The economic impacts of the Green Revolution have been studied widely, but not its social-cultural effects on different farming communities. The adoption of high yielding varieties (HYVs) of rice changed the nature of rice farming in the two West Bengal villages of Padulara and Naigachi. The villages present an interesting contrast of socio-economic and cultural change due to the differences in the level of adoption of agricultural technologies. This study documents the social and cultural impacts of agricultural technology adoption, specifically (...) the effect on rituals which guided the stages of traditional rice farming and communal life. Agricultural rituals are being modified to suit the processes of modern rice farming, while family rituals are holding strong. The study also shows the evolving nature of rituals as it reflects new found wealth, gender roles, and economic class in these villages. (shrink)

The interview to Ranabir Samaddar – translated from the original in Bengali by V. Ramaswamy – deals with the Naxalite decade in the perspective of the history it grew from, the history it was part of, and the history it created. The underlying question is: has this decade inaugurated a new phase in the Indian history of rebellions? Samata Biswas and Sandip Bandopadhyay, speaking on behalf of the Calcutta Research Group, engage in a deep dialogue on the novelties and (...) the legacy of the “dangerous decade” that the rulers have only wanted to put to death. The interview explores the evolving modes of popular politics of the past as well, shedding light on the unprecedented and stark opposition between activism and pacifism including submission to law and order. The answers are as much historical as political. (shrink)

Leading figures in comparative philosophy and cultural studies demonstrate what the future of comparative philosophy might look like in practice.

In contemporary Western analytic philosophy, the classic analogical argument explaining our knowledge of other minds has been rejected. But at least three alternative positive theories of our knowledge of the second person have been formulated: the theory-theory, the simulation theory and the theory of direct empathy. After sketching out the problems faced by these accounts of the ego’s access to the contents of the mind of a “second ego”, this paper tries to recreate one argument given by Abhinavagupta (Shaiva philosopher (...) of recognition) to the effect that even in another’s body, one must feel and recognize one’s own self, if one is able to address that embodied person as a “you”. The otherness of You does not take away from its subjectivity. In that sense, just as every second person to whom one could speak is, first, a person, she is also a first person. Even as I regret that I do not know exactly how some other person is feeling right now, I must have some general access to the subjective experience of that other person, for otherwise what is it that I feel so painfully ignorant about? My subjective world is mine only to the extent that I recognize its continuity with a sharable subjective world where other I-s can make a You out of me. (shrink)

This is a short introduction by the two authors Rada Iveković and Ranabir Samaddar to the issue of the French journal "Rue Descartes" (N. 62), titled "Terrors and terrorisms" or, in French "Terreurs et terrorismes". They start from the idea that what is called "terrorism" isn't in itself an independent phenomenon, but is rather historically produced and then fought by the state as well as by the international system of states, in a vicious circle that radicalises positions and violence. (...) But "terrorism" (or "terror") is nothing in itself, its definition is extremely vague, and it turns around the state and its power. (shrink)

You cannot say “thank you” in Sanskrit. It would be ridiculous to deduce from this (as William Ward, a British Orientalist) that gratefulness as a sentiment was unknown to the ancient Indian people. It is no less ridiculous to argue that rationality as a concept is absent from or marginal to the entire panoply of classical Indian philosophical traditions on the basis of the fact that there is no exact Sanskrit equivalent of that word.

Tactile exploration often involves sequential touches interspersed with stimulus-free durations. Whereas it is obvious that texture-related perceptual variables, irrespective of the encoding strategy, must be stored in memory for comparison, it is rather unclear which of those variables are held in memory. There are two established variables—“intensity” and “frequency”, which are “temporally global” variables because of the long stimulus integration interval required to average the signal or derive spectral components, respectively; on the other hand, a recently established third contender is (...) the “temporally local” variable that codes for kinematic profiles of very short, suprathreshold events in the vibrotactile signal. Here, we present the first psychophysical evidence that temporally local variables can be stored in memory. To that end, we asked participants to detect changes in pulsatile indentation stimuli at their fingertips with and without a gap of 1 s between stimulus presentations. The stimuli either contained global variables alone, or a mix of local and global variables. We found, first, that humans are much better at detecting a change in stimuli when local variables are available rather than global ones alone—as evident by the fact that 21 compared to only 6 participants out of 25 yielded a valid psychophysical curve, respectively. Second, this observation persists even when there is a gap between the stimuli, implying local variables must be stored in memory. Third, an extensive array of relevant intensity definitions failed to explain participants’ performance in any consistent manner, which implies that perceptual decisions were less likely to be driven by intensity coding. Taken together, our results suggest that humans perform pulsatile change detection utilizing local pulse shape, and to a lesser degree global pulse rate, and that both parameters can be stored in memory. (shrink)

The tendency and ability to take adequate revenge for an insult or injury inflicted in the past have been often glorified as part of a ‘just and honourable’ individual or communal character. This article argues against this old—and currently popular—belief that the act of revenge is justified and reasonable. The central flaw in the idea of revenge is that it is a futile attempt to remedy past suffering. The article shows how revenge cannot be defended as ‘teaching the aggressor a (...) lesson’ or as ‘getting even with the aggressor’ or as ‘retributive punishment’, and why at the heart of the retaliator’s motivation structure there is a tragic self-frustrating contradiction. It also explains how and why revenge spirals escalate rather than bring closure to the violence and injury. The alternative suggested by the article is not ‘forgive and forget’, but ‘remember and resist’. In conclusion, a few powerful defences of revenge are discussed as objections to this generally anti-vengeance moral stand. By answering these objections, it is proved that the rage that feeds vengeance should be restrained and retrained in a positive direction, not because it is a negative emotion—some negative emotions may, depending upon the context, be healthy—but because it is an unjust, sick and self-conflicted emotion. (shrink)

In this exploration into the close relation between terror and law, I attempt first to show that the relation between terror and law is not a simple question of relating violence to law, but to the very process of constitution making. Second, laws relating to terror may or may not find a formal place in the constitution, but this relation is essential to the working of the basic law, of the foundational concept of the rule of law. Third, intelligence gathering (...) occupies a key place in this relation, and this activity, which has no mention in the constitution almost anywhere in the world, is the fulcrum on which reasons of state stand. Fourth, intelligence is the close monitoring of human movement, of the body, of the physical activities, and in this physical form of politics we have the meeting of the body and reasoning, terror and constitution, violence and law. And finally, the article describes a specifically Indian experience; yet may have larger significance in terms of retrieving the history of constitution making. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Remembering Jitendra Nath MohantyArindam Chakrabarti (bio)The only philosopher in the global history of philosophy who read and taught (in the original Sanskrit, German, and English) Patañjali, Vyāsa, Śaṅkara, Gangeśa, Kant, Hegel, Husserl, Heidegger, Frege, Wittgenstein, Hume, McTaggart, Russell, Davidson, and Dummett with equal expertise, depth, and hermeneutic originality is no more. Jitendra Nath Mohanty, who passed away on the 7th of March 2023, was emeritus professor of philosophy at (...) Temple University, Philadelphia. In the last decade of his life, he used to spend long periods in his home in Kolkata, the city where he studied as an undergraduate. Born in in 1928 in Cuttack, Orissa, India, Mohanty ranked first in all public examinations and in his B.A. at Presidency College, Kolkata and his M.A. examination at the University of Calcutta. After receiving a Ph.D. from the University of Göttingen in 1954, he came back to India and continued his traditional-style tutelage under two great Sanskrit Pandits: Ananta Tarkatirtha (for Navya Nyāya) and Mahamahopadhyaya Yogendranath Bagchi (for Advaita Vedānta). In his long academic career, he taught at the University of Burdwan, the University of Calcutta, the New School for Social Research, the University of Oklahoma, Emory University, and Temple University and held visiting professorships at All Souls College Oxford and Jadavpur University, Kolkata.JNM was trained equally thoroughly in three distinct traditions and styles of philosophy. Even great modern Indian philosophers of the twentieth century, such as K. C. Bhattacharya, B. N. Seal, R. D. Ranade, Radhakrishnan, B. K. Matilal, Daya Krishna, and R. C. Gandhi, could claim scholarly fluency in at most two traditions (of course the "Indian tradition" itself is a maddeningly complex plurality of traditions often sharing very little in common—e.g., Abhidharma Buddhism and Mādhva Dualist Vedānta). But Mohanty was well-versed in and collected insights and inspiration from European (Continental) Phenomenology, and Analytic Anglo-American Philosophy and several of the diverse Sanskrit Indian Philosophical schools of thought. More importantly, as can be demonstrated in detail, it is his expertise in the pluralistic yet both logically and phenomenologically rigorous styles of classical Indian philosophies that made him uniquely capable of doing the bridgework between continental and analytic philosophies of the West—between Husserl and Frege, for example. [End Page 1]Within philosophy in general his interests ranged from metaphysics to epistemology, ethics, social philosophy, philosophy of physics (especially Time), Logic, philosophy of mathematics, and philosophy of language and mind. Among his numerous publications, the following books achieved bench-mark status in their respective fields: Gaṅgeśa's Theory of Truth: Containing the Text of Gaṅgeśa's Prāmāṇya (jñapti) vāda (Santiniketan: Visva-Bharati, India, 1966); Reason and Tradition in Indian Thought: An Essay on the Nature of Indian Philosophical Thinking (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992); Classical Indian Philosophy (Oxford University Press, 2002); The Self and its Other (Oxford University Press, 2000); Logic, Truth, and the Modalities (Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1999; Jadavpur University, Kolkata, 1999); The Concept of Intentionality (St. Louis: Warren H. Green, 1972); Phenomenology: Between Essentialism and Transcendental Philosophy (Northwestern University Press, 1997); Husserl and Frege (Indiana University Press, 1982); Edmund Husserl's Theory of Meaning (Springer, 1976); and The Philosophy of Edmund Husserl: A Historical Development (Yale University Press, 2008). His charming and inspiring intellectual autobiography was published in 2012 by Oxford University press with the title Between Two Worlds: East and West, an Autobiography. Some of his classic papers are collected in the volume edited with an introduction by Purushottama Billimoria: J. N. Mohanty: Essays on Indian Philosophy Traditional and Modern (New York and New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2002). Philosophy East and West is going to publish a special issue devoted to JNM's life-time achievements in different branches and traditions of philosophy. [End Page 2]Arindam Chakrabarti Philosophy Department, University of Hawai'[email protected] © 2024 University of Hawai'i Press... (shrink)

Thanks to the Inlaks Foundation in India, I was able to do my doctoral research on Our Talk About Nonexistents at Oxford in the early eighties. The two greatest philosophers of that heaven of analytical philosophy - Peter Strawson and Michael Dummett - supervised my work, reading and criticising all the fledgling philosophy that I wrote during those three years. At Sir Peter's request, Gareth Evans, shortly before his death, lent me an unpublished transcript of Kripke's John Locke Lectures. Work (...) on the Appendix about Indian Philosophy was supervised by the late Professor Bimal Krishna Matilal with whom informal but intense philosophical conversations used to spill over into dinner at his place almost every other day. It was Professor Matilal who sent me, over a summer, to study a tough Navya-Nyaya text under his own Nyaya teacher Pandit Visvabandhu Tarkatirtha at Calcutta. All four of these teachers were as kind to me as my life-long mentor in philosophy Professor Pranab Kumar Sen, whose clarity and depth remain the unreachable regu lative ideal of my intellect. When I came back to India, my life became blissfully free of the agonising anxiety to publish, until, after a conference at Jadavpur University where I gave an impromptu paper, ironically enough, on Non-doings, I met Derek Parfit. He had a six-hour conversation with me, explicitly planning my life. Five years had already elapsed since I had finished my D. Phil, but Derek read my thesis and liked it. (shrink)

This book brings together over 25 years of Arindam Chakrabarti's original research in East-West 'fusion' philosophy on issues of epistemology, metaphysics, and philosophy of mind. Organized under the three basic concepts of a thing out there in the world, the self who perceives it, and other subjects or selves, his work revolves around a set of realism links. Examining connections between metaphysical stances toward the world, selves, and universals, Chakrabarti engages with classical Indian and modern Western philosophical approaches to (...) a number of live topics including the refutation of idealism; the question of the definability of truth, and the possibility of truths existing unknown to anyone; the existence of non-conceptual perception; and our knowledge of other minds. He additionally makes forays into fundamental questions regarding death, darkness, absence, and nothingness. Together with conceptual clarification and progress towards alternative solutions to these substantial philosophical problems, Chakrabarti demonstrates the advantage of doing philosophy in a cosmopolitan fashion. Beginning with an analysis of the concept of a thing, and ending with an analysis of the concept of nothing, Realisms Interlinked offers a preview of a future metaphysics, epistemology, and philosophy of mind without borders. (shrink)

Hereditary breast and ovarian cancers are frequently attributed to germline mutations in the tumor suppressor genes BRCA1 and BRCA2. BRCA1/2 act to repair double‐strand breaks (DSBs) and suppress the demise of unstable replication forks. Our work elucidated a dynamic interplay between BRCA2 and the WRN DNA helicase/exonuclease defective in the premature aging disorder Werner syndrome. WRN and BRCA2 participate in complementary pathways to stabilize replication forks in cancer cells, allowing them to proliferate. Whether the functional overlap of WRN and BRCA2 (...) is relevant to replication at gaps between newly synthesized DNA fragments, protection of telomeres, and/or metabolism of secondary DNA structures remain to be determined. Advances in understanding the mechanisms elicited during replication stress have prompted the community to reconsider avenues for cancer therapy. Insights from studies of PARP or topoisomerase inhibitors provide working models for the investigation of WRN's mechanism of action. We discuss these topics, focusing on the implications of the WRN‐BRCA2 genetic interaction under conditions of replication stress. (shrink)

Besides seeing a rabbit or seeing that the rabbit is grayish, do we also sometimes see barely just the particular animal (not as an animal or as anything) or the feature rabbitness or grayness? Such bare, nonverbalizable perception is called "indeterminate perception" (nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa) in Nyāya. Standard Nyāya postulates such pre-predicative bare perception in order to honor the rule that awareness of a qualified entity must be caused by awareness of the qualifier. After connecting this issue with the Western debate (...) concerning the "myth of the given," seven distinct arguments are presented showing that the very notion of such indeterminate perception is epistemically otiose and that the Nyāya theory of perception is better off without it. (shrink)

"[A] positive contribution to the discourse on aesthetics from a cross-cultural perspective. It should be required reading for any academic who teaches and writes on aesthetics and the philosophy of art... There is much to be inspired by, and to learn from."- The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism The Bloomsbury Research Handbook of Indian Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Art provides an extensive research resource to the burgeoning field of Asian aesthetics. Featuring leading international scholars and teachers whose work (...) defines the field, this unique volume reflects the very best scholarship in creative, analytic, and comparative philosophy. Beginning with a philosophical reconstruction of the classical rasa aesthetics, chapters range from the nature of art-emotions, tones of thinking, and aesthetic education to issues in film-theory and problems of the past versus present. As well as discussing indigenous versus foreign in aesthetic practices, this volume covers North and South Indian performance practices and theories, alongside recent and new themes including the Gandhian aesthetics of surrender and self-control and the aesthetics of touch in the light of the politics of untouchability. With such unparalleled and authoritative coverage, The Bloomsbury Research Handbook of Indian Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Art represents a dynamic map of comparative cross-cultural aesthetics. Bringing together original philosophical research from renowned thinkers, it makes a major contribution to both Eastern and Western contemporary aesthetics. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reply to Stephen PhillipsArindam ChakrabartiMuch as I am honored by Stephen Phillips' detailed defense, in the face of my methodological "refutation," of the Nyāya thesis that a raw perception of the qualifier is a necessary causal factor for some (not all) determinate perception of an entity as qualified, I am not fully convinced that my deeper qualms about the very idea of immaculate perception unimpregnated by predicative structure have (...) all been adequately addressed. Instead of a detailed response, which I intend to undertake elsewhere, I wish to underscore the central worry behind my fifth (which Phillips calls "good") and seventh (which Phillips calls "weak") objections.When I claimed that perception is introduced, taxonomically, as a variety of veridical awareness, I had in mind the opening line of Gaṅgeśa's section on the definition of perception:sā ca pramā caturvidhā, pratyakṣānumityupamitiśābdā-bhedātAnd such veridical awareness is of four kinds: perception, inferential knowledge, knowledge from similarity, and knowledge from words.1This seems to be flatly incompatible with the admission of a subclass of perceptions that are not veridical awarenesses!Why does Phillips say that I am simply mistaken? True, taxonomic difficulties cannot overturn empirical evidence. But recall that there is no direct apperceptive evidence for "raw perception." The sole evidence is a generalization from a whole series of mediate (parokṣa) awarenesses that can happily afford to be instrumentally and crucially caused by other awarenesses. On the other hand, immediacy, which is the hallmark of a perception, consists of not having another awareness in its causal nexus. My seeing of a wall as white is direct, rather than inferential, analogical, or testimonial, to the extent that I did not have to go through any other awareness first in order to arrive at this visual perception. An inductive generalization from other mediate (cognition-generated) cognitions should not have such inexorable probative power over our account of immediate sensory cognition as to force us into admitting a neither-true-nor-false third kind of raw awareness!Phillips seems to have overlooked the metaphor of "spelling" that I used in this context while giving my second objection. If the step-by-step picture of building up the content of perception that Gaṅgeśa assumes is correct, then each element of the perceptual content of the predicative perception that this is a flower—the universal flowerhood, the actual physical object identified as "this," and qualification as a cementing relation, in this case inherence—would first have to be cognized in the unconnected "raw" manner! Now, even if we somehow swallow the idea of seeing a universal barely and not in relation to any one of its instances, it simply makes no [End Page 114] sense to talk about a bare, raw, unstructured perceptual acquaintance with qualification or inherence! Logically and structurally one could argue that unless you have "got" a, b, and R first, you cannot have the complex aRb. But this is admittedly a process of logical postmortem dissection of a whole piece of direct qualificative perception. And the point of my metaphorical warning—"You need to have 'L' and 'O' and 'D' and 'N' to spell 'London,' but you do not need to spell 'L' or 'O' or 'D' or 'N' first. Single letters simply cannot be spelled!"—was this: there are all sorts of different ways of "getting." You need to "get" the qualifying feature somehow in order to see or hear or taste something as qualified by that feature, but you do not therefore need to see or hear or taste that feature alone first in a bare, raw, unqualified manner! I do believe, like a good Naiyāyika, that high-pitchedness (or fifthness, in the octave) can be heard although it is a sound-universal. But I refuse to admit that before I can hear a sung note as high-pitched or (the fifth) I must somehow hear that universal directly without hearing it in any note!The central point, once again, is this: all awareness is intentional, according to Nyāya. There are only three kinds of intentional roles that our awarenesses assign to their objects: the role of... (shrink)

Section one : Situations. Death and dialogue -- The impossibility of settled rule -- The singular subject -- Terror, politics, and the subject -- What is resistance? -- A rebel's vision -- Section two : positions. The labour of memory -- Towards a theory of the constituent power -- Possibilities of our trans-national citizenship -- Empire, globalisation, and the subject.

It is not a semantic accident that four key notions of social ethics are also key concepts of theater. These are the concepts of character, playing a part/role, performance, and acting. Of course, one could object that there is a touch of pun in this claim: A character in a drama is not quite the same as good or bad character in a virtue ethics; acting in theater is mere play-acting, whereas acting in social and personal life is serious business. (...) But the distinction between play and serious business does not mean that the former is any less important than the latter. In Homo Ludens, his magisterial study of the play-element in culture, Johan Huizinga remarks: “Play is a thing by itself. The play-concept as such is.. (shrink)

Idealism is a sticky doctrine. Each of us believes that there are lots of things existing and taking place beyond our actual or possible knowledge. Yet we have to live with the predicament that we cannot put our finger on any one such item without somehow touching it with our language and mind. Even our imagination seems to suffer from this incurable ambivalence between self-containment and self-transcendence.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:IntroductionArindam Chakrabarti (bio)I. UrgencyAs global tourism and global profiteering businesses keep aggravating the global ecological crisis, the need for global mutual understanding across cultures increases. But digitally drunk human consumers, generally, do not want what they need most, for example, clean air or cultural epistemic humility. Despite almost a century-long tradition of academic verbiage about “cosmopolitanism” and “postcolonial rectification” of the routine erasing, blanketing, and exoticization of non-Western philosophical (...) cultures, constructive and mutually instructive philosophical dialogue across cultures has just barely begun. But only a small minority of philosophers in Europe and America would deny that philosophy needs to be practiced in an intercultural key more urgently now than ever before. For one thing, as was argued succinctly by Jay L. Garfield and Bryan W. Van Norden more than a decade back in The New York Times (Garfield and Van Norden 2016), at least Histories of Philosophy, which only cover the thinkers from Democritus to Deleuze or from Plato to Putnam, should not be named—without a qualifier—as a history of philosophy. The qualifier “Western” must be added.One of the world’s greatest philosophical classics, Bhagavadgītā, was allegedly delivered “between two armies” ready to launch a genocidal war. Whatever universality the philosophical insights in that text may claim could perhaps be attributed, albeit metaphorically, to the tension between the two sides, two conflicting ideologies, and two lifeworlds in between which Krishna’s “metaphysic of morals” (arguably comparable to Kant’s) was formulated. The four essays collected in this special issue of PEW exemplify and theorize different kinds of border-recognizing, border-ignoring, and border-crossing practices of philosophy. They illustrate the fecundity of philosophy done from more than one cultural standpoint, for example, those of classical Buddhist and contemporary Western environmental philosophies, European and Chinese philosophies, African and Euro-American philosophies, and Analytic versus Indian (South Asian) philosophies.But, of course, no comparative (post-comparative or fusion) philosophy can be done without translating texts of one language into another, for example, classical Chinese into English, Sanskrit into French or German, Spanish into [End Page 1] English, or Akan into English, and some day even Japanese into Hindi. Ideally, the bridge-building philosopher herself should be reading both languages, even if she writes only in English (which, for a couple of centuries, now unfortunately irremediably, is the language of publishable “global”/“cosmopolitan” philosophy, often even in the countries of the global south). Comparative philosophy, dependent upon translation, suffers from the same double bind that the act of intercultural translation faces: It cannot be done, yet—now, of all times—it must be done.II. What May We Hope?Jonardon Ganeri, in a talk given at SUNY, Stony Brook, on March 2, 2016, entitled “Why Philosophy Must Go Global,” said optimistically:The world of academic philosophy is now entering a new age, defined neither by colonial need for recognition nor by postcolonial wish to integrate. There is heightened appreciation of the value of world philosophies; internationalization of the student body; a philosophical pluralism which interaction and migration make salient; growing concerns about diversity within a still too-white faculty body and curricular canon; and identification of deep structural problems with the contemporary philosophical academy. We are entering the age of “re-emergence:” (1) philosophies from every region of the world, are finding new autonomous and authentic forms of articulation; (2) philosophical industry, leaving behind a center-periphery mode of production, is becoming again polycentric; (3) Europe and other colonial powers have been provincialized, no longer mandatory conversation partners or points of comparison; (4) philosophers within the largely Anglophone international academy are beginning to acknowledge their responsibility to arrange international institutions to enable open participation, that is, acknowledge that their control over the academy is a fall-out from colonialism rather than a reflection of intellectual superiority. We may thus look to a future of vibrant pluralistic realism in departments of philosophy, and a new cartography of philosophy.The first wave of translations of “oriental” texts into German, English, and other European languages ushered in, at best, giddy universalism. It chanted slogans like “Neo-Platonists like Plotinus and Indian Monists like Śaṃkara were giving... (shrink)

Although memory is pivotal to consciousness and without it no perceptual judgment or thinking is possible, Nyāya epistemology does not accept memory as a knowledge source. Prof Matilal elucidates and defends Udayana’s justification for calling into question the knowledgehood or even truth of any recollection. Deepening Matilal’s argument, this paper first shows why, if a remembering reproduces exactly the original experience from which it borrows its truth-claim, then there is a mismatch between the time of experience and the time of (...) recall and the remembering ends up being false. To correct that error, if we change the tense in the content of recollection, the added past-ness goes beyond the original experience and violates the purely reproductive nature of memory. The paper ends by responding to this Nyāya position using arguments from Dvaita Vedānta and Jaina epistemology where remembering can be veridical and memory is accepted as an important knowledge source. The additional element of past-ness cannot be derived from sense perception. It has to be a spontaneous contribution of the inner sense. (shrink)

As the first comprehensive collection of essays in English on the perennial problem of free will and agency in Indian philosophies, Free Will, Agency, and Selfhood in Indian Philosophy, edited by Matthew R. Dasti and Edwin F. Bryant, richly deserves to be read widely and critically by philosophers, Asianists, and global historians of ideas. It is an excellent endeavor in comparative philosophy. So, like every exercise in comparative philosophy, it must face a frustrating double bind. Let me start this review (...) essay by illustrating this double bind with an anecdote. Many years back, in a large freshmen's Introduction to Logic class at Montana State University, as a zealous young visiting professor from India, I was... (shrink)

This article is about the Indian Evidence Act. It also explains how evidence is the script that carries law’s unconscious. One one hand, evidence is the site of reason, on the other hand it is also the performative site of the unconscious. The operation of the Evidence Act requires a court, arguments, ways of producing evidence, counter-arguments, scrutiny of the nature of the evidence submitted, and finally the disputation around what constitutes an evidence, and then the judgement. The article argues (...) through a brief presentation of the history of the Act, how law in this way combines the normative and the performative – science of inquiry and the unpredictable script of outcome, procedure and the spectacle built around elements such as - live deposition and the hermeneutic power of the image, rational considerations and emotion, virtuality and the event, serious business in the court and the element of drama. The article suggests with a bit of irony the injunction that to see what law is and how it functions we can go to the cinema; to see what cinema is we can go to the court. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Seeing without Recognizing? More on Denuding Perceptual ContentArindam ChakrabartiTo be in the presence of something is not necessarily to see it. Everyone knows that. Even if an onlooker looks at me and sees me 'looking at' a particular wall with eyes wide open, she cannot be sure that I am seeing that wall. Apart from the possibility that I am distracted or inattentive, I may be focusing on the (...) color of the wall or some particular graffiti on it so attentively that I may not be noticing that it is the color of a wall or that the graffiti is on a wall. Even if the wall causes my perception, it need not be the object of my perception, just as my retina or sunlight is not.Thus, I must have some say on what it is that I am seeing. That does not mean that I may not be mistaken about my own current perceptual content. Neither does it mean that to have a say is to be able to 'say' in descriptive words what one is seeing. All it means is that I cannot be clueless about it. I cannot be, to use Sydney Shoemaker's phrase, strongly "self-blind" (which is worse than being self-oblivious). Now, the myth of immaculate perception, in both of its (radically unlike) Nyāya and Buddhist versions, requires us to admit some such perceptual states that are so radically un-self-ascribable, or—to use Phillips' terminology—unapperceivable, that the subject is "never able to say anything" (in Siderits' words) concerning what she is perceiving during these states. This comes dangerously close to self-blindness. To admit, for other systemic reasons, that one is acquainted directly and pre-predicatively with either a bare featureless fleeting particular (the Sautrāntika Buddhist claim) or a pure universal feature as yet cognitively un-pasted to a particular (the Nyāya claim) is to consign a nook of our own minds to such self-blindness, and also to acknowledge that an awareness can take something as its object without recognizing it as anything whatsoever.Even to see a particular as a unique uncategorizable something is to see it as something, even to see a man as 'that man whom I can't recognize' is to bring him under the general concept of an unknown stranger currently in front of me, a negative demonstrative covering concept. That is why I think seeing is not possible without recognizing. (Seeing cannot even be caused by a bare particular since there aren't any in the world. That is what my realism tells me.) If it were, then we would have to be partially self-blind. But we are not.Recently two parallel controversies have erupted on the pages of this journal: one between myself and Stephen Phillips regarding the necessity of Indeterminate Perception within Nyāya epistemology, and the other between Monima Chadha and Mark Siderits on the issue of whether a realist needs perception of particulars without deployment of concepts. The first controversy is muddied with technical Nyāya assumptions—for example, about how many moments a perceptual cognitive state [End Page 365] lasts or what can be called the instrumental cause of a perception with full-fledged qualificative content. The latter controversy is muddied with the turbid understanding one has of what Kant meant by concepts or the use of concepts in the shaping of an experience.Now, I have for a long time felt that not just Kant's but just about every Western philosopher's concept of a concept (except Frege's, which is an odd notion) is regrettably unclear. Notwithstanding his book A Study of Concepts (MIT Press, 1992), even Peacocke's notion of a concept (which is different from Fodor's notion of a concept) does not yield obvious answers to such simple queries as: "Can two people possess the same concept?" or "When I use a concept that I possess to process a perceived content, do I make the concept itself an object of my perception?"Siderits' bringing in Externalism versus Internalism, the hotly debated issue in current philosophy of content, has also complicated matters. Chadha's initial mistaken... (shrink)

This paper closely examines Hegel’s Gita from the point of view of a theory of being and evaluates its consequences on his view of history and philosophy. Was there anything in the structure of a particular thought in the West in the nineteenth century, that reflected certain similarities with a particular thought in the East? The paper attempts to understand possibilities of a new line of enquiry, namely how much of the dialectic between two philosophies helps us to understand the (...) inner dialectic within one philosophy, beyond Orientalism and contextualism, and enables us to read a work in question in its own right? Hegel’s larger enquiries and engagements with India suggest that they formed an essential part of his broader formulations on philosophy, world history, aesthetics, and religion, and of course logic. If for Hegel Spirit was to be fully itself, mediated by history and the understanding of freedom, then the analysis of Indian philosophy raised a problem intrinsic to West. Hegel’s long commentary on the Gita shows his struggle to engage with the distinctions between the ideas and images of the Gita and his own philosophy, including the question: was there any divine instruction, and any sense, in war and destruction. Hence, Hegel’s reflections on Indian philosophy raised the question of the purpose of philosophy itself. (shrink)

Qu’est-ce qui relie Le Prince de Machiavel et Que faire? de Lénine, que près de quatre cents ans séparent? Le premier est un recueil de formulations sur ce que doit être un prince, les pièges rencontrés sur le chemin de sa réussite, la manière de gouverner, les indices de son pouvoir et ce qui est nécessaire pour inciter le peuple à contribuer à la gloire d’un royaume princier. Le second, écrit à l’époque de la Révolution russe, traite de la construction (...) d’un parti révolutionnaire, de l’union d’une idéologie et d’une classe, et de la manière dont un parti politique peut devenir un tribun du peuple. Les contextes comme les situations sont très différents. Pourtant, il existe un lien étrange entre les deux. Tous deux ont la qualité énigmatique d’être intemporels tout en étant entièrement axés sur les problèmes de l’époque. Tous deux résonnent avec des préoccupations qui partagent des bases similaires. Tous deux touchent la grande question de la contingence et de l’incertitude. Ils semblent ne pas avoir de filiation. Comme s’ils étaient sortis du vide. (shrink)

This article engages with the immuno-political juxtaposition of the healthy self and the pathogenic other to critically examine the representation of Nazis and Jews in Art Spiegelman’s Pulitzer Prize-winning graphic novel _Maus_ (1996). Written as a postmemory narrative, _Maus_ recounts the horrors experienced by the author’s father Vladek Spiegelman as a survivor of the Holocaust that claimed an approximate six million Jewish lives. Beginning with the years leading up to World War II, Spiegelman’s novel reimagines the discrimination, dislocation, and dehumanization (...) suffered by Vladek and his family at various prison camps in Nazi-occupied Poland before being transferred to Auschwitz. Deploying an immuno-political reading of _Maus_, this article investigates how the Third Reich undertook a systematic extermination of the Jewish race by construing them as _immunological nonself_ or pathogenic others. It further argues that Nazism’s fantasy of constructing a racially aseptic German identity by eradicating the Jews as vermin or parasites was reinforced by the late nineteenth-century eugenicist ideologies of racial hygiene. This article finally considers how policies of excessive immunization that was deployed by Nazi biopolitics against the Jewish community, as well as exercised by the Jews to survive the Holocaust, eventually assumed the form of an autoimmune pathology that culminated with the attempted destruction of the entire medico-juridical infrastructure of the German Reich on the one hand and the fostering of suicidal tendencies by the Jewish survivors on the other. (shrink)

The _Mahabharata _is at once an archive and a living text, a sourcebook complete by itself and an open text perennially under construction. Driving home this striking contemporary relevance of the famous Indian epic, _Mahabharata Now _focuses on the issues of narration, aesthetics and ethics, as also their interlinkages. The cross-disciplinary essays in the volume imaginatively re-interpret the ‘timeless’ classic in the light of the pre-modern Indian narrative styles, poetics, aesthetic codes, and moral puzzles; the Western theories on modern ethics, (...) aesthetics, metaphysics, psychoanalysis, and philosophy of science; and the contemporary social, ethical and political concerns. The essays are all united in their effort to situate the _Mahabharata_ in the context of _here _and _now _without violating the sanctity of the ‘written text’ as we have it today. The book will be of interest to scholars and students of Indian and comparative philosophy, Indian and comparative literature, cultural studies, and history. (shrink)

In this exploration into the close relation between terror and law, I attempt first to show that the relation between terror and law is not a simple question of relating violence to law, but to the very process of constitution making. Second, laws relating to terror may or may not find a formal place in the constitution, but this relation is essential to the working of the basic law, of the foundational concept of the rule of law. Third, intelligence gathering (...) occupies a key place in this relation, and this activity, which has no mention in the constitution almost anywhere in the world, is the fulcrum on which reasons of state stand. Fourth, intelligence is the close monitoring of human movement, of the body, of the physical activities, and in this physical form of politics we have the meeting of the body and reasoning, terror and constitution, violence and law. And finally, the article describes a specifically Indian experience; yet may have larger significance in terms of retrieving the history of constitution making. (shrink)

This article is about the Indian Evidence Act. It explains how evidence is the script that carries law's unconscious. One one hand, evidence is the site of reason, and on the other hand it is the performative site of the unconscious. The operation of the Evidence Act requires a court, arguments, ways of producing evidence, counter-arguments, scrutiny of the nature of the evidence submitted, and finally the disputation around what constitutes an evidence – and then the judgement. This article argues, (...) through a brief presentation of the history of the Act, how law in this way combines the normative and the performative – science of inquiry and the unpredictable script of the outcome, procedure and the spectacle built around elements such as live deposition and the hermeneutic power of the image, rational considerations and emotion, virtuality and the event, serious business in the court and the element of drama. The article suggests (with a bit of irony) the injunction that to see what law is and how it functions we can go to the cinema, and to see what cinema is we can go to the court. (shrink)