In this insightful study, Bockja Kim evaluates J.N. Findlay's philosophy of religion in order to determine whether it provides a basis for the positive construction of moral philosophy. In this effort, Kim relies heavily on Hegel's distinction between bad and true infinity to interpret Findlay's philosophical thought. Kim argues that the significance of Findlay's moral philosophy lies in its attempt to construct a method for positive moral reflection by redressing the extreme negative philosophies of transcendentalism and existentialism. Findlay's philosophy (...) thus effectively counters the negativity of moral skepticism and mysticism, both of which tend to neglect moral philosophy and ethics. In addition, Kim explores how Findlay's philosophy may promote inter-faith dialogue between religious traditions of the East and West. Philosophers and religious scholars with interests in Christianity and Buddhism will find this thought-provoking work enlightening. (shrink)

The standard view of the function of reason is that it emerged to enable individuals to make better judgements and choices. Once individuals could think better, and once we had suitable communicative tools, individual reasoning acquired a public face; we reasoned together as well as privately, in our own mind. Hugo Mercier and Dan Sperber argue that this gets the story the wrong way around: reasoning evolved for public purposes: to persuade, negotiate, assess. Once it was established publically, perhaps it (...) acquired a private function too. With the exception of a few minor complaints, this evolutionary case is well made. However, Mercier and Sperber embed their evolutionary case within a modular view of the mind and suggest a modular view of public reasoning itself. While I find the evolutionary case persuasive, I am sceptical of the cognitive science framework. (shrink)

This paper evaluates and criticises the developmental systems conception of evolution and develops instead an extension of the gene's eye conception of evolution. We argue (i) Dawkin's attempt to segregate developmental and evolutionary issues about genes is unsatisfactory. On plausible views of development it is arbitrary to single out genes as the units of selection. (ii) The genotype does not carry information about the phenotype in any way that distinguishes the role of the genes in development from that other factors. (...) (iii) There is no simple and general causal criterion which distinguishes the role of genes in development and evolution. (iv) There is, however, an important sense in which genes but not every other developmental factor represent the phenotype. (v) The idea that genes represent features of the phenotype forces us to recognise that genes are not the only, or almost the only, replicators. Many mechanisms of replication are involved in both development and evolution. (vi) A conception of evolutionary history which recognises both genetic and non-genetic replicators, lineages of replicators and interactors has advantages over both the radical rejection of the replicator/interactor distinction and the conservative restriction of replication to genetic replication. (shrink)

The ontological dependence of one domain on another is compatible with the explanatory autonomy of the less basic domain. That autonomy results from the fact that the relationship between two domains can be very complex. In this paper I distinguish two different types of complexity, two ways the relationship between domains can fail to be transparent, both of which are relevant to evolutionary biology. Sometimes high level explanations preserve a certain type of causal or counterfactual information which would be lost (...) at the lower level; I argue that this is central to the proper understanding of the adaptationist program. Sometimes high level kinds are multiply realised by lower level kinds: I argue that this is central to the understanding of macroevolution. (shrink)

The present paper attempts to provide an exact truthmaker semantical analysis of modalized propositions. According to the present proposal, an exact truthmaker for “Necessarily _P_” is a state that bans every exact truthmaker for “Not _P_”, and an exact truthmaker for “Possibly _P_” is a state that allows an exact truthmaker for _P_. Based on this proposal, a formal semantics will be developed; and the soundness and completeness results for a well-known family of the systems of normal modal propositional logic (...) will be established. It shall be seen that the present analysis offers an exactification of the standard Kripke semantics in the sense that it analyzes the accessibility relation between possible worlds in terms of the banning and allowing relations between the constituent states, and thereby gives an account of “truth at a possible world” in terms of exact truthmaking. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that the adaptive fit between human cultures and their environment is persuasive evidence that some form of evolutionary mechanism has been important in driving human cultural change. I distinguish three mechanisms of cultural evolution: niche construction leading to cultural group selection; the vertical flow of cultural information from parents to their children, and the replication and spread of memes. I further argue that both cultural group selection and the vertical flow of cultural information have been (...) important. More conjecturally, I identify a potential role for meme-based cultural evolution in the explanation of the ‘human revolution’ of the last 100 000 or so years, and defuse an important objection to that explanation. Introduction Cultural groups The cultural invention of adaptive complexes Niche construction models Dual inheritance Memes Memes or minds? Conclusion. (shrink)

The use of ethnography to understand archaeology is both prevalent and controversial. This paper develops an alternative approach, using ethnography to build and test a general theory of forager behaviors, and their variations in different conditions, one which can then be applied even to prehistoric sites differing from contemporary experience. Human behavioral ecology is chosen as the framework theory, and forager social learning as a case study. The argument is then applied to social learning in the late Pleistocene, and hence (...) to a famous archaeological puzzle: the late Pleistocene acceleration of technical innovation and regional differentiation. (shrink)

Although many accept the Rawlsian distinction between ‘end-state’ and ‘transitional’ principles, theorists disagree strongly over which feasibility constraint to use when selecting the former. While ‘minimalists’ favor a scientific-laws-only constraint, ‘non-minimalists’ believe that end-state principles should also be constrained by what people could (empirically) accept after reasoned discussion. I argue that a theorist who follows ‘non-minimalism’ will devise end-state principles that cannot be realized (as end-state principles), or cannot be stabilized (as end-state principles), or are indistinguishable in content from those (...) she would have selected had she followed ‘minimalism.’ The paper ends by outlining the implications of my analysis for the broader methodological map of political philosophy. (shrink)

Does the seller of a house have to tell the buyer that the water is turned off twelve hours a day? Does the buyer of a great quantity of tobacco have to inform the seller that the military blockade of the local port, which had depressed tobacco sales and lowered prices, is about to end? Courts say yes in the first case, no in the second. How can we understand the difference in judgments? And what does it say about whether (...) the psychiatrist should disclose to his patient's girlfriend that the patient wants to kill her? Kim Lane Scheppele answers the question, Which secrets are legal secrets and what makes them so? She challenges the economic theory of law, which argues that judges decide cases in ways that maximize efficiency, and she shows that judges use equality as an important principle in their decisions. In the course of thinking about secrets, Scheppele also explores broader questions about judicial reasoning--how judges find meaning in legal texts and how they infuse every fact summary with the values of their legal culture. Finally, the specific insights about secrecy are shown to be consistent with a general moral theory of law that indicates what the content of law should be if the law is to be legitimate, a theory that sees legal justification as the opportunity to attract consent. This is more than a book about secrets. It is also a book about the limits of an economic view of law. Ultimately, it is a work in constructive legal theory, one that draws on moral philosophy, sociology, economics, and political theory to develop a new view of legal interpretation and legal morality. (shrink)

In many texts on evolution the reader will find a characteristic depiction of inheritance and evolution, one showing the generations of an evolving population linked only by a causal flow from genotype to genotype. On this view, the genotype of each organism in this population plays a dual role as both the motor of individual development and as the sole causal channel across the generations. This picture is known to be literally false. In many species, parents exert direct causal influence (...) on their offspring, and some of those influences cause the offspring to resemble the parent. For example, a butterfly that lays her eggs on the same plant host on which she hatched thereby exerts a causal influence on her offspring, and one apt to cause them to resemble her more than they would, had she chosen a plant of a different species. None of this is at all controversial, but it poses a puzzle. If the “Weissmanian” conception is literally false, why is it seen as a perspicacious representation of evolution? (shrink)

In this paper I consider the view that scientific change is the result of a selection process which has the same structure as that which drives natural selection. I argue that there are important differences between organic evolution and scientific growth. First, natural selection is much more constrained than scientific change; for example it is hard to populations of organisms to escape local maxima. Science progresses; it may not even make sense to say that biological evolution is progressive. Second, natural (...) selection depends for its power on the specifics of its domain, so I doubt that there is much point in seeing a selective regime in science as an instance of a more general family of selective regimes. Third, the replicator/interactor distinction fits scientific change much less well than biological evolution. But a family of selective theories of science can be identified ranging from the very ambitious to the very modest. Though the very ambitious programs of evolutionary epistemology are in trouble, there is space for one which is not a trivial redescription of what everyone already knows, but which is sensitive to the peculiarities of its domain. That selective theory explains important aspects of the community organization of science, an organization which is central to scientific progress. (shrink)

Humans interpret others. We are able to anticipate both the actions and intentional states of other agents. We do not do so perfectly, but since we are complex and flexible creatures even limited success needs explanation. For some years now Steve Stich (frequently in collaboration with Shaun Nichols) has been both participant in, and observer of, debates about the foundation of these capacities (Stich and Nichols 1992; Stich and Nichols 1995). As a commentator on this debate, Stich (with Nichols) gave (...) explicit and fair-minded sketches of the cognitive architectures presupposed by the various theories of mindreading. As a participant, Stich has mostly been a defender of the theory-theory, the view that normal human agents have an internally represented theory of other agents and they use that theory in interpreting other agents. The main recent rival to this position, simulationism, claims that agents use their own decision-making mechanisms as a model of those of other agents, and derive their predictions by modelling others in something like the way aeronautical engineers derive predictions from the use of scale models in wind-tunnels. Stich has been sceptical about this alternative, for on his view simulation theory makes mistaken predictions about both the development of interpretive competence and about the pattern of interpretive success and failure. (shrink)

Mèngzǐ’s 孟子 advice to King Xuān 宣 to take up his feeling of compassion for an ox and apply it to his people (_Mèngzǐ_ 1A7) is equivocal, and can be understood in two markedly different ways: on one hand, to take immediate care of the people’s needs by performing a kind of (mental) act of applying compassion; on the other hand, to engage in a long-term project of cultivating compassion for them. These views, moreover, when combined with the assumption that (...) emotion is the sole motivator of moral action, give us a perplexing picture of Mèngzǐ as urging the king to do exactly what he cannot—namely, acting out of compassion for his people that he falls short of feeling enough of. This essay explicates the Mengzian model of moral extension (_tuī_ 推) through a solution to this puzzle, specifically by explaining how one’s immediate performance of moral actions are conducive to cultivating related moral emotions. (shrink)

This study developed an online career adaptability improvement program as part of the undergraduate curriculum to improve college students’ career adaptability and verify its effectiveness. This 13-week intervention program, developed using the Korea-Career Adaptability Scale, consists of three domains: knowledge and recognition of the self and work environment, self-directed coping related to career behavior, and environmental interaction for career decisions and adaptation. Two sub-studies were conducted to achieve the research objectives: Study 1 included developing and testing a pilot program and (...) Study 2 quantitatively analyzed the final program to test its effectiveness. In Study 1, preliminary program development and validity were verified, and in Study 2, the effectiveness of the final program was verified. As a strategy to achieve the research purpose, in Study 1, literature review and needs analysis, program design reflecting the results of the needs analysis, validity verification through Delphi survey, preliminary program implementation and evaluation, and the operation of the final program were performed. To test the effectiveness of the program in Study 2, a pre-posttest of career adaptability was conducted on experimental, comparison, and control groups using the non-equivalent group pretest–posttest design, followed by a program satisfaction survey. This study is meaningful in that it developed an online program to help college students improve career adaptability and identified its effectiveness. This study yielded two results. First, it successfully developed a career adaptability improvement program for undergraduate students, wherein the career development tasks, and the sub-factors of career adaptability were organically interlinked. Second, it verified the statistically significant differences in the career adaptability scores among the experimental, comparison, and control groups. The highest mean score was obtained by participants in the experimental group, followed by the comparison and the control group. (shrink)

Extended redundancy analysis is a statistical method that relates multiple sets of predictors to response variables. In ERA, the conventional approach of model evaluation tends to overestimate the performance of a model since the performance is assessed using the same sample used for model development. To avoid the overly optimistic assessment, we introduce a new model evaluation approach for ERA, which utilizes computer-intensive resampling methods to assess how well a model performs on unseen data. Specifically, we suggest several new model (...) evaluation metrics for ERA that compute a model’s performance on out-of-sample data, i.e., data not used for model development. Although considerable work has been done in machine learning and statistics to examine the utility of cross-validation and bootstrap variants for assessing such out-of-sample predictive performance, to date, no research has been carried out in the context of ERA. We use simulated and real data examples to compare the proposed model evaluation approach with the conventional one. Results show the conventional approach always favor more complex ERA models, thereby failing to prevent the problem of overfitting in model selection. Conversely, the proposed approach can select the true ERA model among many mis-specified models. (shrink)

As people struggle to come to terms with cultural pluralism, there is growing recognition of bicultural or multicultural persons and their potential communication patterns. Prior conceptualizations of multicultural identity focused on the idea that people can blend multiple cultures in their minds or switch between representations of cultures as ways to be good towards the Other. This approach may sound sensible, but there is the inescapable injustice embedded in any formulation of the other, and not only the Other but also (...) the other of the Other. The very openness of a genuinely multicultural identity precludes the establishment of such things as ethnic, racial or cultural ‘identities’. The fundamental propositions of this article are that multicultural identity can be seen as different ways of being in the world, which is a facet of enlightened experience by coming into being of ‘intuitive intelligence’ that ‘self/personhood/identity’ is an illusion; the acquisition of multicultural identity is a natural process of human growth, one that does involve a radical shift of personal perspectives, maturation of vision. Ultimately, I suggest a radical rethinking and reversal of the essentialist view of multicultural identity and present multicultural identity as an awareness event transcending one’s cultural identity. It is time for a paradigm shift. (shrink)

This paper explores Mencius' political theory of international relations and the morality of war from the perspective of Confucian moralpolitik. It argues that while acknowledging the possibility of international justice among the feudal, yet de facto, independent states during the Warring States period, Mencius subscribed to the idea that international morality (and justice) can be best maintained under what I call 'Confucian international moral hierarchy' among the states. By upholding international moral hierarchy, Mencius attempted to achieve an international community in (...) which big/strong and small/weak states are mutually connected to each other for the common welfare of the people. The paper then turns to Mencius' ideas on just war and investigates how Mencius rationalized the punitive expedition in the virtual absence of a symbolic institutional authority representing the Mandate of Heaven, the metaphysical ground for the morality of war, by presenting its visible alternatives. It closes by critically revisiting Daniel Bell's interpretation of Mencius's ideas of a just war. (shrink)

This paper is an exposition and defense of Kant’s philosophy of geometry. The main thesis is that Euclidean geometry investigates the properties of geometrical objects in an inner space that is given to us a priori (pure space) and hence is a priori and synthetic. This thesis is supported by arguing that Euclidean geometry requires certain intuitive objects (Sect. 1), that these objects are a priori constructions in pure space (Sect. 2), and finally that the role of geometrical construction is (...) to provide geometrical objects, not concepts, as some have claimed (Sect. 3). (shrink)

Spinoza’s stance against “bad” universals is well known but his own view on “good” universals is not obvious. In this paper we examine the ontological status of general terms in Spinoza against the background of his metaphysical ontology. We then move onto his view of universals in his discussions of the three kind of knowledge. I argue that Spinoza’s view may be best characterized as trope-conceptualism. Universals are, considered in things themselves, nothing but tropes, i.e., fully particularized properties of individual (...) objects. In particular, I claim that what Spinoza calls “attributes” in his grand scheme of ontology are tropes, of which we can have “adequate” ideas. Spinoza’s theory is a lot more delicate and sophisticated than is usually construed. (shrink)

Being most familiar but characteristically elusive, the problem of time has long become a scandal to the philosophical ingenuity. True, many of the great thinkers have only joined to testify in chorus to the ever growing Augustinian bewilderment in their pursuit of the mystery of time. ;The purpose of this work is twofold and simple: to clarify and consequently vindicate what contributions the Husserlian phenomenology as a radically altered perspective has made to help us out of the time-old predicament surrounding (...) time. ;In the first part of clarification , the status and significance of time as one of the most controversial issues in philosophy are discussed, and its historical background is thematically traced back that helps track down how the time-study has come to turn to the phenomenological perspective. The second part of clarification is primarily devoted to expounding the central message of Husserl's analysis of time-consciousness as the prime example of the phenomenological approaches to time-experience. The essence of Husserl's exploration into time-consciousness lies in showing how we constitute temporal and experiential unity be overcoming our commonsensical addiction to the transcendent, objective time and through the unique notions of retention and protention. ;Vindication also consists of two parts: comparison and application. Comparative studies of Augustine, Kant, James, and Bergson in Chapter 3 are done in order to illustrate and help vindicate Husserl in his phenomenological insight into time-consciousness clarified in the preceding chapters. The application part is primarily concerned with whether or/and how the phenomenological insight into time can be extended to exploring the sense of history as a meaningful whole. ;In short, this work claims to be a comprehensive assessment of the significance of phenomenological insight of time-experience, based on a critical understanding of Husserl's analysis of time-consciousness and of its historico-thematic background and through its thematic comparisons with the corresponding wisdoms of some of the most profound thinkers, and by attempting to apply it to constituting the sense of history. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Despite the common understanding of kairos as a temporal concept, it also harbors a spatial notion that holds particular significance in relation to Greek visual arts. The inquiry into its primary role in the formation of aesthetic beauty requires a phenomenological reading of the Lysippan personification of the concept, as it resonates with its counterparts in the fields of philosophy, rhetoric, and medicine. Using Andrew Stewart’s suggestion as a starting point—that the Lysippan Kairos may serve as the artist’s manifesto, (...) consciously constructed in response to the earlier Polykleitan Canon—the evidence for kairos as the sire of beauty is shown to reside not only in its principal role in characterizing the perfect proportion and harmony, but also in its relationship to somatic intuition and sensory understanding, implicating the viewer as a key participant in the process. (shrink)