These, wird sich nur dann helfen, wird nur dann eine »gelassene Weltlichkeit« entwickeln können, wenn sie den theologischen Zustand in Fragen des Rechtes zu verlassen und in einen philosophischen Zustand einzutreten bereit ist. Bohn fordert die protestantische Theologie dazu auf, sich Philosophie als pure Weltweisheit wieder neu brauchbar zu machen. Für diese Perspektive stellt er erste theoretische Grundlagen bereit. Möglich wird die - theologisch motivierte! - Hinwendung zur Philosophie durch eine Rehabilitierung der ursprünglichen, durch Bohn jedoch deutlich korrigierten und damit neu zugänglichen Lösung des protestantischen Konfliktes mit der Welt: durch die Rückkehr zur Zwei-Reiche-Idee. (shrink)

Der Band plädiert für eine Resymmetrisierung des Sprachlichen und des Bildlichen für das Verständnis der Gegenwartsgesellschaft. Bildlichkeit wird als eine vom Wahrnehmungsmodus unterschiedene genuin soziale Sinnform aufgefasst. Wir verlassen uns darauf, dass auch Andere ganz selbstverständlich dargestellte Welt von wahrgenommener Welt unterscheiden. Auf die Darstellungen von Darstellungsformen hat sich moderne Kunst spezialisiert. Am Beispiel der Gegenwartskunst wird die Vermehrung, Kombinatorik und wechselseitige Bezugnahme künstlerischer Formen als Katalysator für innerkünstlerische Transformationen identifizierbar.

Divine Foundationalism is the thesis that God is the source of all things (apart from God hirself). I clarify and defend the thesis, before I consider the main arguments for and against it.

Responsible AI (RAI) guidelines aim to ensure that AI systems respect democratic values. While a step in the right direction, they currently fail to impact practice. Our work discusses reasons for this lack of impact and clusters them into five areas: (1) the abstract nature of RAI guidelines, (2) the problem of selecting and reconciling values, (3) the difficulty of operationalising RAI success metrics, (4) the fragmentation of the AI pipeline, and (5) the lack of internal advocacy and accountability. Afterwards, (...) we introduce a number of approaches to RAI from a range of disciplines, exploring their potential as solutions to the identified challenges. We anchor these solutions in practice through concrete examples, bridging the gap between the theoretical considerations of RAI and on-the-ground processes that currently shape how AI systems are built. Our work considers the socio-technical nature of RAI limitations and the resulting necessity of producing socio-technical solutions. (shrink)

In this paper, I reply to Hamri's new kind of cosmological argument for the ultimate ground of being by blocking the argument in more than one place.

Roughly, the problem of the Trinity is the problem of how God can be one and yet be the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, which are three, not one. That one thing is identical with three distinct things seems to violate traditional laws of identity. I propose a solution to this problem according to which it is just an ordinary claim of one-many identity. For example, one pair of shoes is identical with two shoes; and my one body (...) is identical with its six limbs of arms, legs, head, and torso. The pair of shoes is not identical with each one of the two shoes, nor is my body identical with each one of its six limbs, but rather identical with all of them taken together, or collectively. I argue that the problem of the Trinity should be understood accordingly: God is identical with the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit collectively, but not with each one of them distributively. According to the way I develop this proposal, no traditional laws of identity are violated, but merely generalized in an intuitive way. I argue that this is compatible with Christian Orthodoxy as given by the Athanasian Creed. I end by responding to some anticipated objections. (shrink)

Recent publications debate the value of inconsistency arguments. Here, I argue that 'Cause of Death Arguments' - inconsistency arguments that claim miscarriage causes death far more often than induced abortion - are unsound or invalid. 'Miscarriage' ambiguously refers both to intrauterine death, an outcome that does not itself cause death, and preterm delivery, which only sometimes causes death. The referential ambiguity also obscures actions people do take to prevent 'miscarriage.' When using the most plausible versions of each premise, these arguments (...) equivocate. Thus, they cannot prove anything. However, missing the equivocation also causes those responding to Cause of Death Arguments to make unconvincing arguments; they inadvertently make or grant false claims themselves. To avoid such mistakes and expose the merely rhetorical power of Cause of Death Arguments, philosophers should replace 'miscarriage' with disambiguated terms. Doing so should lead people across the abortion debate to finally abandon the Cause of Death Argument. (shrink)

(No abstract is available for this citation).

The Anselmian Thesis is the thesis that God is that than which nothing greater can be thought. In this paper, I argue that such a notion of God is incoherent due to greatness being indefinitely extensible: roughly, for any great being that can be, there is another one that is greater, so there cannot be a being than which nothing greater can be. Someone will say that it is impossible to produce the best, because there is no perfect creature, and (...) that it is always possible to produce one which would be more perfect.’ G.W. Leibniz. Theodicy. Edited by A. Farrer (Chicago, IL: Open Court, 1985. Pp. 249.). (shrink)

In this work I first develop, motivate, and defend the view that mereological composition, the relation between an object and all its parts collectively, is a relation of identity. I argue that this view implies and hence can explain the logical necessity of classical mereology, the formal study of the part-whole relation. I then critically discuss four contemporary views of the same kind. Finally, I employ my thesis in a recent discussion of whether the world is fundamentally one in number.

This article consists of a report submitted to the Massachusetts Commissioner of Mental Health in 1981 from the members of a citizens task force convened for the purpose of recommending policy to the Department in matters concerning privacy and human sexuality. The Chairman of the Committee was given responsibility for producing the information and resources necessary for the members to debate the issue with some intelligence, of facilitating the process and the deliberations, and of writing the final recommendations and report (...) contained in this article.The need for policy in the areas of privacy and human sexuality for persons living in our state institutions serving the handicapped is a continuing and critical one. Resolution of the issues requires informed, courageous decision making by those who are responsible for the welfare of persons with mental or developmental deficiencies. The policy suggested in this article may serve as a step forward for those decision makers. (shrink)

What is human nature? How is language related to thought -- and should the connection be investigated socially or scientifically? Is external reality coherent or fragmented? What are the foundations of rationality, and how trustworthy are they? Such questions have bedevilled thinkers for millennia. Contemporary scholars have harnessed enormous resources to find answers, yet their inquiry is invariably constrained by the tunnel vision of academic specialisation. This issue of The Dolphin seeks to establish common ground among the disciplines examining the (...) mind-brain continuum. Among those meeting the editors' challenge to think outside the disciplinary box are Noam Chomsky, John Searle and Steven Pinker, as well as a dozen others from the fields of neuroscience, linguistics, philosophy, cognitive science, English, computer science and ethnography. The implicit framework that results should help researchers in all fields locate the diversity of human knowing within a joint ontological perspective. (shrink)

In light of the sociological insight that it is left to the art system what counts as art, new artistic forms inevitably alter the prevailing concept of art. The article examines how artistic morphogenesis occurs in a twofold manner in the case of contemporary art: as self-referential process through new form combinatorics or asynchronous artistic operations whose artworks elude the gaze, and as other-referential relation. One of the main features of contemporary art lies in its strong reference to the present, (...) based on a conception of operative time. Time is not understood as a sequence of past, present, future, but rather as the linking of respective presences. Contemporary art shares this understanding of time with event-based social theories. This is analysed as other-referential act of synchronization within the art system with its societal environment. Empirical evidence is provided by select works of art and by self-descriptions of the art system. (shrink)

Including an edited transcription of a colloquium on Sander's life and work, this title contains plates selected from the J. Paul Getty Museum's collection. Sander's works exemplify the contradictory nature of early 20th century Germany.

Five days before his twenty-first birthday, Guillaume Apollinaire set out on an automobile trip that would in large part determine his future. Together with the Viscountess Elinor de Milhau, who had hired him to tutor her daughter in French, he left for Germany on August 21, 1901. Since the car averaged thirty kilometers an hour, it took them nine days to reach her villa on the Rhine, near Honnef. For the next year, Apollinaire tutored the daughter in the morning and (...) explored the picturesque area in the afternoon. Inspired by his new surroundings, he read voraciously and began to write a new kind of verse influenced by French Symbolism and German Romanticism. Apollinaire managed to combine a realistic form of lyric.. (shrink)