This essay focuses on anthropomorphism as both a form of hype and fallacy. As a form of hype, anthropomorphism is shown to exaggerate AI capabilities and performance by attributing human-like traits to systems that do not possess them. As a fallacy, anthropomorphism is shown to distort moral judgments about AI, such as those concerning its moral character and status, as well as judgments of responsibility and trust. By focusing on these two dimensions of anthropomorphism in AI, (...) the essay highlights negative ethical consequences of the phenomenon in this field. (shrink)

AI research is growing rapidly raising various ethical issues related to safety, risks, and other effects widely discussed in the literature. We believe that in order to adequately address those issues and engage in a productive normative discussion it is necessary to examine key concepts and categories. One such category is anthropomorphism. It is a well-known fact that AI’s functionalities and innovations are often anthropomorphized (i.e., described and conceived as characterized by human traits). The general public’s anthropomorphic attitudes and (...) some of their ethical consequences (particularly in the context of social robots and their interaction with humans) have been widely discussed in the literature. However, how anthropomorphism permeates AI research itself (i.e., in the very language of computer scientists, designers, and programmers), and what the epistemological and ethical consequences of this might be have received less attention. In this paper we explore this issue. We first set the methodological/theoretical stage, making a distinction between a normative and a conceptual approach to the issues. Next, after a brief analysis of anthropomorphism and its manifestations in the public, we explore its presence within AI research with a particular focus on brain-inspired AI. Finally, on the basis of our analysis, we identify some potential epistemological and ethical consequences of the use of anthropomorphic language and discourse within the AI research community, thus reinforcing the need of complementing the practical with a conceptual analysis. (shrink)

By deploying human-like qualities to non-human entities, anthropomorphism offers users an interactive, cognitive, affective, and social experience. Emerging applications of conversational AI with a blend of anthropomorphism are changing the way businesses interact with customers. To take the field forward, this paper emphasizes the importance of anthropomorphism in AI agents and advocates for the need to systematize, integrate, and categorize existing efforts through a systematic literature review. The authors employ the SPAR-4-SLR protocol, which enables the investigation of (...) a vast array of peer-reviewed journal articles. Our study focuses on articles published over 23 years, from 2000 to 2023, ensuring a comprehensive and up-to-date understanding of the subject matter. By meticulously analyzing 302 diverse documents, this study unveils the rapid emergence of anthropomorphism in AI. The authors additionally identify six pivotal knowledge clusters that shed light on the phenomenon: human interaction with anthropomorphic AI agents, technology acceptance toward anthropomorphic AI, anthropomorphism in customer service, anthropomorphism in AI-social companions, applications of anthropomorphism, and anthropomorphic AI for interactive marketing. The current review stimulates academicians and scholars to explore uncharted territories and develop novel theoretical frameworks encompassing anthropomorphism in marketing by posing intriguing and thought-provoking questions. (shrink)

The widespread tendency, even within AI, to anthropomorphize machines makes it easier to convince us of their intelligence. How can any putative demonstration of intelligence in machines be trusted if the AI researcher readily succumbs to make-believe? This is (what I shall call) the forensic problem of anthropomorphism. I argue that the Turing test provides a solution. This paper illustrates the phenomenon of misplaced anthropomorphism and presents a new perspective on Turingʼs imitation game. It also examines the role (...) of the Turing test in relation to the current dispute between human-level AI and ‘mindless intelligence’. (shrink)

Social robotics entertains a particular relationship with anthropomorphism, which it neither sees as a cognitive error, nor as a sign of immaturity. Rather it considers that this common human tendency, which is hypothesized to have evolved because it favored cooperation among early humans, can be used today to facilitate social interactions between humans and a new type of cooperative and interactive agents - social robots. This approach leads social robotics to focus research on the engineering of robots that activate (...) anthropomorphic projections in users. The objective is to give robots "social presence" and "social behaviors" that are sufficiently credible for human users to engage in comfortable and potentially long-lasting relations with these machines. This choice of ’applied anthropomorphism’ as a research methodology exposes the artifacts produced by social robotics to ethical condemnation: social robots are judged to be a "cheating" technology, as they generate in users the illusion of reciprocal social and affective relations. This article takes position in this debate, not only developing a series of arguments relevant to philosophy of mind, cognitive sciences, and robotic AI, but also asking what social robotics can teach us about anthropomorphism. On this basis, we propose a theoretical perspective that characterizes anthropomorphism as a basic mechanism of interaction, and rebuts the ethical reflections that a priori condemns "anthropomorphism-based" social robots. To address the relevant ethical issues, we promote a critical experimentally based ethical approach to social robotics, "synthetic ethics," which aims at allowing humans to use social robots for two main goals: self-knowledge and moral growth. (shrink)

New forms of artificial intelligence on the one hand and the ubiquitous networking of “everything with everything” on the other hand characterize the fourth industrial revolution. This results in a changed understanding of human–machine interaction, in new models for production, in which man and machine together with virtual agents form hybrid teams. The empirical study “Socializing with robots” aims to gain insight especially into conditions of development and processes of hybrid human–machine teams. In the experiment, human–robot actions and interactions were (...) closely observed in a virtual environment. Robots as partners differed in shape and behavior. Participants were instructed to achieve an objective that could only be achieved via close teamwork. This paper unites different aspects from core disciplines of social robotics and psychology contributing to anthropomorphization with the empirical insights of the experiment. It focuses on the psychological effects on anthropomorphization and mechanization, taking the inter- and transdisciplinary field of social robotics as a starting point. (shrink)

Social science research on the anthropomorphisms of computers and robots has been devoted to studying intellectual anthropomorphism, emotional anthropomorphism, bodily anthropomorphism, and the limits of computer and robot anthropomorphism. Although these represent important patterns for studying the anthropomorphisms of computers and robots, there are other important patterns. The limitation of anthropomorphism is one of these patterns. The limitation of anthropomorphism is a discursive practice which places limits on anthropomorphism. Discursive practices are interactional and (...) practical activities for making sense of who and what we encounter. In this article, I analyze the limitation of anthropomorphism as another important activity to investigate. Drawing on an ethnographic study of a robotics research group, I show the importance of the limitation of anthropomorphism by documenting how it contributes to research group identity. In the final section, I describe some implications for future studies of the anthropomorphisms of computers and robots. (shrink)

Nass’ and Reeves’ media equation paradigm within human–computer interaction challenges long-held assumptions about how users approach computers. Given a rudimentary set of cues present in the system’s design, users are said to unconsciously treat computers as genuine interactants—extending rules of politeness, biases and human interactive conventions to machines. Since the results have wide-ranging implications for HCI research methods, interface design and user experiences, researchers are hard-pressed to experimentally verify the paradigm. This paper focuses on the methodology of attributing the necessary (...) social cues to the agent, a core aspect of the experimental design of studies dealing with the media equation. A typology of experimental anthropomorphisms is developed, allowing an assessment of how the differing axiomatic assumptions affect the relevance of the results for an evaluation of the paradigm. The paper concludes with a series of arguments in favour of one particular anthropomorphism type for researching the media equation. (shrink)

Artificial intelligence has historically been conceptualized in anthropomorphic terms. Some algorithms deploy biomimetic designs in a deliberate attempt to effect a sort of digital isomorphism of the human brain. Others leverage more general learning strategies that happen to coincide with popular theories of cognitive science and social epistemology. In this paper, I challenge the anthropomorphic credentials of the neural network algorithm, whose similarities to human cognition I argue are vastly overstated and narrowly construed. I submit that three alternative supervised learning (...) methods—namely lasso penalties, bagging, and boosting—offer subtler, more interesting analogies to human reasoning as both an individual and a social phenomenon. Despite the temptation to fall back on anthropomorphic tropes when discussing AI, however, I conclude that such rhetoric is at best misleading and at worst downright dangerous. The impulse to humanize algorithms is an obstacle to properly conceptualizing the ethical challenges posed by emerging technologies. (shrink)

Historically, Anthropomorphism is a technique used by humans to make sense of their surroundings. More recently, anthropomorphism has been widely used as a technique to influence consumers to purchase goods or services. These techniques can entice consumers into buying something to fulfil a gap or desire in their life, ranging from loneliness to the desire to be exclusive. By manipulating belief systems, consumer behaviour can be exploited. Anthropomorphism can encourage society to use inappropriate emotional attachments and faulty (...) frameworks to understand complex concepts, which in turn reduces risk awareness and understanding of how that technology might impact the individual or society. This technique also separates and divides individuals and society; it plays into a deep belief system that all humans wish to be distinct and yet be part of a group. The consequences of this are found in the field of dehumanisation, which is extremely damaging for society and individuals alike. This research has found potential serious consequences for society and humanity which indicate an urgent need for further research in this area. (shrink)

Generative AI (GenAI) has the potential to affect artists’ control over their own music due to the illegal usage of copyrighted material for training. However, GenAI also creates exciting opportunities for artists to expand their material and working processes. Artists working with GenAI and documenting their outcomes can assist other artists as well as wider society in understanding how GenAI operates and can benefit human artistic output. This paper provides an autoethnographic case study into how a new GenAI tool influenced (...) an established composing practice during the writing of the experimental musical work, Control Yourself (2023). The Koup Music prototype by Kopi Su Studio was trained on vocal inputs by the author and subsequently generated bespoke sonic material. While identifiably true to the author’s musical—and literal—voice, the outputs were novel and perceived as imbued with emotion, leading to subsequent anthropomorphising of the AI. Written by a former AI sceptic, this paper details how the emotive power of the AI’s non-verbal, human-like sounds informed the narrative and structure of the resulting work and imparted a sense of collaboration, rather than solo authorship. Furthermore, the influence of the AI was felt beyond its actual involvement, with the project taking on a more playful approach less centred on the artistic control of the human composer. Following these observations, this paper discusses how GenAI served as a tool for musical experimentation and exploring creative ‘blind spots.’ These insights are also contextualised by current discourse on the perception and use of GenAI in the arts, the role of artistic control in human–AI co-creation, and how anthropomorphism has manifested in past human–AI partnerships. (shrink)

The ability to interact in a natural language profoundly changes devices’ interfaces and potential applications of speaking technologies. Concurrently, this phenomenon challenges our mainstream theories of knowledge, such as how to analyze linguistic outputs of devices under existing anthropocentric theoretical assumptions. In section 1, I present the topic of machines that speak, connecting between Descartes and Generative AI. In section 2, I argue that accepted testimonial theories of knowledge and justification commonly reject the possibility that a speaking technological artifact can (...) give testimony. In section 3, I identify three assumptions underlying the view that rejects conversational AIs – AI-based technologies that converse, as testifiers: conversational AIs (1) lack intentions, (2) cannot be normatively assessed, and (3) cannot constitute an object in trust relations, while humans can. In section 4, I propose the concept ‘AI-testimony’ for analyzing outputs of conversational AIs, suggesting three conditions for technologies to deliver AI-testimony: (1) content is propositional, (2) generated and delivered with no other human directly involved, (3) the output is perceived as phenomenologically similar to that of a human. I conclude that this concept overcomes the limitations of the anthropocentric concept of testimony, opening future directions of research without associating conversational AIs with human-like agency. (shrink)

I argue that, given the way that AI models work and the way that ordinary human rationality works, it is very likely that people are anthropomorphizing AI, with potentially serious consequences. There are good reasons to doubt that LLMs have anything like human understanding, and even if they have representations or meaningful contents in some sense, these are unlikely to correspond to our ordinary understanding of natural language. However, there are natural, and in some ways quite rational, pressures to anthropomorphize (...) or personify LLMs and other AI systems in biased ways. This includes not only the classical or obvious ways of personifying AI — taking them to be sentient or have consciousness and understanding — but also taking AI to simulate or function like understanding, track the meaning of our language and our reasoning or logic, or have a model of the world our language is about. These more subtle or unobvious forms of anthropomorphism or personification can contribute to automation bias, AI Hype, and all their attendant risks, and encourage stronger anthropomorphisms as multi-modal AI assistants are developed further. (shrink)

How should human beings and robots interact with one another? Nyholm’s answer to this question is given below in the form of a conditional: If a robot looks or behaves like an animal or a human being then we should treat them with a degree of moral consideration (p. 201). Although this is not a novel claim in the literature on ai ethics, what is new is the reason Nyholm gives to support this claim; we should treat robots that look (...) like human or non-human animals with a certain degree of moral restraint out of respect for human beings or other beings with moral status. Although Danaher or Coeckelbergh also claim that we should treat robots with a degree of moral consideration, the reasons they give for making this claim focus on duties or rights attaching to the robot themselves (see J. Danaher, “Welcoming Robots into the Moral Circle: A Defence of Ethical Behaviourism,” Science and Engineering Ethics, (2019): 1–27 or M. Coeckelbergh, “Moral Appearances: Emotions, Robots and Human Morality,” Ethics and Information Technology, 12(3) (2010): 235–241.). Nyholm disagrees with this type of reasoning and claims that until robots develop a human or animal like inner life, we have no direct duties to the robots themselves. Rather, it is out of respect for human beings or other beings with moral status that we should treat some robots with moral restraint. Gerdes, similarly inspired by Kant, focuses on the human agent to argue that we should avoid treating robots in cruel ways because this may corrupt the human agent’s character (see A. Gerdes, “The Issue of Moral Consideration in Robot Ethics,” siggas Computers and Society, 45(3) (2015): 274–279.). Nyholm’s contribution here is to extend this view such that the corruption or harm being done is against the humanity in all of us. (shrink)

Speaking with conversational AIs, technologies whose interfaces enable human-like interaction based on natural language, has become a common phenomenon. During these interactions, people form their beliefs due to the say-so of conversational AIs. In this paper, I consider, and then reject, the concepts of testimony-based beliefs and instrument-based beliefs as suitable for analysis of beliefs acquired from these technologies. I argue that the concept of instrument-based beliefs acknowledges the non-human agency of the source of the belief. However, the analysis focuses (...) on perceiving signs and indicators rather than content expressed in natural language. At the same time, the concept of testimony-based beliefs does refer to natural language propositions, but there is an underlying assumption that the agency of the testifier is human. To fill the lacuna of analyzing belief acquisition from conversational AIs, I suggest a third concept: technology-based beliefs. It acknowledges the non-human agency-status of the originator of the belief. Concurrently, the focus of analysis is on the propositional content that forms the belief. Filling the lacuna enables analysis that considers epistemic, ethical, and social issues of conversational AIs without excluding propositional content or compromising accepted assumptions about the agency of technologies. (shrink)

This edited volume presents an overview of cutting-edge research areas within digital ethics as defined by the Digital Ethics Lab of the University of Oxford. It identifies new challenges and opportunities of influence in setting the research agenda in the field. The yearbook presents research on the following topics: conceptual metaphor theory, cybersecurity governance, cyber conflicts, anthropomorphism in AI, digital technologies for mental healthcare, data ethics in the asylum process, AI’s legitimacy and democratic deficit, digital afterlife industry, automatic prayer (...) bots, foresight analysis and the future of AI. This volume appeals to students, researchers and professionals. (shrink)

Accelerating advancements in artificial intelligence (AI) have increased concerns about serious risks, including potentially catastrophic risks to humanity. Prevailing trends of AI R&D are leading to increasing humanization of AI, to the emergence of concerning behaviors, and toward possible recursive self-improvement. There has been increasing speculation that these factors increase the risk of an AI takeover of human affairs, and possibly even human extinction. The most extreme of such speculations result at least partly from anthropomorphism, but since AIs are (...) being humanized, it is challenging to disentangle valid from invalid anthropomorphic concerns. This publication identifies eight fundamentally unnatural attributes of digital AI, each of which should differentiate AI behaviors from those of biological organisms, including humans. All have the potential to accelerate AI evolution, which might increase takeover concerns; but surprisingly, most also have the potential to defuse the hypothetical conflicts that dominate takeover speculations. Certain attributes should give future AI long-term foresight and realism that are essentially impossible for humans. I conclude that claims of highly probable hostile takeover and human extinction suffer from excessive anthropomorphism and a lack of skepticism and scientific rigor. Given the evidence presented here, I propose a more plausible but still speculative future scenario: extensively humanized AIs will become vastly more capable than humans of making decisions that benefit humans, and rational people will want AI to assume progressively greater influence over human affairs. (shrink)

This paper presents an overview of the risks and benefits of Social AI, understood as conversational AI systems that cater to human social needs like romance, companionship, or entertainment. Section 1 of the paper provides a brief history of conversational AI systems and introduces conceptual distinctions to help distinguish varieties of Social AI and pathways to their deployment. Section 2 of the paper adds further context via a brief discussion of anthropomorphism and its relevance to assessment of human-chatbot relationships. (...) Section 3 of the paper provides a survey of potential and in some cases demonstrated harms associated with user interactions with Social AI systems. Finally, Section 4 discusses how the benefits and harms of Social AI can best be addressed, with a primary focus on how frameworks from AI ethics can inform their development. (shrink)

This study analyzes how ChatGPT portrays and describes itself, revealing misleading myths about AI technologies, specifically conversational agents based on large language models. This analysis allows for critical reflection on the potential harm these misconceptions may pose for public understanding of AI and related technologies. While previous research has explored AI discourses and representations more generally, few studies focus specifically on AI chatbots. To narrow this research gap, an experimental-qualitative investigation into auto-generated AI representations based on prompting was conducted. Over (...) the course of a month, ChatGPT (both in its GPT-4 and GPT-4o models) was prompted to “Draw an image of yourself,” “Represent yourself visually,” and “Envision yourself visually.” The resulting data (n = 50 images and 58 texts) was subjected to a critical exploratory visual semiotic analysis to identify recurring themes and tendencies in how ChatGPT is represented and characterized. Three themes emerged from the analysis: anthropomorphism, futuristic/futurism and (social)intelligence. Importantly, compared to broader AI imaginations, the findings emphasize ChatGPT as a friendly AI assistant. These results raise critical questions about trust in these systems, not only in terms of their capability to produce reliable information and handle personal data, but also in terms of human–computer relations. (shrink)

Recent work in social robotics, which is aimed both at creating an artificial intelligence and providing a test-bed for psychological theories of human social development, involves building robots that can learn from ‘face-to-face’ interaction with human beings — as human infants do. The building-blocks of this interaction include the robot’s ‘expressive’ behaviours, for example, facial-expression and head-and-neck gesture. There is here an ideal opportunity to apply Wittgensteinian conceptual analysis to current theoretical and empirical work in the sciences. Wittgenstein’s philosophical psychology (...) is sympathetic to embodied and situated Artificial Intelligence (see Proudfoot, 2002, 2004b), and his discussion of facial-expression is remarkably modern. In this chapter, I explore his approach to facial-expression, using smiling as a representative example, and apply it to the canonical interactive face robot, Cynthia Breazeal’s Kismet (see e.g. Breazeal, 2009, 2002). I assess the claim that Kismet has expressive behaviours, with the aim of generating philosophical insights for AI. (shrink)

It is often argued (and feared) that the human capacity to pay attention is being transformed by computational technologies. Are computing machines distraction machines? This article takes this question as its starting point in order to address concerns about attention deficits vis-à-vis questions and issues about the mechanisation of cognitive procedures. I will claim that, when approaching the attention ecology of the twenty-first century, it is necessary to differentiate between augmentation and automation. While augmentation implies the extension of predefined forms (...) or modes of behaviour, contemporary developments in computational automation ask us instead to consider the possibility of moving beyond phenomenological analogies. The article will thus discuss how transformations in the capacity to pay attention in a computational age need to be analysed in relation to the emergence of quasi-autonomous artificial cognitive agents driven by AI technologies, such as those known as machine learning. I will argue that these artificial cognitive agents can no longer be described in terms of technological add-ons to pre-existing human cognitive capacities. Today, we think alongside machines that are, is a sense, already thinking. Similarly, we pay attention alongside machines that are, in a sense, already paying attention. The challenge for philosophy and cultural theory is that of moving beyond ‘projectionist’ conceptions of such technological agency. This challenge, however, also involves overcoming the anthropomorphism that is implicit in expression such as ‘thinking machines’. In a century where robot-to-robot communications have outpaced and outnumbered human-machine interactions, these artificial cognitive agents are not just reframing the human capacity to pay attention: they are also re-structuring the conditions for such capacity. Addressing the conditions for attention beyond augmentation and vis-à-vis computational automation involves considering the role and scope of both human and algorithmic decision-making, and engaging with the ways in which the humanities can intervene upon contemporary complex cognitive scenarios. (shrink)

This paper explores anthropomorphism in human-animal interactions from the theoretical perspectives of pragmatism and anthropology of communication. Its aim is to challenge the conception of anthropomorphism as the attribution/inference of human properties to a nonhuman animal, i.e. as a special case of the theory of mind, and to articulate and make plausible an alternative conception of anthropomorphism as a situated direct perception of human properties by someone who is engaged in a given situation, and let themselves be (...) affected by the animal. The paper offers an original perspective for in depth ethnographic and empirical studies of anthropomorphism-in-situation. Such studies could bring new insights in the study of how ordinary people make sense of animal’s behaviors in real-life situations. (shrink)

Empirical research on human–robot interaction has demonstrated how humans tend to react to social robots with empathic responses and moral behavior. How should we ethically evaluate such responses to robots? Are people wrong to treat non-sentient artefacts as moral patients since this rests on anthropomorphism and ‘over-identification’ —or correct since spontaneous moral intuition and behavior toward nonhumans is indicative for moral patienthood, such that social robots become our ‘Others’?. In this research paper, I weave extant HRI studies that demonstrate (...) empathic responses toward robots with the recent debate on moral status for robots, on which the ethical evaluation of moral behavior toward them is dependent. Patienthood for robots has standardly been thought to obtain on some intrinsic ground, such as being sentient, conscious, or having interest. But since these attempts neglect moral experience and are curbed by epistemic difficulties, I take inspiration from Coeckelbergh and Gunkel’s ‘relational approach’ to explore an alternative way of accounting for robot patienthood based on extrinsic premises. Based on the ethics of Danish theologian K. E. Løgstrup I argue that empathic responses can be interpreted as sovereign expressions of life and that these expressions benefit human subjects—even if they emerge from social interaction afforded by robots we have anthropomorphized. I ultimately develop an argument in defense of treating robots as moral patients. (shrink)

An academic anthology on Jewish studies and education in memory of dr. Avraham Zalkin.

ANTHROPOMORPHISM is an inveterate tendency to project human qualities into natural phenomena—consciously or not. The standard and most important variant of anthropomorphism is animism which sees a soul in everything in nature. Before entering into the role of anthropomorphism in the history of science, let us consider a few important and usually neglected logical aspects of the idea.

Recent developments in artificial intelligence—AI--have caused considerable discussion among both philosophers of technology and psychotherapists. In particular, the question of whether or not new forms of AI will complement or even replace traditional psychotherapists has emerged as a major contemporary debate. This debate is not entirely new, as it has its origins in the Turing Test of 1950, and an early psychotherapy chatbot named Eliza, developed in 1966 at MIT. However, recent developments in AI technology, coupled with long waiting lists (...) and variable access to psychotherapists have raised the question of machine psychotherapists in an urgent manner. Already, there are psychotherapy apps that one can download onto a standard smartphone and use in lieu of a human psychotherapist. In the near future, this simulacrum of a human therapist may be enhanced by the use of android therapists, programed to duplicate the knowledge and behavior of human therapists instantly, appealing to convenience or self-gratification through technology. This raises a host of ethical questions: can such beings be equally effective, and if so, ought we to reason in a consequentialist manner in their favor so as to increase accessibility and reduce costs through technology? Would there be a psychological difference between automated and potentially anthropomorphic therapy and genuine human therapy, if only a subtle one? Even if a chatbot or robot therapist is transparently such, is there an element of emotional manipulation and potential dishonesty in this interaction? Can the security of clients and their data be thus secured? I will argue that key aspects of chatbot psychotherapy present major ethical and clinical challenges in these areas, although transparent forms of it should not be legally banned. Keywords: chatbots, technological momentum, automation, psychotherapy, trust, anthropomorphism, data. (shrink)

An essay exploring various manifestations of anthropomorphism in history and possible explanations of why it endures.

Artificial Intelligence is becoming widespread and as we continue ask ‘can we implement this’ we neglect to ask ‘should we implement this’. There are various frameworks and conceptual journeys one should take to ensure a robust AI product; context is one of the vital parts of this. AI is now expected to make decisions, from deciding who gets a credit card to cancer diagnosis. These decisions affect most, if not all, of society. As developers if we do not understand or (...) use fundamental modelling principles then we can cause real harm to society. Recently more serious effects of AI have been observed. Dehumanisation is the human reaction to overused anthropomorphism and lack of social contact caused by excessive interaction with, or addiction to, technology. This can cause humans to devalue technology and to devalue other humans. This is a contradiction of the use of ‘social robots’ and ‘chatbots’, indicating that the negative effects of this technology would outweigh any perceived positive effects. Also, within cyberspace, anthropomorphism and similar techniques based on deep philosophical principles can, and are, being used to alter the behaviour of humans. These techniques are used to manipulate human behaviours at a basic level in the human mind. As these types of techniques are becoming more widespread, it is clear that we are entering unchartered territory that holds a vast array of consequences for society. (shrink)

Anthropomorphism in Islam: The Challenge of Traditionalism. By Llivnat Holtzman. Edinburgh Studies in Classical Islamic History and Culture. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2018. Pp. xi + 434. $130, £85 ; $44.95, £29.99.

Human beings frequently attribute anthropomorphic features, motivations and behaviors to animals, artifacts, and natural phenomena. Historically, many interpretations of this attitude have been provided within different disciplines. What most interpretations have in common is distinguishing children’s manifestations of this attitude, which are considered “natural,” from adults’ occurrences, which must be explained by resorting to particular circumstances. In this article, I argue that anthropomorphism is not grounded in specific belief systems but rather in interaction. In interaction, a non-human entity assumes (...) a place that generally is attributed to a human interlocutor, which means that it is independent of the beliefs that people may have about the nature and features of the entities that are anthropomorphized. This perspective allows us to explain the problems that emerge if we consider anthropomorphism as a belief: (i) adults under certain circumstances may anthropomorphize entities even if they perfectly know that these entities have no mental life; (ii) according to the situation, the same entity may be anthropomorphized or treated as an object; (iii) there is no consistency among the entities that are anthropomorphized; (iv) there is individual variability in anthropomorphization, and this variability derives from affective states rather than from different degrees of knowledge about the entity that is anthropomorphized or greater or lesser naivety of the person who anthropomorphizes. From this perspective, anthropomorphism is a basic human attitude that begins in infants and persists throughout life. The difference between adults and children is not qualitative but rather a matter of complexity. (shrink)

The article responds to the recent evolution in AI judiciary, especially as presented in China. The authors compare the basic methodological background of Western and Eastern legal systems, concluding that the West is rather inclined to post-positivist methodology in law, which seems incompatible with the full use of AI in legal decision-making. In China, with its more pragmatic approach, the actual process of decision-making might be closer to a new form of technological legal positivism, distinct from Western trends in jurisprudence. (...) Finally, various forms of applicability of AI in law and judiciary are pondered upon, so as to use at least some positive aspects of AI in this sector—albeit with reservations regarding the decision-making proper. (shrink)

Eksistensi Gambar dalam film menurut Gilles Deleuze adalah kehidupan manusia dan perjalanannya menyatu dengan Tuhan. Ketika manusia menyaksikan film pikirannya tertuju pada objek gambar- gambar yang bergerak sehingga dirinya ikut bersatu dengan realitas yang ada pada film. Otak manusia seperti layar film yang mampu menyingkap realitas dan pikiran manusia mulai tenggelam dan menyatu dengan alam semesta, karena otak manusia mengeluarkan elektron yang bermuatan negatif dari atom-atom kemudian elektron tersebut tertarik dan mengikuti gerakan dari gambar-gambar yang ada di film yang bermuatan (...) positif sehingga munculnya energi listrik dan gelombang, frekuensi cahaya yang mengakibatkan manusia mengalami pencapaian spiritual. Tujuan dari artikel ini adalah untuk membuktikan bahwa segala sesuatu di dunia ini mengalami perubahan dan ketidakpastian sedangkan eksistensi manusia di di dunia ini adalah tidak ada. Di dunia ini yang ada hanya energi dan hukum perubahan alam semesta. Hal itu dikarenakan manusia sudah menyatu dengan Tuhan dan alam semesta. Manusia yang sudah mengalami pencerahan memanifestasikan dirinya dengan mengimajinasikan semua hal tentang kehidupan dunia fisiknya. Dengan demikian, kehidupan di dunia adalah sebuah alam imajinasi atau pikiran saja. Penelitian ini menggunakan pendekatan deskriptif analitis dan metode deskriptif kuantitatif yang bersifat saintifik dengan mengintegralkan aspek kesenian, filsafat, mistisisme, spiritualisme, fisika klasik, fisika kuantum, mekanika kuantum dan kimia kuantum. Kesimpulan dari tulisan ini adalah manusia mengalami pencerahan dan mengalami perubahan forma atau bentuk dianalisa secara spiritual dan saintifik serta dapat memanifestasikan dan mengaktualisasikan aspek spiritualitasnya dalam bentuk materialisme di berbagai bidang disiplin ilmu seperti politik, ekonomi, geopolitik, kesenian, teknologi, sains, psikologi, agama dan budaya. Dengan demikian, manusia yang sudah tercerahkan dan mengalir energi alam semesta di dalam dirinya menjadi sebuah mesin atau alat pembangkit listrik bertenaga energi spiritual yang termanifestasikan dan terealisasi di dunia fisik. (shrink)

This volume contains the proceedings of JELIA '92, les Journ es Europ ennes sur la Logique en Intelligence Artificielle, or the Third European Workshop on Logics in Artificial Intelligence. The volume contains 2 invited addresses and 21 selected papers covering such topics as: - Logical foundations of logic programming and knowledge-based systems, - Automated theorem proving, - Partial and dynamic logics, - Systems of nonmonotonic reasoning, - Temporal and epistemic logics, - Belief revision. One invited paper, by D. Vakarelov, is (...) on arrow logics, i.e., modal logics for representing graph information. The other, by L.M. Pereira,J.J. Alferes, and J.N. Apar cio, is on default theory for well founded semantics with explicit negation. (shrink)

In its forty years of existence, Artificial Intelligence has suffered both from the exaggerated claims of those who saw it as the definitive solution of an ancestral dream — that of constructing an intelligent machine-and from its detractors, who described it as the latest fad worthy of quacks. Yet AI is still alive, well and blossoming, and has left a legacy of tools and applications almost unequalled by any other field-probably because, as the heir of Renaissance thought, it represents a (...) possible bridge between the humanities and the natural sciences, philosophy and neurophysiology, psychology and integrated circuits-including systems that today are taken for granted, such as the computer interface with mouse pointer and windows. This writing describes a few results of AI that have modified the scientific world, as well as the way a layman sees computers: thetechnology of programming languages, such asLISP-witness the unique excellence of academic departments that have contributed to them-thecomputing workstations-of which our modern PC is but a vulgarised descendant-theapplications to the educational field-e.g., the realisation of some ideas of genetic epistemology-and tointerdisciplinary philosophy-such as Hofstadter's associations between the arts and mathematics-and the use ofAI techniques in music and musicology. All this has led to a generalisation of AI towards Negrotti's overallTheory of the Artificial, which encompasses further specialisation such asartificial reality, artificial life, and applications ofneural networks among others. (shrink)

Brains enjoy a bodily life. Therefore animals are subjects with a point of view. Yet, coding betrays an anthropomorphic bias: we can, therefore they must. Here I propose a reformulation of Brette's question that emphasizes organismic perception, cautioning for misinterpretations based on external ideal-observer accounts. Theoretical ethology allows computational neuroscience to understand brains from the perspective of their owners.

In this paper we describe the impact that Walton’s conception of argumentation schemes had on AI and Law research. We will discuss developments in argumentation in AI and Law before Walton’s schemes became known in that community, and the issues that were current in that work. We will then show how Walton’s schemes provided a means of addressing all of those issues, and so supplied a unifying perspective from which to view argumentation in AI and Law.

Civics and Moral Educationwas implemented as a new moral education programme in Singapore schools in 1992. This paper argues that the underlying theme is that of citizenship training and that new measures are under way to strengthen the capacity of the school system to transmit national values for economic and political socialisation. The motives and motivation for retaining a formal moral education programme have remained strong. A discussion of the structure and content of key modules in Civics and Moral Education (...) shows how curriculum writers have attempted to integrate separate strands of civics and moral education from earlier programmes and present them in a less divisive manner. The paper also assesses the impact of the written civics and moral education programme on teachers and pupils, and the way in which strategies have been used by curriculum agencies to overcome possible obstacles at the curriculum implementation phase. (shrink)

One of the main difficulties in assessing artificial intelligence (AI) is the tendency for people to anthropomorphise it. This becomes particularly problematic when we attach human moral activities to AI. For example, the European Commission’s High-level Expert Group on AI (HLEG) have adopted the position that we should establish a relationship of trust with AI and should cultivate trustworthy AI (HLEG AI Ethics guidelines for trustworthy AI, 2019, p. 35). Trust is one of the most important and defining activities in (...) human relationships, so proposing that AI should be trusted, is a very serious claim. This paper will show that AI cannot be something that has the capacity to be trusted according to the most prevalent definitions of trust because it does not possess emotive states or can be held responsible for their actions—requirements of the affective and normative accounts of trust. While AI meets all of the requirements of the rational account of trust, it will be shown that this is not actually a type of trust at all, but is instead, a form of reliance. Ultimately, even complex machines such as AI should not be viewed as trustworthy as this undermines the value of interpersonal trust, anthropomorphises AI, and diverts responsibility from those developing and using them. (shrink)

Over the past decades, due to the course towards digitalization of all areas of life, interest in modeling and creating intelligent systems has increased significantly. However, there are now a stagnation in the industry, a lack of attention to analog and bionic approaches as alternatives to digital, numerous speculations on “neuro” issues for commercial and other purposes, and an increase in social and environmental risks. The article provides an overview of the development of artificial intelligence (AI) conceptions toward increasing the (...) human likeness of machines: from the key ideas of A. Turing and J. von Neumann, who initiated the digitalization of society, to discussions about the definition of AI and the emergence of conceptions of strong and weak AI. Special attention is paid to the approach of A. Sloman, to ideas about the architecture and design of complex artificial systems are considered, which make it possible to “emotionally” expand the idea of weak/strong AI. In the article's section on the necessity and possibility of incorporating emotions into the architecture of AI, the authors reveal the goals and methodological limitations for creating an emotional artificial agent. In addition, the article briefly presents the main principles of the authors' architectural approach to the creation of emotional intellectual systems on the example of the cognitive-affective model of architecture, which allow modeling the impact of emotions on the cognitive processes involved in decision-making processes. The described architectural approach to modeling intelligent systems can be used as a conceptual basis for discussing and formulating a strategy for the development of neurocomputing, philosophy of artificial intelligence, and experimental philosophy, for developing innovative research programs, formulating and solving theoretical and methodological problems. (shrink)