In this paper, we re-examine a series of gedanken welcher Weg (WW) experiments introduced by Scully, Englert and Walther that contain the essential ideas underlying the quantum eraser. For this purpose we use the Bohm model which gives a sharp picture of the behaviour of the atoms involved in these experiments. This model supports the thesis that interference disappears in such WW experiments, even though the centre of mass wave function remains coherent throughout the experiment. It also shows exactly what (...) it means to say ‘that the interference can be restored by manipulating the WW detectors long after the atoms have passed’. It does not support Wheeler’s notion that ‘the past is undefined and undefinable without the observation (in the present)’. (shrink)

The paper offers an interpretation of thesis 6.01. The treatment touches upon variables, identity, elementary propositions, internal relations. Klammerausdrücke, and operations. Wittenstein's notations are found not to cover the particular form of definition by induction that is used at 6 and 6.01. It is concluded that Wittgenstein's ability to design of a formal system of logic does not match his outstanding logico-philosophical insight.

Le but principal de la conférence est de montrer comment l’hypothèse monadologique explique les rapports entre l’âme et le cerveau.Elle est divisée en trois parties, dont la première expose les faits de la localisation cérébrale des phénomènes psychiques, la deuxième la localisation de ceux-ci dans la conscience elle-même, et la troisième l’explication monadologique des rapports entre l’âme et le cerveau.Dans la première, l’auteur insiste d’abord sur la différence anatomique entre les centres de projection et les centres dassociation dans l’écorce cérébrale, (...) et il énumère ensuite, d’après Flechsig, les régions de celle-ci où se trouvent les centres sensoriels.Dans la deuxième partie, l’auteur montre que tous les contenus de la conscience sont localisés, directement ou indirectement, dans l’espace visuel.Dans la troisième partie, l’auteur démontre d’abord l’impossibilité de la localisation directe des phénomènes psychiques dans l’écorce cérébrale ; il énumère ensuite les difficultés anatomiques et physiologiques du siège simple de l’âme ; et il montre enfin que ces difficultés disparaissent dans l’hypothèse monado- logicrue. (shrink)

Context: The debate around and about constructivism in German-language communication studies. Problem: The reception of constructivism in German-language communication studies exhibits all the features of an instructive lesson: it makes clear how an academic field reacts, and how it can react, to the introduction of specific theories. Moreover, this case highlights the persistent virulent fundamental conflict between realist and relativist epistemologies in conjunction with a matching catalogue of accusations raised – whether rightly or wrongly – towards all those representatives of (...) communication studies that have adopted a constructivist approach making use of constructivist arguments. Method: By reconstructing the debate as precisely as possible it is mapped onto the fundamental problems of the conception of constructivist theory. Results: It is demonstrated that the depicted reservations and accusations can essentially be mapped onto three fundamental problems of constructivist theory development. 1. The problem of practice-relevance. The central question is how the relationship between (constructivist) epistemology and everyday practice ought to be spelled out in concrete terms, because this very relationship is the source of many worries (“Constructivism undermines the journalistic ideal of objectivity,” etc.). 2. The problem of self-contradiction. It is essentially represented by the question of how one ought to present and promote a relativist epistemology – without at the same time, explicitly or implicitly, introducing absolute claims of validity that contradict one’s own initial premises. 3. The problem of terminological imprecision and referential confusion: concepts and terms such as “truth,” “reality” and “objective knowledge” are used in many different ways. It is not always clear whether an author wants to refer to an absolute reality or whether he or she is talking about a concept that is admittedly created within given frontiers of knowledge. (shrink)