In this paper we see that the answer of this question is affirmative. We prove this for Dco-algebras and as special case we obtain the result for Positive Implication algebras. First we give, without proof, the properties of Dco-algebras and S-algebras and their connection with Positive Implication algebras and Implication algebras. These results can be found in [T] and [IT].

Currently, testimony is studied extensively in Anglo-American philosophy. However, most of this work is done from a justificationist perspective in which philosophers try to justify our reliance on testimony in some way. I agree with Popper that justificationism is radically mistaken. Thus, I construct an account of how we respond to testimony that in no way attempts to justify our reliance on it. This account is not a straightforward exegesis of Popper, as he never tackled testimony systematically. It makes use, (...) however, of several of Popper's key insights and incorporates them into a viable theory of testimony. Key Words: testimony • anti-justificationism • social epistemology • situational analysis • defeasibility. (shrink)

The “systematicity argument” has been used to argue for a classical cognitive architecture (Fodor in The Language of Thought. Harvester Press, London, 1975, Why there still has to be a language of thought? In Psychosemantics, appendix. MIT Press, Cambridge, pp 135–154, 1987; Fodor and Pylyshyn in Cognition 28:3–71, 1988; Aizawa in The systematicity arguments. Kluwer Academic Press, Dordrecht, 2003). From the premises that cognition is systematic and that the best/only explanation of systematicity is compositional structure, it concludes that cognition is (...) to be explained in terms of symbols (in a language of thought) and formal rules. The debate, with connectionism, has mostly centered on the second premise-whether an explanation of systematicity requires compositional structure, which neural networks do not to exhibit (for example, Hadley and Hayward, in Minds and Machines, 7:1–37). In this paper, I will take issue with the first premise. Several arguments will be deployed that show that cognition is not systematic in general; that, in fact, systematicity seems to be related to language. I will argue that it is just verbal minds that are systematic, and they are so because of the structuring role of language in cognition. A dual-process theory of cognition will be defended as the best explanation of the facts. (shrink)

The declared goal of this paper is to fill this gap: “... cognitive systems research needs questions or challenges that define progress. The challenges are not (yet more) predictions of the future, but a guideline to what are the aims and what would constitute progress.” – the quotation being from the project description of EUCogII, the project for the European Network for Cognitive Systems within which this formulation of the ‘challenges’ was originally developed (http://www.eucognition.org). So, we stick out our neck (...) and formulate the challenges for artificial cognitive systems. These challenges are articulated in terms of a definition of what a cognitive system is: a system that learns from experience and uses its acquired knowledge (both declarative and practical) in a flexible manner to achieve its own goals. (shrink)

Bartley’s pancritical rationalism is seen by some as being a refinement of Popper’s critical rationalism. I contest this view and argue that pancritical rationalism is obtained from critical rationalism by removing some of its most important and useful features. The remainder consists of a restatement of some of Popper’s key ideas and an interpretation of others that I attempt to show is not entirely faithful to what Popper says.

During the period before the Greek revolution of 1821, and especially during the years between 1750 and 1821, there were two ways in which European scientific thought was propagated in Greece. The first is traditional. It comes from ancient Greece and, through Byzantium, reaches the period before the Greek revolution. It makes known the thought of Aristotle, Democrititus, and others on ‘natural philosophy’. The second way comes from Europe. The Greek scholars of the period before the Greek revolution, and especially (...) at the end of the eighteenth century, tried to bring to and propagate in Greece the spirit ofthe European Enlightenment, They tried to make known to the Greek people the scientific achievements of Newton, Descartes, Lavoisier, and Laplace. Scientific knowledge is an important weapon against superstition, and Greek students had to learn about science to become free persons in an independent Greek state. (shrink)

Commentary on Brahmasūtra of Bādarāyaṇa, classical work on Vedanta philosophy.

An extensive literature about pictorial representation discusses what is involved when a two-dimensional image represents some specific object or type of object. A smaller literature addresses parallel issues in sculptural representation. But little has been said about the role played by the sculptural material itself in determining the meanings of the sculptural work. Appealing to Nelson Goodman and Catherine Elgin’s discussions of literal and metaphorical exemplification, I argue that the material of which a sculpture is constituted plays key roles in (...) what is represented and how it is represented, in part because we have bodily and emotional responses to the real possibilities the sculptural material creates for us. I discuss examples of contemporary artworks by Melvin Edwards, Kara Walker, Willie Cole, Marc Quinn, Ai Weiwei, Janine Antoni, El Anatsui, Zoe Leonard, and others. (shrink)

The present article commences analyzing the origins and influences of the religious discourse on the configuration of the modern constitutional discourse and the contributions of the jus-positivism in the consolidation of this sacred-civil language. The second issue is the definition of the U.S. Constitution as a mixed and not as a democratic constitution, with regard to the influences of Plato, Aristotle, Cicero and Polybius to the Drafters of the first modern constitutional text; stability and equilibrium took preference over democracy in (...) a wide sense. I also analyze how the Drafter’s decision has conditioned the modern constitutional system up to the present. (shrink)

Physicians are frequently consulted by people with physical symptoms that, after having ruled out an "organic" pathology, we suspect they are related to the most frequent psychological conditions in the usual consultation: the various forms of reaction to severe stress (Acute Stress Reaction and Adjustment Disorder, from ICD 11), "functional" pathologies, burn out syndrome, and anxiety disorders, especially Generalized Anxiety Disorder, with or without associated depression. They are usually given a brief explanation about these problems and how they affect their (...) health, given a brochure, or suggested a website with information. And then they are encouraged to visit a mental health practitioner. But there are some challenges to this seemingly simple scenario:Not all patients are ready or willing to hear that their health problem might be related to their life or emotions. Many are strongly influenced by mind-body dualism. Others have an intuition that such a relationship exists but bringing that to consciousness is not an easy process, because it can awaken emotions that are difficult to handle. This is quite frequent in people suffering chronic anxiety (DSM-5 Generalized Anxiety Disorder) who prefer to consult medical providers rather than psychologists (Wittchen H. U. et al. 2002), because they do not consider their constant and excessive worry to be related to their discomfort. In their worrying they are hoping for a straightforward solution. Often these patients ask th... (shrink)

En este trabajo se analizan los argumentos de Berkeley a favor del inmaterialismo. Especial atención se dedica al argumento a priori que subyace en el lema esse est percipi, y sobre todo a la manera en que Berkeley entiende el concepto de existencia y el valor metafísico que otorga a su significación. Asimismo, se explica también cómo este inmaterialismo es un espiritualismo o realismo teológico puesto al servicio de causas apologéticas.

En este artículo se pretende analizar hasta qué punto las filosofías de Ortega y Wittgenstein compartirían un horizonte filosófico común. En este sentido se presentan, aunque con matices distintos, los siguientes elementos comunes: el rechazo del realismo metafísico y el cientismo, el abandono de la concepción sustancialista del sujeto, la irrupción en la discusión filosófica del significado o el sentido como algo que necesita comprensión o aclaración, la urgencia de solucionar el problema de la autenticidad.

In this paper we discuss Prinz’s Kantian arguments in “Is Empathy Necessary for Morality?”. They purport to show that empathy is not necessary for morality because it is not part of the capacities required for moral competence and it can bias moral judgment. First, we show that even conceding Prinz his notions of empathy and moral competence, empathy still plays a role in moral competence. Second, we argue that moral competence is not limited to moral judgment. Third, we reject Prinz’s (...) notion of empathy because it is too restrictive, in requiring emotional matching. We conclude that once morality and empathy are properly understood, empathy’s role in morality is vindicated. Morality is not reduced to a form of rational judgment, but it necessarily presupposes pro-social preferences and motivation and sensitivity to inter-subjective demands. (shrink)

Let ${\mathbb{BRL}}$ denote the variety of commutative integral bounded residuated lattices (bounded residuated lattices for short). A Boolean retraction term for a subvariety ${\mathbb{V}}$ of ${\mathbb{BRL}}$ is a unary term t in the language of bounded residuated lattices such that for every ${{\bf A} \in \mathbb{V}, t^{A}}$ , the interpretation of the term on A, defines a retraction from A onto its Boolean skeleton B(A). It is shown that Boolean retraction terms are equationally definable, in the sense that there is (...) a variety ${\mathbb{V}_{t} \subsetneq \mathbb{BRL}}$ such that a variety ${\mathbb{V} \subsetneq \mathbb{BRL}}$ admits the unary term t as a Boolean retraction term if and only if ${\mathbb{V} \subseteq \mathbb{V}_{t}}$ . Moreover, the equation s(x) = t(x) holds in ${\mathbb{V}_{s} \cap \mathbb{V}_{t}}$ . The radical of ${{\bf A} \in \mathbb{BRL}}$ , with the structure of an unbounded residuated lattice with the operations inherited from A expanded with a unary operation corresponding to double negation and a a binary operation defined in terms of the monoid product and the negation, is called the radical algebra of A. To each involutive variety ${\mathbb{V} \subseteq \mathbb{V}_{t}}$ is associated a variety ${\mathbb{V}^{r}}$ formed by the isomorphic copies of the radical algebras of the directly indecomposable algebras in ${\mathbb{V}}$ . Each free algebra in such ${\mathbb{V}}$ is representable as a weak Boolean product of directly indecomposable algebras over the Stone space of the free Boolean algebra with the same number of free generators, and the radical algebra of each directly indecomposable factor is a free algebra in the associated variety ${\mathbb{V}^{r}}$ , also with the same number of free generators.A hierarchy of subvarieties of ${\mathbb{BRL}}$ admitting Boolean retraction terms is exhibited. (shrink)

The classical Glivenko theorem asserts that a propositional formula admits a classical proof if and only if its double negation admits an intuitionistic proof. By a natural expansion of the BCK-logic with negation we understand an algebraizable logic whose language is an expansion of the language of BCK-logic with negation by a family of connectives implicitly defined by equations and compatible with BCK-congruences. Many of the logics in the current literature are natural expansions of BCK-logic with negation. The validity of (...) the analogous of Glivenko theorem in these logics is equivalent to the validity of a simple one-variable formula in the language of BCK-logic with negation. (shrink)

This study aimed to verify the psychometric properties of the Polish version of the Grit-S questionnaire. Grit is understood here as the perseverance and passion for long-term goals, and it encompasses two dimensions: Consistency of Interest and Perseverance of Effort. The sample comprised N = 270 participants aged 18-34. We performed confirmatory factor analyses to verify the dimensional structure of grit, multi-group confirmatory factor analysis to compare the structure across gender, and correlation analysis to examine external validity. Findings showed satisfactory (...) parameters for Grit-S including: reliability, structural and external validity, and measurement invariance across gender groups. The results support the possibility of using the Grit-S questionnaire in research exploring the predictors of success. (shrink)

AbstractŁukasiewicz implication algebras are {→,1}-subreducts of Wajsberg algebras (MV-algebras). They are the algebraic counterpart of Super-Łukasiewicz Implicational logics investigated in Komori, Nogoya Math J 72:127–133, 1978. The aim of this paper is to study the direct decomposability of free Łukasiewicz implication algebras. We show that freely generated algebras are directly indecomposable. We also study the direct decomposability in free algebras of all its proper subvarieties and show that infinitely freely generated algebras are indecomposable, while finitely free generated algebras can be (...) only decomposed into a direct product of two factors, one of which is the two-element implication algebra. (shrink)

This book is a unique exploration of the idea of the "second person" in human interaction, the idea that face-to-face interactions involve a distinctive form of reciprocal mental state attributions that mediates their dynamical unfolding. Challenging the view of mental attribution as a sort of "theory of mind", Pérez and Gomila argue that the second person perspective of mental understanding is the conceptually, ontogenetically, and phylogenetically basic way of understanding mentality. Second person interaction provides the opportunity for the acquisition of (...) concepts of mental states of increasing complexity. The book reviews the growing interest in a variety of second person phenomena, both in development and in adulthood, presenting research that shows how participants in human interaction attribute psychological states of a referentially transparent kind to each other. This review documents the spontaneous preference for face-to-face interaction, from eye contact to joint attention, from forms of vitality to communicative intentions, from interaction detection to joint action, and from synchrony to interpersonal coordination. Also looking at the implications and applications of the second person perspective within fields as diverse as art and morality, this book is fascinating reading for students and academics in social and cognitive psychology, cognitive science, neuroscience, and philosophy. (shrink)

In this paper, we take Darwall’s analytical project of the second-person standpoint as the starting point for a naturalistic project about our moral psychology. In his project, Darwall contends that our moral notions constitutively imply the perspective of second-personal interaction, i.e. the interaction of two mutually recognized agents who make and acknowledge claims on one another. This allows him to explain the distinctive purported authority of morality. Yet a naturalized interpretation of it has potential as an account of our moral (...) psychology. We propose a naturalistic interpretation of Darwall’s work to address some of the main issues about our moral psychology. First, we explain why moral norms motivate us; namely, because of these second-personal relations. We provide a naturalized version of this solution. Second, we articulate how intersubjective interactions take place effectively; grounding duties to particular other subjects, and being related to distinctive moral emotions. Third, we address the question of the limits of the moral community, proposing that it comprises all agents capable of second-personal interactions. Finally, we explain the emergence of community norms through intersubjective interaction. Since all group members can adopt alternatively the second-personal stance to each other, demands are sanctioned and recognized in a triangulation process which explains the emergence of group norms. (shrink)

Building on the discussion between Stephen Darwall and Michael Tomassello, we propose an alternative evolutionary account of moral motivation in its two-pronged dimension. We argue that an evolutionary account of moral motivation must account for the two forms of moral motivation that we distinguish: motivation to be partial, which is triggered by the affective relationships we develop with others; and motivation to be impartial, which is triggered by those norms to which we give impartial validity. To that aim, we present (...) the second-person standpoint of morality, first as Darwall conceives of it, and then as we reinterpret it from a naturalistic approach. Then we synthesize Tomasello’s evolutionary account of morality, and Darwall’s objections to it. To reply to those objections, building on Tomasello’s proposal, we argue that the motivation to be impartial, and the feeling of obligation to comply with normative requirements, appeared when humans anticipated and, critically, internalized others’ sanctions to the violation of social norms. Consequently, we posit that social norms and sanctions appeared first at the community level, and only after that were they internalized in the form of self-directed reactive attitudes. Finally, we derive some corollaries that follow from our proposal. (shrink)

Emotional contagion is a phenomenon that has attracted much interest in recent times. However, the main approach on offer, the mimicry theory, fails to properly account for its many facets. In particular, we focus on two shortcomings: the elicitation of emotional contagion is not context-independent, and there can be cases of emotional contagion without motor mimicry. We contend that a general theory of emotion elicitation is better suited to account for these features, because of its multi-level appraisal component. From this (...) standpoint, emotional contagion is viewed as a particular kind of emotional response that involves the same components and processes of emotional responses in general. (shrink)

Merleau-Ponty decía que nuestra relación con el mundo se sitúa en el orden del «misterio insoluble». Es la invisibilidad de los dioses lo que garantiza la visibilidad del mundo. Este verso invisible –«le Dieu caché», «Dieu insondable», «Être muet», «arrière-silence», «membrure cachée», en términos merleau-pontianos– es la textura misma del recto visible. En el cine extremo o visionario este lenguaje aparentemente antitético no está menos presente para expresar eso que excede a toda visibilidad. Voyance (Merleau-Ponty) que emerge de los légamos (...) de lo invisible pero que no es lo contrario de la vista: «vision [est] ek-stase...», una visión en la que el mudo Ser revela su propio sentido. Así pues, lo invisible no es lo opuesto absoluto de lo visible sino más bien, como dice Merleau-Ponty, su «contrapartida secreta» sin la cual no podría existir la visibilidad. Asimismo, según Derrida, la imagen cinematográfica tiene una estructura fantasmática, está suspendida entre la presencia y la ausencia, pues la invisibilidad determina la lógica de las imágenes. El cine es un ojo, pero sólo ve bien cuando también se relaciona con ese ojo interior que es el de la «visión» de los visionarios. Igualmente, para Jean-Luc Godard, uno de los cineastas más relevantes del cine contemporáneo, la imagen real es la que no vemos. Lo que se ve en el filme tiene menos importancia que lo invisible. Violencia del mirar, desvelamiento de otra luz, que restituye la imagen de lo sagrado. (shrink)

Empirical studies such as Goyal et al. (J Polit Econ 114(2):403–412, 2006) or Newman (Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 101(Suppl. 1):5200–5205, 2004) show that scientific collaboration networks present a highly unequal and hierarchical distribution of links. This implies that some researchers can be much more active and productive than others and, consequently, they can enjoy a much better scientific reputation. One may think that big intrinsical differences among researchers can constitute the main driving force behind these inequalities. Nevertheless, this model (...) shows that, under specific circumstances, very similar individuals may self-organize themselves forming unequal and hierarchical structures. (shrink)

We give a presentation of Post algebras of ordern+1 (n1) asn+1 bounded Wajsberg algebras with an additional constant, and we show that a Wajsberg algebra admits a P-algebra reduct if and only if it isn+1 bounded.